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PREFACE 
his volume forms part of a wider project on the European 
Union’s Association Agreements (AAs) and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. These agreements serve as the cornerstone of 
the EU’s ambitious strategy to help anchor these three states into what 
they themselves call their “European choice”. They are comprehensive 
in scope and content, with an equal weight attached to both political 
and economic aspects. This broad landscape of issues has been 
analysed systematically in three Handbooks, now appearing in their 
second editions.1  
The present volume picks up on the key political aspects in 
greater depth, and does so with a comparative approach taking all three 
cases together. The task has been to go through the critical determinants 
of, and obstacles hindering ‘good governance’, including constitutional 
aspects and hazards for the process such as the oligarchs, pervasive 
corruption and the unique geo-political situation in which the three 
states find themselves in between the EU and Russia.   
As with the three ‘Handbooks’, this present volume was 
produced by research teams from four independent think tanks, CEPS 
in Brussels, Reformatics in Tbilisi, Expert-Grup in Chisinau and the 
Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting in Kyiv.  
While much of the content of the Handbook is undoubtedly 
rather dry, we hope that the reader will appreciate the lighter touch in 
the artwork of Constantin Sunnerberg, which graces the introductory 
page of each chapter. 
                                                        
1 Emerson, M. and V. Movchan (eds), Deepening EU-Ukrainian Relations - What, 
why and how?, Brussels and London: CEPS and RLI, 2nd edition, 2018. 
Emerson, M. and T. Kovziridze (eds), Deepening EU-Georgian Relations - What, 
why and how?, Brussels and London: CEPS and RLI, 2nd  edition, 2018. 
Emerson, M. and D. Cenusa (eds), Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations - What, why 
and how?, Brussels and London: CEPS and RLI, 2nd edition, 2018. 
T
x  PREFACE 
x  
Thanks are also due to the CEPS editorial team – Anne 
Harrington, Jackie West, Els Van den Broeck, Margarita Minkova and 
Hugh Barton-Smith – for their painstaking work. 
Finally, the authors are most grateful to the Swedish 
International Development Agency (Sida) for their support and 
funding for the project and in particular to Mirja Peterson and Maria 
Liungman from the beginning, and to Sanna Leino more recently.  
All conclusions drawn are of course attributable only to the 
authors. 
 Michael Emerson, Denis Cenușă, Tamara Kovziridze 
& Veronika Movchan 
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THE ESSENCE OF THE STRUGGLE 
MICHAEL EMERSON 
This book is about the 
political struggle underway in 
three countries in Europe’s 
eastern neighbourhood – 
Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine – that have made 
what they call their 
“European choice”. The 
struggle is about their 
political and economic 
transformation, from being 
post-Soviet states into being 
part of “normal Europe”. The 
struggle is most fundamental 
in political terms, to become 
European-style democracies. 
Facing this challenge is all the 
more ambitious at a time 
when much of the rest of the 
world sees or talks about what 
has been called a “democratic recession”, even if its reality is itself 
contested.1 
All three countries would like to have the incentive of getting 
onto the ladder leading to full membership of the European Union 
(EU). The officially designated ‘membership perspective’ language 
and status is not agreed by the member states of the EU, but neither 
is it excluded at some future date. The EU’s constituent treaty says 
that any European democracy is entitled to apply for membership. 
                                                        
1 See S. Levitsky and L. Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 2015. 
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But for the time being, the EU is unwilling to create premature 
expectations when the states in question are a substantial way off 
meeting the political and economic conditions for full membership, 
and the EU itself is in a state of considerable turmoil. The EU is 
struggling with uncertainty over how to reinforce its own protection 
against significant levels of immigration from its Arab and African 
neighbours, how to strengthen the governance of the eurozone, how 
to respond to the rise of illiberal democracies in parts of Central 
Europe and how to manage Brexit. There is also a long queue of 
Balkan states whose pre-accession processes are moving very 
slowly.    
Despite this ambiguity from the EU side, the struggle to 
achieve good governance in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is being 
fought out on the political stage day by day, year by year. For a vivid 
perspective, the comparison may be made with Russia and other 
states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where there is 
hardly any real struggle at all, with the possible exception of 
Armenia. Authoritarianism prevails, and opposition movements 
are either suppressed or allowed a weak existence that amounts to 
a parody of democracy.  
Four core chapters in this book address the political state of 
these three struggling semi-democracies, with detailed accounts of 
fundamental factors impeding or buttressing democratic practice, 
notably the judiciary, the oligarchs and anti-corruption policies. 
“Democracy and its Deficits’ is the short title of the first 
chapter by Ghia Nodia et al. Both words are crucial. For sure, the 
political systems of the three states are relatively democratic, 
compared to those in the EAEU; but their systems also have serious 
shortcomings in relation to any broad normative definition of 
‘European-style’ democracy. The formal constitutional 
arrangements in all three countries have allowed for competitive 
political processes. The basic institutions of political democracy are 
established, and elections are openly, and indeed fiercely, 
competitive.  
However, not all government changes have been achieved by 
ordinary elections. The distinction is made between government 
changes by the ballot box, versus at the barricades. The ‘colour 
revolutions’ of Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 and 2014 saw 
the people at the barricades, protesting in anger at the failure of 
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regular politics to deliver what the electorate reasonably expected 
by way of clean or at least cleaner governance.  
The distinction is also made between two competing elites 
that still exist in all three countries: between the former Communist 
nomenklatura and new elites promoting mixes of pro-democracy and 
nationalist agendas. Crucially, all three countries were unable to 
begin their post-Communist periods with comprehensive 
democratic and free market reforms. The nomenklatura learned to 
speak ‘democracy’, but have proved structurally resistant to 
thorough reform processes. The political systems have had to face 
the “painful choices between efficiency and pluralism that are 
typical of countries with weak democratic traditions”. Nodia notes 
that Georgia has been the only one of the three where the executive 
(under President Saakashvili in 2003-13) accumulated a 
concentration of power that departed from the democratic, yet at 
the same time delivered the most successful public policy reforms 
(and notably so in curbing corruption, to which we return further 
below).  
An indispensable pillar of sound democratic systems is 
independence of the judiciary, to assure both the rule of law in its 
operational detail and well as a key component of the requisite 
checks and balances between the three branches of government – 
legislature, executive and judiciary. There are reform efforts, but 
also ongoing problems in all three countries, as discussed in the 
chapter by Steven Blockmans, ‘Integrity on Trial: Judicial reform in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova’. 
Reform in Georgia’s justice sector has been implemented in 
several phases for over a decade. The objectives have become more 
and more sophisticated. Technically, Georgia has done more than 
any other country in the region. Yet local and international 
watchdogs have pointed to instances of selective justice and 
attempts whereby making legal/institutional progress has been 
overshadowed by a lack of political will (or too much will, but in 
the wrong direction). With many good practices in place, the 
ultimate test is the guarantee for the judiciary against undue 
political interference, over which the workings of the power 
structure in Georgia pose issues of concern.  
Moldova’s direction of travel has been in reverse in recent 
years and its Justice Sector Reform Strategy for the period 2011 to 
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2016 has fallen flat: changes were made mostly at the procedural 
and technical levels, but they have not been matched by 
improvements in the independence and integrity of judges. 
Moldova is facing unprecedented attacks on judicial independence 
and an increasing phenomenon of selective justice.  
In Ukraine, in spite of the Euromaidan revolution of 2013, 
there is still a post-Soviet legacy of weak rule of law and high levels 
of fraud. The judiciary, in particular, has traditionally been 
perceived as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. In 
June 2016, the authorities kick-started a process of multi-annual 
reform of the justice sector, with amendments to the Constitution 
and the adoption of new legislation. Despite these attempts at 
reform, law enforcement remains biased, with groups of top 
officials and wealthy businessmen seemingly enjoying low levels of 
accountability and high levels of illicit privileges. The changes to the 
justice sector are planned to be introduced gradually over the course 
of the next few years, so until 2020 the jury is still out.  
One of the major impediments to sound democratic 
governance in all three countries has been the role of oligarchs, or 
of very rich individuals able to heavily influence if not capture the 
political process. Wojciech Kononczuk et al. view the oligarch 
phenomenon as a key obstacle to reform. This chapter documents in 
some detail the economic holdings of the several oligarchs in 
Ukraine, the single oligarch-leader of Moldova, Vlad Plahotniuc, 
and the single very rich individual in Georgia, Bidzina Ivanshvili, 
who controls the ruling party. Neither Plathotniuc nor Ivanshvili 
currently holds elected office. The President of Ukraine is a rich 
individual, but not to the point of being classified as a five-star 
oligarch. Mr Ivanishvili was briefly prime minister of Georgia, but 
has subsequently preferred to operate without the constraints of 
public office.  
The disadvantages of oligarchy are several: limiting political 
pluralism, monopolising the economy, blocking reforms, capturing 
state institutions, sustaining corruption, and so on. Lest these 
disadvantages sound rather general, one can cite two recent 
instances where the oligarchs have been instrumental in bringing 
the economy close to the point of financial bankruptcy. In Moldova, 
the political leadership has failed to bring to justice those 
responsible for a huge banking fraud in 2016. In Ukraine, the 
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leading private sector bank owned by a pre-eminent oligarch also 
saw a huge banking fraud in 2017. In both cases, the public budget 
had to contribute macroeconomically significant sums to 
rescue/privatisation operations.  
How can these countries respond to the ominous challenges 
posed by oligarchy? There is no single magic bullet, but rather a set 
of conditions that reach into all the fundamental requisites for good 
governance: a maturing of democratic systems, rules for the funding 
of political parties, effective anti-corruption policies, serious 
competition policies and independence of the judiciary and media. 
Also relevant is the reform agenda of the Association Agreements 
with the EU, with their many measures in the broad field of 
economic regulation (need for independent regulators for energy 
and major service sectors, etc.).  
Pervasive across the governance of almost all the post-
Communist states of Europe is the problem of corruption, both 
‘petty corruption’ involving for example technical inspection 
services, through to ‘grand corruption’ at the level of the political 
leadership and oligarchs. Anti-corruption policy has in recent years 
become a well-structured subject, thanks to the work of several 
international organisations and NGOs. This provides a robust basis 
for comparisons. Among the three countries, Georgia stands out for 
having quite dramatically transformed itself into a de-corrupted 
state, whereas neither Moldova nor Ukraine have been able to do so 
yet. Why? The chapter by Michael Emerson et al. documents anti-
corruption agendas, first at the strategic level of political leadership 
and the role of the judiciary (as highlighted above); second at the 
level of detailed legislation on such matters as the criminalisation of 
corruption, sanctions and immunities, asset declarations and the 
protection of whistle-blowers, etc.  
Broadly speaking, all three countries have advanced a lot in 
parallel on the legislative agenda. Where they differ however, is on 
the decisive question of the political will to apply the legislative 
agenda with sincerity and determination. As mentioned above, 
Georgia distinguished itself with a dramatic programme combining 
economic regulatory liberalisation and de-corruption during the 
Saakashvili presidency. Unfortunately for the purpose of our 
narrative, this was achieved with ruthless effect, unhindered by 
democratic niceties. On the other hand, it is remarkable that this 
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episode seem to have left its mark, with no significant relapse into 
corrupt practice under succeeding administrations. Georgian 
society seems to have locked itself into a de-corrupted culture. At 
the same time, Moldova and Ukraine, while making considerable 
progress on the legislative agenda, have not had political 
leaderships willing and able to offer consistent, strong support for 
implementation.   
An intriguing question raised in the chapter by Serena 
Romano is whether these problems of corruption might be eased if 
more women held high positions in these countries. Some scholars 
have argued that women are more trustworthy and public-spirited 
than men, and thus more likely to reject opportunities for 
corruption. By contrast men are seen as more individualistic. Some 
evidence for this view is found in a correlation between high 
numbers of women in parliaments and lower levels of corruption. 
A more refined thesis, supported by some research, is that when the 
level of female representation is increased from a very low level, the 
incidence of corruption declines, but where the level gets closer to 
parity this gain is reversed. Moldova, as a country with both a high 
level of representation in official positions and high corruption is 
cited as illustrating this point. The author acknowledges that these 
conclusions are contested by other scholars, and that further 
research is needed. What seems to be more generally accepted, is 
that where women are far away from gender balance in an assembly 
their influence will be marginal, whereas a figure of around 40% or 
more passes the threshold for effective representation of gender-
related issues.  
While Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine marked their 
‘European choice’ by signing their Association Agreements with the 
EU, some of their neighbours – notably Belarus and Armenia – 
made the contrary choice of joining the Russian-led Eurasian 
Economic Union. This raises the question how far these 
developments mean a definitive division of the East European space 
into two clubs of radically different political and societal cultures. 
This issue is explored by Andrey Makarychev, and the wording in 
the title of his chapter “Incomplete Hegemonies, Hybrid 
Neighbours…” is already pointing towards a more nuanced view. 
Split identities in these states, looking both east and west, remain 
and even deepen.  
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The respective neighbourhood strategies of the EU and Russia 
are set out in some detail. ‘Europeanisation’ is the keyword in the 
EU’s strategy, stressing values and rules, while renouncing the use 
of coercive instruments. But one of the hard lessons for the EU has 
been the observation that while leaders in some states with 
Association Agreements have tended to become adept in the use of 
the discourse of European democracy, they have not made 
significant reductions in the corruption of their regimes. Russia’s 
toolkit for its ‘near abroad’ is based on both ideas and military force. 
The ideas are those of Eurasian integration and the ‘Russian world’, 
which embraces ethnic, religious and linguistic aspects that are 
missing in the European approach. Russia’s willingness to use 
military force has been amply illustrated in Georgia and Ukraine; 
the author sees this “overtly militarised imperial Realpolitik” to have 
brought few dividends, and indeed negative alienation as a result. 
This is the background to the author’s exploration of several 
scenarios that could lead to a still hypothetical pan-European space, 
in which the actual tensions between the two regional hegemons – 
the EU and Russia – might be eased. These deserve open-minded 
consideration and debate, since the status quo is so unsatisfactory, 
although there is no easy option. 
Contrasting with these ideas of ‘hybrid’ status and identity, 
the chapter by Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva looks 
comparatively at the quality of governance of all states of the 
European neighbourhood that seek full membership of the EU, i.e. 
the remaining Balkan non-member states and the three East 
European states with Association Agreements with the EU. The EU 
itself discriminates between the two groups, with the Balkan states 
granted ‘membership perspectives’, whereas this is denied to 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The chapter therefore reviews the 
performance of both groups of countries in terms of their political 
and economic governance. Multiple sources, both official and non-
governmental, converge on a basic message, namely that the two 
groups are comparable. Both groups see a considerable range in 
performance, between front-runners and laggards, but this enriches 
rather than undermines the message. The front-runners in both 
groups (Serbia, Montenegro and Georgia) are comparable, although 
Georgia scores a little better than the Balkan front-runners. As for 
the laggards, Moldova and Ukraine are closer to, if somewhat ahead 
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of Albania and Bosnia. These findings show that the EU’s 
discrimination between the membership perspectives of the two 
groups is without objective foundation. Yet the prospect of the EU’s 
further enlargement is itself remote. Overall, the conclusion is that 
the EU’s set of enlargement and neighbourhood policies needs a re-
think, for which three options are offered.  
Finally, a chapter by Kataryna Wolczuk reviews the three 
Handbooks on the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine.2 This offers an overview of the key features of the three 
Association Agreements, which contain an unprecedented export of 
the EU’s regulatory legislation to non-member states, in addition to 
radical market-opening provisions. The assumption is that EU 
regulatory standards equate with what is modern, efficient and of 
widespread validity in the territories of the neighbouring states. 
While this may sound hyperbolic to those accustomed to the EU’s 
own fierce internal debates, the very fact that the pursuit of good 
governance in the three countries is such a struggle draws attention 
to a specific point of real importance. The domestic politics of the 
three countries risk continued instability, especially in Moldova and 
Ukraine, given the structural problems discussed above (imperfect 
democracies, oligarchs, corruption, etc.). In this situation, the 
adoption of extensive approximation on tested EU legislation 
translates into a stable structure for the processes of reform, and sets 
these processes in part at least on automatic pilot for a number of 
years ahead. Without this, the prospects for political and economic 
reform would be much weaker, as is visible in the countries of the 
Eurasian Economic Union.   
 
 
                                                        
2 See references in Chapter 8. 
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1. TOWARDS BECOMING 
EUROPEAN-STYLE DEMOCRACIES 
GHIA NODIA WITH DENIS CENUȘĂ 
& MIKHAIL MINAKOV 
Introduction 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are 
three participating states of the 
European Partnership that have 
chosen to conclude Association 
Agreements with the European 
Union, often at the expense of 
relations with their most powerful 
neighbour, Russia. They are also 
rather similar in their levels of 
democratic development. Within a 
post-Soviet space, they stand out for 
their relatively high level of 
democratic freedoms and political 
pluralism; none of them, however, 
can be considered a consolidated 
democracy, and most analysts describe them as uncertain or hybrid 
political regimes that combine features of autocracy and democracy.  
This chapter offers a comparative analysis of the three 
countries’ political systems and aims to interpret both the roots of 
their relative success, and the nature of the deficits that prevent 
them from consolidating their democratic institutions. Among these 
deficits are problems stemming from ethnic, regional and cultural 
conflicts; strong and weak features in their general constitutional 
systems; the links between democratic development and 
government capacity to produce public goods; state capture 
(including control over the most influential media organisations) by 
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powerful oligarchs and endemic corruption; underdevelopment of 
political parties and party systems; insufficient trust towards 
institutions of electoral democracy and a resulting propensity to use 
extra-constitutional means of political struggle. Civil society 
organisations have also failed penetrate the wider public and the 
anti-liberal discourse of traditionally dominant churches and anti-
Western media and civil society groups is often supported by 
Russia.  
Despite these structural challenges, the commitment to 
European values and norms demonstrated by societies in these 
three countries gives hope that they can eventually consolidate their 
democratic institutions. It is argued that closer ties to the EU are 
important in explaining their relatively high level of democratic 
development. For this reason, the consistent and enhanced 
commitment of the European Union to this region is crucial to their 
continued success in this area. 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine do not constitute a single 
geographical region, but since 2014 they have acquired a certain 
commonality of fate. In that year, all three countries signed 
Association Agreements (AA) with the European Union that came 
into effect in July 2016 for Georgia and Moldova and in September 
2017 for Ukraine. This choice proved far more difficult, if not 
momentous, than what most Europeans and many citizens of these 
countries had initially imagined. Ukraine paid the heaviest price for 
the choice it made: it endured a violent government overthrow, 
effective loss of territory, and continuing Russia-inflicted warfare in 
the Donbas region. For Moldova and Georgia, however, the choice 
of this still modest form of European integration spells bigger 
problems for its relations with Russia and active resistance to its 
Europeanising policies from within. The choice for Europe makes 
these three countries stand out from their partners in the European 
Eastern Partnership of the EU, as well as from the post-Soviet realm 
in general. It is also notable that the choice was made when the tide 
of Euroscepticism within the EU, and Russia’s openly aggressive 
attempts to undermine it from without, exposed Europe’s 
vulnerability. It is therefore perhaps justified to denote Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine as an ‘AA region’ in Europe’s East: we use 
this term in the rest of the paper.  
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As seen by societies within the AA region, the AA should not 
be the final destination for relations with the EU. These countries 
insist on their European vocation and believe that it should 
ultimately be recognised by offering them a path to membership. 
There is no consensus on this issue within the EU, although the 
voices in favour of a European calling for Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine increase in volume.1  
However, it is also understood that both association with the 
EU and the hope of eventual membership is closely linked to 
acquiring European values, norms, institutions and practices. The 
values of liberal democracy are of paramount importance. How do 
the three AA countries score on this account? It depends on which 
standard we choose. If we compare them to other post-Soviet 
countries (excluding the Baltic states), they are by far the most 
democratic ones. But this does not make them consolidated 
democracies, and they are still far from meeting the demands that 
the EU would expect of its future members. Their political 
institutions are weak, unstable, susceptible to being captured by 
oligarchs2 or autocratic leaders, and have low trust among their 
populations. Yet they also have lively political competition, 
periodically go through changes of power (sometimes by 
constitutional, sometimes by revolutionary means), have relatively 
vibrant independent media and civil society, and people who 
largely support democratic values. Nevertheless, the political 
systems are at risk from within and are open to external influences. 
But two assumptions can be made with confidence: they have 
genuine chances of success, and successful cooperation with the 
European Union may be the key factor in this success.  
                                                        
1 European Parliament, Recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, 
the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the 
November 2017 Summit (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do? 
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0440+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN& 
language=EN). 
2, Wojciech Konończuk, Denis Cenusa and Kornely Kakachia, “Oligarchs in 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as key obstacles to reforms”, June 2017 
(http://3dcftas.eu/publications/other/oligarchs-ukraine-moldova-and-
georgia-key-obstacles-reforms). 
12  TOWARDS BECOMING EUROPEAN-STYLE DEMOCRACIES 
 
This paper summarises the trajectories of three countries in 
their development of European-style democratic institutions, and 
outlines the challenges ahead. It does not aspire to offer a 
comprehensive account of achievements and problems, but focuses 
on several key dimensions that have mattered most in their political 
development so far and exposes the most painful aspects of that 
process of development. Some important areas, such as the rule of 
law and justice systems, are not discussed here.3 It aims to paint a 
broad picture and serve as a starting point for discussion.  
Where do the three countries stand? 
Despite huge differences between the domestic political scenes and 
development trajectories of the three AA countries, they also have 
features in common. This is confirmed by most widely used 
comparative international assessments of the levels of democracy in 
different countries. In its “Freedom in the World” reports, Freedom 
House typically ascribes to these countries scores between 3 and 4 
(with 1 standing for the most “free” or democratic country, and 7 
for the most “unfree” or autocratic.) This means that they are 
considered as only “partly free”, but that they are also rather close 
to being “free” – a score of 2.5 would allow for that.4 In fact, their 
scores improved marginally over the last three years – the period 
when association with Europe was high on their political agendas 
(this is not to suggest that such relative progress will be sustainable 
in years to come).  
Table 1.1 Freedom in the World scores, 1996-2016  
 Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
1996-2016 mean 3.52 3.26 3.26 
2014-2016 mean 3 3 3 
 
                                                        
3 CEPS is producing a comparative study on this subject. 
4 The only exception is Ukraine between 2004-09, when it was given a score of 
2.5 (or a “free” country) for five consecutive years – but this did not prove 
sustainable.  
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The Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
which uses a somewhat different methodology and terminology, 
attributes the same countries slightly above or below 6 points5 – this 
happens to be a dividing line between “hybrid regimes” and 
“flawed democracies”. However, it assessed the differences 
between countries to be somewhat larger: since 2007 when 
Democracy Index started to collect its data, it has assessed Moldova 
as a “flawed democracy” (even more flawed than most others); 
Georgia – as a “hybrid regime” (although in the last four years it is 
thought to be one of the most democratic of the “hybrid regimes”); 
while Ukraine has descended from the “flawed democracy” 
category (2007-10) to that of “hybrid regime” (2011-16). 
Similar numerical scores do not necessarily imply similarities 
in the typology of problems or achievements between the three 
countries, as the following analysis attempts to demonstrate. We 
start by reviewing the general development path of these unstable 
democracies and typical problems that stem from their starting 
conditions and environments.  
How democracy evolved: Parallel trajectories  
In all three countries, democracy emerged as an alternative to the 
discredited Soviet Communist rule. The early post-Soviet period 
was notable for its enthusiasm for democracy as a declared aim of 
reforms. However, the success of the democratic project was 
hampered by many structural or societal deficits: a habit of 
overdependence on the state; weak capacity of citizens’ voluntary 
association in the public space (something that we know as civil 
society); a lack of understanding of how democratic institutions 
actually work (which contrasts with the high legitimacy of the 
general normative idea of democracy); and deep cleavages among 
multi-ethnic populations towards the projects of new nation states. 
These problems were exacerbated by the economic breakdown 
caused by the implosion of the Soviet-style ‘command economy’ 
and the disruption of economic ties with the rest of the former Soviet 
Union. These problems have hindered the democratic transition and 
challenged the development of democracy over the last 25 years.  
                                                        
5 In this case, higher ratings mean more democratic and lower ratings less 
democratic. 
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On the political level, there were two main competing elites. 
An alternative political elite emerged out of parties and movements 
that challenged the existing regime on a combination of pro-
democracy and strong nationalist agendas. They confronted the 
existing Communist nomenklatura that was keen to preserve its 
power and accompanying privileges. Both these elites had 
fundamental shortcomings. The post-Communist elites shed their 
erstwhile ideological commitments and professed allegiance to new 
slogans of democracy and nation state, but were structurally 
predisposed to resisting necessary democratic and free-market 
reforms. They were also well-placed to translate their pre-existing 
administrative power into control over the most important 
economic resources, thus laying the ground for the plutocratic (or 
oligarchic) character of the new regimes. The weaknesses of the 
newly emerging elites lay in their lack of political experience, 
insufficient organisation and over-emphasis of the nationalist 
agenda, which could have alienated ethnic minorities. The 
electorate saw the nomenklatura as a force for stability and 
moderation, while the new elites saw it as standing for change and 
reform. The turbulence of the early post-Communist years inclined 
them to give preference to the values of stability.  
The outcomes of the struggle between these elites were 
different in different countries. In Georgia, the alternative elite was 
initially the most successful by ousting the Communist party from 
power in the October-November 1990 elections. That looked like a 
clean break with the past, and no successor organisation to the 
Communist party was ever created in Georgia. However, the 
nationalist Round Table coalition led by the charismatic Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia proved divisive and incompetent and in January 
1992, it was ousted following a popular insurgence or coup. The 
incoming government led by Eduard Shevardnadze, a reformed 
Communist, included a mixture of former nomenklatura, democratic 
reformers and armed strongmen. Developments in Moldova and 
Ukraine were not so dramatic, but the new elites were never 
successful in defeating and delegitimising former nomenklatura, 
although they were partly successful in imposing elements of their 
agenda on it. The outcome was that, unlike more successful 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, the three countries did 
not start their transitions with a period of more or less 
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comprehensive democratic and free market reforms led by new 
non-Communist elites.  
Ethno-territorial divisions were another birthmark of the 
three nascent democracies that continue to dog them to this day. 
They stemmed both from the ‘objective’ reasons (some ethnic 
minorities were not prepared to embrace new nation states); 
mistakes made by nationalist elites; and Moscow’s willingness to 
manipulate the internal difficulties of the emergent states. Again, 
Georgian developments were the most momentous, with two 
protracted wars for secession in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,6 
which ended in defeat for the central government and the creation 
of two unrecognised states. Moldova faced a similar problem and a 
similar outcome in Transnistria in 1992, although the scale of 
violence was far lower. In both countries, the Russian military was 
an important actor that played a prominent role in defining the 
outcomes of the conflicts. Ukraine was the most successful in 
preventing ethno-territorial problems, but as it turned out it only 
postponed the problem until Russia decided to use the existing 
cleavages for its hybrid war in 2014 in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.  
For these reasons, the first half of the 1990s was a period of 
uncertainty, economic crisis, and – in the case of Georgia – total 
breakdown of statehood. The situation only stabilised in the mid-
1990s by creating mixed regimes. The above-mentioned Freedom 
House ratings confirm that this mixed character of political systems 
has remained largely unchanged since then. It was also at this time 
that all three countries adopted new constitutions. Each constitution 
reflected the political balance and attitudes of the day, and were 
subject to periodic overhauls as the power balances changed.  
While stability was welcome after a period of turbulence, in 
practice it was largely bought at the expense of high levels of 
corruption, state capture by oligarchic groups, government 
inefficiency in terms of its capacity to provide public goods and 
slow economic development. All countries faced a contradiction 
between formally declared principles of constitutional democracy, 
transparency and meritocracy, which were also more or less 
reflected in the constitutions and legislation (that could be drafted 
                                                        
6 The war in South Ossetia continued from January 1991 to June 1992, while that 
in Abkhazia lasted from August 1992 to September 1993.  
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in cooperation with consultants from established Western 
democracies), and the reality of neo-patrimonial, informal, clan-
based governance. This undermined the legitimacy of the 
entrenched elites (often rooted in the former nomenklatura but 
‘enriched’ by new economic and political entrepreneurs), so the 
demands for dramatic change ripened. This expressed itself in the 
‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively. In Moldova, the resistance to the rule of the 
Communists led by a chaotic coalition of pro-European political 
forces did not take these dramatic forms, but in 2009 they also 
succeeded in coming to power after the April youth riots and 
subsequent political turmoil in the same year.  
These power changes, however, have led to different 
outcomes in different countries. In Georgia, reforms carried out by 
President Mikheil Saakashvili and his United National Movement 
(UNM) were largely successful in uprooting corruption, visibly 
improving the quality of public services and improving the 
investment climate. However, the fact that these reforms were 
carried out in a top-down fashion, at the expense of concentrating 
power in the presidency, and were accompanied by some human 
rights abuses, eventually triggered strong protests based on a heady 
mix of democratic and nativist discourse. In Ukraine, the ‘Orange’ 
government was more pluralistic but did not bring about any 
serious achievements, either in political or economic development, 
which led to very deep public disappointment. In Moldova, the 
coalition of centre- to right-leaning parties was successful in 
overthrowing the Communists from power, but became mired in 
corruption and poor governance scandals and hence lost credibility.  
Another new trend in the 2000s could be termed the 
‘geopolitisation’ of the political discourse on democracy.7 On the 
one hand, a more muscular Russia emerged under Putin, clearly 
alarmed by the colour revolutions, interpreting them as Western 
conspiracies to squeeze Russia out from its position of influence in 
its ‘near abroad’. On the other hand, the inclusion of the regional 
countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003 for Moldova 
and Ukraine, 2004 for Georgia), and, especially the Eastern 
                                                        
7 See Ghia Nodia, “The Revenge of Geopolitics”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 25, 
No. 4, October 2014, pp. 139-150. 
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Partnership (EaP) initiative turned the EU into a more influential 
actor in the region, and came to be considered as the key partner 
and ally of pro-reform political groups within these countries. 
Hence, the division between pro-democratic reforms and pro- 
status quo agendas began to be perceived as a clash between pro-
Europe and pro-Russia forces.  
This perception was shared by the Russian government, and 
by the different societal actors within the future AA region. The 
strongest expression of this was the 2013-14 Euromaidan revolution 
in Ukraine, triggered by the outrage at President Yanukovych’s last-
minute refusal to initial the Association Agreement with the EU. 
Ukraine was both pressured and seduced by Putin, but the agenda 
of Euromaidan developed into a general protest against the regime 
and corrupt oligarchic rule. The EU thus became a symbol of clean, 
effective and participatory democracy for which the Ukrainian 
people yearned. This was less the case in Moldova, where the EU 
was accused of supporting corrupt elites following revelations of 
bank fraud in November 2014, which had an adverse effect on 
public attitudes to the EU. 
While there is a genuine popular demand in all three 
countries for such democracy, there is also a deep frustration with 
political elites, including those who claim to be harbingers of reform 
and fighters of corruption. In all three countries, political parties are 
among the least trusted institutions. While there have been several 
changes of power – through revolutionary or constitutional means 
(giving widespread hope of a genuine democratic breakthrough as 
well as good governance), they usually ended in frustration on the 
part of the citizenry. On the other hand, these countries maintained 
relatively dynamic and competitive political landscapes, an open 
space for political debate and healthy levels of social activism.  
Ethnic, regional and cultural conflicts and divisions 
Agreement about borders, as well as a shared sense of belonging 
among citizens of a given state, may be the single most important 
precondition for a successful democratic political system. Before 
people embark on the difficult task of jointly constructing 
institutions of democratic state, they should consider themselves as 
a political community or nation, which does not necessarily coincide 
with an ethnic nation. This is why an attempt at democratic 
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transition may be critically dangerous for the unity of nascent 
democratic states, especially when this period coincides with the 
break-up of multinational states or empires.  
In general, most democratic countries have regional and/or 
ethnic divisions. With proper management of diversity, these 
divisions do not necessity pose a risk to the unity of the country. 
Whether some divisions lead to conflicts that threaten unity and 
civic peace depends on many factors, including the depth of pre-
existing cultural cleavages, strategic decisions made by political 
elites and/or external influences.  
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have considerable ethnic and 
regional divisions and unresolved territorial conflicts. It was in the 
period of the Soviet break-up that most such conflicts in the post-
Soviet space emerged. Georgia had two such conflicts (Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia). They resulted from pre-existing ethno-cultural 
differences; differing collective historical and identity memories; 
certain minorities were apprehensive of the nationalist rhetoric of 
emergent elites in the new countries; and the outside influence of 
Russia. Moldova has a conflict in the Transnistrian region with no 
ethnic roots, but based rather on historical and geopolitical 
distinctions, mixed with a renaissance of nationalist movements 
following the collapse of the USSR. Overall, Russia was not 
interested in the consolidation of new nation states on the territories 
of post-Soviet countries that it considered its natural zone of 
influence, and sought local allies to disrupt such processes: ethnic 
minorities could be a natural choice.  
In all three cases, the outcome was similar: the separatist 
forces won, establishing de facto control over areas they claimed; 
supposedly temporary ceasefire agreements created quasi-
permanent dividing lines, and de facto states of an uncertain 
international status developed into quasi-polities with all the formal 
attributes of statehood on the seceded territories. All three of them 
have been in existence for more than 20 years now. At least in the 
perception of the so-called ‘parent-states,’ Russia’s support was 
crucial to that outcome, and in maintaining the shaky status quo. 
Residents of de facto states became accustomed to living that way 
and developed into separate societies, although Transnistria, unlike 
the two other cases, has fairly strong economic ties with its parent 
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state via humanitarian payments (pensions, social allowances, etc.) 
and the gas-connected benefits to the breakaway region’s industry.  
While the international community tried to resolve these 
conflicts and achieve more permanent and mutually agreed 
solutions, it was Russia that was in effect the main power-broker. 
For a long time, the Russian government was interested either in 
solutions that would substantively compromise the sovereignty of 
the affected states (that the latter rejected), or in prolonging the 
status quo that would buy it influence in the area. In the wake of the 
2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, the situation changed with regards 
to Georgia, with Russia recognising the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Only a handful of states followed Moscow’s 
example, which meant that both territories turned into Russian 
protectorates with little effective sovereignty. After these changes, 
Georgia considered both Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be 
“territories occupied by Russia”. In the case of Moldova, Russia 
tried to maintain its influence by proposing the federalisation of the 
country envisaged by its 2003 ‘Kozak Plan’, the plan that the 
Moldovan government initially considered but eventually rejected. 
The latter sparked the first confrontation with the Kremlin, 
consisting of reviewed prices for gas supplies and embargoes on 
Moldovan wines. 
Not all ethnic or regional divisions ended in such conflicts, 
however. All three countries had other ethnic and religious 
minorities; in some cases, their existence did not cause tensions, in 
others, tensions were resolved. For instance, Moldova managed to 
contain the problem that emerged in relations between the nascent 
Moldovan state and its Gagauzian minority, instituting a Gagauzian 
administrative autonomy. Likewise, Georgia had a regional 
problem with the Adjaran Autonomous Region, which claimed 
greater powers than the Georgian constitution provided for. But 
there has never been an agenda of secession, or threats of violence. 
After the local autocratic leader, Aslan Abashidze was ousted by the 
protest movement, the territorial problem appears to have 
disappeared. While there were some fears that part of the Georgian 
regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli where 
respectively ethnic Armenians and Azeris are concentrated on the 
border with their ethnic homelands, there was never any open 
conflict in these regions either.  
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Ukraine also is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country, 
but all its identity-based divisions are overshadowed by the 
cleavage between its south-eastern part that tends to be culturally 
closer to Russia, and the western part where Ukrainian ethnic 
identity, and a desire for national sovereignty, is much stronger. Yet 
while this cleavage was strongly pronounced in voting patterns, 
with the east tending to vote for candidates considered as ‘pro-
Russian’ and the west supporting pro-independence and pro-
European forces, Ukraine had long managed to avoid political 
confrontation along cultural identity lines. In 1991, instituting an 
autonomous region in Crimea (the most Russia-oriented among 
Ukraine’s regions) appeared to have averted the danger of a 
territorial conflict of the kind seen in Georgia and Moldova. 
However, in 2014, Russia used the pretext of the change of 
Ukrainian government when President Yanukovych fled the 
country to annex Crimea and foment separatist revolt in the south-
eastern regions. This revolt ended with the creation of two non-
recognised ‘statelets’ in the Donbass region. After eight months of 
bloody war in 2014-15, the frontline stabilised and slowly turned 
into a quasi-border with the Russian-backed separatist region. As a 
result, Ukraine’s situation came to resemble that of Georgia and 
Moldova, with Crimea being annexed by Russia and Donbass 
becoming an area of ‘semi-frozen conflict’.  
Such conflicts impede democratic consolidation in several 
ways: they disrupt the general functioning of the state; strengthen 
the political players inclined towards radical and exclusive 
nationalist agendas; are conducive to the creation of citizens’ 
militias whose presence can disrupt the balance of power and 
hamper orderly democratic procedures; and, of course, lead to 
massive violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
However, especially for Ukraine and Georgia, these conflicts, which 
are primarily perceived as conflicts with Russia, weakened the 
latter’s capacity to influence national political actors and generally 
strengthened both countries’ resolve to pursue the European 
integration agenda. Following the eruption of fighting in the 
Donbass region, the population that is generally Russian-speaking 
took a strong pro-Ukrainian position. In this sense, the fighting 
contributed to the consolidation of Ukrainian civic identity on 
territories other than those under separatist control.  
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As a result of these conflicts, all three countries have part of 
their territories outside their effective jurisdictions. While none of 
them contemplate reconciling themselves to the loss of these 
territories, the countries recognise that they have little chance of 
restoring their territorial integrity soon, and there is consensus that 
they have to focus on the agenda of domestic reforms and 
development without abandoning the reintegration efforts. This 
does not mean, though, that there are no remaining identity and 
culture-related cleavages and challenges in the parts of the countries 
where the control of the state is not challenged. In Moldova, the 
issue of Moldovan vs Romanian identity continues to be divisive. 
Once the European aspirations of Moldova became clearer in 2009, 
and especially after the signing of the Association Agreement, the 
movement for reunification with Romania moved closer to or even 
merged with pro-EU sentiments. Since Moldova started to be run 
by so-called pro-EU governments, and the dialogue with the EU 
intensified, the geopolitical division between pro-EU and pro-
Russian political forces dramatically increased. In Ukraine, issues 
related to the formal status and practical use of the Russian vs 
Ukrainian language continues to be controversial. In Georgia, most 
in the Armenian and Azeri ethnic minorities do not have a 
command of the Georgian language and are weakly integrated into 
Georgian society, which hampers their participation in political, 
social and economic life. The status of religious, especially Muslim 
minorities is also an area of concern. In all countries, support for 
European integration tends to be weaker among many in the 
minority populations,8 so the governments and societies need to 
convince them that the path of European integration will actually 
improve the protection of minority rights.  
General constitutional systems 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine adopted their first post-Communist 
constitutions in the mid-1990s: Moldova in 1994, Georgia in 1995 
                                                        
8 For instance, in Georgia in June 2017, in minority settlements only 23% 
supported the state goal of European integration and 49% that of Eurasian 
option. Laura Thornton, David Sichinava, “Public attitudes in Georgia Results 
of a June 2017 survey carried out for the National Democratic Institute by CRRC 
Georgia”, (https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20poll_ 
june%202017_ ISSUES_ENG_VF.pdf). 
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and Ukraine in 1996. This was preceded by a lengthy process of 
debate between different political forces. The forces of stability 
usually promoted strong presidential rule, greater centralism and 
majoritarian electoral systems, while reformist forces typically (but 
not always consistently) called for stronger parliaments, greater 
decentralisation and proportionate voting systems. Moreover, the 
first constitutions had to take into account the actual and potential 
ethno-territorial conflicts that threatened the three nascent states.  
The outcomes were based on some sort of compromise 
between different political forces, and were different in different 
countries. Ukraine adopted a semi-presidential system with the 
president having firm control of the executive branch, including the 
cabinet, the prime minister, and a network of the president’s 
regional (oblast) representatives called governors, including the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. However, the parliament (Rada) 
retained a high level of independence, and shared with the 
president an impact on the judiciary system. There was a mixed 
system of political representation, including both majoritarian and 
proportionate components. The constitution also reaffirmed the 
autonomy of the region of Crimea (which it did not have in Soviet 
times).  
In Georgia, the conflict between pro-government and 
opposition forces led to a compromise solution, which was a strict, 
American-style division between president and parliament. This 
allowed parliament to be a relatively independent centre of power. 
Due to the difficulty in reaching consensus on the territorial 
arrangement of the country, this topic was not included in the 
constitution at all, on the pretext that it would be added after the 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had been resolved (the 
Upper Chamber of Parliament also had to be created after that). In 
practice, however, a rather centralised system of governance was 
established. A new regional level of governance (not yet mentioned 
in the constitution) was created, based on the office of the 
president’s personal representatives in the regions. Municipal 
(rayon) level administrators (gamgebelis) were also appointed by the 
president. 
Moldova was the only country of the three (as well as in the 
post-Soviet area in general) that avoided the path of strong 
presidentialism. The parliamentary system has shaped the politics 
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of the country since its independence in August 1991, and several 
later attempts to introduce a stronger presidency failed (even 
though it has been always a popular idea, as confirmed by the 
results of the referendum of 1999 that had no juridical effects).9 
According to a constitutional provision enacted in 2000, the 
president had to be elected by three-fifths of the parliament (rather 
than by direct popular vote, as before), but this created problems 
after 2009 when a monopoly of the Communist party ended and 
diverse ruling coalitions had trouble garnering enough votes to fill 
the president’s seat. Under these circumstances, Moldova faced 
numerous political crises and frequent snap elections (in 2001, 2009, 
and 2010). In 2016, in a controversial act, the Constitutional Court 
restored the constitutional provisions effective prior to the 
modification of 2000, thus re-introducing the direct election of the 
president.10 The system is not yet stabilised, however, and there are 
continuous calls to extend the competences of the president.  
Although Moldova’s constitution has been relatively stable 
since its adoption, in Ukraine and Georgia the changing balance of 
power led to several overhauls. In the case of Ukraine, the 
competencies of the president, and the balance of power between 
the president and prime minister/parliament changed several 
times. Despite this, however, the president was always considered 
to be the most important political figure in the country. In Georgia, 
changes of the constitutional system of power turned out to be more 
thorough. The 2004 package of amendments changed the system 
into a formally semi-presidential but in effect more presidentialist 
one – something that the government of the day justified by the 
necessity to carry out rapid reforms. Another large overhaul took 
place in 2010 (most of the changes came into effect in 2013), when 
                                                        
9 According to the referendum of May 1999, out of 1.4 million citizens (58.33% 
of the total population) 55.3% opted for presidential form of government and 
conferred to the president the right to form and rule the government. However, 
the plebiscite had no juridical effects because it included less than 61% of the 
electorate (http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/ 
constitutional-crisis-responsibilities-consequences/).  
10 Denis Cenușă, “Back to direct presidential elections in Moldova: From one 
political crisis to another?”, 21 March 2016 (http://3dcftas.eu/ 
publications/other/back-direct-presidential-elections-moldova-one-political-
crisis-another). 
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the powers of parliament were considerably increased at the 
expense of the presidency, which tended to become a largely 
ceremonial position. A movement towards parliamentary system 
was completed through amendments in 2017 that removed direct 
elections of the president. The electoral system also became a purely 
proportional one. The implementation of both changes, however, 
was postponed until after the next presidential and parliamentary 
elections (due in 2018 and 2020).  
No less important is how the constitutional process developed. 
Georgia has had a propensity for parliamentary supermajorities: 
this allowed the parties in power to change the constitution at will. 
The 1995 constitution was the result of a genuine compromise 
between the government and opposition parties; but the overhauls 
of 2004, 2010 and 2017 reflected the political will of a single party 
(UNM in the first two cases, the Georgian Dream in the latter case). 
It was the outside powers (represented by the Venice Commission, 
for instance) that played some balancing role. In the Moldovan and 
Ukrainian parliaments, strong majorities are almost never created, 
which provides for more debate and an inclusive constitutional 
process, even if the same factor often undermines the efficiency of 
governance.  
Whatever the strong or weak features of the formal 
constitutions in the three countries, all of them face a challenge of 
extra-constitutional governance. The weakness of democratic 
traditions and institutions make them vulnerable to powerful 
extraconstitutional informal influences. The entrenched business 
oligarchies are the most obvious example. The term, however, is 
more strictly applicable to the political scene in Moldova and 
Ukraine, where there is a group of ultra-rich players who sometimes 
become political players directly, or try to influence the political 
process by aligning themselves to different political and social 
players, and own the most influential media. This could lead to 
some kind of oligarchic pluralism based on infighting between 
different financial-political groups, especially in Ukraine. This 
checked the autocratic tendencies of any single political actor, but 
also makes it extremely difficult to achieve clean, transparent and 
efficient government.  
Until recently, Georgia has not experienced ‘oligarchy’ in the 
strict sense, because there has never been a group of powerful 
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businesses able to manipulate political players. Here, the problem 
was rather one of the extreme personalisation of politics, with 
charismatic individual leaders (Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, Mikheil Saakashvili) often seen as standing above 
party systems and constitutional rules. This may have changed with 
the advent of Bidzina Ivanishvili, who came to power in 2012 largely 
thanks to his enormous, by Georgian standards, financial resources 
(he is widely believed to wield powerful informal influence over his 
ruling Georgian Dream party since his resignation from the position 
of prime minister in 2013). This makes Georgia’s situation 
somewhat closer to that of Moldova, where Vladimir Plahotniuc, a 
rich businessman, also calls the shots in the ruling Democratic Party 
and the country without occupying the position of prime minister 
or any other elective mandate.  
To sum up, the formal constitutions of all three countries are 
generally conducive to a competitive political process that provides 
for the creation of accountable government. They also include all the 
major safeguards for the protection of political liberties and human 
rights. This does not mean that there is no place for the 
improvement of the formal constitutional systems (for instance, 
strengthening local and regional governance may be such an area), 
but such shortcomings do not prevent these countries from 
consolidating their democratic political systems. In practice, 
however, these systems are susceptible to the negative influence of 
extra-constitutional factors, such as charismatic individuals and 
their personality-driven parties, and powerful business players 
known as oligarchs.  
The political systems also face a painful choice between 
efficiency and pluralism that is typical for countries with weak 
democratic traditions. The period between 2004 and 2013 in Georgia 
might have been the only one in all three countries when the formal 
constitutional set-up clearly provided for an excessive 
concentration of power in the executive. However, it was in this 
period (especially during the first half) that Georgia carried out the 
most successful public policy reforms, when the level of corruption 
went down significantly, while the capacity of the government to 
produce public goods (as well as the quality of those public goods) 
increased substantially. The same system also created a genuine 
threat of the autocratic consolidation of power. On the other hand, 
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a constitutional environment providing for greater pluralism may 
also weaken the government’s capacity to carry out necessary 
public policy reforms, thereby enabling powerful plutocratic actors 
to manipulate the system.  
All three countries have yet to find a proper balance between 
strong and efficacious state on the one hand, and strong democratic 
institutions capable of imposing genuine accountability on their 
rulers on the other. They also need to accept that only an inclusive, 
consensus-based constitutional process will lead to the adoption of 
legitimate, effective, formal constitutional rules rather than have 
extra-constitutional powers guide the behaviour of political actors.  
Government performance and legitimacy 
Apart from observing democratic norms such as respect for human 
rights, accountability, and transparency, etc., democratic regimes 
also need to gain ‘performance legitimacy’ to demonstrate that they 
are capable of effectively serving their peoples. When making their 
political choices, most citizens are not motivated by ideological 
considerations but by the ability of the government to produce 
public goods that make their lives better. In post-Soviet countries, 
democracy has suffered from the widespread perception that 
democratic pluralism brings chaos, inefficiency and corruption, 
whereas the autocratic Soviet government delivers more orderly 
and affluent lives. Communist nomenklatura exploited this nostalgia 
for former times and presented themselves as more competent 
leaders who could ensure stability after a period of turmoil. Putin’s 
regime in Russia is the most obvious example of such a trend, as it 
largely based its legitimacy on the contrast with the more 
democratic but unruly and poor 1990s. It is therefore crucial for 
democracies to prove that they can perform better than autocracies.  
Government performance has been a problem for all the three 
countries discussed here, although the degree of the problem and 
the dynamics of development varied. In the 1990s, it was Georgia 
that suffered the most dramatic implosion of state, caused by both 
prolonged ethno-territorial conflicts and the crisis of legitimacy 
engendered by the violent change of the first democratically elected 
government. At this time Georgia was a textbook example of a failed 
state, with armed militias competing for control that the 
government had lost. While basic order was restored by the mid-
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1990s, the state was still notoriously weak and corrupt, incapable of 
collecting taxes, paying salaries to public servants, taking care of 
public infrastructure, etc. In 2003, it shared 124-128th places among 
133 nations in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency 
International.11 The trust towards almost all government bodies was 
below 20%.12 This overall failure of the government created a 
background that led to the ‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003. 
Georgia is also the country that has achieved the most salient 
success in efforts to reform the government after the Rose 
Revolution. By 2012, it reached 51st place among 174 nations.13 It 
also made considerable progress in the areas of fiscal policy, the 
provision of public services to citizens and the development of 
public infrastructure, etc.14 While the breakthrough was achieved 
during the UNM’s period in power, the reforms proved generally 
sustainable, also when power changed: for instance, by 2016, 
Georgia’s position in the Corruption Perception Index further 
improved with the country occupying 44th place among 176 
nations,15 above a number of European Union countries including 
Italy, Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia.  
This does not translate into great confidence on the part of 
citizens, however. Between April 2015 and June 2016, the number of 
Georgians who believed that the country was going in the right 
direction oscillated between 20-30%, reaching 33% by April 2017 
(31% thought that Georgia was going in the wrong direction, and 
another 31% thought that it was not changing at all). When it came 
to the performance of institutions, between 30-55% rated the 
                                                        
11 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2002 
(https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2002/0/).  
12 International Republican Institute, Georgia National Voter Study May 2003; 
Theodor Hanf and Ghia Nodia, Lurching to Democracy. From agnostic tolerance to 
pious Jacobinism: Societal change and people’s reactions, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000, p. 105. 
13 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2016 (https:// 
www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016). 
14 World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Public Services: Chronicling Georgia’s 
Reforms, Washington, D.C., 2012. 
15 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2016 (https:// 
www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016).  
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performance of public service halls, the army, and the police as good 
or very good, while the positive approval ratings of the Prosecutor’s 
Office, the courts, and parliament were between 10-13%. This does 
not mean that people are completely dissatisfied: between 40-50% 
rated their performance as “average”.16   
Table 1.2 Performance of state institutions and the dominant church 
(“good or very good”) 
 Georgia17 Moldova18  Ukraine19 
Army 49 46 57 
Police 37 46 41 
Courts 13 24 9 
Parliament 10 17 14 
Church 58 68 62 
Country is going in the right 
direction 
31 38 35 
 
Ukraine is often used as a counter-example. It never fell as 
low in terms of weakness of the state as Georgia did in the 1990s, 
but following two Maidan revolutions its democratic 
breakthroughs never translated into any sizeable success in 
overcoming corruption or increasing the effectiveness of public 
services. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, the incoming 
government failed to carry out effective reforms and was soon 
discredited, losing power to the very candidate (Victor 
                                                        
16 Public attitudes in Georgia Results of an April 2017 survey carried out for 
NDI by CRRC Georgia (https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/ 
NDI_April_2017_ political%20Presentation_ENG_version%20final.pdf).  
17 Laura Thornton and Koba Turmanidze, “Public attitudes in Georgia: Results 
of a April 2017 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia” 
(https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_April_2017_political%20Pres
entation_ENG_version%20final.pdf).  
18 Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, April 2017 
(www.ipp.md). 
19 “Stavlennia hromadyan Ukrainy do suspilnykh instytutiv, elektoralni 
orientatsii”, Razumkov Center, 11 October 2017, 
(http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/socio/Press1017.pdf).  
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Yanukovych) whom Victor Yushchenko, the favourite of the 2004 
movement, had defeated. The government elected in the wake of 
2014 ‘Revolution of dignity’ did carry out certain reforms, and 
achieved some results. In 2015-16 two new institutions were created 
to prosecute (National Anticorruption Bureau, NABU) and prevent 
corruption (National Agency for Prevention of Corruption, NAPC), 
with a number of high-profile investigations into people close to the 
president and the former prime minister.20 This brought modest 
results: in 2016 the Corruption Perception Index scored 29 points, as 
shown in Table 1.3, which is the highest score for the entire period 
of measurement, but it still stands for endemic corruption and 
leaves the country in the 131th place among 176 nations – hardly a 
satisfying position.21  
Table 1.3 Levels of corruption 
 Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
2002 24 21 24 
2009 41 33 22 
2016 67 30 29 
Notes: Today, a score of 100 stands for the least corrupt, and a score of 1, for the 
most corrupt countries. Until 2012, however, Transparency International used 
a system whereby the least corrupt country would get 10 rather than 100 points. 
Thus, for instance, in 2006 Georgia’s score was expressed as 4.1 rather than 41, 
but for better visibility we upgraded the older scores to the new format both in 
Table 1.3 and later in the text. 
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International 
(https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/). 
 
This situation is further reflected in the very low trust towards 
government institutions. In a December 2016 poll, among the most 
trusted (over 50%) institutions are the church, volunteers and the 
army; while the least trustworthy (at under 10%) are the 
                                                        
20 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-corruption-arrests/ukraine-
makes-two-high-profile-detentions-in-corruption-case-idUSKBN17N1AS?il=0 
21 Ibid. 
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government, parliament and courts.22 Over 70% of Ukrainians 
believe that Ukraine is developing in the wrong direction, which 
reflects a rather high level of public dissatisfaction that may be 
dangerous for the legitimacy of the political system.23  
Government inefficiency and corruption are also considered 
to be a huge problem in Moldova affecting public procurement, the 
management of the companies with state participation, public 
assets, but also the integrity of decision-making in areas such as the 
financial sector, energy, and the environment etc. Generally, 
Moldova is considered to be a highly corrupt country in the 
Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, 
although it has its ups and downs: in 2012-14 it had the best scores 
ever of 35-36, but they fell to 33 and 30 (123rd place among 176 
nations) in 2015 and 2016. This was somewhat better than in the 
2000s, in the period of the Communist party rule, when typical 
scores oscillated between 24-28%.24 The people of Moldova are 
deeply dissatisfied with how things are going: according to the 
Institute of Public Policy research, in April 2017, only 31% of those 
polled believed that the country was heading in the right direction, 
and 64% thought it was going in the wrong direction.25  
Especially for Ukraine and Moldova, increasing government 
effectiveness, its responsiveness to citizens’ needs, and 
substantively reducing the rate of corruption is an extremely high 
priority task. This, however, can only be achieved through 
confronting the key political problem of state institution ‘capture’ 
by powerful oligarchic groups or super-rich individuals in all three 
countries.  
                                                        
22 Kiev International Institute of Sociology, “Trust to Social Institutions” 
(https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_inde
x_2016 http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=678&page=1).  
23 IRI Poll: Social and Political Moods of Ukrainians, 8 June 2017 
(http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/poll_iri_dinamika_obschestve
nno-politicheskih_vzglyadov_v_ukraine.html).  
24 Ibid. 
25 Source: Institute for Public Policy, www.ipp.md. 
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Political parties and party systems 
The considerable level of political pluralism and competitive 
political environment are among the most important positive 
features of the political systems in the three countries. This is what 
makes them stand out from other, more autocratic regimes in the 
post-Soviet realm. In these countries, elections often (if not always) 
constitute an area for meaningful and unpredictable competition for 
power rather than a mere democratic façade, and elections may be 
a way for the opposition to come to power (although they are still 
not the only way).  
On the other hand, in all three countries the level of 
development of political parties and party systems may be one of 
the main (if not the main) underlying structural weaknesses of 
democratic institutions. Parties are weakly institutionalised and 
often personalised, while party systems are fragmented and 
unstable, and the level of popular trust towards political elites is 
low. Typically, the party scene may change radically from one 
election to the other, with once seemingly strong parties often 
leaving the political scene altogether and being completely 
marginalised.  
There is a tendency to develop, on the one hand, parties of 
power that are hardly distinguishable from the state administration, 
and are used more as an instrument of power. However, this merger 
with the state administration may be their point of vulnerability as 
they are also dependent on maintaining their position in power for 
their very existence or organisational stability, and may have a 
difficult time when they lose levers of administrative control. On the 
other hand, the opposition may consist of a multitude of small 
unstable groups lacking consistent and clear policy platforms and 
stable constituencies, rather than competing for the protest vote and 
trying to take advantage of the weaknesses of incumbent 
authorities. People are thus cynical about political parties, 
considering them as machines that vie for power rather than truly 
representing their interests. One of the most notable expressions of 
this mistrust towards the political class was the insistence of 
Euromaidan activists during the 2014 protests on distancing 
themselves from all political parties and their leaders, because they 
were presumed to be corrupt organisations by definition. This 
contrasts with the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’, when Victor 
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Yushchenko and his Our Ukraine party still attracted the broad 
enthusiasm of protesters. But this party did not survive for long, 
and disappeared as a political force by 2010. 
Arguably, the decline of political parties, including the crisis 
of their public credibility, is also a problem faced by many 
established democracies of the West. Here, the negative trend 
expresses itself in the strengthening of new populist parties with 
extreme right or left agendas, narrowing the political space for 
moderate established parties. In the countries discussed, however, 
there have never been any ‘established parties’ to begin with, and 
the behaviour and public rhetoric of most important parties could 
always be described as ‘populist’ – at least, when they were in 
opposition.  
In Georgia, the trend to create dominant parties of power, 
always inspired by their leaders’ personalities. The first of such 
parties, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia, was built around the 
personality of Eduard Shevardnadze after he had already 
established himself as the country’s leader. The same is true of 
Georgia’s Revival Union, built around Aslan Abashidze, the 
Adjaran regional leader. Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National 
Movement (UNM) and Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream (GD), 
on the other hand, originated as broad opposition movements. 
However, as parties of power, all of them acted in a similar manner, 
being a tool of political dominance over all branches of state 
governance, and often constitutional majorities in parliament. 
Following the 2016 elections, GD outperformed all its predecessors, 
gaining more than three-quarters of parliamentary seats. All of 
them, except for UNM, disappeared as soon as they lost power and 
their leaders left the political scene.  
In Ukraine and Moldova, attempts to create stable parties of 
power were less successful. President-led parties, namely Leonid 
Kuchma’s For United Ukraine! (as well as his People’s Democratic 
Party and Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)), Victor 
Yushchenko’ Our Ukraine, Victor Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions, 
and Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc obtained pluralities in parliament (the 
largest share of votes, but never majorities), so they had to create 
parliamentary coalitions. In Moldova, only the Communist party 
had stable parliamentary majorities between 2001 and 2009.  
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The public personalities of major leaders might have been 
associated with their political records or charismatic personalities 
(such as Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine, Eduard Shevardnadze and 
Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia), but there is also a growing trend of 
building new parties around the economic power of rich 
individuals or oligarchs. In Moldova, Vladimir Plahotniuc, who is 
often described as possibly the richest individual in the country, 
came to lead the Democratic Party (PDM) that since the beginning 
of 2016 has been in control of the Moldovan government. He is 
believed to effectively coordinate government activities without 
occupying any official or elected position. Control over the 
government took place during 2015-16, when Plahotniuc’s party 
absorbed defected MPs from rival partner and opposition parties. 
This allowed the Democratic Party, outside an electoral exercise, to 
increase the number of MPs from 19 to 41 in two years. In Ukraine, 
President Petro Poroshenko is also described as one of the oligarchs, 
albeit not the wealthiest one. Other oligarchs are actively involved 
in supporting or opposing the regime and different political figures. 
It is widely believed in Ukraine that building strong political forces 
without at least some support from oligarchic groups is very 
difficult. In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party was created by 
Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is by far the wealthiest person in the 
country; although he is not formally in charge of it, he is widely 
believed to be its main unifying force capable of defining its 
direction if he so wishes.  
This oligarchisation of the political process may be considered 
to be both an expression of political party weakness, and a factor that 
contributes to the further erosion of public trust towards this key 
institution of democracy. It shows that society has insufficient 
mobilisation, cohesion and social and economic capital to support 
independent political organisations, and the void may be filled by 
wealthy individuals that replace social groups as powers that either 
stay at the helm or are behind political parties. But if political parties 
become the instruments of rich individuals or groups, this gives 
citizens good reason not to trust them.  
Being personalistic, oligarchic and clientelist, the parties 
usually lack a clear ideological or programmatic vision. The 
Communist parties in Ukraine and Moldova may be partial 
exceptions. In these countries (but not in Georgia), Communist 
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parties and old nomenklatura networks were successful at 
maintaining relatively strong successor organisations. They did not 
have the agenda of fully restoring Communist-like economic order 
and accepted the democratic rules of political competition, but their 
symbolic affiliation with a supposedly more orderly and affluent 
Communist past gave them a somewhat distinct ideological profile, 
while linkage to the networks of the former nomenklatura helped 
preserve relative organisational stability. In Ukraine, the 
Communist party was a strong organised parliamentary force until 
2014, and in the 1990s it had the strongest factions in Verkhovna 
Rada (Parliament) – although other parties in cooperation with 
independent MPs created parliamentary majorities that excluded 
Communists. The Socialist party, a more centralist offspring of the 
CPU, was also influential in the 1990s and up to 2006. However, 
they never came close to obtaining power. In Moldova, the 
Communist party was actually in power between 2001 and 2009 but 
the influence of Communist parties in both countries tended to 
decline over time, while in Ukraine it was outlawed for allegedly 
supporting Russian aggression in the east.  
Most other parties do not have coherent ideological profiles. 
They tend to combine campaigning on issues of social justice during 
elections with centre-right policies when in office. In lieu of the clear 
programmatic distinctions that tend to characterise parties in the 
West, differences between parties tend to be identity-based and 
geopolitical. On the one hand are supporters of the European (or 
generally pro-Western) policies who usually tend to be stronger 
supporters of national independence, who are in conflict with those 
who are sceptical of the idea of European integration and tilt 
towards stronger cooperation with Russia. This is more obvious in 
Ukraine and Moldova. In Ukraine, traditionally, the east and the 
south vote differently from the west and the north, with the latter 
part being sovereigntist and pro-European. Public opinion polls 
also confirm this divide: there was never majority support for 
NATO membership, and quite divided attitudes towards EU 
integration. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
effective control of part of Donbass by Russian-backed separatist 
forces – the provinces that happened to be most supportive of pro-
Russian trends, as well as popular outrage about Russia’s 
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aggressive policies, has tilted the political balance towards 
Europe.26   
Despite its image, the Communist party in Moldova was 
balancing between policies of accommodation with Russia and 
coming closer to Europe, while the Socialist party (now represented 
in power by President Igor Dodon) takes an openly Eurosceptic and 
pro-Moscow line. The pro-European flank is represented by a group 
of parties that coalesce to create cabinets, as they have done since 
2009. In recent years, the Democratic Party (PDM) has become the 
strongest of them. At present, the pro-Moscow line in Moldova is 
the strongest among the three countries, which is probably caused 
by inefficiency and numerous corruption scandals typical of 
coalition cabinets that are controlled by parties supportive of EU 
integration. Uneasy cohabitation, and even allegedly occasional 
coordination, between pro-Russian President Dodon and the pro-
European cabinet epitomises the shaky geopolitical balance.27  
In Georgia, the constituency of pro-Russian forces is the 
smallest of the three. Since the second half of the 1990s, support for 
pro-Western policies, potentially also for EU and NATO policies, 
have become the point of national consensus that no party of any 
consequence challenged. For the UNM government, support for 
pro-Western policies became their signature issue. Public opinion 
polls have showed stable and solid majorities in favour of European 
and Euro-Atlantic Integration. After the August 2008 war, the 
informal taboo about open support for pro-Russian positions was 
broken, probably due to disappointment with insufficient Western 
support during and after the 2008 war, a backlash against the 
‘westernising’ reforms of Mikheil Saakashvili’s government, and 
Russia’s new policies of active support for pro-Russian political and 
civil society groups. So far, however, this has not led to radical 
changes in Georgia’s political landscape. One openly pro-Russian 
party, the Patriot’s Alliance, barely cleared the 5% barrier to enter 
the Georgian parliament following the 2016 elections. However, 
polls also show that the number of supporters for Eurasian over 
                                                        
26 See http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=713&page=1&y=2017. 
27 Expert-Grup, “State of the Country Report 2017” (http://expert-
grup.org/en/biblioteca/item/1482-raport-de-stare-a-tarii-2017). 
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European integration grew to about 25%, and is especially high 
among Armenian and Azeri ethnic minorities.28  
The political party scene is also influenced by electoral 
legislation, namely the balance between majoritarian (single-
mandate constituency seats). In Ukraine, this balance has never 
become the point of contention between different political parties, 
save for the 1994 elections (when elections were based on single-
mandate constituencies) and the 2006-07 elections (based on the PR 
principle), the 50/50 principle has been working, with half of the 
450 seats elected through proportionate representation, and the 
other half in single-mandate constituencies). This system is still in 
place, despite some pressure to change to a purely proportionate 
system with open candidate lists. The parties of power tended to 
have some advantages in single-constituency districts and gave 
preference to strengthening that component of the electoral system. 
In Moldova, the proportional electoral system had been in 
place since early the 1990s, but in 2017 it changed to a mixed system 
whereby 50 of 101 MPs are elected, as before, through party lists, 
and 51 from single-mandate constituencies. This change, adopted 
despite protests from the opposition and civil society, and ignoring 
recommendations from the Council of Europe and the EU, was 
supported by the Democratic Party and the Socialists, the two 
parties that control, respectively, the cabinet and the presidency. 
This confirms the trend that incumbent parties hope to benefit more 
than opposition parties from the majoritarian or first-past-the-post 
elections in single-mandate constituencies.   
In the case of Georgia, the mixed system had been used in all 
elections, except for 1992. In 1995-2004, the number of seats 
apportioned by the proportional system exceeded that of single-
mandate constituencies, but after the number of seats was reduced 
to 150, the system was about 50/50. The majoritarian component 
strongly favoured the parties in power and was considered the main 
reason for the creation of parliamentary supermajorities. As a result, 
the opposition and pro-democracy groups advocated the 
                                                        
28 Laura Thornton–NDI Georgia, Koba Turmanidze–CRRC Georgia, “Public 
attitudes in Georgia. Results of a November 2016 survey carried out for NDI by 
CRRC Georgia” (https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_November% 
202016%20poll_Issues_GEO_vf.pdf). 
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introduction of a fully proportionate system, while incumbent 
parties supported the status quo. In 2016, the ruling GD obtained 
48% of the vote according to party lists, but having carried nearly 
all single-mandate constituencies, won 117 out of 150 parliamentary 
seats. During the next overhaul of the constitutions in 2017, the GD 
majority agreed to switch to a purely PR system, but this change will 
only come into force after the next parliamentary elections expected 
in 2020.   
The chief cause for concern is that changes within the political 
landscape show little sign of improvement. Parties continue to rely 
on personalities and most important ones increasingly rely on the 
political interests of plutocrats. In Moldova, the geopolitical 
division between pro-Russian and pro-European outweighs all 
other public policy considerations, and the former tends to be 
currently on the rise. Georgia is still prone to creating dominant 
parties with parliamentary supermajorities. The public is even more 
disillusioned with its political class. Substantive progress towards 
the consolidation of democracy in all three countries is hardly 
possible without the development of strong political parties that 
convince citizens of their ability and willingness to represent their 
interests, and distinct political agendas that allow for an 
improvement standard of living.   
Revolutionary and rule-based forms of political 
competition 
Lack of trust in the political class and the resulting scepticism about 
the validity of procedural democracy that may be ‘captured’ by 
oligarchic interests results in the general weakness of representative 
democracy institutions on the one hand, and a greater readiness to 
revert to forms of direct democracy, such as mass rallies and acts of 
civil resistance that might oust the government. The relatively high 
legitimacy of such methods of political struggle is partly justified by 
popular mistrust about the integrity of procedures of electoral 
democracy and political parties, as well as the practices of 
incumbent governments that often question the very legitimacy of 
opposition groups and use selective justice procedures to prevent 
their most dangerous opponents from taking part in the political 
process. This gives credence to claims that a mobilised public may 
serve as a more authentic representative of the will of the people 
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than the latter’s duly elected representatives. In practice, this 
expresses itself in unconstitutional changes of power, or in attempts 
at such changes.  
This problem is much more pronounced in Georgia and 
Ukraine than in Moldova. In both former countries, power changed 
twice through unconstitutional means. In Georgia, the first 
democratically elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was ousted 
in a bloody popular rebellion or coup in January 1992. This was 
succeeded by a deep crisis of legitimacy, a break-down of statehood, 
and civil war, from which the country took years to recover. The 
second such episode occurred in November 2003, when broad 
popular protests caused by blatantly rigged parliamentary elections 
forced President Shevardnadze to resign: this came to be known as 
the ‘Rose Revolution’. This time, the protest took the form of 
peaceful civil resistance, while after the president’s resignation the 
processes swiftly resumed the constitutional mould, and the 
incoming UNM government carried out reforms that led to the 
strengthening of political institutions and much more efficient 
government.  
While the peaceful character of the Rose Revolution 
conditioned its generally positive image in the collective memory, it 
failed to consolidate a system whereby only constitutional methods 
of fighting for power were considered acceptable. In 2007 and 2009 
the Georgian opposition – alleging that the autocratic nature of 
Mikheil Saakashvili’s rule made it impossible to change 
government through elections – tried to replicate the Rose 
Revolution methods by mobilising a broad peaceful protest 
movement, but without success. While in October 2012 the GD 
coalition came to power peacefully through elections, before that 
there were widespread expectations among both government and 
opposition supporters of a large post-election turmoil (with one side 
hypothetically refusing to accept their actual outcome). Despite the 
fully constitutional transfer of power, however, the winning GD 
government opened criminal cases against almost all leaders of the 
former government, including President Saakashvili) that many 
observers considered to be a political vendetta based on selective 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  39 
 
justice.29 Currently, it is a popular opinion among supporters of the 
UNM, the strongest opposition party, that GD will not allow a 
peaceful transition of power, so sooner or later the mobilisation of 
street protests to that end may become necessary. This view is not 
widely shared, but neither is there consensus that only 
constitutional means of contesting power will be acceptable from 
now on.  
In Ukraine, the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ followed a scenario 
close to the then recent Georgian case: in allegedly rigged 
presidential elections Victor Yanukovych was declared winner in 
the run-off with Victor Yushchenko, which then led to protracted 
public protests that forced the government to declare the election 
results null and void and set a re-vote, won by Yushchenko. This 
was another example of successful peaceful resistance movement in 
support of democracy, and it did indeed bring about greater 
democratic pluralism and created hopes of democratic 
consolidation. However, as hopes generated by the Orange 
Revolution were frustrated due to lack of successful government 
reforms, by 2009 the support for pro-democracy forces dropped.30 
In 2010, Yushchenko lost elections and conceded power to Victor 
Yanukovych, and later his Party of the Regions also gained plurality 
in Parliament. The precedent of constitutional change of power was 
perceived by some scholars as an indicator of the consolidation of 
democracy, but such assessments proved premature. Yanukovych 
took a harder line, imprisoning his main political opponents, 
including Yulia Tymoshenko, his main rival in the 2010 elections. 
The second Maidan revolution of 2013-14 was much more dramatic: 
it was prompted by Yanukovych’s decision to drop the plan of 
association with the EU in favour of joining the Russia-led Eurasian 
Union, led to armed clashes between the police and the protesters 
and ended up with President Yanukovych fleeing the country. This 
change of power also gave Russia a pretext to annex Crimea and 
instigate a separatist rebellion in the south-eastern Ukraine.  
                                                        
29 Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz, “Justice or 
Vengeance?”, International Herald Tribune, 26 November 2012; Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), The functioning of democratic 
institutions in Georgia, Resolution 2015 (2014).  
30 http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=299&page=1&y=2009. 
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It remains to be seen whether the second Maidan revolution 
will after all lead to the consolidation of rules-based electoral 
democracy. However, there is no guarantee that political 
competition will remain within the limits of the law. This was 
indicated, for instance, by a September 2017 episode, when Mikheil 
Saakashvili, this time a Ukrainian opposition politician, forced his 
way, together with his supporters, through the Ukrainian border. 
He chose to do this because several weeks before President 
Poroshenko deprived him of his Ukrainian citizenship, allegedly on 
political rather than legal grounds. Several of the most popular 
Ukrainian opposition politicians supported Saakashvili’s action and 
actually stood by his side, which showed that the episode may set 
the tone for the following political processes. The process continued 
by erecting a tent town in Kyiv, but at the time of writing the 
protesters only call for accelerating reforms rather than the 
resignation of the government.  
The cases of Victor Yanukovych winning presidential 
elections in Ukraine in 2010, and of the GD defeating the UNM in 
Georgia in 2012 show that peaceful constitutional transitions of 
power from government to the opposition are possible in these 
countries. In both cases, these precedents were broadly welcomed 
as signs of imminent democratic consolidation. But the general 
tendency towards concentration of administrative resources by the 
incumbent government, the weakness of opposition parties and the 
weak rule of law hampers the creation of a level playing field for the 
government and opposition players, and undermines the trust of 
the citizens that governments may be voted out of power by routine 
procedures.   
Moldova has never experienced an unconstitutional change 
of power. The change of power usually takes place through 
elections that according to ODIHR reports are considered generally 
free and fair, but in reality are influenced by the use of 
administrative, media and poorly accountable resources. The only 
case when Moldova was close to turmoil that could endanger the 
constitutional process was in 2009, when the youth riots in April 
reacted to the outcomes of elections of April 2009, when the 
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Communist party gained 60 seats in the legislative.31 The riots 
ended with violent persecution of the protesters by police and state 
security forces. This provoked public reaction that undermined the 
legitimacy of the Communist party and prompted political support 
for the so-called pro-European parties. This complicated the 
appointment of the country’s president in the parliament that failed 
to obtain 61 votes and triggered early elections in July 2009, which 
became a departure point for all the pro-EU governing coalitions 
that have run the country since then.  
In all three countries, the vast majority of people cherish 
stability and loathe any repetition of revolutionary turmoil. 
Currently, there are no indicators that any of the three countries 
may be moving towards another unconstitutional change of power. 
However, these societies have still not reached a stage described by 
Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz as rule-based electoral democracy 
being ‘the only game in town’.32 The perception is still widespread 
that the incumbent government may manipulate the system in a 
way that does not allow the opposition a chance to meaningfully 
challenge their position in power. This provides legitimacy for 
agendas and tactics that imply a possibility of an extra-
constitutional use of ‘people power’. This weakens citizens’ trust 
towards democratic political institutions, and continues a challenge 
to long term political stability of the country.   
Media, civil society, media, popular movements, 
social forces, religious groups 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine largely owe their image as mostly 
democratic countries to their vibrant and pluralistic civil society 
scene, which includes independent media and different popular 
movements. Generally, civil society actors are free to express their 
                                                        
31 Resolution of the European Parliament of 300 April 2009 regarding the 
situation in Moldova (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do? 
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B6-2009-0264+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN& 
language=en). 
32 J.J. Linz and A. Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America and post-communist Europe, 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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opinion, including harsh criticism of the governments in all three 
countries. Legislation does not on the whole create unnecessary 
hurdles for the functioning of such groups.33 Moreover, at some 
point they may influence the process of political agenda-setting, or 
specific political decisions.  
Civil society organisations frequently serve as a pool for 
political and civil service appointments, especially when pro-
European pro-reform parties come to power. This sometimes allows 
them to pursue their agenda on a new level. For instance, the success 
of reforms after the Rose Revolution is often ascribed to the fact that 
most political teams pushing for reforms came from civil society 
organisations and brought with them fresh attitudes and bold 
visions. In Ukraine, NGO coalitions are active and creative in trying 
to push the reform agenda: “Reanimation Package of Reforms” is 
the latest such initiative.34 In Georgia, an NGO the Es shen gekheba 
(“This affects you”) coalition was active in the last period of UNM 
rule and sometime afterwards, pushing for specific demands in the 
area of human rights with occasional success in influencing 
government policies. In December 2016, in Moldova, the joint 
actions of civil society prevented the adoption of the draft law 
allowing tax and capital amnesty, which would have legalised 
illegally obtained wealth while encouraging further illicit 
practices.35 Signing Association Agreements with the EU boosted 
civic activism in each of the three countries, where civil society 
platforms and domestic advisory groups largely focus on 
advocating and monitoring reforms linked to the Europeanisation 
process. This contrasts sharply with most other post-Soviet 
countries where increasingly restrictive and repressive laws are 
                                                        
33 However, there is a growing pressure on anticorruption NGOs in Ukraine 
that now must report on their income in the e-assets declaration system 
together with highest officials and politicians. In the case of Moldova, there 
were some attempts to limit the activity of the NGOs that receive funds from 
abroad, which were dropped as a result of civil society’s opposition, supported 
by the donor community. 
34 See information on the coalition at http://rpr.org.ua/en/.  
35 Legal Resources Centre from Moldova, December 2016 
(http://www.crjm.org/en/amnistia-fiscala-si-de-capital-republica-
moldova/). 
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instituted that treat NGOs and independent media as subversive 
forces that may also be unwelcome agents of foreign influence.  
The role of civil society during the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ 
and the 2013-14 ‘Revolution of Dignity’ were high points that 
showed the power of civil society in Ukraine. The same is true of the 
role of Georgia’s civil society during the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’. 
Civil society played an important role by setting the agenda for the 
protest movements, mobilising citizens’ participation, keeping the 
movement within the limits of peaceful civil resistance, and 
demonstrating a high level of organisation and resilience during the 
lengthy stand-off between the government and the public. In the 
case of the 2013-14 Ukrainian movement, especially when political 
parties were deliberately sidelined, the spontaneous self-
organisation of civil society played a decisive role in the success of 
the movement.  
Yet several structural weaknesses challenge civil society in 
these countries. Civil society organisations mostly depend on 
external players and communicate less effectively with local 
constituencies, making them insufficiently embedded in the wider 
society.36 Many citizens perceive civil society organisations as elite 
groups with links to foreign donors, which makes it easier for 
governments to ignore their demand for reform. Moreover, the 
image of civil society as a force promoting foreign, namely 
European agendas is used by conservative, often Church-related 
and pro-Russian groups, to discredit them and resist their liberal 
calls for anti-discrimination legislation, for example. 
While the media is generally free and pluralistic in all three 
countries, its ownership structure is problematic. In Ukraine, most 
influential media outlets belong to the big oligarchs that hold media 
pluralism hostage to their competing political interests. In Georgia, 
where there is no pluralism of oligarchs, most popular media 
organisations fall under government influence, which curbs public 
access to different sources of information and opinion. One of the 
most important points of criticism against Mikheil Saakashvili’s rule 
in Georgia was that since 2008, the three top TV companies were 
                                                        
36 K. Smagliy, “A Wake Up Call for Ukraine’s Civil Society”, Kennan Cable No. 
25 (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no25-wake-
call-for-ukraines-civil-society).  
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subservient to the government view. Currently, the situation is 
better since Rustavi-2, one of the two most popular TV companies, 
informally affiliated to the strongest opposition party, and is 
strongly critical of government policies. The authorities appear 
resolved to take control of the company through a proxy 
businessman who claims it was unlawfully deprived of ownership 
in the past. The legal process has signs of political bias, and only 
intervention by the European Court of Human Rights has 
suspended the process of company takeover.37 
Though less pronounced, the trend of leading political parties 
trying to take control of main media outlets is also true of Moldova. 
The most powerful Democratic Party has built a powerful media 
empire directly covering, or via proxies, four TV channels (Prime, 
Publika TV, Canal 2 and 3) with national coverage, including radio 
stations, online and to a lesser extent the printed press. Other parties 
have their own media organisations but not nationwide TV 
companies, which wield the greatest influence over public opinion. 
For the survival of independent media, the advertising market plays 
a decisive role, but approximately 50-60% of this market is 
controlled by the most powerful oligarch of the country, the 
Democratic Party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc. Even the recent 
amendments to the Audio-visual Code that limit the ownership of 
licences to two are avoided by transferring the control of media 
institutions to various proxies.  
In sum, while all three countries enjoy a relatively high level 
of media pluralism, with citizens for the most part having access to 
various opinions, media freedom is without solid grounds and is 
vulnerable to political intervention. The internet is fairly free in all 
three countries and is increasingly influential for young and 
educated people. Television remains the most powerful media, 
however, and control of the most popular national TV networks 
offer considerable advantage to specific political players. Without 
equal access to this most influential media, there is no level playing 
field for different political actors.  
                                                        
37 Luis Navarro, “Georgia’s Back and Forth Freedom Marches: The Case of 
Rustavi-2”, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 7 March 2017 
(http://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/georgias-back-forth-freedom-
marches-case-rustavi-2/).  
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Religious organisations may also play a role, but the situation 
in all three countries is different. In Ukraine, there is a split between 
two major Orthodox denominations: one is led by Kiev Patriarchy, 
is independent from Moscow and strived to be represented an 
autocephalic Orthodox Church, the other is subordinate to Moscow 
Patriarchy (most Orthodox Ukrainians belong to this Church). The 
split is highly politicised: the Kiev Patriarchy is supported Victor 
Yushchenko and generally pro-Western political forces, earning 
political support in return, while Victor Yanukovych and his Party 
of the Regions had a similar relationship with Moscow Patriarchy-
oriented groups. After Euromaidan, new ruling groups planned to 
adopt legislation aimed at limiting the activities of churches whose 
leadership was based in an “aggressor state”, which implies Russia 
– a step that may be a blow to a Moscow-subordinated Orthodox 
Church in Ukraine.38  
There is similar division in Moldova, where there is the 
Metropolis of Moldova (Moldovan Orthodox Church), which is 
affiliated to the Russian Orthodox Church, and another Orthodox 
religious organisation subordinated to the Romanian Orthodox 
Church. The former is much more powerful and politically active, 
however. The Metropolis of Moldova tacitly supported the pro-
Eurasian (in effect, pro-Russian), anti-European Igor Dodon’s 
candidacy for president,39 and promised to revoke the anti-
discrimination law adopted in May 2012. On the other hand, 
Dodon’s Socialist party presents itself as a champion of traditional 
family values, claiming that European integration threatens these 
values and calling on Moldovans to embrace Eurasian civilisation.40 
In addition, the same Church opposed anti-discrimination 
legislation as it allegedly ‘promoted’ homosexuality, citing it as an 
                                                        
38 Paul Goble, “Ukrainian Legislation about Religion Will Finalize Divorce 
between Kyiv and Moscow”, Euromaidan Press, 19 May 2017 (http:// 
euromaidanpress.com/2017/05/19/ukrainian-legislation-about-religion-will-
finalize-divorce-between-kyiv-and-moscow-euromaidan-press/).  
39 Denis Cenușă, “Geopolitical Games Expected Ahead of Moldova’s 2018 
Elections”, 10 October 2017 (https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/10/ 
geopolitical-games-expected-ahead-moldovas-2018-elections/). 
40 Denis Cenușă, “European values versus traditional values and geopolitical 
subtext in Moldova”, IPN, 29 May 2017 (http://www.ipn.md/en/integrare-
europeana/84125#). 
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indication of Europe promoting ‘immorality’ in its neighbourhood. 
The latest gesture of Igor Dodon is the signature of the CIS 
Declaration of 11 October 2017 promoting traditional family values. 
In Georgia, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is the 
single dominant religious organisation. It is strongly linked to 
Georgia’s national identity and its privileged status is legally 
established through a 2002 Constitutional Agreement between GOC 
and Georgian state. GOC’s official position is that it supports 
Georgia’s European integration. However, many members of the 
clergy, including those close to the top of the hierarchy, view 
European integration policies as a threat to public morality and 
indigenous Georgian culture. For instance, the Church actively 
opposed anti-discrimination legislation because it included clauses 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Moreover, a number of NGOs are affiliated to the Church 
or claim to be defending traditional religious values. Such 
organisations (that may fall under the category of ‘uncivil society’) 
often use violence to attack representatives of minority religious 
denominations or groups that promote liberal values, especially the 
rights of LGBT community.  
External policies and influences  
All three countries have long experienced two types of external 
influences – from Europe and from Russia. This implies not just 
general geopolitical competition, but also impacts on the trajectory 
of development of domestic political institutions. Very few players 
can compete with these two. The US is also an important actor, but 
its general policies towards this region, including efforts at 
democracy promotion, are indistinguishable from those of the EU, 
and local actors often conflate them into a general vision of ‘the 
West’. However, the EU’s EaP and AA institutional frameworks 
make it the chief democracy-promoter in these countries.  
While these two vectors were also perceived as competing 
and pushing the countries in opposite directions in the 1990s, this 
competition gradually became more confrontational in the 2000s. 
The first impetus to this trend was given by the colour revolutions 
in Georgia and Ukraine of 2003 and 2004. While the West generally 
welcomed them as legitimate expressions of people power in 
protest at electoral fraud and to support the domestic forces of 
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reform, Russia’s leadership perceived the same events as Western 
conspiracy to install anti-Russian regimes in its immediate 
neighbourhood, thereby creating a model and precedent for similar 
‘regime change’ in their own countries. Thus, for Russia’s political 
elite, the advance of democracy in its neighbourhood acquired 
geopolitical significance, with democracy promotion by Western 
actors being perceived as hostile anti-Russian acts.  
The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and Russia’s hostile acts 
towards Ukraine in 2014-17 following the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ 
was the next step in which Russia punished Georgia for its attempts 
to join NATO and Ukraine for its choice to associate itself with 
Europe. Trade sanctions applied to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
in response to the signature and ratification of the AA/DCFTA by 
these countries were also a form of punishment, albeit a milder one. 
Table 1.4 Support for different foreign policy options (%) 
 Georgia41 Moldova42 Ukraine43 
EU integration 62 39.4 53 
Eurasian Integration 23 39.9 18 
 
The effect of Russia’s actions was that efforts aimed at 
democratic development in the three countries of the EaP that chose 
the path of European integration became “geopoliticised”. While 
Europe is the chief democracy promoting actor in the eastern 
European AA region, Russian political elites consider the same 
countries as geopolitical battlefields, where the possible success of 
democratic reforms is only understood as an attempt to undermine 
Russia’s interests in the region. Russia therefore acts as a spoiler 
                                                        
41 Laura Thornton and David Sichinava, “Public attitudes in Georgia, Results of a June 
2017 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia” (https://www.ndi.org/ 
sites/default/files/NDI%20poll_june%202017_ISSUES_ENG_VF.pdf). 
42 Institute for Public Policy, Barometer of Public Opinion, April 2017 
(www.ipp.md). 
43 Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine (April 21 – May 5, 2017), conducted by 
International Republican Institute, Rating Group Ukraine and the Center for 
Insights in Survey Research, accessed online (checked on 4 November 2017) 
(http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2017-may-survey-of-residents-of-
ukraine_en.pdf). 
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rather than as a country providing an alternative model of 
development: it aims to discredit the very idea of Europe-inspired 
democratic reforms and the political forces associated with this 
policy direction.   
Hence it is Russia’s priority to counter European efforts by 
strengthening the pro-Russian actors in the three countries. On the 
political level, it is most successful in Moldova where president 
Dodon and his Socialist party openly prefer Eurasian to European 
integration. However, the success of this party can be explained not 
so much by Russia’s efforts as by the collapse of public support for 
the notionally pro-European parties that were discredited by 
corruption, bank fraud and the overall poor performance of the 
governing coalitions controlled by these parties. In Ukraine, 
Russia’s aggressive behaviour since 2014 undermined its influence 
on the Ukrainian political scene, but the government’s poor 
performance can also be used by Russia for political purposes. In 
Georgia, the openly pro-Russian political forces are relatively weak, 
but the relative increase in support for the option of Eurasian (rather 
than European) integration still implies that Russia can have levers 
within Georgia as well.  
Apart from political parties, Russia uses alliances with civil 
society, media and religious groups to promote its agenda. In all 
three countries, Orthodox Churches (in Moldova and Ukraine, 
those directly affiliated with Moscow Patriarchy) are considered 
open or tacit allies of Russia. Russia also tries to support pro-
Russian media-organisations, websites, and civil society groups.  
It is also notable that ethnic minority-populated areas often 
tend to be less supportive of the European integration path than 
overall population. For instance, during an unconstitutional 
referendum held in February 2014, approximately 98% of 
Gagauzian voters in Moldova supported integration with the 
Russian-led Customs Union.44 Armenian and Azeri-populated 
areas in Georgia are also less supportive of the EU and NATO 
                                                        
44 Radio Free Europe (https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-gagauz-referendum 
-counting/25251251.html). 
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integration projects, although the difference here is less marked.45 
This is an additional reason for Russia to focus its ‘soft power’ 
policies on ethnic minorities in the pro-Western neighbours 
(although 2014 Russian intervention in the regions of Ukraine that 
were least supportive of the country’s pro-Western policies went 
beyond ‘soft power’ methods).  
Nevertheless, the principal success factor in all of these 
propaganda and disinformation efforts is the failure of democratic 
and good governance reforms in Association Agreement countries. 
While Russia has some geopolitical levers such as influencing 
conflicts in the east of Ukraine or ‘frozen conflicts’ in Georgia and 
Moldova, it is the success or failure of reforms that determines the 
influence of these competing world views.   
Concluding remarks 
The state of democratic development in Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine allows for both pessimistic and optimistic conclusions. The 
three countries face significant, and differing structural problems in 
their democratic development, but there are major similarities.  
Nation-building processes in each country have been 
challenged by minorities disagreeing about their place and status 
within emerging nation states and/or the external manipulation of 
these disagreements, which led to violent conflicts, and the reality 
of ‘frozen’ or (in Ukraine) ‘semi-frozen’ conflicts and secessionist 
movements. None of the countries managed to create a reasonable 
distance between economic and political elites, such that being close 
to power almost becomes a necessary condition of gaining wealth, 
and the super-rich often succeed in converting their economic 
resources into political power, thus becoming ‘oligarchs’.  
Corruption and state capture have become endemic in 
political regimes, although since 2004 Georgia has had more success 
than others in tackling that challenge. Trust in state institutions is 
rather low: only a fraction of people believe that they are doing good 
                                                        
45 In an April 2017 poll, 54 percent of respondents in minority areas supported 
Georgia’s policy to join the EU, against 80 percent nation-wide. See Laura 
Thornton and Koba Turmanidze, Public attitudes in Georgia Results of April 2017 
survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia. 
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job at providing public goods, and only a minority in each country 
agree that their countries go in the right direction.  
The institutions of electoral democracy are not fully trusted 
either: while there have been precedents of power change through 
elections in each of the three countries, such changes have not 
become routine, and in some cases peaceful or not so peaceful 
revolutions were needed to oust unpopular governments. Still, 
there is no consensus among the major political players (in Georgia 
and Ukraine) that elections are the only legitimate means to gain 
political power. Such scepticism about electoral democracy is 
caused by the absence of fair political competition, due to the 
incumbent authorities’ propensity to monopolise political control, 
harass and delegitimise the opposition, apply selective justice, take 
control of the most influential media outlets, and other 
undemocratic practices.  
The public is generally supportive of democratic institutions 
and occasionally displays an enormous capacity to mobilise for 
democratic causes – but has so far failed to develop a robust 
network of intermediate institutions, such as stable political parties 
or broad public associations that could articulate, represent and 
advocate for interests of different segments of society. As a result, 
the ongoing political competition is mainly between charismatic (or 
super-rich) personalities and broad identity-based geopolitical 
orientations rather than between political visions and platforms. 
There is no public consensus on values of diversity, pluralism and 
tolerance of minority cultures or lifestyles, with influential social 
groups such as Orthodox Churches promoting openly illiberal 
agendas.  
There are also genuine grounds for optimism, however. 
Despite autocratic trends, all three countries have proved resilient 
in preserving relatively high levels of political and media pluralism, 
and more or less competitive political environments. There has been 
significant progress in specific areas of political reforms. 
Constitutions (if not necessarily constitutional processes) generally 
satisfy modern democratic principles, even if parties in power tend 
to tailor them to their political interests.  
Despite active propaganda and disinformation from illiberal 
and anti-Western groups and organisations, liberal democracy 
continues to be the only normative reference for most political 
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actors. Civil society, while insufficiently rooted in the broader 
public, has been active, vibrant, relatively well-organised and 
successful in setting agendas for reform, occasionally influencing 
political decisions. As a result, while the political regimes in all three 
countries have never reached the point of democratic consolidation, 
they are considered by most observers to be freer than any other 
successor-states of the Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic 
states), and closer to being democracies than autocracies.  
The European dimension has been an extremely important 
factor for the continuous democratisation of all three countries. 
Despite competition between European and Eurasian identities, 
each of them ultimately considers itself to be a European country. 
The choice to pursue the path of association with Europe, which the 
countries made despite obvious political risks (especially 
momentous in the case of Ukraine) is the best proof of their genuine 
commitment to the European path of development. This gives the 
EU considerable leverage in these countries, which has been used to 
urge them to carry out democratic reforms, or – at the very least – 
to limit autocratic trends.  
In the future too, the EU can play a very important, if not 
decisive role in helping these countries consolidate their democratic 
systems. However, with Association Agreements having been 
concluded, visa-free regimes granted, and the EU reluctant to 
extend a membership perspective to these countries, there is a 
shortage of incentives that the EU can use to back up its democracy-
promotion efforts. In order to keep up momentum for the process 
of reforms, it is vital that the EU develop a clearer forward-looking 
strategy towards the emerging AA-DCFTA region in its eastern 
neighbourhood, including convincing incentives for the further 
Europeanisation of these countries. 
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2. OLIGARCHS AS KEY OBSTACLES 
TO REFORM 
WOJCIECH KONOŃCZUK, DENIS CENUȘĂ  
& KORNELY KAKACHIA 
Introduction 
The chapter reviews the role of 
oligarchs in Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. Oligarchy is a term being 
used to denote a system of 
governance in which a small 
number of very wealthy 
individuals are able informally to 
control or strongly influence state 
policy. The portfolios of economic 
assets of the main oligarchs of the 
three countries is described in 
some detail. The nature of their 
influence on policymaking is 
further analysed, in particular the 
disadvantages for the governance 
of these countries. 
While these impacts differ in their detail by country, in 
general terms they tend towards limiting political pluralism, 
capturing state institutions, corruption, monopolisation, and more 
broadly the blocking of reform processes. Oligarchs are symptoms 
rather than causes of weak political institutions. Correspondingly, 
the remedies need a wide reach, including institutional capacity-
building, effective anti-corruption bodies, suitable public funding 
for political parties, effective competition policy and an 
independent judiciary and media, supported by many features of 
the Association Agreements and DCFTAs with the EU. Modern 
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economies will always need major business leaders and enterprises. 
The challenge is how to transform the oligarchs into normal 
business leaders. 
The oligarchic system has been known since ancient times, and is 
still a phenomenon in some of the post-Soviet states.1 Although the 
situations in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are different, there are 
also significant similarities. The most obvious is that all three have 
signed Association Agreements with the EU and declared European 
integration to be a key priority of their domestic and foreign 
policies.  
It appears that the negative legacy of post-Soviet oligarchs has 
not been fully acknowledged by the West, and has therefore been 
insufficiently studied. Part of the reason for this may be difficulties 
in fact-finding and describing and proving oligarchic influence, 
which is often a chain of opaque political, economic or financial 
operations. Oligarchy is an informal institution and in some 
respects it is more important in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia than 
the formal institutions and norms based on their constitutions. 
Anyone studying oligarchy is therefore forced to rely on 
presumptions rather than hard facts. Behind-the-scenes oligarchic 
systems are extraordinarily important to understanding the policy-
shaping mechanisms at work in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, 
and are a real obstacle to structural reform. 
Who are the oligarchs? 
The oligarchs’ origins are different in each of the three countries. In 
Ukraine oligarchs first emerged as important players in the mid-
1990s and quickly became a dominant feature of domestic political 
and economic life. Ukraine’s transformation and privatisation 
process resulted in the emergence of several business groups that 
accumulated economic power by controlling key economic sectors. 
In order to defend their assets they started investing in politics, thus 
becoming key political players. The most powerful oligarchs of the 
last two decades are Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and 
                                                        
1 The term ‘oligarchy’ was coined in the mid-1990s in Russia, and popularised 
by Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya.  
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Dmytro Firtash.2 In addition, over a dozen smaller groups can be 
defined as oligarchic.  
The oligarchs in Ukraine have mostly been reluctant to hold 
public positions, but instead either establish their own means of 
political action or support existing parties in exchange for lobbying 
for their interests. They have never monopolised state power, but 
thanks to their resources they have become the indispensable 
partners of the political class. One distinctive characteristic is the 
oligarch’s political flexibility. They lack consistent political 
sympathies and support any political party they deem useful for the 
protection of their business empires.3  
The last two decades have shown that the periodical changes 
of political regime in Ukraine have had little effect on the country’s 
enduring oligarchic system. Despite reshuffles among Ukrainian 
oligarchic groups and some loss of influence, a core of oligarchs 
remains stable.4 Likewise, in the three years since the Revolution of 
Dignity, the oligarchic system has been weakened but remains an 
important element in political and economic life. Some of the 
formerly most powerful oligarchs were eliminated as a factor in 
Ukrainian politics (the so-called Family or oligarchic group centred 
around the former President Victor Yanukovych’s and led by his 
son Oleksandr and by Serhiy Kurchenko), or lost part of their 
influence (Dmytro Firtash’s group), but others are still influential 
(such as the Kolomoyskyi group and so-called agrarian oligarchs 
representing the fast-growing agriculture sector). A special case is 
Petro Poroshenko, who – before being elected president – had been 
considered a second-rank oligarch with substantial political 
experience (formerly he served as minister of foreign affairs and 
economy). Obviously, his position and influence has increased 
significantly but his main business asset, the Roshen confectionery 
company, was passed to a trust fund managed by the Rothschild 
                                                        
2 See further below on requests for Firtash’s extradition, which may now limit 
his influence.  
3 Jaba Devderiani, Between Europe and Russia, oligarchs rule, Carnegie 
Europe, 1 December, 2016. 
4 Heiko Pleines, “Oligarchs and politics in Ukraine”, Demokratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratisation, 24 (1), winter 2016, p. 125.  
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Group.5 Overall, the oligarchic system still shapes Ukraine’s politics 
and economy.  
In Moldova the first steps towards an oligarchic system were 
taken during the rule of the Communist Party (2001-09), but the 
process of the country’s oligarchisation accelerated during the first 
period in power of the Alliance of European Integration coalition 
(2009-13). Its main shareholders were the Prime Minister Vlad Filat, 
leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), and 
Vlad Plahotniuc, the informal leader and sponsor of the Democratic 
Party of Moldova (PDM). Both politicians became allies and key 
players in Moldovan politics, but there was also a constant ‘under 
the carpet’ struggle between them for political influence and 
business assets. This period of difficult co-habitation has also been 
called ‘oligarchic pluralism’, as before entering politics Plahotniuc 
and Filat were seen as successful businessmen, and both are among 
the richest citizens of Moldova.6  
In 2014 the relationship between the two politicians suffered 
a definitive rupture, and as a result in October 2015 Filat was 
arrested and sentenced to nine years in prison. This led to the 
monopolisation of power by one oligarch, Vlad Plahotniuc, who 
due to his control of the state’s main institutions has concentrated 
unprecedented political and economic instruments in his hands. 
The overwhelming scale of Plahotniuc’s influence and his currently 
unchallenged position make it possible to say that Moldova is now 
displaying the symptoms of a ‘captured state’.7  
The situation in Georgia is very different from that in Ukraine 
and Moldova because previously there had not been a group of 
wealthy people who divided spheres of control. Georgia’s slow 
economic development, relatively small market and unstable 
political situation did not allow the ‘luxury’ of an oligarchy. During 
Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency (1995-2003) attempts were 
made by members of his family to take control of some business 
                                                        
5 Rothschild says Ukraine president's trust up to international standards, 
Reuters, 7 April 2016. 
6 Kamil Całus, Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony, 
Centre for Eastern Studies, 11 April 2016. 
7 Denis Cenușă, “Captured state” and “useful oligarchs” in proximity of EU: 
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, IPN, 17 October 2016. 
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assets, but ultimately this failed. Instead, a specific type of oligarchs 
emerged who made their fortunes in Russia in the 1990s and 
belonged to the Russian oligarchy during its most powerful period 
(from the mid-1990s to 2003, when the so-called Yukos affair started 
and the previous oligarchs lost their former power).  
In the late 2000s these Russian oligarchs of Georgian descent 
returned to their homeland and decided to translate their wealth 
into political power. The three most important figures were Badri 
Patarkatsishvili, who attempted a state takeover in 2007 but failed 
(and died in 2008), Kakha Bendukidze, who after his return to 
Georgia in 2004 became the Rose Revolution’s ideological dynamo 
and served as State Minister for Reform Coordination (but died in 
2014 in London),8 and Bidzina Ivanisvhili, who established the 
Georgian Dream coalition that won the parliamentary elections in 
2012.9 Ivanishvili became prime minister (2012-13) but then 
resigned and gave up the position to a member of his party. Since 
then, however, he has been widely perceived to be the most 
influential political actor in Georgia, essentially controlling 
Georgian politics even if formally he does not hold any public or 
party functions. In October 2016 the Georgian Dream won a 
constitutional majority in the parliamentary elections, which has 
further increased Ivanishvili’s influence over the country. 
Oligarchic portfolios 
Ukraine 
The oligarchs have been able to maintain their status as important 
players in Ukraine’s politics thanks to a number of factors. The most 
important is their dominance over strategic branches of the 
economy. Oligarchic capital in Ukraine is much stronger than in 
                                                        
8 Stephen Jones, Kakha Bendukidze and Georgia’s failed experiment, 
Opendemocracy.net, 2 January 2015. 
9 Bidzina Ivanishvili used to be one of the most secretive oligarchs in Russia. In 
the mid-1990s he was one of the so-called Semibankirshchina, an informal group 
of seven Russian oligarchs established to re-elect President Boris Yeltsin. Regis 
Gente, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a man who plays according to Russian rules?, 
Caucasus Survey 1, 2013. 
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other countries in the region. According to Deloitte’s CEE Top 500 
report, which ranks the largest companies in Central Europe and 
Ukraine, 64% of Ukrainian enterprises are controlled by local 
private capital (compared to 29.4% in Poland, 23.2% in the Czech 
Republic and 4.6% in Romania).10 The share of foreign capital in the 
ownership structure of Ukrainian companies consists of just 12%, 
and is the weakest among the CEE countries (compared to 54.4% in 
Poland, 63.8% in the Czech Republic and 84% in Romania). The 
Economist’s crony-capitalism index estimates that the Ukrainian 
oligarchs’ wealth equals 7.8% of the country GDP.11  
Traditionally there have been a dozen or so oligarchic groups 
in Ukraine, whose assets extended into all key sectors of the 
economy, especially energy, raw materials and heavy metals. They 
have never consolidated into one integrated group; on the contrary, 
they have often had contradictory interests and compete with each 
other for new assets and political influence. Several of these 
oligarchs have had the strongest positions:  
 Rinat Akhmetov is the richest oligarch in Ukraine, who owns 
among many other assets the largest electric energy and coal 
company (DTEK, with a 25% share in the total production of 
electricity and a 70% share in the production of electricity 
from fossil fuels), the largest metallurgy corporation 
(Metinvest), crucial companies in the agricultural (HarvEast), 
gas production (Neftegasdobycha) and telecommunications 
(Ukrtelecom) sectors, as well as one of the most popular TV 
channels (Ukraina TV), etc. 
 The Privat Group of Ihor Kolomoysky and his business 
partner Hennadiy Bogoliubov is among Ukraine’s most 
powerful oligarchic groups since the 1990s, which controls 
assets in the energy sector (42% stake in Ukrnafta, the main 
player in the oil market), the chemical, metallurgic and 
transport sectors, the media (1+1 TV channel), agriculture 
(Privat Agro-Holding), and the biggest Ukrainian bank 
(Privatbank, until December 2016, when it was nationalised 
as a failing bank of systemic importance). 
                                                        
10 Deloitte Central Europe Top 500.  
11 Comparing crony capitalism around the world, The Economist, 5 May 2016. 
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 The group of Dmytro Firtash, whose interests are mainly in 
the chemical and gas sectors (DF Group) and the media (the 
Inter TV channel, among others). Although since 2014 he has 
been under house arrest in Vienna waiting for possible 
extradition to the US on bribery charges, he remains an 
important factor in Ukrainian politics.12 Traditionally Firtash 
has had close ties with Russia and his business expansion was 
supported by Gazprombank’s loans. 
There are also other oligarchs whose interests are focused on 
particular branches of the economy, such as Viktor Pinchuk 
(metallurgy and media), Yuri Kosiuk, Andriy Verevskiy and Oleg 
Bakhmatiuk (the agriculture sector), Kostyantin Zhevago (the iron 
ore mining industry) and Petro Poroshenko (confectionery and 
automobile industry). According to some assessments, the wealth 
of the 50 richest Ukrainians in 2010 was equivalent to 46% of 
Ukraine’s GDP (compared to 16% in Russia and 4% in the US) but 
due to the economic crisis this level dropped to around 18% of the 
GDP in 2016.13 The general map of the oligarchs’ assets has 
remained relatively stable over the last ten years or so.  
Many of the oligarchic groups have additional powerful 
instruments, which make their position vis-à-vis the authorities 
even more powerful. In particular, they control most of the media 
market as the major TV channels owned by four oligarchs 
                                                        
12 In February 2017 the Austrian court granted the US’s extradition request, but 
the final decision will be taken by the Austrian minister of justice. Additionally, 
a separate warrant for Firtash has been issued by Spain on money-laundering 
charges. His political interests in Ukraine are represented by Serhiy 
Lyovochkin and Opposition Bloc party. 
13 Iryna Zhak, Pasquale Tridico, A plea for change, The Ukrainian Week, 8 
October 2014. According to the most recent Forbes ranking of the richest people 
in the world, six Ukrainians have wealth estimated at more than $1 billion: 
Akhmetov (US$4.6bn), Kolomoysky and his business partner Hennadiy 
Boholubov (respectively $1.4bn and $1,1bn), Kosiuk (US$1bn), Kostyantin 
Zhevago ($1.2 bn) and Pinchuk ($1.1bn). Poroshenko’s assets are estimated at 
$850 million. 
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(Kolomoysky, Firtash, Akhmetov and Pinchuk) control around 80% 
of the Ukrainian television market.14 
Moldova 
In the last few years Moldova’s economy has become monopolised 
by the country’s two most powerful oligarchs, who combine 
political and business activities. Although it is not easy to assess 
their business assets, which they often hold through proxies and 
offshore companies, information from 2010 indicates that Vlad 
Plahotniuc’s personal wealth amounted then to over $2 billion and 
Vlad Filat’s to approximately $1.2 billion (altogether around half of 
Moldova’s GDP).15 They increased their political and economic 
power by replacing the Communist Party’s monopoly during the 
political turmoil in April 2009.  
Apart from the Plahotniuc/Filat tandem,16 other smaller 
oligarchs attempted to gain and/or increase political influence 
during 2009-14, but they failed. Ilan Shor, who gained a significant 
share of his fortune through transactions on the banking market, has 
faced investigations and trials related to banking fraud, in addition 
to evidence that his companies were involved in the massive ‘stolen 
billion’ banking fraud revealed in late 2014.17 There are indications 
that Shor, under pressure from Plahotniuc, agreed to make serious 
corruption-related accusations against Filat in 2015. Consequently, 
the General Prosecutor’s Office exempted him from the imputations 
of banking fraud.18  
Another oligarch, Veaceslav Platon made big gains from 
illegal operations in the banking sector since the 1990s. He has been 
accused of the illegal takeover of banks, money laundering 
involving Russia, and many other criminal offences. Platon 
                                                        
14 This calculation is based on figures from the Television Industry Committee 
(2016). 
15 Presa rusa: Premierul Vlad Filat, locul trei in topul celor mai bogati oameni 
din R. Moldova, 10 July 2010. 
16 Denis Cenusa, “Captured state” and “useful oligarchs” in proximity of EU: 
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, 17 October 2016. 
17 See https://www.rise.md/articol/codrii-shorheiului/  
18 See http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/shor-iskupil-svoyu-vinu-tem-chto-
napisal-etot-donos-intervyu-nm-s-genprokurorom-ed-29986.  
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repeatedly avoided arrest by moving his business to Ukraine, where 
he worked with Victor Yanukovych’s proxies, and before that 
entered Moldovan politics (2009-10). In August 2016 Platon was 
detained and extradited from Ukraine and sentenced to 18 years 
imprisonment in April 2017 with regard to the ‘stolen billion’ affair.  
Renato Usatii came to prominence after building his fortune 
in Russia, where he also established close relations with Russian 
oligarchs in the railroad sector, including various Russian criminal 
entities and the intelligence services. Both Shor and Usatii planned 
to enter high-level politics by creating new or building up already 
existing political parties, and won local elections in 2015 in Orhei 
and Bălți, respectively. According to recent polls,19 Usatii still 
maintains significant political popularity, although he runs his 
party from Moscow as he is afraid of arrest on the basis of a 
controversial warrant issued by the Moldovan law enforcement 
bodies. 
Abundant information about Plahotniuc and other oligarchs’ 
operations became available since the dispute between him and 
Vlad Filat. According to reports from investigative journalists, civil 
society and the opposition, Plahotniuc promotes the majority of his 
interests via proxies in the real estate, media and scrap metal 
industries, among others. By March 2017, a company associated 
with Plahotniuc controlled a big share of the media market: four TV 
channels out of the five with nationwide coverage and three radio 
stations.20 These outlets reportedly cover 60-70% of the market.21 
Control of the media is important not only because they present a 
favourable public image of Plahotniuc but also because they ensure 
income from advertising, which is channelled to another 
Plahotniuc-related company. Due to this media advantage, 
Plahotniuc and his Democratic Party can reach a large audience and 
influence the daily political agenda. Even after the Audio-visual 
Code was adjusted in March 2017 to impose limits of up to two 
licences per owner for TV and radio stations, with respective 
                                                        
19 Barometrul de Opinie Publică, October 2016. 
20 See https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/oficial-vlad-plahotniuc-proprietar-a-
patru-televiziuni-si-trei-posturi-de-radio.  
21 Press Freedom of Republic of Moldova 2015, Independent Journalism Center 
2015. 
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sanctions, Plahotniuc continued to control the media market. His 
company (General Media Group) transferred the broadcasting 
rights for two of its channels to a new company (Telestar Media), 
which belongs to one of Plahotniuc’s advisors. 
Plahotniuc has been involved in the energy sector and 
allegedly in the recent crisis of the banking sector, but rather 
through intermediary persons and companies. The offshore 
intermediary company Energokapital, which sold electricity 
produced in Transnistria’s Cuciurgan power plant between 
December 2014 and March 2017, seems to be linked to him.22 The 
banking sector started to run out of resources at previous stages 
(2010-13) through various transactions involving offshore 
companies. However, the hardest hit came between January-
December 2014, when three banks – two of which, Banca de 
Economii and Banca Sociala, were government-backed and of 
systemic importance – became involved in illegal lending 
operations. According to investigations led by the Kroll Company, 
these schemes had a direct connection with companies associated 
with Shor23 and Russian banks, but without clear links to 
Plahotniuc. However, Platon has claimed that Plahotniuc, via his 
proxies and thanks to his control over the National Bank of 
Moldova, contributed to the mass fraud.24 Apart from Platon, 
another high profile figure is prosecuted for charges concerning the 
‘stolen billion’ affair - Chiril Lucinschi, son of the former President 
Petru Lucinschi and former Member of Parliament from the Liberal 
Democrat Party, run by former Prime Minister Vlad Filat.  
Georgia 
Bidzina Ivanishvili’s dominant position in Georgian politics is 
based on his personal wealth, which is estimated at around $4.5 
                                                        
22 Michael Bird, Andrei Cotrut, Moldovan energy intermediary company 
linked to “billion-dollar bank theft” scandal, 14 March 2016. 
23 Kroll Report, 2015.  
24 Veaceslav Platon: „Dețin documente despre implicarea lui Plahotniuc în 
furtul miliardului”. Ce spune despre Gofman și Iaralov, [« I have documents 
regarding the theft of one billion » What does this say about Gofman and 
Iaralov.] Ziarul National, 25 July 2016. 
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billion (a third of Georgia’s entire GDP).25 He made his money in 
Russia and moved back home in 2003 after selling his business 
shares there. His bank Rossiyskiy Kredit was sold for $352 million 
to a group of investors comprising major Russian bankers. His 
drugstore chain Doktor Stoletov was sold for $60 million to the 
Imperia-Pharma company, which according to the Russian press is 
controlled by the Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina 
Matvienko’s son, Sergey. He also found purchasers for his 
agriculture company Stoilenskiy Niva. Due to offshore companies 
and a lack of transparency, it is hard to ascertain the extent of 
Bidzina Ivanishvili’s current assets. According to the Panama 
Papers,26 Ivanishvili has not indicated all companies in his asset 
declarations. The declaration also revealed that a significant part of 
Ivanishvili’s assets were registered under the names of family 
members.  
Apart from his assets in Georgia,27 Ivanishvili owns a 
substantial portfolio of shares and bonds in blue-chip Western 
companies.28 His art collection is estimated to be $1 billion, 
accounting for around 25% of his capital.29 These two categories of 
assets would have nothing to do with his oligarchic powers in 
Georgia.  
According to the Officials’ Asset Declarations database,30 at 
least 38 officials have worked for companies associated with Bidzina 
Ivanishvili in the past, many of whom currently hold political office. 
While nobody could claim that these people have been illegally 
appointed or elected to their positions, this trend raises concerns 
                                                        
25 See http://www.forbes.com/profile/bidzina-ivanishvili/ . 
26 Luisa Kroll, Billionaires, Former Billionaires Outed For Offshore Wealth By 
The Panama Papers, 3 April 2016. 
27 Ivanishvili owns vast land across Georgia, including in Borjomi, a resort town 
in south-central Georgia and wealthy Tbilisis suburb. The report revealed he 
also owned a property in Moscow. 
28 Tamar Khurtsia, What do Georgian Government members own?, Agenda.ge, 
8 January 2014. 
29 Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Net Worth Dropped by $400 Million: Forbes Releases 
Billionaires List, Caucasus Business Week, 2 March 2016. 
30 See https://declaration.gov.ge/.  
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about whether the principle of merit-based selection of public 
officials has been justly applied.31 Ivanishvili’s name is also 
associated with GDS TV, which is 100% owned by his son Bera 
Ivanishvili. 
Now that Saakashvili is out of the political picture, 
Ivanashvili represents himself as a kind of messiah figure to which 
Georgian society seems particularly disposed.32 While outside 
democratic control and beyond any institutional checks and 
balances, Ivanashvili is believed to be the overarching controller of 
the Georgian government, even though he has not held any official 
post since he stepped down as prime minister at the end of 2013. 
The Ivanishvili factor alone makes many Georgians question the 
government’s transparency and complain about the persistent, 
informal system of political governance. A major risk is the 
continuing dependence of the nation and its ruling party on the 
financial resources and personality of a single person.  
To summarise 
As described above, and presented in Table 2.1, the nature of 
oligarchic influence is different in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. 
In Ukraine there has tended to be a balance between the various 
oligarchic factions and state power, although the former have 
always had enough resources to pressure decision-makers. The 
Moldovan case represents a classic case of ‘state capture’, where the 
de facto merger between economic and political power has had far-
reaching consequences for the quality of democracy. The Georgian 
case is the least obvious, and it would be an exaggeration to claim 
that it is a ‘captured state’ but its current leadership could lead the 
country in this direction.  
  
                                                        
31 Ivanishvili's companies – the forge for government officials, TI Georgia, 22 
April 2015. 
32 All three of Georgia’s previous post-independence leaders, Zviaad 
Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnardze and Mikheil Saakashvili fitted this 
mould. 
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Table 2.1 Anatomy of the oligarchic groups in Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia 
 Ukraine Moldova Georgia 
Type of 
oligarchic 
influence 
Balance 
between 
different 
groups of 
oligarchs 
Severe form of 
oligarchic 
presence – ‘state 
capture’ 
Informal 
governance 
with an 
oligarch in  
key political 
positions 
Number of 
oligarchic 
groups 
Numerous 
oligarchs – 
‘oligarchic 
pluralism’ 
Dominant 
position of one 
oligarch, with no 
challenger or 
competitor 
Dominant 
position of one 
oligarch, with 
no challenger 
or competitor 
Key areas 
of 
economic 
activity 
Energy, 
metallurgy, 
agriculture, 
media 
Media, real estate Real estate, 
media 
Means of 
operations 
Direct and 
indirect 
influence (via 
the parliament 
and informal 
ties with the 
government)  
Indirect via 
offshore 
companies and 
proxies, and 
direct via political 
parties and state 
institutions 
Via political 
institutions 
and political 
parties 
The disadvantages of oligarchy 
The oligarchic system has numerous negative consequences for 
political, economic and social activities in Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia. The oligarchs emerged in specific conditions in each 
country, and are usually the products of the weakness of the state, 
the ineffectiveness of the state’s public institutions, endemic 
corruption and political party systems that are either inefficient or 
completely absent in the normal sense. Yet the oligarchs are a 
symptom of the crisis condition of the state, rather than a direct 
cause of it.33  
                                                        
33 Heiko Pleines, “Oligarchs. More a symptom than a cause of Ukraine’s crisis”, 
VoxUkraine, 19 January 2017. 
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Oligarchs are not usually interested in changing the status quo 
and support the existing regimes, albeit on condition that they pose 
no threat to their business interests. Oligarchic systems fossilise the 
weaknesses of a state, and in many cases make them even weaker. 
Successful modernisation would mean a change to conditions that 
had previously been favourable for them.  
Below we review the various types of impacts that oligarchs 
have had in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Some of them are 
relevant to all three countries, albeit with varying degrees of 
intensity, but others are specific to just one or two. Generally, it is 
difficult to track accurately the activities of the oligarchy and the 
damage it does because by nature they operate in the shadows and 
behind the scenes. But there are also obvious oligarch-backed 
activities that provide enough evidence to assess the nature and 
goals of their influence.  
Limiting political pluralism 
In a poorly managed state with a corrupt and ineffective 
bureaucracy, oligarchs are the best-organised group and know how 
to use their competitive advantages. Thanks to the resources at their 
disposal (financial power, dominance of the media, etc.) they can 
afford to spend huge sums of money on political bribes and to hire 
lobbyists to work at home and abroad. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, ensuring as big a representation in parliament as possible has 
become one of the oligarchs’ key goals. This mechanism has been 
clearly visible in Ukraine since the 1990s. To protect their business 
interests they need to win support from major political parties; in 
exchange for funding political campaigns and granting access to the 
media they control, political parties agree to lobby for the oligarchs’ 
interests or reserve some of the seats on their electoral lists to 
individuals put forward by the oligarchs.  
The experience of the Ukrainian parliamentary system has 
shown that no serious political force is able to successfully operate 
without financial backing from the oligarchs. This does not mean 
that the politicians become mere puppets of the oligarchs, but their 
role in shaping important political decisions has often been decisive. 
According to press reports, Dmytro Firtash was one of the brokers 
of a deal between Petro Poroshenko and Vitali Klitschko in March 
2014. Klitschko, whose UDAR party was probably financed by 
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Firtash, withdrew from the presidential race and left room for 
Poroshenko. Moreover, the post-Maidan parliamentary elections of 
26 October 2014 confirmed that the major Ukrainian oligarchic 
groups have retained significant influence in parliament thanks to 
their control over a few dozen deputies at least (however, in the 
previous terms of parliament the oligarchs’ impact was greater). It 
is difficult to assess the influence the oligarchs’ hold over the 
political parties, but almost all the main parties (including the Petro 
Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front) are influenced by the most 
powerful oligarchic groups.34  
In the case of Moldova, two crucial political parties (i.e. 
Democrats and Liberal-Democrats) have been almost completely 
taken over in recent years by their oligarchic ‘owners’, namely Vlad 
Plahotniuc and Vlad Filat respectively. Georgia faces a similar 
situation, where Bidzina Ivanishvili backed the Georgian Dream 
party, which won the parliamentary elections in October 2016.35 The 
broad scope of the oligarchs’ influence is a serious obstacle to 
creating normal political party systems, because the oligarch-
dependent parties receive informal benefits at the expense of other 
political forces. It creates unequal conditions, undermines political 
pluralism and expands political corruption. It also has triggered 
opposition outside the conventional political system.36 As a result, 
shadow actors, whose power and influence are not constrained by 
law and who occupy no elected positions, participate informally in 
the decision-making process.37 In this way, the oligarchs have 
become a permanent feature of politics (in Ukraine), or hold the real 
power (in Moldova and Georgia).  
In Georgia, a new wave of ‘oligarchisation’ of politics 
emerged before the 2012 election period and most notably in the 
aftermath of the 2012 elections. However, unlike in Ukraine or 
                                                        
34 More details: Wojciech Konończuk, Oligarchs after the Maidan: the old 
system in a ‘new’ Ukraine, Centre for Easten Studies, 16 February 2015. 
35 Maciej Falkowski, The Georgian Dream takes total control, Centre for Eastern 
Studies, 9 November 2016. 
36 Denis Cenușă, Moldova between protests and “state capture”, CIDOB, March 
2016, https://www.cidob.org/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion/ 
europa/moldova_between_protests_and_state_capture.  
37 Some Ukrainian oligarchs were members of the parliament in the past, 
namely Akhmetov, Poroshenko and Pinchuk. 
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Moldova, in Georgia the oligarchic influence is not closely linked to 
corrupt structures or inefficient institutions. Bidzina Ivanishvili 
appeared at a time when Georgia’s institutions were the strongest 
and most efficient in the post-Soviet space. In terms of fighting 
corruption, Georgia had emerged as a model in the post-Soviet 
space and broader region.  
Yet key figures among Georgia’s political elite in power are 
financially dependent on the oligarch. Bidzina Ivanishvili has two 
main types of influence: political, as no key decisions are made 
without him or his instruction, and financial, where he funds some 
of the prominent politicians to maintain influence over them. 
Ivanishvili’s openly declared objective has been to destroy the 
political opposition and in particular the United National 
Movement, the main alternative political party. Important political 
opponents and politicians have been jailed, or sued based on 
criminal charges, including former President Mikhail Saakashvili, 
former mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava, former Minister of Interior 
Vano Maribishvili, etc. This situation puts Georgia in a vulnerable 
position vis-à-vis both its commitment to democracy and its foreign 
policy orientation, and increases regime and institutional 
uncertainty for the future. Informal oligarchic governance is also 
associated with a gradual emergence of pro-Russian sentiment in 
Georgia and increased Russian influence over Georgian NGOs and 
the political party landscape. For the first time since independence, 
an openly Eurosceptic nationalist party – widely believed to be 
harbouring pro-Russian sentiments – entered the Georgian 
Parliament after the 2016 elections, allegedly backed by Bidzina 
Ivanishvili. 
Capturing state institutions 
The restriction of political pluralism leads to the ‘capture’ of specific 
state institutions, which in this way become mere façades. Rather 
than serving the public interest, such institutions serve the private 
interests of politicians, or the oligarchs themselves if they succeed 
in capturing state power. The first model is seen in Ukraine, where 
state institutions are fragile and dependent on the ruling coalition, 
which does not have the will to reform and convert the institutions 
into independent bodies, which is always a prerequisite for a 
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successful transformation.38 An example of this is the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, which is subordinated to the Ukrainian president 
and perceived to be a powerful weapon against potential political 
rivals. In 2016, Yuriy Lutsenko, a close ally of Petro Poroshenko and 
former head of the president‘s party in parliament, was appointed 
as prosecutor general. His activities have so far been beneficial for 
the president due to his use of legal instruments to start 
investigations against the president’s political foes.39 
Moldova is probably the most ‘advanced’ model of state 
capture in Europe. Many of its key institutions (in particular in the 
law enforcement area such as the Prosecutor General Office, Anti-
Corruption Centre) are seen as being under the full control of Vlad 
Plahotniuc.40 Control over the Anti-Corruption Centre became a 
matter of permanent dispute between Vladimir Plahotniuc and ex-
Prime-Minister Vlad Filat, who was ultimately arrested by this 
institution after being stripped of his immunity in parliament. As 
the oligarchic Filat-Plahotniuc tandem was dismantled, the 
Democratic Party government controlled by Plahotniuc 
significantly increased its power in the country.41 In his last speech 
before parliament in October 2015 (anticipating his imminent 
arrest), Filat named the law enforcement state institutions (the 
General Prosecutor’s Office and the Anti-Corruption Centre) as 
having fallen under the control of Plahotniuc. The Council of Audits 
also seems to be under a certain level of influence from political 
stakeholders, including Plahotniuc. Other institutions related to the 
                                                        
38 Many such arguments are given in Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, Crown Business 2012. 
39 Генеральна прокуратура Юрського періоду [The General Prosecutor's 
Office of the jurassic period], Radio Svoboda, 14 April 2017; Sergej Leshchenko, 
Corruption Inc., Die Zeit, 5 May 2017. 
40 Joint Statement EPP-ALDE: Moldova – the uninominal system is a desperate 
attempt to keep the Democratic Party in power, http://www.epp.eu/press-
releases/joint-statement-epp-alde-moldova-the-uninominal-system-is-a-
desperate-attempt-to-keep-the-democratic-party-in-power/ 
41 After Filat’s downfall in late 2015, the governing coalition reshaped and 
included the Democrats, their junior ally the Liberal Party, and fugitive MPs 
from other parliamentary parties (the Liberal Democratic Party, the 
Communist Party), totalling around 57 MPs. This allowed the Democrats to 
extend their control over 12 of the 16 ministries (four being conceded to the 
Liberal Party), Expert-Grup, State of the Country Report 2016.  
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media or energy regulation are also of questionable independence 
from the Democratic Party and its dwarf political allies. The 
economic position of Plahotniuc and his proxies is assured by their 
control over those crucial public institutions. Neither the General 
Prosecutor’s Office nor the Anti-Corruption Centre has reacted to 
the involvement of the oligarch’s proxies in banking frauds, shady 
energy schemes or embezzlement cases involving state-owned 
companies. The same institutions have engaged in only rather 
selective fighting of corruption (notably against Filat and his 
proxies, Platon etc.) rather than targeting all cases systematically.  
The ‘capture’ element is also seen in the parliament. By May 
2017, the Democratic Party had drawn more than 40 MPs via 
different forms of ‘sticks and carrots’ into the Democratic Party’s 
faction in the Parliament. As a result, the Democrats more than 
doubled their number of seats in the legislative body from their 
initial 19 MPs after the elections in November 2014. Increasing the 
number of MPs is meant to ease the law-making process for the 
Democrats. In addition, the Democrats seek to change the electoral 
system without having the full support of the opposition and civil 
society and being openly criticised by the major pan-European 
political parties. Recent polls show that the Democrats risk falling 
below the threshold of 6% necessary to remain in parliament. They 
seek to justify the need to switch from the current proportional 
system to a mixed system that would see half the seats elected by 
uninominal voting, which would include representatives from the 
diaspora and the Transnistrian region. They argue that this would 
give more voter control over MPs. On this they might reach a 
consensus with the Socialists, with whom President Igor Dodon is 
associated.  
As regards Georgia, Transparency International recently 
published an analysis showing that its system of democratic checks 
and balances remains weak. The report found that parliamentary 
oversight of the judiciary is too weak to serve as an effective check 
on the power of the executive branch, whose power remains largely 
secured by the ruling party’s constitutional majority in Parliament.42  
                                                        
42 Andrew McDevitt, The State Of Corruption: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova And Ukraine, Transparency International 2015. 
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Corruption 
Ukraine and Moldova are among the most corrupt countries in the 
world, currently ranked 134th and 123rd respectively on the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2016.43 
Meanwhile, Georgia (44th place) is an example of the great progress 
that can be made in reducing corruption, which was one of the 
biggest achievements of Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency (2004-12).  
The system of governance in both Ukraine and Moldova has 
been transformed into rent-seeking mechanisms.44 Systemic 
corruption is an important factor in keeping the oligarchs powerful. 
They did not invent political corruption, but they actively 
participate in various corrupt schemes with the political class. 
Oligarchs’ businesses can thrive thanks to shadowy corruption-
based deals with the ruling elite, as well as public tenders or 
privatisations whose outcomes may be fixed in advance. The 
authorities participate in illegal schemes and share their profits with 
the oligarchs, with consequences for the state budget.  
In the case of Ukraine, this longstanding model of specific 
synergy between the authorities and the oligarchs was preserved 
after the Revolution of Dignity due to the decision taken by the post-
Maidan elite to enter into an informal alliance with the main 
oligarchic groups. But this is on a smaller scale than during the 
Viktor Yanukovych presidency. Furthermore, new anti-corruption 
bodies were created: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), 
the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, which is a good start in fighting 
systemic corruption. Their work shows that only the NABU can be 
perceived as a truly independent institution; the other two fall 
under the influence of the presidential office, which also attempts to 
limit NABU operation.45 Despite some achievements in the anti-
corruption campaign (including investigations into a few high-level 
officials) moderate progress has been achieved.  
                                                        
43 Transparency International Corruption Index 2016. 
44 Heiko Pleines, Oligarchs. More a symptom than a cause of Ukraine’s crisis, 
VoxUkraine, 19 January 2017. 
45 Sergej Leshchenko, Corruption Inc., Die Zeit, 5 May 2017. 
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There is not enough space in this chapter to present all the 
‘old-new’ shadow deals since 2014, but some salient examples can 
be cited.  
In March 2016, the National Commission for Energy, Housing 
and Utilities Services Regulation (NKREKU) introduced a new 
formula for calculating the price of the electricity generated by 
power plants. The new system is based on the price of coal in the 
port of Rotterdam plus the cost of its delivery to Ukraine. The so-
called ‘Rotterdam-plus’ formula was one of the reasons why 
Ukrainian customers started to pay energy bills that are three and a 
half times higher than in 2015. The main beneficiary of the new price 
formula is DTEK, owned by Rinat Akhmetov; this company is not 
only Ukraine’s largest coal producer but also produces 70% of 
Ukraine’s energy from thermal power plants. The Rotterdam price 
formula has been widely criticised by Ukrainian experts as lacking 
economic logic and being politically motivated.46 Thanks to the new 
formula, the energy companies, mainly DTEK and Centrenego 
(state-owned, but media reported it to be under influence of Igor 
Kononenko, a Poroshenko Bloc deputy and the president’s trusted 
man), have received additional revenues of up to US$400 million a 
year.47 According to the government’s initial statements, the new 
energy formula was intended to allow Ukrainian power plants to 
switch to coal sourced other than from the separatist-controlled part 
of the Donbas region. However, the Ukrainian government has not 
implemented any directive to create the legal framework to force 
power plants to spend additional revenues on their technological 
modernisation. On the contrary, the ‘Rotterdam-plus’ formula can 
be seen as a government-designed helping hand for the heavily 
indebted DTEK (the company’s debts are estimated at US$2.3bn).  
Some shady energy sector schemes are visible in Moldova, in 
particular, supplies of electricity to Moldova from the Transnistrian 
region’s Cuciurgan power plant via traders with an offshore 
                                                        
46 Andriy Gerus, What’s Wrong With the 'Rotterdam Formula'?, Ukrainska 
Pravda, 22 June 2016. 
47 Владислав Швец, Баланс недели: чрезвычайные меры в 
электроэнергетике, рост ВВП и прокурорская проверка тарифов [The 
outcome of the week: extraordinary measures in the energy sector, the rise of 
GDP and the prosecutor's review of tariffs], Unian, 18 February 2017. 
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presence, namely through Energokapital48 between December 2014 
and March 2017, which conducted transactions offshore via 
VictoriaBank, associated with Plahotniuc’s proxies until autumn 
2016. 
Since 2003, Georgia has made significant progress in fighting 
corruption. Following transfers of power in 2012 and 2013, the then 
Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and his successor Prime Minister 
Irakli Garibashvili both pledged to strengthen Georgia’s anti-
corruption stance. Georgia is widely recognised as having had 
considerable success in tackling petty corruption and public-sector 
bribery. This means that the reforms implemented in Georgia since 
2004 have indeed had a substantial impact on corruption. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
concluded that perceived corruption in Georgia is lower than in 
several EU member states, including Slovakia, Italy, Greece, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and much lower than in neighbouring 
Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan.  
Monopolising the economy 
Oligarchs gain control over some of key sectors of the economy, 
hindering normal market competition. In Ukraine, for instance, 
oligarch-controlled companies have considerable market power in 
the electric energy sector, coal mining (in the dominant position of 
DTEK), the media, gas distribution (mainly controlled by Firtash), 
and the oil refinery sector (Ukrtatnafta controlled by Kolomoysky). 
In addition to the oligarchs’ assets, they also manage some of the 
most valuable state-owned monopolies (especially in the sectors of 
energy, ports, transport, and alcoholic drinks) thanks to their 
informal deals with the authorities. Ukraine’s Anti-Monopoly 
Committee has not hindered this – on the contrary.  
One of the many negative effects of this monopolisation of economic 
activities is the poor investment climate. The 2017 Index of 
Economic Freedom ranks Ukraine 166th (out of 180 countries), 
                                                        
48 Denis Cenușă, Otilia Nuțu, The Bridge over the Prut, version 2.0: the 
electricity interconnection between Romania and Moldova, Expert Grup, 19 
January 2017. 
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Moldova 110th, contrasting with Georgia’s 13th place.49 Foreign 
investors are discouraged from entering Ukraine and Moldova 
because of informal preferences for oligarchic capital, the weak rule 
of law, and the fear of corporate raiding.50 As a result, the level of 
FDI in these two countries is among the lowest per capita in Europe.  
In Moldova there is a little evidence of direct interference by 
Vlad Plahotniuc in the decision-making process that would favour 
the specific sectors allegedly controlled by him and/or his ‘inner 
circle’. Some cases can be traced, however. In early 2016, the 
parliamentarian majority of the Democratic deputies passed a draft 
law to modify the country’s existing broadcasting code. The law 
aimed to reduce the monopoly in the media sector by introducing 
legal limitations to the number of broadcasting licences, from five 
to two per media owner. Nevertheless, the already existing licences 
are to be maintained until they expire.51 In 2016, the Democratic 
Party proposed modifications to the code, criticised by local NGOs 
and by international organisations.52 The critics regarded the 
amendments as favourable to the big outlets, similar to those 
controlled by Plahotniuc’s proxies, which have nationwide 
coverage and control more than 50% of the advertising media 
market. Facing harsh criticism from the media NGOs, the draft law 
was then overtaken by a new broadcasting code that received 
support in the first reading in 2016, having been welcomed by local 
NGOs. 
Another case is the government’s decision in December 2016 
to create a monopoly for pharmaceutical procurement in the public 
sector, which raised concerns among local observers.53 The 
authorities justified their decision by highlighting the need to 
                                                        
49 See http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking 
50 Matthew Rojansky, Corporate Raiding in Ukraine: Causes, Methods and 
Consequences, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization vol. 
22, 3/2014. 
51 Statement of the civil society, March 2016  
52 See https://freedomhouse.org/article/moldova-restrictions-foreign-
broadcasters-undermine-press  
53 Governmental Decision no. 1336 of December 2016 regarding the 
establishment of the state-controlled joint stock company MoldFarm. 
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eliminate frequent contractual irregularities in the procurement of 
pharmaceuticals for the public sector. A similar initiative is being 
proposed for the gambling sector, where new regulations will 
replace the current, poorly governed state of affairs, but only by 
introducing another state monopoly.54 The state’s poor performance 
in managing public properties intensifies concerns about the 
creation of new state monopolies, which would be controlled by 
Plahotniuc’s proxies. Overall, the Democratic Party has not engaged 
extensively in the de-monopolisation of sectors where Plahotniuc’s 
interests mostly stand (scrap metal, the advertising industry).  
In Georgia, Ivanishvili’s influence is stronger in the political 
field (namely on the government and parliamentary majority) than 
on the economy. He did not make money in Georgia, although he 
owns certain assets and increasingly gains control of the media. 
Unlike some other oligarchs, Ivanishvili does not focus so much on 
investment projects in his home country. The main exception is a 
much-vaunted private equity fund he launched less than a month 
before key presidential elections. The $6bn Georgian Co-Investment 
Fund has attracted heavyweight investors, including the UAE’s 
Abu Dhabi Group, Turkey’s Calik Holdings and China’s Milestone 
Intl. Holding – plus a commitment of $1bn of his own money from 
Ivanishvili himself. The fund’s size and governance structures cause 
concern in an environment where business and politics have often 
been intertwined. The Fund aims to finance projects in energy, 
tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure and other areas. 
Recent developments in the media landscape in Georgia may 
endanger media pluralism. These include the merger of three major 
television channels (Imedi TV, GDS, and Maestro TV55), and 
controversial events surrounding the Georgian Public broadcaster. 
In addition, the courts have transferred ownership of the Rustavi2 
TV channel, the highly popular network that is consistently critical 
                                                        
54 See http://eco.md/index.php/home/rss/item/4975-plahotniuc-multiplic 
%C4%83-metalferosul. 
55 Imedi TV is owned by the family of deceased businessman Badri 
Patarkatsishvili, GDS is owned by Bera Ivanishvili – the son of Bidzina 
Ivanishvili – and Maestro TV has several shareholders. Controlling shares in 
Maestro TV and GDS will be transferred to Imedi TV, and Patarkatsishvili’s 
family will own the new media conglomerate. 
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of the government, to someone who is close to the ruling party. 
Critics view this as politically motivated and initiated by the 
government,56 and timed to precede local elections.57  
Blocking reforms 
The oligarchs remain one of the key obstacles to reform. Any 
programme for the systemic modernisation of the state and for 
establishing a rule-of-law based system poses a threat to their 
interests. Hence, they have tried to use the instruments at their 
disposal to influence the reform process, to ensure that it does not 
strike at their business interests (in Ukraine) or, thanks to their 
control over the state’s institutions, to block changes less favourable 
to their interests (Moldova and Georgia).  
Reforms in Ukraine since 2014 have already weakened the 
interests of certain some Ukrainian oligarchs, however, especially in 
the gas and banking sectors.  Another step in the right direction was 
the decision to fund political parties from the state budget, but it is 
still too early to say whether this will help to curb the oligarchs’ 
influence; they are skilful in obstructing or delaying reforms and in 
some spheres influence decision-making processes. In cooperation 
with some of the ruling elite, the oligarchs have been accused of 
blocking the modernisation and privatisation of many major state-
owned enterprises, particularly in the energy sector (Ukranfta and 
Centrenego, controlled by Kolomoysky and Kononenko 
respectively),58 the chemical sector (the Odessa Port Plant, 
                                                        
56 K. Kakachia, B. Lebanidze, J. Larsen, M. Grigalashvili, The First 100 Days of 
The Georgian Dream Government: A Reality Check, Georgian Institute of 
Politics 2017. 
57 Cory Welt, The Curious Case of Rustavi-2: Protecting Media Freedom and 
the Rule of Law in Georgia. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, November, 2015. 
58 Как Коломойский выводит миллиарды из «Укрнафты» [How Kolomojski 
is syphoning billions out of ‘Ukrnafta’], Capital.ua, 14 June 2016. 
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controlled by Kononenko),59 and the Ukrainian Railways (which is 
under the influence of Akhmentov and Leonid Yurushev).60 
One of the most important achievements of the Ukrainian 
reform process has been the creation of the independent National 
Anti-Corruption Bureau (as discussed in more detail in chapter 4). 
But its initial period of operation shows that its work is being 
obstructed by part of the ruling elite, including the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, as it poses a danger to the interests of corrupt 
politicians and oligarchs. Another example concerns the case of a 
new energy regulator, established in September 2016 after 
longstanding pressure from the IMF and the European 
Commission. Although the regulator is a desirable part of energy 
sector reform, the authorities (the president, the parliament and the 
ministry of energy) have informally reserved themselves the right 
to select the members of the new institution’s board, which will give 
them significant leverage over the regulator’s work.61 In order to 
make the work of the energy regulator genuinely independent its 
board members should be elected by an independent commission, 
in which representatives of authorities should have less than half of 
the seats and in an election process in which energy market 
participants are genuinely involved. 
In Moldova, Plahotniuc’s objective clashes with the logic of 
reforms that would reduce political and systemic corruption in the 
public, private and overall judiciary. The most recent and 
illustrative cases of blocking the reforms refer to the appointment of 
the new General Prosecutor, and the ‘Integrity’ legislative package 
that empowers the National Commission of Integrity to enforce 
asset declarations of public officials. The rapid and controversial 
appointment of Eduard Harunjen as new general prosecutor in late 
2016 raised serious questions about the commitment of the 
                                                        
59 Приватизацию ОПЗ сворачивают, завод возглавит экс-помощник 
Кононенкo [OPZ – End of privatisation, the plant will be led by ex-assistant 
Kononenko], Epravda.com.ua, 13 December 2016.  
60 The Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) accounts for around 3% of the 
country’s GDP. Иван Верстюк, Тяжелый рок Войцеха Балчуна (Hard rock of 
Vojceh Balchun), nv.ua, 3 February 2017. http://www.liga.net/projects/ 
corruption_transport/  
61 Tadeusz Iwański, Ukraine: new regulator of the Energy sector, Centre for 
Eastern Studies, 28 September 2016. 
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authorities to continue the Prosecutor Office’s reform, initiated in 
2015. The Democratic Party blocked the ‘Integrity’ package law in 
2015, and new legislation has only progressed subsequently under 
the pressure of the EU and Western partners. The new law should 
increase the powers and the efficacy of the body in charge, with 
verification and investigation of the asset declarations public 
officials. However, the body requires an administration formed 
from people selected in a transparent way and with no political 
affiliation.  
Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream government came to power 
after an active and successful phase of reforms, which lasted eight-
nine years and transformed Georgia from a failing state with weak 
institutions to a fast-growing liberal economy which has 
increasingly emerged as a regional hub. But since 2012 the pace of 
reforms has slowed. However, Georgia is making headway in 
implementing a number of reforms to strengthen democracy, 
uphold the rule of law and bolster the economy, according to a 
report released on 29 November 2016 by the European External 
Action Service and the European Commission. Its findings show 
that Georgia has implemented a number of measures required 
under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which came into 
force on 1 July 2016. The report also notes that Georgia successfully 
met all benchmarks under the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, as 
evidenced by the European Commission's proposal to the Council 
and the European Parliament that subsequently led to the lifting of 
visa obligations for Georgian citizens in March 2016.62 
How to respond to the challenges posed by 
oligarchs? 
The fragmentary reforms in Ukraine, Moldova and their slow pace 
in Georgia since 2012 have not curbed oligarchic influence to any 
significant degree. The majority of reforms implemented have been 
under pressure from Western institutions (the EU, the US, and the 
IMF), often against the will of the oligarch-backed governments. 
Moreover, these reforms are not irreversible and are still far from 
laying the foundations for genuine systemic change. It is crucial to 
                                                        
62 EU report: Georgia making headway in the implementation of its Association 
Agenda, Brussels, 29 November 2016. 
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fully implement some reforms already accepted by the parliament. 
Measures urgently needed to cleanse the political, economic and 
justice systems of interference by the oligarchs can be summarised 
as follows:  
Institutional capacity building  
Each of the countries discussed has weak and dependent state 
institutions, which leads to a lack of checks and balances 
mechanisms. It is essential to free the law enforcement institutions 
of political influence by ensuring the transparent appointment of 
senior officials, initially under the possible supervision of the EU 
and other international donors. Law enforcement institutions 
should be subject to the oversight of parliament as the more 
representative political body. The goal should be to reach a situation 
whereby the state institutions are strong enough to withstand 
pressure from oligarchic groups. Another element should be fair 
salaries for state institutions’ staff.  
Effective anti-corruption bodies 
Independent anti-corruption institutions should play a key role in 
minimising the role of informal political and economic actors. 
Combating corruption directly benefits the reform process. In 
Ukraine’s case it is crucial to protect the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau from political interference so that it can continue its 
operations. Moldova’s Anti-Corruption Centre must function 
without political control. Building the principles of transparency 
and accountability into the governance system is the best way of 
reducing corruption risks: public officials are likely to refrain from 
using power for personal gain if they know that citizens can easily 
access information about their activities (transparency) and that 
whatever crimes they commit will result in punishment 
(accountability). It is impossible to have transparency and 
accountability mechanisms (such as an independent judiciary or 
free media) in an undemocratic system.  
Funding for political parties  
The essential steps here are to cleanse the political parties of vested 
interests and oligarchic groups by implementing new legislation on 
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financing political parties from the state budget (in Moldova63 and 
Georgia), in parallel with a close permanent audit of their finances, 
and sanctions for offences. In Ukraine, the new legislation for 
financing political parties that has been implemented has yet to 
prove its effectiveness. This should include capacity-building and 
more specialised (financial) competences for the Central Electoral 
Committee. Only normal political parties with transparent budgets, 
audited regularly by a truly independent state institution, can be 
immune from oligarchic pressure.  
Competition policy 
It is necessary to beef up the institutions that promote competition 
and develop more robust legislation and mechanisms for 
dismantling de jure or de facto monopolies which involve state 
enterprises or private entities controlled by vested interests. The 
DCFTA provisions are extremely helpful, but only their consistent 
implementation can genuinely change the current state of affairs 
and reduce the oligarchs’ influence. Another important contribution 
should be the creation of independent regulators for various 
branches of the economy, especially for the energy market. Without 
an effective competition and deregulation policy, better conditions 
for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises will not 
be created. The development of SMEs played an important role in 
transforming the economies of Central Europe. 
Independent judiciary  
Cleaning up corrupt justice systems should be one of the priorities 
of the reform process as it will affect many other dimensions, create 
a positive business climate and enhance the public’s trust in the 
state. Part of the broader approach towards reforming the justice 
system should be a fundamental reform of rules in the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, to liberate the judiciary from control of the 
Prosecutor’s Office or the government. 
                                                        
63 The Electoral Committee demanded that eligible political parties create bank 
accounts to receive the funds from the budget monthly, which overall amounts 
to approx. 40 million MDL (approx. 19 million EUR). Report on the 
implementation of the Priority Reform Action Plan, Expert-Grup, ADEPT, 
CRJM, September 2016. 
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Independent media 
To balance the near-monopolistic influence of the oligarch-owned 
media (especially TV channels), public media should be 
strengthened. This would require reform of the state’s funding 
policy, as well as the introduction of television licences (regular fee 
paid by citizens). Additional laws limiting the concentration of 
media outlets in the hands of one company or individuals are also 
needed. This will improve the quality of the information and will 
increase public awareness about the vital policy issues faced by the 
countries. Additionally, the audio-visual bodies require both 
capacity building and more competences to sanction disinformation 
and fake news.  
Association Agreements and DCFTA implementation 
All three countries have started to implement Association 
Agreements (including DCFTAs), which include many provisions 
to reinforce, directly or indirectly, the policy priorities summarised 
above to curb the undue influence of oligarchs, and more broadly to 
accelerate the modernisation of their economy and political 
institutions by reforming the state’s regulations in many spheres.64 
The foremost mechanism is through the liberalisation of external 
trade, which puts an end to the process of oligarchic interests 
securing protection for specific sectors, especially when backed up 
by reforms of internal competition, public procurement, and diverse 
regulatory functions.  
Conclusions 
Curbing the power of the oligarchies in Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia depends on the effectiveness of the abovementioned 
reforms. Only their successful implementation, which in some 
spheres has already begun, will offer these countries the 
opportunity to fundamentally revise the relationship between 
political power and the oligarchs. Transforming the oligarchs into 
normal economic players – key business leaders – can only be 
                                                        
64 Michael Emerson, Veronika Movchan (eds) (2016), Deepening EU-Ukrainian 
Relations: What, why and how?, CEPS; with companion publications on 
Georgia and Moldova. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  85 
 
achieved through transformation of the economic and political 
system in the three countries examined here.  
‘De-oligarchisation’ depends on the de-politicisation of specific 
state institutions, the effective fighting against corruption, and the 
de-monopolisation of the media and key economic sectors. This will 
determine the success of the modernisation and building-up of 
democratic institutions in these countries. 
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3. INTEGRITY AND JUDICIAL 
REFORM ON TRIAL  
STEVEN BLOCKMANS, NADEJDA HRIPTIEVSCHI, 
VIACHESLAV PANASIUK & EKATERINE 
ZGULADZE 
Introduction 
The EU Association Agreements 
with Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine, signed in 2014, are 
premised on a mutual commitment 
to liberal democratic values. They 
recognise that the rule of law lies at 
the heart of political association and 
economic integration; respect for the 
rule of law is declared an “essential 
element”, the violation of which 
may lead to a suspension of the 
agreements. The jointly agreed 
Association Agendas flesh out this 
essential element but remain rather 
vague, nonetheless. Priority matters 
for action in the justice sector include the impartiality of the 
judiciary, prosecution and law enforcement bodies, and their 
freedom from political interference and corruption. All three 
countries are expected to ensure the review of the appointment 
procedures of judges, strengthen the independence of the judiciary, 
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establish zero tolerance of corruption for the legal profession, and 
reform legislation regarding prosecutors, judges and lawyers.1 
On paper the commitments of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
look more or less the same, yet the starting points for 
implementation are very different. This is the result of different 
historical trajectories and current-day political trends in the 
transition of the three associated states. 
Georgia applied shock therapy to its constitutional, 
administrative and economic systems after the Rose Revolution in 
2003. Reform in the justice sector was slower to take off and has been 
implemented in three increasingly sophisticated waves that have 
brought significant improvement in recent years. Judicial 
independence has been stymied by executive and legislative 
interests, however. A lack of transparency and professionalism 
surrounding proceedings also remains a problem. But even if 
Georgia has slipped a little in global rankings of late, it remains far 
ahead of its 3DCFTA fellows. 
Ukraine is having a second stab at the radical reform of its 
governance structures but, unlike Georgia 15 years ago, is finding it 
much harder to wipe the slate clean. Although due process 
guarantees exist, in practice individuals with financial resources 
and political influence can escape prosecution for wrongdoing. The 
Ukrainian government has made little progress in meeting domestic 
and international demands to investigate and prosecute crimes 
committed during the final months of the Yanukovych 
administration in late 2013 and early 2014, which included shooting 
protesters. Despite the legislative boom overall and the introduction 
of far-reaching vetting processes, which have led to a quasi-
automatic clean-up of parts of the judiciary, the authorities’ failure 
to prosecute extensive high-level corruption has undermined the 
popularity of the government and altered the reform dynamic. 
Moldova also struggles with endemic corruption among its 
public officials and within the judiciary. Oligarchic groups continue 
to hold sway over all state institutions and stand in the way of the 
country’s fight against corruption. Reforms have mostly addressed 
                                                        
1 For a detailed analysis of the commitments entered into by each of the three 
countries, see the second editions of the handbooks produced by Emerson et al. 
in the context of the 3DCFTAs project and taken up in the list of references. 
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the procedural and technical levels but have not been matched by 
improvements in the independence and integrity of judges. The 
latter was dealt several blows in 2016, as a result of the political 
fallout over a massive banking scandal that had rocked Moldova in 
2014. Numerous other controversies, such as the appointment of a 
judge to the Supreme Court, despite failing to meet requirements 
for financial disclosures, have completely eroded citizens’ trust in 
the courts. 
In spite of the differences between the three DCFTA countries, 
their judicial systems also have common features and challenges: 
progress (albeit varied) in modernising the legal framework for the 
organisation of the judiciaries; resistance in the implementation of 
innovations with regard to the functioning of the judiciary; political 
interference and corruption in appointment procedures of judges 
and the work of the courts; difficulties in creating an independent 
prosecutorial service – the bane of any corrupt political regime – 
and/or effective law enforcement bodies. 
In its 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 
EU put ‘resilience’ front and centre. The services’ adoption of this 
buzzword reflects a shift in the debate about the nature of EU 
engagement with neighbouring countries. It de-emphasises the goal 
of transformation that formed the bedrock of the ‘old’ ENP and 
replaces it with support for the ability to withstand systemic shocks 
and threats at both the state and societal level, mainly in the (hard) 
security sphere, but also in providing access to justice and building 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. By taking a 
context-specific approach to improving relations with neighbouring 
countries on a differentiated basis, the EU is keen to identify and 
build upon existing positive sources of resilience, as well as to track 
and respond to vulnerabilities with the right mix of instruments and 
budgets at its disposal.2 
In the case of Georgia, this raises the question of how resilient 
the Saakashvili-era reforms are. Can they withstand the corrosion of 
corruptive practices by narrow-minded political and economic 
                                                        
2 Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High 
Representative to the European Parliament and Council, “A Strategic 
Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external Action”, JOIN(2017) 21 final, 7 June 
2017, Annex 10, particularly guiding consideration no. 4. 
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operators? In Ukraine, however, the challenge is how to prolong 
and channel the positive reform dynamic to firmly anchor 
institutional and procedural change in the justice sector. In 
Moldova, the issue is rather to insulate the few pockets of successful 
reform while supporting drivers of change in their fight against 
illiberal forces. 
This paper aims, firstly, to identify innovations in the three 
associated states’ justice sectors. It will do so by analysing changes 
to both the ‘hardware’ of the justice system, i.e. the constitutional 
and institutional frameworks (section 2), as well as the ‘software’, 
i.e. selection, appointment, promotion and disciplinary procedures 
and other means to fight corruption in the justice sector (section 3).3 
While recognising that the results of judicial reform will not always 
be visible right away and that, as a consequence of the specificities 
of each country’s context, there may not be one preferred model of 
justice sector reform, it is nevertheless useful to identify landmark 
innovations in an area in which lasting change is so notoriously 
difficult to secure. 
By way of obiter dictum, this report will compile noteworthy 
judicial practice in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with the 
implementation of the Association Agreements (section 4). The 
AA/DCFTAs are destined to have a profound effect on the legal and 
judicial systems for several reasons. They have already triggered 
and are likely to trigger further constitutional amendments aimed 
at ensuring that these Eastern Partnership countries effectively 
share the EU’s liberal democratic values and implement the AAs. 
To achieve this, the provisions of the AAs and the decisions of the 
common institutions set up under the agreements must be 
effectively applied (i.e. in conformity with the relevant EU acquis) 
by the three countries’ judiciaries, raising the issue of direct effect 
within the Georgian and Ukrainian legal systems. Setting 
precedents for implementation is key, as the landmark judgments 
of the Moldovan Constitutional and Supreme Courts show. Not 
only does a review of the existing court practice with the 
AA/DCFTAs serve to gauge the awareness levels of national judges 
about the need to enforce their country’s contractual obligations 
                                                        
3 On the fight against corruption writ large, see the contribution by Emerson, 
Hriptievschi, Kalitenko, Kovziridze and Prohnitchi to this volume. 
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entered into with the European Union. It also offers insights into the 
level of openness of domestic courts to use international/European 
law in setting aside conflicting national rules and bad practices. The 
focus will be on the deep and comprehensive free trade 
arrangements (DCFTAs) of the Association Agreements, thus 
linking up to the second edition of the Handbooks published under 
the umbrella of the ‘3DCFTA’ research project.4 
Constitutional and institutional reform 
Constitutional and institutional reform in Georgia 
Technically speaking, the adoption in 1997 of the ‘Organic Law on 
Common Courts’ was the first step in Georgia’s judicial reform 
process,5 but the initiative failed due to lack of political will, despite 
strong backing from international partners. It was not until after the 
Rose Revolution in 2003 that the newly elected government put 
everything at stake to transform the country into a modern state. All 
sectors of the economy were targeted in a major anti-corruption 
drive.  
One of the first changes concerned Georgia’s criminal law, 
with the introduction in 2004 of a US-inspired plea bargain 
mechanism as an alternative and consensual means of criminal case 
resolution pending more comprehensive changes to the justice 
system.6 The government at the time believed that this out-of-court 
                                                        
4 See http//:www.3dcftas.eu.  
5 The period from 1997 to 1999 saw i) an Organic Law on Common Courts of 
Georgia; ii) an Organic Law on Supreme Court of Georgia; iii) a new system for 
appointment of judges; iv) judges appointed during the Soviet period left the 
system; v) the appointment of judges who passed the exams and went through 
the selection process. 
6 An out-of-court settlement of cases whereby the defendant agrees to a guilty 
plea in exchange for a lesser charge or for a more lenient sentence and/or for 
dismissal of certain related charges. As in other countries, there were two basic 
forms of plea bargains in Georgia: the guilty plea (agreement on plea) and the 
‘no contest’ plea (agreement on sentence without guilty plea). Under the 
system, the defendant has the right to appeal the judgment rendered 
consequent to the plea bargain. The court must then satisfy itself that the plea 
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dispute settlement mechanism was a helpful tool for law 
enforcement agencies in the early stages of the state-building 
exercise. Georgia delivered such impressive results that the 
mechanism even became the object of criticism because of ‘trigger-
happy’ prosecutors.7 
One of the main reforms started in 2005 was the 
reorganisation of the judicial architecture to create a functionally 
balanced system ensuring the principle of sequential order. The 
reform modernised the trial courts, clarified their jurisdiction, and 
introduced the specialisation of judges. The structure of trial courts 
was set up in a new way, with 24 enlarged district (city) courts (with 
approx. 130 judges in each) reviewing cases in first instance. Under 
their authority, new magistrate courts (41 judges each) ensure the 
timely and simplified review and adjudication of less significant 
cases. 
Two Appellate Courts were introduced, thereby changing the 
model of regional courts within the unified system of common 
courts. These courts adjudicate cases only by way of an appeals 
procedure and no longer in first instance. Appeals against decisions 
of trial courts (among them those of magistrate judges) from the 
west of Georgia are heard by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal, whereas 
the judgments of courts from the east Georgia are addressed by the 
Tbilisi Court of Appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia turned into a purely cassation 
instance court. The criminal cases panel of the Supreme Court, 
which used to review cases of particular gravity as a first instance 
court, was abolished. The Supreme Court considers the 
admissibility of cases in accordance with new criteria on the 
significance of claims for the development of the law and their 
contribution to the establishment of a common judicial practice. 
                                                        
bargain was concluded with the free will of the defendant, that the defendant 
fully acknowledged the essence of the plea agreement and its consequences.  
7 By 2010, around 80% of the cases were decided through the plea bargain 
mechanism, for which Georgia was often criticised by NGOs and European 
institutions alike. see ‘Plea bargaining in Georgia’, 23 February 2010, 
Transparency International Georgia, report available at 
http://transparency.ge/en/post/report/plea-bargaining-georgia. 
94  INTEGRITY AND JUDICIAL REFORM ON TRIAL 
 
Substantial amendments to the constitution were enacted on 
27 December 2006 whereby the appointment and dismissal of 
judges were removed from the competence of the president of 
Georgia and transferred to the High Council of Justice (HCJ).  
Until then, the HCJ had been an advisory body for the 
president, consisting of 12 members: four appointed by the 
president, four appointed by the parliament, one by the Supreme 
Court of Georgia; plus the presidents of the High Court of Abkhazia 
and High Court of Adjara, and the minister for justice as ex officio 
members. This system was changed by the law of 19 June 2007. The 
High Council of Justice was transformed into the highest authority 
for the administration of justice. For the first time, the HCJ mostly 
comprised judges (8 out of 15 members, elected by the Conference 
of Judges, a self-governing body of judges); the minister for justice 
and prosecutor general were removed as members. As part of the 
“new democratic reforms package within the Second Wave” 
announced in 2009, one member of the High Council of Justice was 
elected from the ranks of opposition MPs. Until the reforms 
undertaken by the new government of Georgia in 2013 (see below), 
the High Council of Justice was chaired by the chairman of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia and had full and exclusive authority to 
appoint, dismiss and take disciplinary measures against the judges. 
In July 2007, the Criminal Code of Georgia was amended to 
de-criminalise the adoption of unlawful judgments or other 
decisions by a judge, and the Georgian parliament adopted the Law 
on Rules of Communication with Judges of Common Courts to 
ensure adherence to the principles of independence and 
impartiality.8 
In 2008, the position of the Prosecutor General was abolished 
and merged with the Ministry of Justice, drawing on both the 
French and US models. The government at the time claimed that it 
linked criminal justice policy with the politically responsible person 
but that the Prosecutor General kept operative independence 
because the minister had no power over criminal cases. The office 
of chief prosecutor became a quasi-autonomous branch of the 
                                                        
8 On 26 February 2010 further amendments increased the fine for the violation 
of the rules of communication by public servant twofold; for state political 
officials the fine was increased threefold. 
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ministry of justice, with the chief prosecutor appointed by the 
president of Georgia upon the nomination of the minister for justice 
and dismissed solely by the president. Changes to the ‘Law on 
Prosecutor, CPC and Law on Structural Authority and Activity of 
Government’ were adopted in 2015, according to which the office of 
prosecutor remained in the system of the ministry of justice, while 
a prosecutorial board was introduced, through which the minister 
executed general oversight. The rules on appointing the general 
prosecutor were also modified and delegated to the board, 
government and parliament.9 Recently adopted changes to the 
constitution10 stipulate that the prosecutor’s office is independent in 
its activity. Yet, the general prosecutor is selected by parliament by 
majority vote (of full composition), contrary to the Venice 
Commission’s recommendation for QMV, upon nomination of the 
prosecutorial board.11 
The first decade of judicial reform saw other positive changes 
too, such as higher salaries and improved infrastructure. NGOs and 
the international community nevertheless criticised Georgia for the 
slow pace and indecisiveness of reform in this critical sector, 
especially in comparison to the progress made in other sectors. 
A new ‘First Wave’ of justice reform was launched on May 
1st, 2013 by the incoming government. Amendments were made to 
the ‘Law on Common Courts’, the ‘Law on Disciplinary 
Responsibility and Disciplinary Prosecution of Judges’ and the ‘Law 
on the High School of Justice’. These changes were eagerly awaited 
by civil society organisations and very much derived from their 
recommendations. The rules for the selection of members of the 
High Council of Justice were also sharpened: politically neutral 
persons would hitherto be selected for a non-renewable mandate by 
way of an open competition, not by MPs selected by their peers. In 
addition, the right to nominate candidates was granted to higher 
education institutions, NGOs and the Georgian Bar Association. 
                                                        
9 See http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdf 
file=CDL-AD(2015)039-e 
10 See http://www.parliament.ge/ge/ajax/downloadFile/75697/1324-rs 
11 See http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdf 
file=CDL-AD(2017)023-e 
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The role of the Conference of Judges was enhanced. Prior to the 
amendments, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court had the 
exclusive right to nominate candidates to be judges in the High 
Council of Justice to the Conference of Judges. With the 
amendments, each member of the Conference of Judges gained the 
right to nominate these candidates.12 All of these improvements 
strengthened the position of the HCJ and enhanced its freedom 
from political interference. 
Prosecutors were thenceforth separated from the ministry of 
justice;13 the plea-bargaining system was abolished; trials were 
opened to the public and media scrutiny (conditions apply); an 
obligation was created to keep audio/video records of courts 
hearings and disclose them to involved parties upon request; access 
to trial by jury was expanded;14 and the rights of defendants and 
their legal counsel were increased, including the right to retrial. 
The Venice Commission, the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, EU special envoy Thomas Hammarberg 
and the European Commission supported the amendments and 
continue to monitor their implementation. 
A ‘Second Wave’ of reform was launched on August 1st, 2014 
but has generally been perceived as regressive.15 Although it 
introduced the appointment of judges for life (before reaching the 
age of 65 determined by law), it also set a mandatory three-year 
probation period – thus putting a strain on the independence of least 
100 judges. 
                                                        
12 Similarly, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court would no longer serve as 
the Chairperson of the Independent Board of the High School of Justice. The 
latter chairperson was thenceforth elected by the Conference of Judges, while 
the remaining members of the Independent Board were elected by the HCJ 
instead of the Chairperson of the Supreme Court.  
13 In November 2008, the position of prosecutor general was abolished and the 
prosecutorial office was merged with the ministry of justice.   
14 First introduced in the 1917-21 years of independence. 
15 Statement of the Coalition about Appointment of Judges for a Probationary 
Period, the Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary, available 
at: http://bit.ly/2btwUYY. 
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The ‘Third Wave’ of reforms was passed on 8th February 2017 
when parliament voted down 26 objections and amendments 
proposed by President Margvelashvili and supported by the Venice 
Commission and civil society organisations.16 In particular, the 
legislative package did not envisage the election of court presidents 
by judges and contained regressive changes regarding the 
composition of the HCJ.17 One positive element of the new 
legislation is the introduction of an electronic case-assignment 
system. Unfortunately, the launch of this system has been 
postponed several times. 
The greatest weakness of the Third Wave of legislative reform 
lies precisely in the opaque way in which it was introduced and in 
its delayed implementation. The latter has ‘allowed’ the HCJ – in a 
controversial process decried by NGOs for its lack of transparency 
– to appoint 64 judges, five of whom (former judges of the Supreme 
Court and Constitutional Court) for life, without a probation period. 
Tensions grew, as the NGO community refused to present a report 
in protest at the developments in the judicial system. In June 2017 
the Parliament of Georgia heard proposed amendments to the 
legislation regulating judicial probation, with a view to complying 
with the Constitutional Court decision of 15 February 2017 in the 
case of Omar Jorbenadze vs. Parliament of Georgia. The law should 
determine the circle of judges to be exempted from the probation 
period and set the procedure for their life-time appointment. 
Despite high public interest in the matter, amendments were 
prepared without engaging civil society. NGOs believe that the 
draft law still leaves ample room for arbitrariness since it does not 
establish in a clear and unequivocal manner the HCJ’s obligation to 
                                                        
16 Joint Opinion N°773/2014 of the Venice Commission and the Directorate 
of Human Rights (DHR) of the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule 
of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the Draft Law on Amendments to the 
Organic Law on General Courts, Strasbourg, available at: 
http://bit.ly/2bKgOJQ. 
17 See Coalition for Independent and Transparent Judiciary, 
https://www.scribd.com/document/348378290/The-Judicial-System-Past-
Reforms-and-Future-Perspectives#fullscreen&from_embed 
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substantiate its decisions of appointing acting and former justices of 
the Supreme and Constitutional Courts for life.18 
In general, the court system is more gender balanced than the 
administration of other branches of power in Georgia. Currently, 
the Supreme Court is chaired by a woman; one of her two deputies 
is also female, in addition to three female judges out of 10 in total. 
In the Constitutional Court four out of nine judges are women. 
According to 2012 data, 42% of judges of the Supreme Court were 
female; 33% in the Constitutional Court; 54% in Appeal Court and 
47% in District Courts.19 
Constitutional and institutional reform in Ukraine 
It took the violence of the Euromaidan to shift Ukraine’s real judicial 
reform into gear. Upon the proposal of the new President of Ukraine 
and the Constitutional Commission set up under his authority, the 
Verkhovna Rada has adopted a triptych of primary legislation 
aimed at improving the constitutional foundations and practical 
implementation of the rule of law. 
In June 2016, the Rada adopted the first two parts of the 
package. The ‘Law on Amendments to the Constitution’20 provides 
for: 
 Restructuring the judicial architecture by: a) granting the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine an independent status; b) 
introducing a complaint procedure under which a natural or 
legal person is given the right to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court on the constitutionality of the law which is applied in 
final instance in his/her case;21 
                                                        
18 See http://www.transparency.ge/en/post/coalition-addresses-hearing-
legislative-amendments-lifetime-appointment-judges 
19 Research by Natia Gorgadze – Gender Equality (2012), on file with the 
authors. 
20 Law number 3524 “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine” of 2 June 
2016 had been approved by the Venice Commission on 26 October 2015. It 
entered into force on 30 September 2016. 
21 Uncertainty still surrounds the retroactive effect of Constitutional Court 
decision in this respect. 
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 The composition of the High Council of Justice – the body 
responsible for the appointment, career development and 
responsibility of judges – in a manner in which the majority 
of its members will be judges elected by judges; 
 De-politicisation of the judiciary through: a) the abolition of 
the five-year probation period for the appointment of judges 
and the implementation of a procedure according to which 
judges hold positions indefinitely; b) eliminating parliament 
from the process of appointment and dismissal of judges, a 
power which is formally exercised by the President of 
Ukraine, based on a binding submission by the HCJ; c) 
granting the HCJ (rather than the president and the 
parliament) the competence to dismiss judges, and transfer 
them from one court to another;  
 Limitation of judicial immunity from absolute to functional: 
a) without the consent of the HCJ a judge cannot be arrested 
or held in custody or detention until the sentence has been 
delivered by a court (except after the commission of a grave 
crime or a felony); b) a judge cannot be held liable for a court 
decision that s/he has made, except when this constitutes a 
crime or a disciplinary offence; 
 Financial independence of the courts and the activity of 
judges: in the state budget, the expenses for the maintenance 
of the courts are determined separately, taking into account 
the proposals of the HCJ, and the amount of the remuneration 
of the judge is established by law; 
 Raising professional requirements of judges by: a) increasing 
the age limit from 25 to 30 years; and b) raising the required 
professional experience in the sphere of law from 3 to 5 years;  
 Cancellation of unusual supervisory powers of the public 
prosecutor over the observance of: a) human/citizen rights 
and freedoms; b) laws on these issues by executive 
authorities, local governments and their officials and officers; 
c) laws in the execution of judgments in criminal cases, as well 
as the application of other measures of coercion related to the 
restraint of personal liberty of citizens. 
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In parallel to the above-mentioned constitutional 
amendments the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new version of the 
‘Law on the Judicial System and Status of Judges’.22 This law drew 
sharp criticism from the expert community because of the violation 
of the regulatory procedure for its adoption: the draft had only been 
submitted to Parliament on 30 May 2016, i.e. three days prior to its 
adoption. Important provisions of the law concern: 
 Enhancing the integrity criteria for judges by: a) introducing 
an obligation for all (candidate) judges to file a Declaration of 
Kinship and a Declaration of Integrity; b) establishing a new 
ground for dismissing a judge for violation of the duty to 
confirm the legality of the origin of property; c) establishing a 
Public Council for Integrity (PCI) at the High Qualifications 
Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) with the aim of 
facilitating the latter in establishing criteria of professional 
ethics and integrity to test the suitability of (candidate) 
judges; 
 Enhancing the independence of judges by: a) significantly 
increasing the salaries: €1,630/month for local courts (a rise of 
€570); €2,700 for appeal courts (a rise of €1,600); €4,000 for the 
Supreme Court (a rise of €2,765); b) introducing the possibility 
of entitlements for work that involves access to state secrets, 
seniority, holding an administrative position and/or an 
additional degree. 
The law also restructured the four-level Ukrainian judicial 
system, which thenceforth consists of a Constitutional Court and a 
three-tiered system of courts of general jurisdiction:23 
 Courts of the first instance, consisting of circuit courts 
(criminal and civil jurisdiction), administrative circuit courts, 
and commercial circuit courts; 
 Courts of appeals, consisting of appellate courts (criminal and 
civil jurisdiction), administrative appellate courts, and 
commercial appellate courts; 
                                                        
22 Law number 4734 of 2 June 2016. 
23 Higher specialised courts were taken out from in-between appellate courts 
(ruling upon judgments by local, first instance, courts) and the Supreme Court 
of Ukraine. 
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 A new Supreme Court, consisting of five internal bodies: the 
Great Chambers of Supreme Court, the Administrative Court 
of Cassation (divided in chambers for tax issues, social rights, 
and political rights), the Commercial Court of Cassation (with 
separate chambers for bankruptcy, intellectual property and 
antitrust, and corporate disputes), the Criminal Court of 
Cassation, and the Civil Court of Cassation. 
Although the law does not explicitly refer to when the court 
system should be reorganised, the general activity of the authorities 
involved in judicial reform indicates that this will only be possible 
now that the composition of the new Supreme Court of Justice has 
been finalised. Completed in November 2017, the selection of judges 
to the Supreme Court only partly contributed to the judicial 
system’s clean-up, with the PCI questioning the integrity, 
independence and professional records of about a quarter of newly 
appointed judges. Despite widespread criticism about the failure of 
the High Qualification Commission of Judges to select Supreme 
Court candidates fairly and through transparent processes, 
President Poroshenko formally appointed 113 judges, including a 
number of incumbent or retired judges who were considered to be 
flawed candidates. 
Another eye-catching change to the judicial architecture of 
Ukraine is the creation of two (first-instance) specialised courts: a 
‘High Court on Intellectual Property’ and a ‘High Anti-Corruption 
Court’ (HAC). The necessity of their establishment, however, was a 
matter of intense debate. With regard to the former, critics said that 
the number of disputes related to intellectual property in Ukrainian 
courts is not that big. While litigants may benefit from narrowly 
specialised IP judges, the question is, indeed, whether significant 
budget allocations are needed for the creation of this court. As for 
the HAC, the scope of its horizontal jurisdiction was subject to a 
protracted on/off debate with the president of Ukraine, as well as 
amendments to Ukrainian procedural laws. In April 2018, the 
second and final reading of the draft legislation for the creation of 
the HAC was pushed back to allow for consultations with the 
Venice Commission. After much international pressure, the Rada 
finally approved the ‘Law on Establishment of the Anti-Corruption 
Court in Ukraine’ on 7 June 2018. The HAC will consider only the 
top-corruption cases which fall within the investigative jurisdiction 
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of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the 
Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (see section 3.2). A 
committee of international experts will play an important role in the 
selection of judges serving the HAC. Now that the law has been 
passed, implementation can start. 
The third and final part of the 2016 legislative triptych 
concerned the adoption of the ‘Law on the High Council of 
Justice’.24 This law fleshed out some of the elements of the 
constitutional changes introduced in June of that year and 
attributed a number of powers to the High Council of Justice, 
including: a) submitting to the President of Ukraine the 
appointment of a judge; b) ensuring the implementation of 
disciplinary proceedings against judges; c) taking decisions to 
dismiss judges; d) granting consent to the arrest or detention of a 
judge; e) deciding on transfers or secondment of judges from one 
court to another; f) deciding on the temporary removal of a judge 
from the administration of justice; g) agreeing on the number of 
judges in courts; and h) participation in determining the 
expenditures of the state budget for the maintenance of courts, 
bodies and institutions of the justice system. 
On the side of the prosecution, the ‘Law on the Prosecutor’s 
Office’ of October 2014 had already put an end to its general 
supervisory role. Since the adoption of the 2016 amendments to the 
constitution, the main functions of the Office are the maintenance of 
a public prosecution in court; the organisation and procedural 
guidance to the pre-trial investigation, supervision of the secret and 
other investigation activities and searches of law enforcement 
bodies;25 and the representation of the interests of the state in court 
in exceptional cases and in the manner prescribed by the law. 
                                                        
24 Law number 1798-VIII of 21 December 2016. 
25 The transitional provisions of the Law stipulate that the Prosecutor’s Office 
will continue to i) carry out pre-trial investigation prior to the commencement 
of the activities of the State Investigation Bureau, but not later than five years 
after the entry into force of the Criminal Procedure Code, i.e. 11 August 2018; 
and ii) supervise the observance of the law in the execution of court decisions 
in criminal cases, in the application of other measures of compulsory nature, 
related to the restrictions of the personal freedom of citizens, before the entry 
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A significant achievement of the law of 2014 was the 
introduction of the prosecutorial service’s self-governing bodies 
(the ‘All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors’ and the ‘Council of 
Prosecutors of Ukraine’) and the ‘Qualification Commission of 
Prosecutors’, whose main task is the selection, career development 
and accountability of prosecutors.26 
While these innovations look good on paper, reforming the 
prosecution has in practice been extremely slow and unable to meet 
the general needs of society. Political influence has remained: the 
Rada may express no confidence in the Attorney General, which 
results in his resignation. ‘Soviet’ elements have also survived 
recent reforms, such as the military prosecutor’s office and the 
function of representing the interests of individuals and the state in 
court. There is a high degree of system preservation: according to 
the results of the competitions conducted for the positions in local 
prosecutor’s offices, 76% of the seats were occupied by incumbents. 
This is due to: a) delay of entry into a force of the law; b) the period 
of the competition: July-August; c) the fact that competitions were 
conducted only for the positions of the heads of local public 
prosecutors; d) the significant reduction of wages by the 
government during the second stage of the competition for these 
posts (by about €100; salaries now average at €300 per month). 
Effective enforcement of judgments has been a longstanding 
concern for investors in Ukraine. The enforcement system currently 
faces substantial challenges since the percentage of actually 
enforced judgments is extremely low. Moreover, the officials 
responsible for the job are rather (financially) unmotivated and the 
cooperation between authorities in this area is problematic and 
complicated. The main novelty of the ‘Law on Enforcement of 
Judgments’ provides that, apart from the State Enforcement Service 
of Ukraine, the decisions of the courts and other authorities may 
now be enforced by ‘private enforcers’ listed in the Unified Registry. 
Such individuals have to meet certain age, educational and other 
requirements as well as pass a test to be allowed to enforce 
                                                        
into a force the law on the establishment of a dual system of regular 
penitentiary inspections. 
26 Of the 11 members of the Commission 5 are prosecutors, while the other 6 
are appointed by the legal community and the Ombudsman. 
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decisions. Another essential requirement is that such individuals 
are obliged to insure their professional liability. Private enforcers 
are not allowed to enforce judgments whose monetary value 
exceeds their insurance premium. Within these parameters, there is 
good ground to believe that one of the most persistent problems in 
Ukrainian litigation might be solved. 
Technical support of the judiciary falls within the purview of 
the State Judicial Administration (SJA).27 According to a recent 
report by the SJA, the judicial system (about 600 courts) was in 2016 
equipped with 25,016 computers linked up to the court registration 
system. All courts have technical equipment for conducting court 
sessions in video communication mode, which is gaining popularity 
among the people. The Unified State Register of Judicial Decisions 
has been functioning since 2006, which currently includes more 
than 65 million copies of court decisions. Until recently, a 2013 pilot 
project on the exchange of electronic documents between the parties 
of the trial and the court operated in parallel to the sending of such 
documents in paper form, in accordance with the requirements of 
the law. Moreover, in accordance with the provisions of the ‘Law on 
the Judiciary and the status of judges’, an ‘Institute of Electronic 
Justice’ is envisaged, which will greatly improve the access to and 
administration of justice, reduce its cost and the risk of fraud.28 It 
will take time to consistently and fully implement the truly 
progressive legislation underpinning the creation of a much-
anticipated ‘electronic court’.29 But work has begun. In accordance 
                                                        
27 Until end of 2016, the EU-funded project “Support to Justice Sector Reforms 
in Ukraine” aimed to support sector-wide reforms 
(http://www.justicereformukraine.eu). The project was divided into six key 
legal components central to policy and institutional reforms: justice sector 
reform strategy; support to execution of court decisions; prosecution reform; 
access to justice and the right to defence; independence of the judiciary; 
prevention and fight against corruption. 
28 From 2015 onwards, measures have been taken to establish and connect 
information-payment terminals in courts to provide the payment of court fees. 
29 No less popular among the population is the institution of sms-message for 
the participants in the trial about the date and the time of the case. 
Unfortunately, the information is only about the previous years, but one can 
observe a positive trend in their use. Thus, in the first quarter of 2016, about 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  105 
 
with Order No. 367 of 23 March 2017, the State Judicial 
Administration of Ukraine has approved the procedure for the 
exchange of electronic documents in civil, administrative and 
economic cases between seven pilot courts.30 The first results of the 
operation of the E-Court subsystem give rise to hope in its future 
success.31 
Constitutional and institutional reform in Moldova 
Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova has 
been held back by a string of constitutional crises. The constitution 
of July 1994 introduced the institutional framework of Moldova’s 
current political system, with a unicameral parliament, a directly 
elected president, and substantial autonomy to the regions of 
Transnistria and Gagauzia. In 2000, a constitutional amendment 
endowed parliament with the power to elect the president. In light 
of parliament’s failure to fulfil this duty, a referendum in 2010 tried 
to reintroduce direct presidential elections to the country, but failed 
                                                        
380,000 such text messages were sent by the local and appellate courts, up by 
13% compared to the same period in 2015. 
30 It is assumed that electronic documents can be filed to the court only after a 
registration in the subsystem ‘E-Court’ posted on the website of ‘Judiciary 
Ukraine’ at: e.court.gov.ua. Registration in the subsystem ‘E-Court’ includes: 
creating an account with the postal system ‘mail.gov.ua’; Registration of 
personal electronic cabinet's tied to his electronic signature. Once registered, 
participants of the trial may sue electronically all procedural documents to the 
court, stipulated by the procedural law of Ukraine, but only when submitting 
to the court the relevant legal documents at the next hearing in writing form. 
31 Preliminary results indicate that interaction between courts, lawyers, free legal 
aid centres, banking institutions, the prosecutor’s office and one institute 
conducting forensic research (in Odessa) has been established and that there is a 
reduction in the average length of the trial in court (20-30 days), while the average 
time for processing one document (registration, automatic distribution, transfer 
to a judge) is five minutes. In addition, with the help of the ‘E-Court’ subsystem, 
it is possible to create and send an executive document (issued for enforcement 
in accordance with a court decision) electronically. Consequently, unlike the 
current order, according to which the average length of receipt of documents to 
the executive service is 5-7 days, the receipt of such a document using the 
subsystem ‘E-Court’ occurs instantaneously. The cost of sending documents is 0 
UAH (today 10 UAH). 
106  INTEGRITY AND JUDICIAL REFORM ON TRIAL 
 
as the turnout requirements were not met. An indirect electoral 
system was maintained. 
Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, widespread popular 
dissatisfaction with the government, the economy and lack of 
reforms has each time been channelled and temporarily defused 
through a vast number of elections marred by irregularities. Even 
the 2009 ‘Twitter Revolution’ did not manage to change the broken 
system. Each time a new clan of inept and corrupt politicians took 
over. 
Moldova inherited a legacy of weak justice sector institutions 
that continue to undermine public trust in law enforcement and the 
court system, even as it aspires to meet European standards. The 
judicial system consists of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Court 
of Appeal, and the courts of first instance. The structure and 
jurisdiction of the courts are established by an organic law. Judges 
of the first and appeal courts are appointed by the president, judges 
of the Supreme Court of Justice by the parliament, all at the proposal 
of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Judges are appointed at first 
for a five-year term and subsequently until the age of retirement. 
The Constitutional Court is deemed to be independent of any other 
public authority. Its six judges guard the implementation of the 
notion of the separation of state powers. Once appointed, judges of 
the Constitutional Court cannot be removed. Judges of the 
Constitutional Court are appointed by the legislature, the 
government and the Superior Council of Magistracy, each of those 
bodies selecting two candidates.  
The 2011-16 Justice Sector Reform Strategy (JSRS) focused on 
several reforms pertaining to the Constitutional Court: its 
composition, the criteria and procedures for selecting its judges, 
their term of office, and the group of subjects enjoying legal 
standing before it. No significant legislative reform was carried out 
until mid-2016, when the ministry of justice initiated consultations 
on a draft law amending the composition and competencies of the 
constitutional court. The draft law, adopted by the government and 
positively reviewed by the constitutional court, was taken up by 
parliament on 22 December 2016 but suffered delays thereafter. The 
draft law provides for an increase in the number of judges from six 
to seven, with a seventh to be appointed by the president. It also 
provides for the extension of the mandate of judges from six to nine 
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years, non-renewable. The adoption of the law by parliament would 
also codify the constitutional court’s own decision to widen locus 
standi to all courts.32 
The judicial activism of the constitutional court has earned 
many plaudits for its independent stance in a hotly contested 
political environment.33 Yet, some of its decisions have raised 
serious questions among independent observers about the 
constitutional court’s impartiality and place in the trias politica. In 
March 2016, the court declared the changes introduced to the 
electoral law in 2000 as unconstitutional. It thus established direct 
presidential elections through the back door. Without holding a 
public hearing, without hearing the parties and against 
recommendations by the OSCE and the Venice Commission, the 
court in September 2016 dismissed a claim against the prohibition 
on foreign financing of political parties, thus favouring the ruling 
party in making use of the administrative apparatus. The elections 
of autumn 2016 nevertheless resulted in the victory of a populist and 
openly pro-Russian candidate. This sparked tensions with the pro-
EU oriented government and parliamentary majority. In October 
2017 the constitutional court ruled in favour of the “temporary 
suspension” of the president, when he refused to fulfil his 
constitutional obligations, in particular the promulgation of laws. 
The same ruling entitled the prime minister and the speaker of the 
parliament to temporarily exercise presidential prerogative on 
specific issues. The parliamentary majority seized the opportunity 
to reshuffle the government and to enact anti-propaganda 
legislation. The constitutional court’s rulings have thus indirectly 
                                                        
32 This provision was already in force due to the decision of the constitutional 
court of 9 February 2016, which concluded that the role of the supreme court in 
addressing constitutionality exceptions raised by courts is a formal one and that 
hence any court can directly address the constitutional court. By this decision 
the constitutional court de facto allowed citizens to directly address it on 
constitutionality issues in ongoing trials. More details are provided below. 
33 For example, the Court’s decision of 16 April 2015 declaring several provisions of 
the Law on Professional Integrity Testing partially unconstitutional. On 23 
February 2016, the Court ruled that the total period of 12 months for arrest includes 
both the criminal investigation phase and the court examination phase, putting an 
end to varyious problematic practices. On 9 February 2016 the Court extended the 
locus standi, thus providing a direct avenue for constitutional review to any litigant 
in a court case. 
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reshaped the political environment, in many respects 
disadvantaging the opposition. The court has not yet taken any 
decision that would run directly counter to the interests of the 
Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM). 
The reorganisation of the judiciary was among the priorities 
of the JSRS 2011-16. Maintaining a multitude of courts with a small 
number of judges was deemed too expensive, a hurdle to both 
judges’ professional growth and the random assignment of cases, 
which are important anti-corruption tools. The reform was carried 
out in several steps. The economic courts were abolished first. In 
2014, the Court of Appeal in Bender was eliminated. But it took until 
April 2016 for parliament to adopt law no. 76 providing for the 
merger of 44 first instance courts into 15, over a 10-year period (1 
January 2017 – 31 December 2027). The specialised – commercial 
and military – courts were abolished first, on 1 April 2017. This is 
one of the biggest reforms in judiciary since Moldova’s 
independence. The reform has great potential for improving the 
quality and efficiency of justice, but the success depends largely on 
good will and thorough implementation. The ten-year period of 
implementation carries the risks of delays and unplanned changes 
along the way. 
Since 2007, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has been in 
charge of initial and continuous training for judges, prosecutors and 
certain court staff. The focus is on candidate judges and prosecutors, 
as well as continuous on-the-job training of judges. The NIJ has long 
suffered from allegations of corruption at entry and graduation 
exams, as well as the poor quality of training. In need of reform, 
amendments to its legal framework were passed in 2012. Although 
considered insufficient, there has been resistance until 2016 in the 
adoption of additional amendments intended to improve the 
modus operandi of the NIJ.34 The NIJ has now developed a new type 
of entry examination and included a representative of the US 
Embassy in the admissions commission. This is thought to be an 
improvement. At the time of writing, the NIJ was updating its 
teaching curricula. A worrying recent development is the decision 
                                                        
34 The NIJ has benefited from direct technical and financial assistance of several 
important development partners such as USAID, UNDP and the Council of 
Europe.  
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of the SCM requiring that any legal training of judges be 
coordinated with the NIJ. This means a rather closed system of 
access for judges to informal education. It remains to be seen how 
exactly the decision will be implemented. 
Reform of the prosecution has also been long anticipated. As 
recently as 2011, Moldova still had one of the most unreformed 
prosecutorial services in the region, with a strong Soviet legacy: 
dangerously wide competencies going well beyond criminal justice, 
largely at the service of the minister for justice. Although reform of 
the prosecution was a key condition for budget support, failure by 
the parliament to act led the EU to withhold €1.8 million of the 
envisaged €60 million. The draft law was ultimately adopted on 25 
February 2016 and has been in force since 1 August 2016. It narrows 
the powers of prosecution and of the prosecutor general, increases 
the powers of the Superior Council of Prosecutors and reduces 
political involvement in the appointment of the prosecutor general. 
It also strengthens the specialised (anti-corruption and organised 
crime) offices, reduces the hierarchical subordination of prosecutors 
and provides for merging of several prosecution offices. While the 
law and by-laws (also amended in 2016) look good on paper, 
political will has been in short supply to adequately implement the 
reform measures. The reform of the Anti-Corruption Prosecution 
Office, for instance, has lagged behind.35  
Another example is the recycling of incumbents in key 
positions. A noteworthy case is that of the Prosecutor General Mr. 
Harunjen, who was selected by the Superior Council of Prosecutors 
in a public contest and within 24 hours approved by the previous 
president (i.e. days before Dodon took office as president), despite 
publicised materials about his excessive personal wealth and 
allegations that he gave the order to close a criminal investigation 
                                                        
35 For details see the chapters on anticorruption and prosecution reform in the 
Monitoring report on the implementation of the Priority Reform Action Roadmap 
(March-August 2016), prepared by the Association for Participatory Democracy 
(ADEPT), “Expert-Grup” Independent Think-Tank and Legal Resources Centre 
from Moldova (LRCM), available at http://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/09/2016-09-Rep-Roadmap_fin-en-1.pdf. 
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involving the death of a person in the civil unrest of 2009.36 It should 
be noted that Harunjen worked in the Anti-Corruption Prosecution 
Office between August 2013 and July 2015 (including the period of 
bank fraud) before being successively promoted to the position of 
first-deputy of the Prosecutor General, Interim Prosecutor General 
and then Prosecutor General. The 2010 secret annexes of the then 
ruling tripartite coalition mentioned explicitly that the leaders of the 
Prosecutor General’s Office and the National Anti-Corruption 
Centre were appointees of the DPM.37 The slew of high-level 
corruption cases initiated since then, some examined behind closed 
doors, smacks of selective prosecution of persons affiliated with the 
other two coalition parties, namely the Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Moldova (LDPM) and Liberal Party (LP). Likewise, it is noteworthy 
that the Supreme Court has in the past few years not take any 
important decisions contrary to the interests of the Democratic Party 
(DPM). 
Fighting corruption in the justice sector 
Fighting corruption in the justice sector in Georgia 
The eradication of corruption in the justice sector has been a top 
priority for successive governments since the 2003 Rose Revolution. 
Measures have included the manifold increase in salaries and the 
modernisation of infrastructure.  
Before the start of judicial reforms in 2005, court premises 
were in a deplorable condition, as were all other public institutions. 
Today, court premises have been rebuilt and/or refurbished. 
Courtrooms are equipped with proper furniture and computers, 
that allows the production of verbatim reports and minutes of 
hearings electronically and the viewing of physical evidence using 
electronic displays. Key support has been provided throughout the 
                                                        
36 See https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/foto-casa-si-cv-ul-
procurorului-general-interimar-eduard-harunjen.  
37 See Agreement for the creation of the European Integration Alliance 2 (EIA 2), 30 
December 2010, http://www.e-democracy.md/files/parties/acord-constituire-
aie-2010.pdf. For details, see http://unimedia.info/stiri/doc-acordul-aie2--
mina-care-a-desfiintat-alianta-cum-s-au-partajat-functiile-57321.html. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  111 
 
years by a host of international donor organisations.38 The World 
Bank financially supported the process initially, but today the 
renovations are financed from the state budget, with around 75% of 
financing spent on salaries. 
As shown in Table 3.1, the first dramatic rise in salaries 
occurred during the initial stage of reforms in 2005-06 and has been 
growing since. The most recent rise concerns the head of the 
Supreme Court (from GEL 5650 to GEL 7000); appeals court judges 
(from GEL 2500 to GEL 5000); district court judges (from GEL 2500 
to GEL 4600).39 These salaries are high when compared to average 
figures in the public sector but they are not sufficient to deter 
corruption. 
Table 3.1 Budget increase for courts /GEL Mio. (2003-15) 
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
11,153 16,838 36,113 44,358 38,978 45,202 59,315 
Source: Supreme Court of Georgia. 
 
Other areas of concern include the selection and appointment 
process of judges, merit-based promotion, and other. To establish 
more effective criteria for the recruitment of judges, the Georgian 
parliament on 28 December 2005 adopted a Law on the High School 
of Justice. The function of the School is the professional training of 
candidate and incumbent judges and court clerks. Later waves of 
reforms provided for a higher level of independence of the School. 
The year 2015 marked a watershed in terms of developing quality 
trainings and standardised methodologies.40 In June of that year, the 
Independent Council of the High School of Justice approved an 
upgraded training programme for the 12th group of candidate 
                                                        
38 World Bank, USAID, UNDP, Council of Europe, NORLAG, GIZ, IRZ, EU, 
OSCE, ABA. 
39 Law on Amendments in the Law on Remuneration of Judges, 26 December 
2013. 1000 GEL = 380 EUR. 
40 See http://www.hsoj.ge/uploads/Uploads/ActivitiesReport2015Year-
edited.pdf 
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judges.41 Another interesting step forward was the introduction of 
a quality evaluation framework – ‘Kirkpatrick's 4-Level Evaluation 
Model’. The School also provides vocational trainings.42 
The specialisation of judges is one of the positive 
achievements of the Georgia’s reform. In practice, however, the 
number of judges appointed to chambers/boards not matching 
their specialisation is still quite high, especially in Tbilisi City Court. 
While the High Council of Justice claims that its selection criteria for 
judges (i.e. education, professional experience, personal traits, 
moral and ethical features) are in line with international norms43 
and have been codified in the Organic Law of 2017, watchdogs 
argue that they are vague44 and that the recruitment process 
generally lacks transparency, thus leaving opportunities for 
corruption and nepotism.45 The quick dismissal of the president of 
the Tbilisi City Court Mamuka Akhvlediani, who reported an 
alleged leak of a judge’s examination, raises serious concerns about 
                                                        
41 The High School of Justice has prepared the draft amendments concerning 
the extension of judicial training period. In particular, the initial 10-month 
period stipulated by law is to be extended to 24 months and a 6-month training 
period for persons of certain categories is to be extended to 14 months. 
42 In 2015, conducting 85 professional trainings, wherein a total of 1,298 
participants took part (gender balance: 38% – male 62% – female). 
43 See http://hcoj.gov.ge/en/reforms/judicial-reform 
44 The nature of the work that judges perform differs across different levels of 
the judiciary and requires different skills and qualifications. This is not taken 
into account in the evaluation of candidates. Requirements for judges of first 
instance courts and higher courts are identical. An individual without any 
experience as a judge can still be appointed to the appellate court. 
45 In the period from 2011 to 2015, the HCJ actively used the legal mechanisms 
for re-appointing (i.e. transferring/promoting) judges to other courts, without, 
however, any substantiation of the decisions, let alone any form of competition. 
Unsurprisingly, this raised serious suspicions about a deliberate, strategic 
distribution of judges in different courts, by-passing pending recruitment 
procedures and affecting judicial independence and impartiality. Watchdog 
NGOs have observed a declining trend, partly due to legislative amendments. 
Controversy flared up after the rushed appointment of judges prior to the 
enactment of new amendments to the law. See 
http://www.transparency.ge/en/post/general-announcement/ 
statement-regarding-possible-lifetime-appointment-judges-murusidze-and-
sul. 
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the objectivity and impartiality in the selection and appointment of 
judges.46 
The distribution of cases represents another risk of 
corruption. Concerns have been voiced recently about the allegedly 
political motivation behind the distribution of some high profile 
cases, such as against former ruling party members and the Rustavi 
2 TV Channel.47 On paper, the rule of random electronic case 
distribution introduced with the third wave of reforms is an 
important improvement. Yet, contrary to recommendations by the 
Venice Commission, the law leaves open a range of critical issues, 
including exceptional cases, regulation for which falls under the 
High Council of Justice. 
Despite many concerns about the independence of the 
judiciary and prosecutorial dominance in the period from 2005 to 
2012 and the emergence of a new set of challenges in the period from 
2013 to 2017 (incl. alleged selective justice), corruption-related 
allegations have not resurfaced for over a decade. It is therefore 
especially worrisome to note the recent news of possible corruption 
cases in courts, as voiced by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, foreign diplomats, businesses and local NGOs.48 A 
general increase in corruption perception has also been noted by 
Transparency International, which reported in 2016: 
Approximately 40 percent of the citizens believe that 
abuse of authority in civil servants for private profit is 
widespread. As a result, the percentage showing the 
issue increased by 15 units when compared to the 
                                                        
46 See https://idfi.ge/en/the-high-council-of-justice-dismissed-mamuka-
akhvlediani-in-violation-of-the-law and the chronology of events from the first 
statement of Mamuka Akhvlediani to his dismissal - http://bit.ly/2b7iK05. 
47 See, e.g., the judges assigned to three criminal cases brought against one of 
the most important former officials were simultaneously relocated to the Tbilisi 
City Court just before the hearing. See https://goo.gl/l19xSR; and 
Transparency International Georgia, ‘The second trial monitoring report of 
high-profile criminal cases’, 2014 http://www.gdi.ge/uploads/other/0/ 
241.pdf. 
48 See https://www.finchannel.com/~finchannel/business/65323-icc-
georgia-urges-government-to-reform-bias-unreliable-and-corrupt-court-
system.  
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outcome of 2015 and by 28 units when compared to 
2013.49 
This is a sad trend for a country which had achieved so much 
in terms of countering corruption. 
The introduction in 2017 of an asset declaration system for 
officials, which covers the judiciary as well, was a welcome 
development. Pursuant to the commitments entered into under the 
Association Agreement with the EU, an Independent Committee 
has been created to conduct spot checks of the declarations. This 
audit tool is critical, since law enforcement has so far failed to 
respond to questions raised by the media regarding assets held by 
certain officials and judges. 
Fighting corruption in the justice sector in Ukraine 
According to various international and domestic opinion polls 
conducted over the last five years, the level of trust in Ukrainian 
courts is one of the lowest in the world (below 10%).50 With the 
adoption of the ‘Law on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges’ in 
June 2016, a series of unprecedented anti-corruption measures has 
been introduced in the justice sector.51 They concern every sphere of 
professional activity of (candidate) judges and include: checking the 
declarations of assets and kinship; transparent and competitive 
selection procedures; periodic qualification assessment; the 
establishment of a Public Council for Integrity in the HQCJ (see 
section 2.2); and the widening the list of grounds for prosecution.52  
                                                        
49 See http://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/results-public-opinion-poll-
indicates-deterioration-field-corruption.  
50 See, e.g., 2016 polls by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation at 
http://dif.org.ua/. 
51 In this context, it is also worth pointing to the creation in September 2015 of 
a Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office, whose authority includes the 
supervision of observance of the law during the conduct of (pre-trial) 
investigative activities by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 
(NABU). The head of this prosecutor’s office is appointed as the result of an 
open competition. 
52 Wages have also been raised. It is also worth observing that the law allows 
certified lawyers and academics who have no judicial experience to compete 
for positions in the Supreme Court and appellate courts. The aim of this 
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Among the new measures, the vetting process of candidate 
and incumbent judges has been hailed as key to the effort to clean 
the judicial system from the inside out. It consists of an asset 
declaration (all income, assets, including corporate rights and 
securities, financial obligations and expenses) of the person 
authorised to perform functions of the state, as well as his/her 
family members; a declaration of integrity; and a declaration of 
kinship: family ties, positions related to public service. 
Vetting the livelihood of a (candidate) judge is carried out by 
the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC). The 
full review comprises the determination of the authenticity of the 
declared information; the accuracy of the assessment of the declared 
assets; the verification of the existence of a conflict of interest and 
signs of illicit enrichment. Full verification of the declaration is 
carried out for each judge at least once every five years, as well as at 
the request of the HCJ or the HQCJ. The information obtained is 
included in a dossier and can also be used to assess the adherence 
to the rules of professional ethics. 
Criteria for professional ethics and integrity have been 
established by the PCI. This body consists of twenty members, 
including representatives of human rights organisations, lawyers, 
and journalists of good repute. Among the main functions of the PCI 
are collecting, verifying and analysing information about a 
candidate judge; assessing criteria of professional ethics and 
integrity and advising the HQCJ. In the selection process, candidate 
judges should pass a special check by the HQCJ in accordance with 
the submitted documents, a qualifying exam, an interview and 
special training. Based on the results of the qualification assessment, 
the HQCJ adopts a motivated decision to confirm or not confirm the 
ability of a (candidate) judge to administer justice in a relevant 
court. In the case of non-confirmation, a sitting judge shall be 
suspended for up to six months, with simultaneous referral to the 
National School of Judges (see below) for the completion of the 
refresher course, followed by a re-qualification assessment. In case 
of repeated refusal for a judge to administer justice in a relevant 
court, he or she must be dismissed from the position. 
                                                        
relaxation of selection criteria was to allow for a speedy update and clean up 
the judiciary. 
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Finally, the number of grounds for disciplinary action against 
(candidate) judges has been increased to 19. These include: the 
failure or late submission of declarations, as well as the submission 
of knowingly false information; the admission by a judge of unfair 
behaviour, including the incurrence by a judge or members of his 
family of expenses exceeding the income of such a judge and the 
income of his family members; failure to inform or untimely 
communication with the HCJ about an actual or potential conflict of 
interests of the judge; failure to inform the HCJ of a case of 
interference with activities in the administration of justice. 
Full-scale application of the above-mentioned measures has 
not yet taken place, which contributes to the continuation of unfair 
practices in selection procedures, illegal enrichment and the 
adoption of customised decisions. At the same time, it should be 
noted that the mass voluntary retirement of judges (about 1,600 in 
2016) was largely driven by the adoption of the ‘Law on ensuring 
the right to a fair trial’ of 2 February 2015, which introduced the 
qualification evaluation of judges. This, in itself, constituted a major 
clean-up operation. 
Despite the generally positive nature of the above-mentioned 
reforms, their success is not guaranteed. This is primarily due to the 
dearth of qualified human resources. For the first time since 
independence, Ukraine is facing a situation in which only 4,824 of 
nearly 8,000 judge positions (and less than half at cadre level) have 
been filled, with dozens of local courts relying on one or two judges, 
while 12 courts have been forced to close. As a result, citizens do not 
have proper access to justice.53 
The body responsible for training highly qualified personnel 
for the justice system is the National School of Judges of Ukraine 
(NSJU), a state institution with special status in the justice system. 
The NSJU is formed under the High Qualification Council of Judges 
and carries out its activities in accordance with the Law and the 
Charter approved by the HQCJ. The tasks of the NSJU include 
special training for candidate judges; training of judges, including 
those who are elected to administrative positions in courts; periodic 
                                                        
53 This situation is compounded by a lack in security of court buildings after the 
special unit ‘Griffin’ was abolished during the 2015 reform of the state’s law 
enforcement bodies. 
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training of judges in order to improve their qualifications; 
conducting training courses determined by a qualification or 
disciplinary authority to improve the qualifications of judges 
temporarily suspended from the administration of justice; and 
training of court staff and improving their qualifications.54 
A major pending change to Ukrainian litigation concerns the 
representation of parties in court. Currently, Ukrainian lawyers 
willing to represent the interests of clients in court do not need to 
pass (the equivalent of) the bar exam. Even a law diploma is not 
required. The only limitation in this respect applies to practising 
criminal law where lawyers need to have a legal education, two 
years of working experience with an attorney, and to pass the exam 
for an attorney’s licence. Ukraine’s legal community is divided on 
the question whether the introduction of a ‘monopoly’ for attorneys 
at law is a positive development. On the one hand, it is argued that 
the exclusive right of attorneys to represent clients in court is not a 
privilege but about increasing their responsibility, which should be 
subsequently envisaged in procedural law. On the other hand, the 
introduction of the monopoly is viewed as a limitation of the right 
of access to court, as there is a risk that attorneys’ fees may rise 
disproportionately. 
Fighting corruption in the justice sector in Moldova 
Moldova is a typical example of over-regulation with no discernible 
practical impact. As noted earlier, several important legislative 
amendments have been implemented either partially or contrary to 
the stated goals (see section 2.3). 
                                                        
54 According to the latest report of the NSJU in 2016, 155 specialised training 
sessions were held for local court judges. They included topics such as: judicial 
ethics; anti-corruption legislation; time management in the judiciary; 
application of the ECHR in the administration of justice. Overall, in 2016 NSJU 
conducted 257 training activities for judges of local and appellate courts; 3,461 
judges were trained to maintain qualification (average annual number of 
judges passing this training is about 4,000 people). The financing of these 
measures was carried out both at the expense of the state budget and donor 
organisations. In 2016 an additional 6,000 court staff were trained in NSJU and 
enhanced their skills. On the whole, in 2016, 414 judges, 207 lawyers and 
practitioners were involved in teaching activities. 
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A case in point concerns the selection and promotion of 
judges. In 2012, the Moldovan Parliament passed a package of 
legislative amendments that introduced, inter alia, the Judges’ 
Selection and Career Board; criteria for the selection, transfer and 
promotion of judges;55 a mandatory three-yearly performance 
evaluation; and a limited discretion of the Superior Council of 
Magistracy (SCM) on the career of judges. These novelties should 
have led to the selection and promotion of the most competent and 
correct candidates. Yet the practice of 2013-17 shows a different 
picture. For instance, in the period 2013-16 several cases were noted 
when judges with outstanding integrity issues were appointed or 
promoted by the SCM, including after the president’s 
unsubstantiated refusal to appoint other candidates.56 Credible 
mass-media have disclosed integrity problems regarding several 
candidates. Civil society organisations have requested adequate 
procedures from the SCM, however, no reasoning was ever 
provided by the SCM for appointing or promoting judges with 
integrity issues.57 Instead of using questionable tools such as 
polygraph tests, a proper implementation of the rules on asset 
declaration would have a much bigger impact. 
                                                        
55 There are two types of candidate judges: graduates of the National Institute 
of Justice and legal specialists with work experience. They have to go through 
the same procedure: graduation of the National Institute of Justice or exam 
before the Graduation Committee (for candidates with work experience); 
review by the Judges’ Selection and Career Board; proposal by the SCM; and 
appointment by the President/Parliament (the latter for Supreme Court). 
Promotion of judges includes the following stages: performance review by 
Judges’ Performance Evaluation Board; review by Judges’ Selection and Career 
Board; proposal by the SCM; and promotion by the President/Parliament.  
56 The president of the country appoints judges of the first and second instance 
courts (the Parliament for the Supreme Court) at the proposal of the SCM. The 
president can refuse only once the appointment of a candidate judge, by 
reasoned decree. The SCM may propose the same candidate by a vote of two 
thirds of its members and the president is obliged to promote the respective 
candidate. 
57 See, e.g., http://crjm.org/ong-uri-solicita-presedintele-rm-verifice-
informatii-candidati-judecatori-si-admita-pe-cei-cu-reputatie-ireprosabila/.  
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Another example of a failed reform is the 2014 ‘Law on 
disciplinary responsibility of judges’,58 which introduced a raft of 
improvements such as the appointment procedure for members of 
the Disciplinary Board, an extended list of disciplinary offences and 
a longer period (from 1 to 2 years) to hold judges accountable. At 
the same time, however, the law provided for a cumbersome 
mechanism that allows too much discretion to the Judicial 
Inspection to declare inadmissible disciplinary complaints, and a 
long mechanism of five bodies able to examine complaints and 
quash the decision of the previous body. Although the new law has 
increased the categories of persons that can submit disciplinary 
complaints about judges,59 the number of disciplinary sanctions in 
2015 and 2016 decreased when compared to 2011-14.60  
In the case of disciplinary sanctions for certain offences, a 
judge may lose the right to a so-called ‘exit allowance’. Arguably, 
this system undermines judicial independence. The same applies to 
judges benefiting from below market prices for apartments in blocks 
built at the request of the Judges’ Association or under the authority 
of the SCM, on plots of land transferred by the Chisinau 
municipality at preferential conditions. Judges have been found to 
own several apartments, including some registered under the 
                                                        
58 Law no. 178 on disciplinary responsibility of judges, of 27 July 2014, in force 
since 1 January 2015. 
59 Prior to the 2014 law, only members of the Superior Council of Magistracy 
(SCM) could initiate a disciplinary procedure. Since January 2015, any person 
can submit a complaint to the Judicial Inspection, including members of the 
Superior Council of Magistracy, which can proceed with the case or dismiss the 
complaint. 
60 Judicial Inspection dismissed as manifestly ill-founded 72% of all disciplinary 
complaints in 2015 and 81% in 2016. The rate of dismissals by the admissibility 
panels is even higher: 97% in 2015. For more details and analysis, see P. Grecu, 
N. Hriptievsci, Analysis of the legislation and practice concerning disciplinary 
liability of judges 2015-2016, Legal Resources Centre from Moldova, 2016, 
http://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016-11-Analiza-Disc-CRJM-
final-ENG.pdf and, by the same authors, Assessment of needs to improve the legal 
framework on disciplinary liability of judges, Legal Resources Centre from 
Moldova, 2016, http://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CRJM-
Politici-8-Disciplinar-ENG.pdf. 
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names of relatives and others sold at market prices.61 Rather than 
providing perks that compromise the independence and integrity of 
judges, existing benefits should be significantly reduced and regular 
salaries further increased. 
Corruption in the Moldovan judiciary sparked peak public 
indignation in September 2016, when 16 judges were criminally 
charged for money-laundering activities in a $20 billion ‘Russian 
Laundromat’ scheme.62 Although the SCM had been aware since 2012 
of the involvement of judges in these cases,63 it took no action until the 
autumn of 2016. In the meantime, several of the incriminated judges 
were positively evaluated,64 promoted to administrative positions in 
district courts or to Courts of Appeal.65 The majority of judges that issued 
court orders for the transfer of funds came from the Chișinău Rîşcani 
District Court, where the current president of the SCM served before 
2013. The Moldovan think tank IDIS Viitorul has concluded that judges 
                                                        
61 See https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/justitie/chilipiruri-imobiliare-
pentru-judecatori-pe-terenurile-statului.  
62 See, e.g., https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/20/british-
banks-handled-vast-sums-of-laundered-russian-money and Transparency 
International-Moldova, ADEPT, LRCM and IDIS-Viitorul, State Capture: The 
case of the Republic of Moldova (available at http://www.transparency.md/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/TI_Moldova_State_Capture.pdf).  
63 The SCM knew about the ‘Russian Laundromat’ back in 2012 when the Security and 
Intelligence Service (SIS) was notified of the actions of Judge Iurie HÎRBU at Teleneşti 
Court. At the time, the SCM took note of the information provided by the Judicial 
Inspection that the judge certified the debt of USD 30 million on the basis of 
unauthenticated copies of documents. The SCM also noted the intention of a member 
of the SCM to initiate disciplinary proceedings against that judge and forwarded the 
materials to the General Prosecutor’s Office. See SCM decision no. 812/38 of 8 December 
2012 in Romanian, http://csm.md/files/Hotaririle/2012/38/812-38.pdf. In 2014, 
the SCJ analysed court practice on this issue and found several instances of misconduct 
by judges. The findings were brought to the attention of prosecutors, NAC and SCM. In 
May 2014, SCM took note of this information but did not order any further investigation 
or disciplinary proceedings. See SCM decision no. 470/16 of 27 May 2014 in Romanian, 
http://csm.md/files/Hotaririle/2014/16/470-16.pdf. 
64 See Performance Evaluation Board, decision no. 18/2 of 13 February 2015, 
http://csm.md/files/Hotaririle%20CEvaluare/2015/02/18-2.pdf. 
65 See SCM, decision no. 769/30 of 20 October 2015, 
http://csm.md/files/Hotaririle/2015/30/769-30.pdf; and decision no. 8/2 of 26 
January 2016, available at http://csm.md/files/Hotaririle/2016/02/8-2.pdf. 
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were aware of the illicit nature of the transactions and adopted decisions 
in favour of criminal networks because they were assured of high 
political support.66 The cases against the judges have been pending since 
August 2017. 
Several other negative trends have eroded public trust in the 
(independence of the) judiciary.67 One is the phenomenon of closed 
hearings in high-profile cases such as that of Moldova’s ex-Prime 
Minister Filat, sentenced to nine years in prison for, inter alia, 
passive corruption. The first instance and appeals courts heard the 
case in closed proceedings.68 On 22 February 2017, the Supreme 
Court rejected Filat’s appeal in a written procedure. Only the 
decision of the Supreme Court was published in full. Two other 
notorious cases concerned the ‘billion-dollar theft’ from the 
Moldovan banking sector.69 Examining such cases behind closed 
doors fuels the perception of abuse among the public. 
Other threats to the (perception of) independence of the 
Moldovan judiciary concern the initiation of criminal proceedings 
against judges for the merits of their decisions; an increase in the 
                                                        
66 IDIS Viitorul, Operaţiunea Laundromat: Analiza actorilor și a acţiunilor întreprinse 
(Laundromat Operation: Analysis of the actors and actions taken), Chișinău, 2017, pages 
15-16, http://www.viitorul.org/files/library/Puterea%20hibrida_site.pdf. 
67 According to polls 74.5% of the population did not trust the judiciary in 
November 2011. In October 2016, this figure has dropped to 89.6%. Institute for 
Public Policies, Public Opinion Barometer, October 2016: 
http://www.bop.ipp.md/result?type=bar. 
68 On 21 June 2016, just six days before the sentence in Mr. Filat’s case was 
issued by the first instance court, the SCM adopted a new ‘Regulation on 
publishing court decisions’, according to which decisions of cases examined 
behind closed doors are not to be published on its website. The previous 
regulation from 2008 did not provide such a limitation and all court decisions 
were published. 
69 Reference is made here to the cases of Veaceslav Platon, a businessman 
sentenced to 18 years in prison, and Ilan Shor, the mayor of Orhei and former 
President of the Board of Economy Bank of Moldova. This episode concerned the 
disappearance of around 1 billion USD from Moldovan banking sector, representing 
nearly a third of the National Bank’s reserves, or the equivalent of 15% of Moldovan 
GDP. For a detailed explanation, see http://www.transparency.md/2016/ 
12/20/radiography-of-a-bank-fraud-in-moldova-from-money-laundering-to-
billion-fraud-and-state-debt/. 
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interference of the executive and legislative branches with judiciary; 
and dismissals of judges based on information from intelligence 
services, provisions declared unconstitutional on 5 December 2017. 
The most telling example that combines these systemic trends is the 
pending case of ex-judge Domnica Manole.70 On 14 April 2016, 
Judge Manole of the Chisinau Court of Appeals annulled the 
decision of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), by which the 
latter had rejected the initiation of a constitutional referendum. The 
Supreme Court annulled her decision, ruling in favour of CEC. 
Based on this ruling, the Interim General Prosecutor on 26 May 2016 
submitted a request to the SCM to approve the initiation of criminal 
investigation of Judge Manole for her interpretation of the law in a 
context when the constitution contains contradictory provisions and 
there is no judicial precedent on this issue. Five days later the SCM 
approved the request in a closed meeting, ignoring the judge’s 
request to examine it in a public hearing. In a parallel development, 
the Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office reopened an investigation 
against Judge Manole in a case of alleged failure to declare 
properties. This case was quashed in February 2015 after the 
National Anti-corruption Centre (NAC) found that the judge had 
committed no such breach. The reopening of the case smacked of an 
orchestrated (ab)use of prosecutorial powers to harass the judge. On 
5 July 2017, i.e. before she could submit her publicly announced 
candidature for SCM membership, the SCM decided to dismiss 
Judge Manole on the basis of a non-legally binding opinion of the 
Information and Security Services which was examined behind 
closed doors, although Manole had asked for a public hearing. 
Manole appealed the dismissal by the SCM before the Supreme 
Court. Although the case was still pending, the president on 21 July 
2017 signed the decree dismissing the judge. Given the personalities 
involved in this case one would be forgiven for wondering whether 
this kind of prosecution serves the judicial hierarchy in setting an 
example for other judges that would dare to go against the grain.71 
                                                        
70 In another case in which a judge was dismissed based on secret intelligence, 
a complaint was lodged before the European Court of Human Rights for 
alleged breach of due process guarantees required by Article 6 ECHR. 
71 At the General Assembly of Judges of March 2016, Judge Manole had 
criticised several proposals of the judiciary’s leadership, launched in 2015. She 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  123 
 
Judicial implementation of the DCFTA 
Having discussed the judicial reform efforts undertaken in Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine as a result of these countries’ shared desire to 
associate themselves more closely with the EU, the analysis now 
turns to court practice with the implementation of the AA/DCFTAs. 
Not only does such an exercise serve to gauge the awareness levels 
of national judges about the need to enforce their country’s 
contractual obligations entered into with the European Union, it 
also offers insights into the level of openness of domestic courts to 
use international and EU law in setting conflicting national rules 
and bad practices aside. 
In the case of Georgia, according to the ‘Law on Normative 
Acts’ and the ‘Law on International Treaties of Georgia’, 
international agreements such as the Association Agreement with 
the EU are an integral part of the country’s legislation. Their 
hierarchical position is below that of the Constitution and above 
(organic) laws of Georgia. Georgian courts may therefore refer to 
AA/DCFTA provisions. This was also the case for rights and 
obligations derived from the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), but Georgian case law reveals no traces of the 
PCA.72 At the time of writing, only one explicit reference had been 
made to the AA/DCFTA. In its Decision of 31 July 2015, the 
Constitutional Court concluded that there is a right for employees 
to receive damages in the event of unlawful termination of an 
employment contract. The Court based its reasoning, inter alia, on 
Articles 228 and 229 of the AA but was careful to add that these 
                                                        
had appealed the SCM decision of 26 January 2016 for lack of reasoning for the 
promotion of judges to the Supreme Court and publicly criticised the SCM for 
selective approaches on promotions. She was the judge rapporteur in two 
disciplinary cases that sanctioned several judges of the Supreme Court of 
Justice. 
72 See G. Gabrichidze, ‘Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law 
in Georgia’, in: P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov (eds.), Legislative Approximation 
and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union: 
Towards a Common Regulatory Space? London: Routledge, 2014, 188. 
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provisions codify standards established by the International Labour 
Organisation.73 
The near absence of direct references to the AA/DCFTA in 
Georgian jurisprudence might be explained by the fact that the 
agreement – in contrast to the ECHR – contains hardly any 
provisions which could qualify for direct applicability. Yet a review 
of the Unified State register of Judgments reveals that domestic 
courts have used EU (legal) acts in order to reinforce their own legal 
positions.74 A more likely explanation is therefore that it is simply 
too soon after the entry into force of the AA/DCFTA for Georgian 
litigators and judges to have woken up to the idea that the 
agreement could provide them with an autonomous source of legal 
backup, especially after the lukewarm reception by the 
Constitutional Court of Articles 228 and 229. But as the Georgian 
Parliament proceeds with the approximation of large parts of 
national law to the EU acquis, the likelihood grows of domestic 
courts choosing to interpret the former in conformity with the latter. 
The reason for this sense of optimism is gleaned from court 
practice in Ukraine. Even if the Constitutional Court has not yet 
expressed itself on the direct applicability of the AA/DCFTA in the 
legal order of Ukraine, it could well be asked to rule on the binding 
nature of decisions adopted by the EU-Ukraine Association Council 
or on the obligation of the EU-Ukraine joint arbitration panel to 
abide by rulings of the ECJ on the interpretation of the relevant EU 
acquis. In the past, the High Commercial Court of Ukraine has 
recognised the precedence of the PCA over conflicting provisions of 
national law.75 The reform wave which is currently sweeping across 
the justice sector has awakened the activism of judges to seek 
inspiration in Ukraine’s international treaty obligations and rulings 
                                                        
73 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, N 2/3/630, 31 July 2015. 
74 See G. Gabrichidze, ‘The Constitutional Order of Georgia and its Adaptability 
to the EU- Georgia Association Agreement’, in R. Petrov and P. Van Elsuwege 
(eds.), Post-Soviet Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration. Adapting to 
European and Eurasian Integration Projects, London: Routledge, 2018, 105-117. 
75 See judgments of the High Commercial Court of Ukraine on 2 February 2005, 
No. 12/267; of 22 February 2005 (‘Odek’ LTD v Ryvne Custom Office) No. 18/303; 
and of 25 March 2005 (Closed Stock Company ‘Chumak’ v Kherson Custom Office), 
No. 7/299. 
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by the European Court of Human Rights.76 Administrative courts 
have already used EU acquis and ECJ case law, not as a source of law 
in and of itself, but as a “persuasive source of reference” for the 
“harmonious interpretation of national legislation of Ukraine with 
established standards of the EU”.77 According to the High 
Administrative Court this practice is justified by the need for 
effective implementation the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.78 
In his research, Roman Petrov has uncovered dozens of judgments 
rendered since 2014, where general, specialised and high courts 
have referred to the AA/DCFTA and EU acquis (fundamental 
principles, secondary legislation and ECJ case law) in order to 
reinforce their legal argumentation in cases concerning customs 
duties,79 the supply and trade of natural gas,80 the definition of 
origin of goods (honey),81 and even the legality of legislative drafts 
by the President of Ukraine.82 Some judges have even gone so far as 
to consider the entry into force of the AA/DCFTA as an obligation 
to apply EU common values in Ukraine.83 The latter may find 
                                                        
76 See R. Petrov, The Constitutional order of Ukraine and its Adaptability to the 
Process of European Integration’, in R. Petrov and P. Van Elsuwege (eds.), Post-
Soviet Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration. Adapting to European 
and Eurasian Integration Projects, London: Routledge, 2018, 91-104. 
77 See R. Petrov, ‘Regulatory Convergence and Application of EU Law in 
Ukraine’, in P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov (eds.), Legal Approximation of EU 
Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU: Towards a Common Regulatory Space?, 
London: Routledge Press, 2014, 137-158. 
78 Information Letter of the High Administrative Court of Ukraine, No. 
1601/11/10/14-14, 18 November 2014. 
79 See e.g. Judgment of the Appellate Court of the region of Lviv on 06 April 
2016, No. 33/783/241/16. 
80 See e.g. Judgment of the District Administrative Court of the city of Kiev on 
13 April 2016, No. 826/594/16. 
81 See e.g. Judgment of the District Court of the city of Tsyrypinsk on 29 April 
2016, No. 664/906/16-c. 
82 See e.g. Judgment o the High Administrative Court of Ukraine on 26 April 
2016, No. 800/251/16. 
83 Petrov, loc. cit, who refers to the judgment of the Inter-district Court of 
Kolomya of 7 July 2016, No. 346/3499/16-c, which contains a rather emotional 
passage: “The Court notes that after the signing of the Association Agreement 
with the European Union by the President of our country, and after the 
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expression in future (general or Constitutional) court practice in 
cases where new domestic legislation rubs up against such 
“essential elements” of the AA as the freedom of expression.84 
Moldova has produced an uneven court practice with the 
application and enforcement of its AA. State bodies and lower 
courts have based some of their decisions on provisions of the 
AA/DCFTA, albeit often in a partial way not in conformity with 
best practice. Fortunately, wrong interpretations have been 
corrected at last instance when proceedings ran their full course. 
The Constitutional Court addressed the correlation between 
national constitutional principles and the Law on the ratification of 
the EU-Moldova Association Agreement for the first time in 
October 2014.85 The Court argued that the right of the state to 
assume international commitments is an inherent element of state 
sovereignty, which can be manifested externally by establishing 
collaborative relationships with other countries and international 
entities on the basis of international agreements. Strikingly, the 
Constitutional Court also concluded that, when doing so, the 
attribution of competences to designated international institutions 
does not imply the simultaneous transfer of national sovereignty 
per se, but merely the exercise thereof. As such, the Moldovan 
Constitutional Court has adopted the legal canons that define the 
relationship between the supranational EU and its member states 
                                                        
ratification by the supreme legislative body (the Verkhovna Rada Ukraine), 
Ukraine, as a state aspiring the full membership in the EU, must respect private 
property rights of every person as a basic tenet and a cornerstone of European 
values and inviolable foundation of the EU, which must by complied by all 
Member States and by associated countries.” 
84 See, e.g., Executive Order (Ukaz) of the President of Ukraine No. 133/2017 of 
15 May 2017 banning Russian social networks; and the commentary by P. Van 
Elsuwege, ‘Ukraine’s Ban on Russian Social Media: On The Edge Between 
National Security and Freedom of Expression’, VerfBlog, 2017/6/02, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/ukraines-ban-on-russian-social-media- on-the-
edge-between-national-security-and-freedom-of-expression. In a similar vein, 
see the ‘Law Amending the Administrative Code regarding the ban on 
production and propaganda of the St. George (Guards’) Ribbon’ of 16 May 
2017. 
85 Judgment of the Moldovan Constitutional Court on 9 October 2014 
(http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?tip=hotariri&docid=511&l=ro). 
The said law was adopted on 2 July 2014. 
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and set the scene for lower courts to use the AA/DCFTA as a source 
of inspiration and directly applicable law. Two landmark cases 
stand out in this respect, both related to the protection of the 
geographical indication an international trade mark ‘Prosecco’. 
The first case, Bulgari Winery SRL v. State Agency for Intellectual 
Property (AGEPI), concerns an action for annulment of AGEPI’s 
refusal of 27 March 2015 to allow the claimant’s use of the name 
‘Pronto Prosecco’ for marking its sparkling wine while accepting the 
use of the international trade mark Prosecco DOC and PDO on the 
territory of Moldova for champagne-like sparkling wines. The first 
instance court of Riscani, district of Chisinau, rejected AGEPI’s 
arguments, including breaches of provisions of the EU-Moldova 
Association Agreement that allow exceptions only to marks / 
names that had been in use by local companies long before the 
agreement entered into force, as well as a violation of the already 
protected trade mark DOP Champagne (country of origin: France). 
On 23 February 2017, the Chisinau Court of Appeal upheld the 
ruling by the first instance court without, however, going into the 
merits of the case. In fact, both court rulings lacked adequate 
reasoning and appeared to be verging on the arbitrary. The Appeals 
Court limited itself to stating that AGEPI had acted like the defender 
of the private company owning the rights over the combined mark 
Prosecco DOC/PDO, contrary to its statutory competencies. It also 
referred to its sister court in Comrat, which had ruled that Bulgari 
Winery had the right to use the name Prosecco.  
The parallel case, Tomai-Vinex SA and Bulgari Winery SRL v. 
State Inspection for Alcohol Production and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
concerned the decision of the State Inspection of 25 January 2016 
prohibiting the production and placement on the market of the two 
companies’ sparkling wine products with the trademarks 
‘Prosecco’.86 When challenged, the Head of the State inspection 
amended the decision, thereby prohibiting only the placing on the 
market, not its production. The Ministry of Agriculture, however, 
upheld the decision of 25 January 2016 and also prohibited Tomai-
Vinex SA from using the trade mark ‘Prosecco Pronto’ (for exports 
to Russia) and Bulgari Winery SRL from using the mark ‘Prosecco 
Cassara’ (for exports to the US). On 24 June 2016, the first instance 
                                                        
86 AGEPI joined the state authorities in the proceedings. 
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court of Comrat ruled in favour of the two companies. On 20 
October 2016, the Court of Appeal of Comrat upheld that judgment 
by ruling that the state authorities had overstepped their 
competences, because these were limited to the territory of 
Moldova, whereas both companies had stopped their production 
and exports to Russia and the US prior to the decision of January 
2016. The Court stated that according to Article 302 of the AA, the 
Republic of Moldova benefited from a transitional period of five 
years (starting 1 April 2013) to put in place all (customs border) 
measures necessary to stop any unlawful use of protected 
geographical indications. Hence, it seems that the first instance and 
appellate courts concluded that the state authorities were barred 
from taking any measures to impede the production activity of 
economic operators, including the use of the geographical 
indication ‘Prosecco’ by the two companies, until the end of the five-
year transition period. On 20 September 2017, the Supreme Court of 
Justice quashed this reading of the AA and upheld the orders of the 
State Inspection and the Ministry of Agriculture.87 
The Supreme Court ruled that Articles 297-301 and Annexes 
XXX-C/D of the Association Agreement88 obliged the Government 
of Moldova to protect the geographic indications according to the 
level provided by the AA and by way of adequate administrative 
and judicial procedures (including on customs). The Court also held 
that the Moldovan authorities had to ensure the respect of the 
protections at the request of EU.89 The Supreme Court found that 
the lower courts had wrongly interpreted the regime of exceptions 
                                                        
87 See Decision no. 3ra-426/17, Supreme Court of Justice, 20 September 2017, 
available in Romanian at http://jurisprudenta.csj.md/search_col_civil 
.php?id=38959. The ruling of the Court is only reviewed insofar as it relates to 
the AA. 
88 Ratified by Law no. 112 of 2 July 2014. 
89 The European Commission brought a complaint of an Italian company that 
had the right to use the protected geographic indication ‘Prosecco’ to the 
attention of the first meeting of the subcommittee for protection of geographic 
indications that took place on 15 December 2015. The issues had been raised 
again at the EU-Moldova dialogue of 31 March 2017 and a subsequent meeting 
between Prime Minister Pavel Filip and EU Commissioner for Trade Cecilia 
Malmström. See an article published on 24 April 2017, available in Romanian 
at http://agora.md/stiri/31348/spumantul-prosecco-poate-declansa-un-
scandal-diplomatic-intre-r--moldova-si-ue.  
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whereby a limited number of traditional wines produced prior to 
the entry into force of the AA could indeed – until the end of the 
transition period – continue to be marked under such names as 
Champagne, Cognac, Cahors for exports to CIS countries, but not 
products under new names that belong to companies from the EU, 
such as Prosecco. 
Building on the Constitutional Court’s ruling of October 2014, 
this judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice represents a positive 
example that Moldova’s highest judicial bodies are on the right 
track in faithfully implementing the letter and the spirit of the EU-
Moldova Association Agreement. At the same time, the two 
Prosecco cases reveal the urgent need to shield the judiciary from 
inappropriate (corporate) interferences and to properly train 
lawyers and lower court judges on the complexities of the 
Association Agreement. 
Conclusions 
Going by the provisions of the Association Agreements and the 
texts of the ensuing Association Agendas, the commitments of 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to reform their judicial systems look 
more or less the same, yet the starting points for implementation are 
very different. This is the result of different historical trajectories 
and current-day political tendencies in the transition of the three 
associated states. 
Reform in Georgia’s justice sector has been implemented in 
several phases. Building on a major overhaul during the second half 
of the 2000s, the current government, which took office in 2012, 
initiated three waves of reforms. The objectives have become more 
and more sophisticated. Technically, Georgia has done more than 
any other country in the region. This is reflected in, for instance, the 
World Justice Project’s “Rule of Law Index 2017-8”, where Georgia 
ranked 1st in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and 38th globally 
out of 113 countries – down from 29th out of 102 in 2015 but still 
ahead of EU member states Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary. Yet, 
with significant progress made in a relatively short period of time 
and many achievements to be proud of to this day, the judicial 
reform has still not addressed principal issues such as the ambiguity 
of disciplinary liability of judges, the lack of norms regulating the 
High Council of Justice, and the flawed procedures for the election 
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of court presidents and candidates for the European Court of 
Human Rights. While previous governments had succeeded in 
substantially reducing corruption and in establishing institutional 
effectiveness, the lack of political independence of the judicial 
system, including the Prosecutor’s Office, remains to be addressed. 
Local and international watchdogs have pointed to instances of 
selective justice and attempts whereby making legal/institutional 
progress has been overshadowed by a lack of political will (or too 
much will, but misplaced). With many good practices in place, the 
ultimate test is that of the ‘resilience’ (i.e. quality, ethics and 
principles) of the judiciary against undue political interference. In 
this context, it is dispiriting to note that oligarchic power has 
reasserted itself in influencing political choices.90 
In spite of the Euromaidan revolution of 2013, Ukraine is still 
suffering from its post-Soviet legacy of a weak rule of law and high 
levels of fraud. The judiciary, in particular, has traditionally been 
perceived as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. In 
June 2016 the authorities kick-started a process of multiannual 
reform of the justice sector, with amendments to the Constitution 
and the adoption of new legislation aimed at reorganising the 
judicial architecture of the country (by creating a new Supreme 
Court and reducing the judicial tiers from four to three), 
strengthening judicial independence (e.g. by subjecting sitting 
judges to examinations and mandatory electronic asset 
declarations), and abolishing the state’s monopoly on the 
enforcement of court decisions (i.e. through the introduction of 
private bailiffs). Details of many of these reforms will need to be 
regulated in implementing acts but, overall, they represent a major 
overhaul of Ukraine’s judicial system and a revolutionary attempt 
to eradicate widespread corruption in the judiciary (cf. the vetting 
process).  
Despite these attempts at subjecting the justice sector to 
Georgia-style shock therapy, law enforcement remains biased, with 
groups of top officials and wealthy businessmen seemingly 
enjoying low levels of accountability and high levels of illicit 
privileges, while others cannot have their rights protected. The 
situation has improved a little under the previous and current 
                                                        
90 See also the chapter by Konończuk, Cenușa and Kakachia in this book. 
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governments but Ukraine still performs below average according to 
indicators of the World Justice Project’s “Rule of Law Index 2017-
8”, where the country ranks 77th. The selection of judges to the new 
Supreme Court (completed in November 2017) only partly 
contributed to the judicial system’s clean-up as the Public Council 
of Integrity questioned the integrity, independence and 
professional records of about a quarter of newly appointed judges. 
Efforts to modernise the General Prosecutor’s Office are still 
ongoing and the authorities have dithered over the creation of a 
much-anticipated High Anti-Corruption Court. The adoption of the 
necessary legislation to establish the HAC was pushed back well 
into 2018. Now that it has been passed, attention turns to 
implementation. 
The changes to the justice sector are planned for gradual 
introduction over the next few years, so until 2020 the jury is still 
out, as it were. The emerging practice of administrative and 
commercial courts with the implementation of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement gives reason for hope. Unfortunately 
though, the general impression is that the judicial reform dynamic 
has hit the buffers, due to a ruling elite that is unwilling to 
undermine its own wealth and power in the name of progress 
towards an independent judiciary. The justice sector reform in 
Ukraine is rather like the procession of Echternach: three steps 
forward, two steps back.91 
Moldova’s direction of travel has been backwards in recent 
years and its Justice Sector Reform Strategy (JSRS, 2011-2016) has 
fallen flat: changes were made mostly at the procedural and 
technical levels but have not been matched by improvements in the 
independence and integrity of judges. Moldova is facing 
unprecedented attacks on judicial independence and increasing 
instances of selective justice. These are attested mostly via the 
selection and promotion of judges with questionable integrity; 
ungrounded prosecution of outspoken judges; questionable 
dismissals; reduced transparency and corporatism at the level of the 
Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM); increased use of closed 
hearings in high profile cases and reduced transparency of courts in 
                                                        
91 Echternach is a locality in Luxembourg which has an ancient tradition of 
dances conforming to this model. 
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general. The alleged involvement of 16 judges in a $20 billion money 
laundering scheme from Russia to various European states between 
2010 and 2014 is but the tip of the iceberg of a highly dysfunctional 
judicial system. Implementation of the 2016 Law on Prosecution has 
been slow. As a result of high levels of corruption and selective 
justice, citizens’ trust in the judiciary remains below 10%, one of the 
lowest figures globally. The World Justice Project’s “Rule of Law 
Index 2017-8” ranks Moldova 78th out of 113 countries. Citing 
insufficient progress in reforming the justice sector, the EU in 2017 
took the unprecedented step of annulling the remaining half (i.e. €28 
million) of budget support for justice sector reform. Recognising the 
need for urgent measures, the government’s current minister of 
justice has embarked on implementing a ‘small-scale justice reform’ 
for 2018. Its remains to be seen whether this will be enough to 
thoroughly reform the judiciary. Given the fragile state of its 
judiciary, it is remarkable that Moldova has witnessed the first cases 
of application of AA/DCFTA provisions, with laudable precedent-
setting judgments rendered by both the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court of Justice. 
In spite of the differences between the three DCFTA countries, 
our research has helped to bring some common features into 
sharper focus. Firstly, each of the countries faces daunting 
geostrategic and economic challenges which go beyond the focus of 
this report. Under the banner of EU-inspired modernisation, socio-
economic change is fast-tracked, but some justice reforms are being 
delayed or derailed. The latter has heightened tensions between 
rights groups and those defending vested interests. Secondly, 
populist promises of ‘draining the swamp’, i.e. eviscerating 
corruption, have turned out to be half-true (Georgia and Ukraine), 
if not completely false (Moldova). This is vividly illustrated in the 
justice sector, where the appointment procedures of judges and the 
distribution of cases, to name just two examples, are tainted by 
political interference.  
This ultimately poses challenges for the European Union in 
the ways it can confront illiberalism and remove obstacles to an 
independent and impartial judiciary in the three associated states. 
All three countries have come under intensified scrutiny from the 
EU. Their performance in the early stages of implementation of the 
Association Agreements has been evaluated in reports published by 
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the European Commission.92 Yet, pre- and post-accession 
experiences with countries from central (e.g. Hungary and Poland) 
and southeast Europe (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) show 
that judicial transformation processes are not just long and arduous, 
but – in the absence of proper enforcement tools in the hands of the 
guardians of the EU treaties – also subject to potential reversal. This 
downward trend of the rule of law within the EU creates a negative 
feedback loop to corrupt elites outside of the Union and undermines 
the position of the European Commission in enforcing 
commitments made in the context of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. There is precious little leverage beyond withholding 
financial support (‘less for less’), an act that may in itself contribute 
to further delays in or escapes from the implementation of judicial 
reforms. Rethinking the EU’s approach to creating and maintaining 
resilience in the rule of law and justice sector is a topic that should 
exercise minds across the internal/external policy divide of the EU. 
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4. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES  
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KOVZIRIDZE, VERONIKA MOVCHAN 
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Introduction  
Thanks to the work of several 
international organisations and 
NGOs in recent years, anti-
corruption policy has become 
increasingly well-structured as a 
subject, providing a robust basis for 
inter-country comparisons. In the 
cases of the three countries 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, 
Georgia stands out as having taken 
early and radical steps to largely 
eradicate corruption, from a 
starting point of being deeply 
corrupted similar to the situation 
persisting in Moldova and Ukraine: 
though the latter two countries 
have in recent years engaged in much of the legislative agenda for 
curbing or preventing corruption, vested interests have continued 
to block the full potential impact of these measures.  
In Moldova, some key measures to assure the independence 
of key anti-corruption institutions have not yet been taken, and a 
single oligarch group exercises power amounting to ‘state capture’. 
In Ukraine considerable progressive steps have been taken, but the 
overall picture is still marred by a lack of clear and consistent 
political resolve regarding implementation. While legislative action 
does not automatically deliver results, legal infrastructure 
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supported by a real political will at the highest level is key to 
achieving the desired outcome. 
What is corruption? A primary distinction is made between ‘petty 
corruption’ where individuals or small businesses have to pay small 
bribes for securing public services or for passing examination by 
inspectors in relation to various regulations; versus ‘grand 
corruption’ where top-level officials or politicians are involved in 
large financial transactions or significant policy decisions, including 
the role of oligarchs in what is known as ‘state capture’ (see Chapter 
2). Other categories of corruption can include extortion, nepotism, 
exploiting conflicting interests, and the making of improper 
political contributions.  
A comparative analysis of anti-corruption policies in Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine is of particular interest, since they have much 
in common due to their Soviet past, and all now follow essentially 
the same course for economic and political reform, set out in their 
Association Agreements with the European Union. Yet their 
experiences so far with anti-corruption policy are very different. 
While several sources show Moldova and Ukraine as still perceived 
to be the most corrupt of 40 European countries, Georgia is 
perceived to be one of the least corrupt of all post-communist 
Europe, and even ranks ahead of the EU average.1 
Whereas the question of perceptions is very general and 
subjective, the results are broadly confirmed in sources that pose 
more precise and varied questions, such as in Table 4.1, based on 
the World Bank’s enterprise survey. For example, the percentage of 
firms experiencing at least one bribe request is a minimal 2% in both 
Georgia and the OECD’s high-income countries, while the 
corresponding figures for Moldova and Ukraine are 31% and 50%, 
respectively.2 A broadly similar picture emerges from several other 
questions posed in this World Bank enterprise survey.  
 
                                                        
1 Transparency International, 2016. 
2 The most recent World Bank Enterprise Survey was conducted in Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine in 2013 (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). 
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Table 4.1 World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 
 Bribery 
incidence  
(% of firms 
experiencing 
at least one 
bribe request) 
Bribery depth 
(% of public 
transactions 
where bribe 
requested) 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts in 
meetings 
with tax 
officials 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts to 
secure 
government 
contracts 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts to get 
a construction 
contract 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts to 
public 
officials to 
get things 
done 
% of firms 
identifying 
corruption as 
a major 
constraint 
OECD 2 1 1 11 2 8 11 
Eastern & 
Central 
Europe 
17 14 13 26 25 20 22 
Georgia 2 1 0 1 12 2 3 
Moldova 31 22 14 11 49 16 38 
Ukraine 50 45 50 99 73 73 38 
Source: OECD (2016), based on WB Enterprise Surveys conducted in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2013.  
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The Association Agreements and DCFTAs cite the fight 
against corruption as a general objective in the context of promoting 
the rule of law (Articles 3 and 22 in the Ukraine agreement, for 
example), but do not address the issue in any specific or operational 
terms. However, certain sectoral chapters are operationally relevant 
to the fight against corruption, notably those concerning public 
procurement and corporate governance.  
Work on anti-corruption policies over the last few decades by 
international organisations and NGOs has developed a well-
defined set of analytical templates. These identify key institutional 
arrangements and categories of normative legal measures that are 
the backbone of anti-corruption policy. See in particular the work of 
the World Bank, the OECD anti-corruption network for Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, the Council of Europe’s GRECO 
programme, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and Transparency 
International. In what follows we make extensive use of the OECD’s 
recent 2013-2015 report (OECD, 2016c), and the UN Guide for Anti-
Corruption Policies (UNODC, 2003). 
Endemic corruption is the costliest of all factors contributing 
to a negative investment climate, and hence impeding economic 
growth. In the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, it is also undermining 
many of the measures being taken under the Association 
Agreements and DCFTAs to modernise their economies. 
Strategic and overarching aspects 
Political will 
In what follows we compare how the three countries have 
progressed along the lines of the detailed templates of institutional 
arrangements and normative laws (Tables 2, 3 and 4). But first there 
is the crucial overarching question of whether there is the political 
will to really fight corruption, going beyond political declarations 
of intent and basic legislation.  
The fundamental feature of Georgia’s fight against 
corruption was the strong determination of the elite at the highest 
level to eradicate corruption, including the president in leading the 
Rose Revolution, starting in 2004. The objective was to defeat wide-
spread corruption in the shortest possible time. The Rose 
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Revolution had been preceded by an anti-corruption movement, 
and public support for radical anti-corruption measures was strong. 
In practice the method of the government was quite ruthless, with 
entire institutions or their functions completely abolished rather 
than reformed gradually. The logic behind this was that a step-by-
step approach would not yield tangible results in the short term. 
Another distinguishing feature of the Georgian story was that 
economic liberalisation and deregulation went hand-in-hand with 
anti-corruption reforms, and there was strong and genuine political 
support for both. Regulations, rules and requirements prone to 
generate corruption and burdensome for businesses were simply 
abolished with the same ruthless approach. 
Some sceptics felt that this ‘big bang’ fight against corruption 
would only prove a short-term success, could only work under the 
leadership that crafted the strategy, and would collapse with a 
subsequent change of government. This hypothesis proved wrong: 
years after the change of government, the reforms have been 
broadly sustained, and Georgia’s corruption rankings have 
improved further.  
In Moldova, the strong initial commitments to fight against 
corruption undertaken by the pro-European governments in 2009-
10 have subsequently been eroded following agreement by the 
governing parties to divide the leadership positions in the judicial, 
anti-corruption and law enforcement institutions between their 
respective nominees. Achievements in strengthening the anti-
corruption legal and institutional framework were mainly thanks to 
external pressure in the form of aid and conditionality. But there is 
still limited political will to systematically fight corruption, while 
reforms of the prosecutorial and integrity systems remain long 
overdue. Although significant work was done to build a legal and 
institutional anti-corruption framework, their implementation 
remains weak and enforcement inconsistent. In recent years, the 
unprecedented scale of the politicisation of state institutions 
revealed after the 2014 banking scandal and the increasing 
concentration of power in the hands of a single oligarchic group 
puts Moldova into an extreme ‘state capture’ category.  
Corruption was one of the catalysts for Ukraine’s Revolution 
of Dignity (or Euromaidan), which in February 2014 led to the fall 
of the government and the flight of the president. The new regime 
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saw a rapid improvement in political will to tackle corruption, with 
the adoption of a series important strategic documents, including 
the opening up of many public registries, offering access free of 
charge or for a small fee. But since then, anti-corruption ‘policy’ has 
become rather chaotic, especially when it comes to initiatives of 
members of parliament. None of the programmes of parliamentary 
parties regarding anti-corruption measures correspond to the 
recommendations made by international institutions. Proposed 
measures are often more populist than substantive in nature. 
Despite the positive role of civil society organisations in anti-
corruption efforts, the government seems increasingly to view civil 
society as a dangerous opponent rather than a partner. Grand 
corruption is not effectively addressed by prosecutions of high-level 
officials, so exemplary convictions are inevitably non-existent. 
There have also been some worrying signs of curtailing new 
anticorruption bodies, and some of them show disturbing 
vulnerability to political influence. Overall, there is a huge doubt 
about any genuine political will to tackle corruption, not only with 
words, but also in practice.1  
To summarise, in Georgia, the political will for radical and 
rapid anti-corruption reform has been broadly sustained since 2004. 
In Moldova, the initially strong political will in 2009-10 has ceded to 
a system of ‘state capture’ by a single group of oligarchs. In Ukraine, 
legislative regulation is slowly approaching international 
standards, but implementation is being held back by various factors, 
which may be summarised as a lack of political will.  
Anti-corruption strategies and action plans 
The drawing up of such strategies and action plans has become 
general practice in the post-communist states, and is indeed one of 
the central elements of the reform process. But much depends on 
their quality. Such strategies and action plans need to define and 
prioritise the actions of various agencies, allocate domestic and 
foreign aid budgets, set timelines, and organise monitoring and the 
engagement of stakeholders. Anti-corruption strategies need to be 
comprehensive, non-partisan, transparent, and evidence-based.  
                                                        
1 Andrei Marusov, ‘Anti-Corruption Policy of Ukraine, first successes and 
growing resistance’, Renaissance Foundation, December 2016.  
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Table 4.2 Anti-corruption strategies and institutions 
 Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Anti-
corruption 
strategies 
and action 
plans 
Anti-Corruption Strategy 
and Action Plans since 
2005, latest for 2015-16 
adopted in 2015.  
Anti-corruption Strategy and Action 
Plans since 2004, latest for 2017-2020 
adopted in 2017.  
Anti-corruption strategy for 2014-17, first such 
legal text, adopted in 2014, updated for 2015-17. 
Draft Anti-corruption strategy 2018-20 before the 
Parliament. 
Anti-
corruption 
institutions 
Anti-Corruption Council. Since 2012, National Anti-Corruption 
Centre, Anticorruption Prosecution 
Office, National Integrity Authority 
(undergoing a reform since 2016). 
Established in 2015, operational since 2016:  
- National Anti-Corruption Bureau;  
- National Agency for Prevention of Corruption;  
- Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office 
(established in 2018, to be operational in 2019)1 
 - High Anti-Corruption Court 
Integrity of 
public 
service 
Competitive merit-based 
recruitment for civil 
service; a Code of Ethics 
under preparation. 
Mandatory competitive recruitment 
(incomplete); Civil Servant’s Code of 
Conduct; sectoral codes of ethics; 
integrity certificates (since 2018).  
Competitive recruitment and promotion in civil 
service; several codes of ethics. 
Integrity of 
judiciary 
High Council of Justice 
independently appoints 
judges since 2006, with life 
tenure since 2013. 
Supreme Council of Magistracy; 
Independence criticised for 
membership of Minister of Justice, 
and Prosecutor General.  
Independence of High Council of Justice since 
2016 with life tenure for judges from 2016. 
                                                        
1 Law # 1402-VIII dated 02.06.2016 “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”, Law #2447-VIII dated 07.06.2018 “On High Anti-
Corruption Court”. 
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Georgia’s first National Anti-Corruption Strategy was 
adopted in 2005, followed later that year by a National Anti-
Corruption Action Plan. There have been successive revisions of 
these key documents, the latest addressing the years 2015-16, which 
was adopted by the Anti-Corruption Council in February 2015 after 
extensive public consultations and approved by the government 
Decree on 20 April 2015. This document aims “to develop a unified 
anti-corruption policy for preventing and combatting corruption; to 
boost public trust by increasing transparency and accountability of 
public entities; to enhance civil society and establish transparent 
and accountable governance.” It lists a comprehensive set of 
priorities for both the prevention and criminalisation of corruption. 
The Strategy has served as a guiding document throughout, but has 
definitely not been the primary tool for fighting corruption in 
practice.  
Moldova has had a succession of anti-corruption strategy and 
action plan documents from 2004. The latest strategy addressing the 
period 2017-2020 and a subsequent action plan were adopted in 
March 2017, after extensive public consultations and entered into 
force in June 2017.1 The strategy provides a new holistic approach 
in tackling and preventing corruption, based on the Transparency 
International methodology in assessing the national integrity 
system.2 The strategic measures are structured according to eight 
‘integrity pillars’,3 and are mainly oriented towards removing 
barriers to effective implementation of the existing anti-corruption 
legislation. Each pillar has a separate action plan with specific 
progress indicators. However, this commendable document sits 
uneasily alongside non-compliant political practice. 
Ukraine adopted an Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2014-2017 
in 2014.4 This was the first time that such a document had been 
                                                        
1 Parliament Decision No. 56 as of 30.03.2017, (http://lex.justice.md/ 
index.php? action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=370789). 
2 TI Moldova, “National Integrity Assessment Moldova 2014”, 
(https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nisarticle/moldova_2014). 
3 These pillars are: the parliament; government, public sector and local public 
administration; justice and anticorruption authorities; Central Election 
Commission and political parties; Court of Accounts; Ombudsman; private 
sector; civil society and media.  
4 Law no.1699-VII as of 14.10.2014, zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1699-18 
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adopted as a legal text and it was followed by the drafting of an 
implementation programme, detailing institutional innovations 
including establishment of a National Agency for Preventing 
Corruption (NACP – see further below). As of March 2017, out of 44 
planned anti-corruption measures, only 9 have been completed in 
full. The more recent Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2015-2017 is also 
behind schedule. In April 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers approved a 
draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2018-20 prepared by the NACP, 
which is pending in the Verkhovna Rada. 
All three countries have been adopting Anti-Corruption 
Strategy documents and action plans, but even in Georgia they are 
not viewed as being the main drivers of the fight against corruption. 
In Moldova and Ukraine the documents themselves are in line with 
international standards, but implementation lags behind.  
Institutional issues 
Invariably there are three key institutions, the prosecutor’s office, 
the judiciary, and a specific anti-corruption agency and/or inter-
agency coordination system. As regards the specific anti-corruption 
mechanism no single model has prevailed, notably regarding how 
far such entities should be independent, stand-alone bodies, or 
coordinating mechanisms integrated within other government 
structures. There is the further issue of specialised anti-corruption 
units within the prosecutor’s office and judiciary. A widespread 
trend has been the development of inter-agency policy coordination 
or consultative councils with the functions of anti-corruption policy 
development, coordination and monitoring of implementation.  
Georgia’s Anti-Corruption Council (ACC) has been 
operating since 2008 as an interagency coordination body that is 
accountable to the government. The composition of the Council 
includes public agencies, NGOs, businesses and international 
partner/donor organisations. The Minister of Justice of Georgia 
chairs the Council. It operates through an Expert Level Working 
Group, which mirrors the composition of the Council and has a 
broader representation of the non-governmental sector. While the 
ACC is judged by the OECD to have shown a high quality of 
strategic policy development and monitoring of its implementation, 
its role should not be exaggerated. Key decisions which resulted in 
eradication of corruption in various sectors were taken not in the 
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ACC, but by the government and/or single ministers in their areas 
of competence. It is notable that Georgia achieved bigger and faster 
results with a simpler and lighter set of anti-corruption institutions 
than in the cases of Moldova and Ukraine.  
The anti-corruption agency in Moldova, the National 
Anticorruption Centre (NAC), has gone through several waves of 
reform since its establishment in 2002. The latest, in 2012, revised its 
mandate, authorising the NAC to conduct preventive, operational, 
investigative and integrity testing activities, to develop and 
implement integrity plans, and to carry out anti-corruption 
screening of draft legal acts, monitoring of anti-corruption policies, 
research and studies. The agency is supposed to be independent 
from the government, but this is frequently called into question by 
civil society and the political opposition on account of the political 
interference in the appointment of the NAC leadership5 and the 
selective approach of NAC in investigating corruption cases.6 The 
independence and accountability of the NAC has been also subject 
to political disputes within the latest ruling coalitions, and resulted 
in moving the supervision of NAC from the parliament to the 
government in 2013, and back to the parliament in 2015.  
In 2016, two reforms redesigned the anticorruption 
institutional framework in Moldova. First, a specialised office to 
target high-level corruption – the Anticorruption Prosecution Office 
(APO) – was upgraded with enhanced independence. However 
petty corruption was not excluded from its competences and this 
generates a heavy workload, which risks prejudicing its original 
purpose.7 Second, was intended to reform the National Integrity 
Commission (NIC), in charge of controlling asset and interest 
                                                        
5 The ruling coalition agreement signed in 2010 contained a secret annex, 
dividing offices between the constituent political parties, including the law-
enforcement and anti-corruption institutions (NAC and Prosecutor General’s 
Office). The secret annex was leaked to the press in 2013 and is available at: 
http://unimedia.info/stiri/ doc-acordul-aie2--mina-care-a-desfiintatalianta-
cum-s-au-partajat-functiile-57321. 
6 TI-Moldova, ADEPT, CRJM and IDIS Viitorul report “State Capture: the Case 
of the Republic of Moldova”, Chisinau 2017, 
(http://www.transparency.md/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ 
TI_Moldova_State_Capture.pdf). 
7 Idem. 
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declarations. Set up in 2012, this agency has proved very ineffective. 
The 2016 reform aims to strengthen its institutional independence 
and expand its competences, but there are long delays in making 
this operational, despite official commitments.  
The four entities of Ukraine’s institutional set-up for 
combatting corruption need to operate as inter-locking parts of a 
single system:  
 National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NACP),  
 National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU),  
 specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and  
 Anti-Corruption Court, in the course of being established.  
The NACP is an executive agency to advance the formation 
and implementation of the state anti-corruption policy. It offers 
significant guarantees for the independence of its members and has 
wide-ranging competence for anti-corruption policy, verification of 
asset declarations, monitoring of public servants’ lifestyle, control 
over observation of anti-corruption restrictions (plurality of offices, 
conflict of interests, gifts, etc.), cooperation with and protection of 
whistle-blowers, etc. An additional function of supervising political 
party and election financing was added in October 2015. With some 
delay, the NACP became operational in August 2016 after 
overcoming some obstacles, including conflicts with the 
government and delays with the election of the agency’s members, 
etc. Questions have been raised regarding the proactivity and 
efficiency of the NACP and the lack of well-established channels to 
make it accountable and fully transparent. 
The NABU, established in 2015, is a specialised investigative 
agency for high-level corruption cases. The Bureau became 
operational in 2016. As of May 31, 2018, the NABU has conducted 
611 investigations, submitted 140 cases to the courts, and obtained 
21 convictions.8 NABU has itself performed well and had 
investigated and prosecuted a number of high-ranking officials but 
the process has been stuck at court level.  NABU also does not have 
authority to independently intercept (wiretap) information from 
communication channels, it has to submit a request to the State 
Security Service of Ukraine to install wiretapping, which 
                                                        
8 https://nabu.gov.ua/. 
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undermines NABU’s independence and risks information leakages 
in high-profile anti-corruption investigations.9 There are persistent 
attempts to pressure NABU, in particular through failure to provide 
the adequate detective capacity, the threat of removal of the NABU 
Director from office through a mechanism controlled by certain 
political forces, and a number of draft laws to limit NABU’s 
investigative capacity. At the same time, independent experts 
commissioned by the US Embassy and the EU Anti-Corruption 
Initiative in Ukraine found no signs of external interference in 
NABU’s work during the first years of its operations.10 
The SAPO was established in 2015 as an independent unit of 
the Prosecutor General’s Office, and subordinated exclusively to the 
Deputy Prosecutor General – Head of the Specialized Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. It is entrusted with the supervision 
of the observance of laws during detective and investigative 
activities, pre-trial investigations conducted by the NABU, 
prosecution duties in relevant proceedings, and representation of 
citizens or the State’s interests in court in cases connected with 
corruption. However, in practice the accountability of SAPO is poor 
and prosecutors are often inadequately trained. Moreover, relations 
between the NABU and the Prosecutors Office remain tense.  
A High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) was finally 
established in 2018 by a specialised law11 largely aligned with the 
international recommendations, in particular the Venice 
Commission.12 In particular, the issue of the competitive selection of 
judges was settled and a possibility for the Public Council of 
International Experts to prevent the selection of judges in case of 
integrity concerns was assured. However, further amendments to 
the law are needed to address the issue of jurisdiction over appeals 
                                                        
9 The initiative to give the NABU an autonomous right to wiretap was a 
condition of Ukraine-IMF Memorandum signed in September, 2016 and was 
openly supported by the EU. Despite this, the relevant draft law was not 
adopted by the Parliament. 
10https://nabu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/page_uploads/25.04/nabu_assess
ment_report_en.pdf  
11 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2447-19/page  
12http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=C
DL-AD(2017)020-e  
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against first-instance courts decisions made before the HACC 
establishment. The current law foresees a general jurisdiction, while 
the NABU,13 civil society representatives as well as the EU14 
recommend the HACC jurisdiction over appeals.   
All three countries have dedicated anti-corruption 
institutions. Georgia has the simplest system with its Anti-
Corruption Council. Moldova and Ukraine have much more 
complex, multi-institutional setups, with some successes but also 
failings, and without good overall results so far.  
Integrity of public service  
In Georgia, the major effort in public service that contributed to the 
successful fight against corruption was the reform that started in 
2004 with two major objectives. First, it was aimed at downsizing 
and optimising a public sector, including public institutions, 
ministries and agencies, which at that time had an excessive and 
unnecessarily high number of employees. Second, the target was to 
increase salaries of public servants in order to prevent corruption 
and bribes and attract qualified personnel to work for the 
government. This reform was implemented across all ministries and 
agencies, and resulted in a huge (15-fold) increase in the salaries of 
civil servants. This reform was one of the most effective anti-
corruption measures. Georgia has also introduced rules for civil 
service recruitment. Vacancies, including high level positions, must 
be published on the online recruitment portal www.hr.gov.ge and 
filled through competition. However, these new legal provisions 
have not been fully implemented in practice. After the 2012 elections 
and widespread dismissals, many civil servants working in 
ministries were appointed as acting officials, and had to undergo 
open competition at a later stage in order to stay in their positions. 
In April 2017, the Georgian government issued a decree on the 
                                                        
13https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/sentences-nabu-cases-made-courts-
general-jurisdiction-should-be-appealed-appeals-chamber-high  
14http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36086/joint-statement-eu-ua-
summit-2018.pdf  
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definition of the General Rules of Ethics and Behaviour in Public 
Institutions15 in order to regulate the conduct of civil servants.  
In Moldova, the Civil Service Law16 competition procedures 
are not mandatory for a number of high-level official positions, 
while in other cases are applied only after other recruitment 
procedures have been exhausted. This provision has been largely 
used by the ruling coalitions since 2009 to make numerous political 
appointments in senior positions. The new law on integrity that 
came into effect in July 2017 has introduced mandatory competition 
for all public positions, except elective and political positions. A 
controversial amendment to the Civil Service Law, in force since 
February 2016,17 has relaxed the incompatibility regime for public 
servants by allowing work in the private sector outside the 
programme hours. Starting June 2018, an integrity certificate, issued 
by the National Integrity Authority, was introduced as a 
compulsory condition to hold a public position, as a measure to 
increase the integrity of public service18. In 2015, salary increases for 
civil servants began to be implemented. The pressure to comply 
with EU conditions for visa liberalisation and the association 
process has contributed to the process of building up the integrity 
legal framework, but has not translated so far into significant 
improvements in public administration, which has remained highly 
politicised and prone to corruption.  
The new Law on Civil Service of Ukraine, enacted in May 
2016, aims at the creation of a professional and politically neutral 
senior civil service, with measures to improve remuneration, 
upgrade discipline, etc. Entry into the civil service and also 
promotion must be through a competitive selection process based 
exclusively on merit. Many senior appointments in the Ukrainian 
administration are now effectively conducted on the basis of open 
                                                        
15 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/3645402 
16 Law No. 158 on Public Office and the Status of Civil Servants, of 4 July 2008 
with later amendments (http://lex.justice.md/md/330050/). 
17 Law no. 297 as of 22.12.2016 amending art.25 of the Civil Service Law, 
(http://lex.justice.md/md/368700/). 
18 Integrity certificates are issued by the National Integrity Authority based on 
their records and final rulings of the courts on persons forbidden to hold a 
public office due to violation of legislation on declaration of assets and interests. 
(Law no. 74 of 26.04.2018).  
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and transparent competitions. One such example is the selection 
and appointment of the first Head of the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau. However, despite this significant breakthrough in civil 
service reform, there is a need for effective implementation of these 
adopted regulations. There are several codes of conduct for civil 
servants. Monitoring and control over implementation of the rules 
of ethical conduct are entrusted to the NACP.  
Integrity of the judiciary 
This is a core issue for anti-corruption policy, but one that extends 
into the far broader issue of the rule of law, and is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 3. The main issues concern: 
Constitutional guarantees of independence. All three countries 
express guarantees of the independence of their judiciaries in their 
constitutions, but the devil is in the detail. 
The role of judicial councils. Such councils, generally consisting 
mainly of judges elected by their peers, have a key role in the 
independence of appointment of judges. Georgia reformed its High 
Council of Justice in this sense in 2006, whereas previously the 
Council only had the role of advising the president. In Ukraine the 
pre-Euromaidan system did not assure independence of the High 
Council of Justice, but constitutional amendments regarding the 
High Council of Justice were passed in June 2016. The special law 
was adopted in December 2016 and enacted in January 2017. In 
Moldova, the composition of the Superior Council of Magistracy 
(SCM) is criticised for the ex officio membership of the Prosecutor 
General, the Minister of Justice, who is an active politician, and the 
President of the Supreme Court of Justice, who has a strong 
influence on the judiciary due to his double role as president of the 
highest court and as member of the Council. Draft laws amending 
the Constitution regarding the judiciary have failed to be passed in 
2016-2017 through lack of political will.  
The secure term of judges. The main issue here is whether judges 
have secure tenure, with life tenure favoured by the Venice 
Commission, versus systems that see probationary periods or 
limited fixed terms. Georgia adopted life tenure in 2013, but 
retained exceptions for probationary periods and fixed terms for the 
Supreme Court. Ukraine moved to life tenure in June 2016, but not 
before a period of great turbulence involving the dismissal of 
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thousands of judges in the wake of the Euromaidan. Moldova 
retains a system of five-year probation for judges before they obtain 
secure tenure until retirement age. This is a severe impediment to 
judicial independence.  
Appointment procedures. All three countries have established 
objective criteria and competitive procedures for the nomination of 
judges. However, in Moldova, the SCM has a record of ignoring the 
Career Board in many instances, without providing reasons for its 
decisions. Selection and promotion of judges in Moldova is selective 
and has been criticised both by civil society and international 
development partners. In Ukraine, the selection of the Supreme 
Court judges in 2017 was also marred with scandals as the concerns 
of the Public Integrity Council regarding the candidates’ integrity 
were ignored in many instances.    
Financial autonomy. In Ukraine, there is a problem of 
inadequacy of financial resources for the judiciary, even if the 
situation improved with the judiciary reform in June 2016. In 
Moldova, the financial autonomy of the judicial system has 
considerably improved. In Georgia, the budget for the judicial 
system has been increasing continuously in recent years.  
Ethics rules. Codes of professional ethics have been generally 
established, but their enforcement is often weak.  
The right to public hearings is a generally accepted principle. 
However, in Moldova, closed court hearings tend to be used in 
politically significant cases, such as that of former Prime Minister 
Filat, charged with corruption, and that of the businessmen Platon 
and Shor, charged with involvement in the major bank fraud 
revealed in late 2014. In addition, in September 2016, a regulation 
imposed severe restrictions on access to the courts. This was 
criticised by several media and civil society organisations19 and 
subsequently suspended, with no new regulation adopted as of 28 
September 2017. 
                                                        
19 See, for example, a declaration (http://www.api.md/news/view/ro-
declaratie-ong-urile-de-media-si-redactiile-protesteaza-impotriva-restrictiilor-
abuzive-de-acces-la-sedintele-de-judecata-1343).  
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Role of civil society 
The work of non-government organisations (NGOs) is crucial in 
enhancing public awareness and feeding public concerns into the 
work of public authorities.  
In Georgia, NGOs were involved in drafting the 2015-2016 
Anti-Corruption Action Plan and are involved in its 
implementation and monitoring, in particular by contributing to 
elaboration of the new monitoring methodology. NGOs are active 
in the thematic working groups of the Anti-Corruption Council, 
which are co-chaired by civil society and include NGOs as 
members. 
In Moldova, NGOs have also played an important role in 
developing the National Anticorruption Strategy for 2011-2016, its 
evaluation and the drafting of the new National Integrity and 
Anticorruption Strategy for 2017-2020. Civil society representatives 
are included in the monitoring groups of the 2017-2020 strategy. 
However, recently there have been several signs of a worsening 
environment for NGOs, with actions aimed at discrediting civil 
society organisations. Among these, in July 2017, the Minister of 
Justice included three articles in a draft law on NGOs and published 
the draft for public consultations. In general, the draft law was a 
progressive and necessary one, developed through an inclusive 
process by a group of civil society representatives and the Ministry 
of Justice. However, three articles were added to prohibit foreign 
funding for NGOs involved in activities aimed at influencing 
legislation or very broadly defined “political activities”. More than 
65 NGOs criticised this attempt to limit foreign funding of NGOs 
and called upon the Ministry of Justice to withdraw these 
provisions.20 On 12 September 2017, the leader of the Democratic 
Party Vladimir Plahotniuc announced at a press conference that the 
political bureau of the party had requested the Minister of Justice 
halt any work on the draft law on NGOs. On the same day, the 
Minister of Justice issued an order cancelling further work on this 
draft law. Such interventions from Vladimir Plahotniuc, who has no 
                                                        
20 Declaration in English (http://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/07/ 
2017-07-11-Declaration-MJ-initiative-contrary-to-law.pdf). 
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elected position in the current government, highlight the 
deficiencies existing in the democratic decision-making process.  
In Ukraine, civil society has played a crucial role in 
developing anti-corruption legislation and policies following the 
Euromaidan, providing the roadmap for reforms and making 
statements of alarm when called for. The 2014-2017 Anti-Corruption 
Strategy and subsequent legislation were written with a significant 
contribution from civil society. In terms of conducting anti-
corruption expert evaluations, civil society institutions have also 
turned out to be the strongest. Investigative journalists and media 
have actively continued to reveal corruption. But cooperation 
between the state and civil society became fragile, as the sincerity of 
the government’s intentions was thrown into doubt. There has also 
been a move by the parliament to subject the representatives of 
anticorruption NGOs to e-declaration requirements. This is a 
discriminatory requirement solely targeting anti-corruption 
activists. There are attempts to discredit civil society, initiations of 
criminal prosecution, requests to shut down some of the most active 
organisations, and even violence against them. There is an 
impression of targeted, systemic action by the government to harass 
anti-corruption activists. 
Overall, civil society NGOs have been highly active in 
advancing anti-corruption policies in all three countries, but there 
have been some recent steps, especially in Ukraine and Moldova, 
that seek to weaken their effectiveness.  
Specific legal mechanisms 
There is a plethora of specific legal provisions employed in anti-
corruption policies. The last decade has seen significant progress in 
the definition of international standards, and their application in 
many countries, including Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The 
broad picture is one in which Georgia was a leader with its 
relatively early adoption of such measures after the Rose Revolution 
of 2003, while Ukraine lagged behind until the substantial progress 
made since the Euromaidan, whereas Moldova is still trailing at the 
back. The main measures are those listed in Table 4.3, and 
commented on below. It has to be emphasised that legislative action 
can only be a beginning, and implementation at best takes years to 
follow through, and in the worst case may be persistently frustrated. 
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Table 4.3 Legal provisions related to anti-corruption policies 
 Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Criminalisation 
of corruption 
‘Active’ and ‘passive’ 
bribery is a criminal 
offence since 2006. 
‘Active’ and ‘passive’ bribery 
criminalised in the Criminal Code 
of 2003. 
‘Active’ and ‘passive’ bribery defined 
and criminalised in 2014 law. 
Corporate 
liability for 
corruption 
Law already in 2006 
introduces criminal 
liability of companies.  
A broader definition effective since 
6 May 2016. 
Law introduced in 2009, but abolished 
2011, and then re-introduced in 2013 
Illicit enrichment No specific law; covered 
in money laundering law. 
Criminal offence since February 
2014; Constitution presumes 
legality of assets held by persons. 
Criminal offense; Law (inadequate) in 
2011, revised in 2014-15. 
Sanctions Minimum fine €48,000; 
minimum sentence for 
bribery 6 months 
Passive bribery: imprisonment from 
3 to 7 years with a minimum fine of 
€9,700.  
Active bribery: imprisonment up to 6 
years with a minimum fines of 
€5,000 - €14,500. 
Maximum imprisonment: 12 years. 
Fines can be applied in case of ‘low-
damage’ offense (min: €55, max: €850).  
Asset 
declarations  
Senior officials must 
make on-line electronic 
declarations, which are 
publicly open. 
All public officials and some non-
public officials should disclose 
wealth and interests. Starting in 
2018, electronic submission became 
mandatory, except for a few 
categories of public offices.  
All public officials covered since 2016 
and senior officials since 2015; their 
declarations are electronic and open 
(system launched in 2016).  
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Confiscation of 
assets 
Civil Procedure Code of 
Georgia since 2007 provides 
for this after criminal 
conviction. 
Criminal Code provides for ‘extended’ 
confiscation since August 2016. 
Provisions introduced in Criminal Code in 
2016. 
Statute of 
limitations 
15 years. Minimum for public sector: 15 years; 
For private sector: 2 years. 
5-15 years. 
Immunities MPs enjoy immunity. MPs enjoy extensive immunity.  2016 law limits immunities of judges; MPs 
enjoy immunity. 
Whistle blowers Extensive protection, 
enhanced in 2015. 
Insufficient legislative regulation and 
no public authority assigned for whistle 
blowers protection. 
2014 law regulates and partly protects. 
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Criminalisation of corruption  
Since 2006, the Criminal Code of Georgia provides for criminal 
responsibility for promising, offering or giving of money or other 
material benefits to an official (‘active’ bribery), in order for such 
person to perform or not to perform any action. Direct or indirect 
demanding of a bribe by an official (‘passive’ bribery), is also 
criminalised. A physical handover of the bribe is not required.  
Under the criminal code in Moldova, passive and active 
bribery in public and private sectors, as well as trading in influence, 
are criminalised. Sanctions for corruption were increased though 
amendments to the Criminal Code at the end of 2013. A physical 
handover of the bribe is not required. The law includes a list of 
aggravating circumstances, which imply heavier sanctions. 
In Ukraine, the 2014 anti-corruption legislation significantly 
improved provisions for the criminalisation of corruption. Missing 
components of bribery offences and trading in influence were 
included and sanctions strengthened. Some inconsistency remains 
in the definition of corruption crimes in relation to international 
standards. 
Corporate liability for corruption 
Georgia had already introduced criminal liability of legal persons 
for money laundering, private sector bribery and active bribery in 
the public sector in 2006. However, very few cases of corporate 
liability have been observed.  
Moldova’s Criminal Code provides for corporate liability for 
corruption with specific sanctions for legal entities in several 
articles1 (see 3.4 below) and by having extended the criminal 
liability of legal entities since May 2016.  
Ukraine introduced legislation in 2009, only for this to be 
abolished in January 2011. Fresh legislation, particularly related to 
legalisation of property, or to promising, offering, and providing an 
illicit benefit was introduced in May 2013 and entered into force in 
2014 with a limited list of sanctions. 
                                                        
1 See art. 21 para. (5) of the Criminal Code.  
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Illicit enrichment  
This is generally defined as wealth out of line with what could 
plausibly have been made from official public salaries.  
While the Georgian Criminal Code does not contain a 
separate offence of illicit enrichment, its elements can be found in 
the money laundering legislation, where money laundering is 
defined as “the [attempted] legalisation of illicit income”.  
In Moldova, illicit enrichment was introduced in the Criminal 
Code at the end of 2013,2 defined as: “Holding by a person with 
responsible duties or by a public person, personally or through third 
parties, of goods when their value substantially exceeds the 
acquired means and it was established based on evidence that these 
could not have been obtained legally”. 
However the Constitution of Moldova includes an explicit 
presumption of the legality of assets in possession of the person. The 
responsibility to prove the unlawful nature of the goods lies solely 
with the state bodies. The very small number of cases makes it 
difficult to draw any significant conclusions.3 The strongly 
embedded constitutional provisions and high requirements of the 
burden of proof on investigation authorities might be an 
impediment for bringing such cases. 
Ukraine introduced illicit enrichment into law as an offence 
in 2011, but its definition was out of line with UN recommendations. 
In 2014-2015, the wording was revised and brought into line.  
In sum, provisions for tackling illicit enrichment have been 
introduced in all three countries, but there is little evidence of 
effectiveness, and particular doubts in the case of Moldova.  
Sanctions 
In Georgia, the lower limit for financial sanctions against corrupt 
practice is a large fixed sum of money (€44,000). There is no 
maximum. The minimum sentence for basic passive bribery is 6 
years of imprisonment. This has been considered disproportionate, 
                                                        
2 Art. 330/2 of the Criminal Code, introduced by Law no. 326 of 23 December 
2013, in force since 25 February 2014. 
3 National Anticorruption Centre, activity reports for 2015 and 2016, available 
at www.cna.md. 
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not leaving room for an appropriate sanction for small value bribes. 
The risk is that cases may not be brought to court because the 
minimal sentence is inappropriate. However, these provisions 
reflect the urge to fight ruthlessly against corruption.  
In Moldova, passive bribery in the public sector is subject to 
imprisonment from 3 to 7 years with a minimum fine of €9,7004 and 
deprivation of the right to hold certain public jobs or to exercise 
certain activities for a period of 5 to 10 years. For small bribery (not 
more than €250)5 there are lower sanctions. Active bribery in the 
public sector is subject to imprisonment for up to 6 years with a 
minimum fine of €5,000,6 while for a legal entity the minimum fine 
is €14,6007 with deprivation of the right to exercise a certain activity. 
Taking bribes in the private sector is subject to lower sanctions, 
around half as substantial as those applying in the public sector. 
According to a study on corruption cases, archived in the courts for 
the period of 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2012, judges have made 
excessive use of certain provisions of the Criminal Code that 
significantly reduce criminal punishment.8 In four out of five 
corruption cases on which verdicts of conviction were pronounced, 
judges applied a plea bargain agreement and reduced the maximum 
punishment by one third. In a third of cases the courts decided to 
apply milder punishments in connection with certain exceptional 
circumstances, and to suspend imprisonment. 
In Ukraine, fines are applied for ‘low-damage’ cases, while 
for more severe offenses the key sanction is imprisonment, possibly 
complimented by deprivation of the right to hold certain public jobs 
or to exercise certain activities for up to three years and confiscation 
of assets. For example, illicit enrichment and abuse of power are 
                                                        
4 The Criminal Code Provision: 4,000 conventional units. 
5 100 conventional units 
6 2,000 conventional units. 
7 6,000 conventional units 
8 The study was developed by the National Anti-Corruption Centre with the 
support of the Supreme Court of Justice and together with the experts of 
MIAPAC Project and EUHLPAM Mission, available in Romanian and English 
(http://www.cna.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=117&id=205&t=/ 
Studii-si-analize/Studii-despre-coruptie/Studiu-privind-dosarele-de-
coruptie). 
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sanctioned by imprisonment. Passive bribery in the public sector 
can be subject to sanctions starting from a fine (€566 - €850) and up 
to 12 years’ imprisonment plus additional sanctions, depending on 
the severity of the offense. Sentencing for active bribery varies from 
a fine (€283 - €425) to 10 years’ imprisonment. A plea bargain 
agreement can reduce the punishment. A study of 335 corruption-
related sentences in 2016 shows9 that 44 (13%) resulted in sentences 
of imprisonment (though the majority of these sentences are still 
under appeal), 194 (54%) in fines, including 109 cases of plea bargain 
agreements, while discharge from punishment (conditional 
imprisonment) occurred in 22% of cases. Only 40 (11%) saw 
acquittal. The situation did not change much in 2017.10 
Confiscation of assets 
In 2007, Georgia was the first to introduce provisions for the 
confiscation of illegal property and unexplained wealth of public 
officials in its Civil Procedure Code. Such confiscation is possible 
after criminal conviction. Some confiscation cases were publicly 
broadcast, especially in the case of high-level officials in the 
aftermath of the Rose Revolution, aiming to set an example.  
In Moldova, legislation permitting ‘extended confiscation’ 
entered into force in February 2014. Similar to the interpretation of 
the norms regarding illicit enrichment, the Constitutional Court 
reiterated its interpretation of the Constitution as providing for the 
principle of absolute presumption of the lawful acquisition of the 
goods, assigning the burden of proof solely to state bodies. In 
practice, confiscation of assets has never been properly carried out 
in Moldova. However, in July 2017, the Agency for Recovery of 
Criminal Assets was established within the National Anticorruption 
Centre. Although the agency has started seizing criminal assets, 
their recovery is still impossible as the appropriate regulatory 
                                                        
9 The study concerned Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine only 
(http://nashigroshi.org/2017/02/23/habari-2016-koho-posadyly-i-za-scho/). 
10 Burakovsky I. et al (2018) Ukraine’s Fight against Corruption: The Economic 
Front. Economic Assessment of Anticorruption Measures Implemented in 
2014-2018. www.ier.kiev.ua  
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framework was approved only in June 2018.11 The agency is also 
understaffed and not fully equipped. 
In Ukraine provision for such confiscation was introduced as 
an amendment to the Criminal Code of Ukraine in February 2016. 
This was followed in November 2016 by establishment of the Asset 
Recovery Management Agency (ARMA). The agency was staffed in 
2017. In the first half of 2018, the ARMA transferred over $130 
million of revenues from the seized assets management to the 
central budget. Of particular importance for Ukraine is activation of 
possibilities for international ‘mutual legal assistance’, notably for 
recovery of the assets of former President Yanukovych. This is an 
unprecedented scale of investigative activity involving foreign 
evidence being undertaken on corruption matters by Ukrainian law 
enforcement, particularly by NABU and SAPO. In 2017, the 
Prosecutor General reported the confiscation of about $1.5 billion 
deposited on accounts of the former President Yanukovych and his 
affiliates,12 but much more is expected.    
Statute of limitations 
The statute of limitations for active bribery and other corrupt acts is 
a long 15 years in Georgia. For Moldova, with new legislation in 
effect since 2014, the limit is also 15 years for bribery in the public 
sector, but 5 years for bribes in the private sector. Similarly, in 
Ukraine there is a 5-15 year statute of limitations.  
Immunities 
In Georgia, parliamentarians enjoy immunity. According to Article 
52 of the Georgian Constitution, “arrest or detention of an MP, 
search of his/her place of residence, vehicle, workplace, or any 
personal search shall be permissible only by consent of parliament, 
except when the MP is caught at the scene of crime, in which case 
parliament shall be notified immediately. Unless parliament gives 
                                                        
11  The Regulation on the evaluation, administration and use of seized criminal 
assets was approved at the Government sitting of June 20, 2018. 
12 See https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/04/28/7142538/.  
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its consent, the arrested or detained MP shall be released 
immediately”. 13 
In Moldova, parliamentarians enjoy full immunity against 
any judicial prosecution, except in cases of flagrant offence. There 
have been several attempts to amend the legislation to exclude or at 
least reduce this immunity, but none was carried out. However, the 
immunity of an MP and former Prime Minister (Vlad Filat) was 
lifted by parliament in October 2015. He was arrested for passive 
corruption, considered as being clearly connected to the major bank 
fraud at the end of 2014.14 This was the first time an MP’s immunity 
had been lifted since 2006, out of six requests by the Prosecutor 
General.15 Judges also have special rules on immunity. A judge 
cannot be detained, arrested or searched, except in case of a flagrant 
offence, without the prior approval of the Supreme Council of 
Magistrates. Criminal investigation against a judge may only be 
initiated by the Prosecutor General or his/her First Deputy, or, in 
the latter’s absence, by another prosecutor appointed by the 
Prosecutor General, with the prior consent of the Superior Council 
of Magistracy. In cases of flagrant offence and, since 2013, also in 
cases of money laundering, passive corruption, trading in influence 
and illicit enrichment, consent from the Superior Council of 
Magistracy is not necessary. A judge cannot be detained, arrested or 
searched, except in case of a flagrant offence, without the prior 
approval of the SCM. Judges have also extensive administrative 
immunity.16  
In Ukraine, the parliament has been criticised for the misuse 
of immunity provisions by MPs, including for acts of corruption. 
MPs cannot be held criminally liable, detained or arrested without 
the consent of parliament itself. From 2016-2017, the Prosecution 
                                                        
13 The Constitution of Georgia (https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/ 
view/30346). 
14 The “Billion fraud” or “billion theft” case involved the disappearance of around 1 
billion USD from the Moldovan banking sector, including nearly a third of the National 
Bank Reserves, or the equivalent of 15% of Moldovan GDP, within the space of several 
years. The information was publicly released at the end of 2014. For a detailed 
explanation, see http://www.transparency.md/2016/12/20/radiography-of-a-bank-
fraud-in-moldova-from-money-laundering-to-billion-fraud-and-state-debt/. 
15 GRECO op. cit. 
16 Art. 19 of the Law no. 544 on the status of judges of 20 July 1995.  
162  ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES 
 
Office asked for the immunity of several MPs to be lifted, but was 
only partly successful as not all decisions were passed. It therefore 
appears necessary to narrow the content and scope of their 
immunity, by for example authorising the conduct of covert 
investigations into actions of an MP without having to first obtain 
parliamentary consent.  
The removal of MPs’ immunity has been promised during 
several parliamentary elections, but never realised. Over 2015-2017, 
several draft laws regarding this issue were submitted to the 
Parliament, but were not passed. In October 2017, the President 
submitted to the Parliament a new draft law,17 which was submitted 
immediately to the Constitutional Court. The Court concluded in 
June 2018 that the proposed draft law does not contradict the 
Constitution of Ukraine. However, as changes need to be made in 
the Constitution, it is unlikely that the current parliamentary 
coalition will find votes for this initiative. 
In June 2016, a law with amendments to the constitution was 
passed that limited the immunities of judges to a certain extent, for 
example by allowing arrests in cases of flagrant offence. Influence 
by politicians on judicial activity and pressure by prosecutors on 
judges not to acquit the accused has been frequently observed.  
Asset declarations 
In Georgia, only senior officials (about 5,600 in number) are obliged 
to submit asset declarations. In 2010 an Online Asset Declaration 
System was launched to replace the paper declaration system. 
Officials are required to submit the information regarding both 
themselves and their immediate family members for real estate, 
cars, jewellery, bank accounts, cash, shares, and other assets worth 
over €5,000. The submitted declarations are public and are available 
on the web-site https://declaration.gov.ge. However, many 
important officials at the local level are presently exempted.  
In Moldova, the system of asset declarations is currently 
undergoing an institutional reform, following the adoption of a 
legislative package in mid-2016 and amended in 2018 under 
                                                        
17 See: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=62727 
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considerable external pressure.18 The new legislation has extended 
the list of subjects obliged to submit asset declarations to 70,000 
persons, as well as the scope of declarations to include cash worth 
over 15 average monthly wages (approx. €4,000),19 gifts of 
comparable amounts received from family members and relatives, 
jewellery, artworks, and different types of collections worth more 
than 20 average monthly wages (over €5,000). Until 2018 the 
declarations were submitted on paper and made public after they 
have been processed and scanned on a single website platform 
www.declaratii.ani.md. Since January 2018, the electronic 
submission of declarations has become mandatory, except for 
public servants, whose identity is securitised.  From July 2018, the 
ANI has begun issuing integrity certificates for persons seeking to 
hold a public position and has resumed the verification of assets. 
However, it continues to remain poorly equipped and severely 
understaffed.  
The system of asset declarations in Ukraine has undergone 
major changes. Legislation in 2011 established the obligation for a 
vast number of public officials (1 million) to declare their assets, 
income, expenses and financial liabilities, with declarations to be 
submitted at their place of work in paper form. New legislation in 
2014 made the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (NACP) 
responsible for the asset declaration system, and requires all 
declarations to be submitted in an electronic form via the NACP’s 
web-site, where they are automatically published. The new law 
extended the scope of disclosure to include cash, assets such as 
jewellery, antiques and works of art worth over €5,250, and 
intangible assets (e.g. intellectual property rights). Officials of the 
State Security Service, an institution perceived by citizens as 
corruption-prone, are exempt from the public disclosure 
requirements. Persons with high status and responsibility and at a 
high risk of corruption are subject to a mandatory full examination. 
                                                        
18 The adoption of the legislative package on integrity was among the 
conditions set by the EU for resumption of its financial aid to Moldova after it 
was frozen in 2015.  
19 The value is calculated based on the nationwide monthly average wage, 
which in according to the July 2017 Governmental Decision is about 5,600 
Moldovan Lei (MDL) in 2017. 
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The list of positions with high corruption risk was approved by the 
NACP in 2016.  
In 2017, the NACP received 1.24 million e-declarations,20 
while verified only about 100 e-declarations.21 The low verification 
speed is largely explained by an absence of an automatic verification 
of e-declarations. The commitment to introduce the automatic 
verification was among unaccomplished conditions for the 
disbursement of the last tranche of the EU macro-financial 
assistance III (MFA III). The strengthening of the verification system 
for asset declaration is also explicitly mentioned among conditions 
for the disbursement of the MFA IV approved by the European 
Parliament and the Council in July 2018.22 
Protection of whistle-blowers, mechanisms for reporting 
corruption 
Georgia is a frontrunner of countries regarding the protection of 
whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowing may be anonymous, and there 
are extensive guarantees to protect whistle-blowers and close 
relatives. The whistle-blower’s identity is confidential, unless they 
choose to the contrary. In addition, the whistle-blower may not be 
subjected to prosecution, or be otherwise held responsible for the 
circumstances related to the facts of the whistle-blowing. 2015 
amendments to the law allow whistle-blowers to inform civil 
society or the mass media promptly.  
In Moldova, there is no law protecting whistle-blowers and 
no public authority assigned for their protection. A framework 
regulation on whistle-blowers covering only the public sector was 
adopted by the government in 2013. All public institutions were to 
adapt their internal regulations on this basis, but not all had done 
this by 2018. In May 2018, the law on protection of whistle-blowers, 
included in the new 2017-2020 National Strategy of Integrity and 
Anticorruption (SNIA), passed the first reading in parliament. 
                                                        
20 See https://nazk.gov.ua/statystychni-dani/. 
21 See https://dt.ua/POLITICS/za-rik-nazk-perevirilo-91-deklaraciyu-iz-1-5-
mln-solomatina-260283_.html/. 
22Seehttps://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:320
18D0947&from=EN.  
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In Ukraine, a 2014 law established a definition of a whistle-
blower and procedures for protecting them from personal harm and 
from harmful measures by a supervisor or employer. The law also 
provides that information about the whistle-blower may be 
disclosed only with his or her consent and that anonymous reports 
can be accepted. The NAPC has approved methodological 
guidelines for the organisation of work with reports of corruption 
by whistle-blowers, but has not yet started to develop the practice 
of whistle-blower protection measures. There is at present no 
information about cases of NACP support for whistle-blowers. 
Further guarantees and incentives for whistle-blowers are 
stipulated in the special draft law currently being promoted by civic 
activists and reform-minded MPs and public officials. 
Broader policy issues 
This section covers a number of important preventive measures 
targeting corruption, which are summarised in Table 4.4. These are 
mainly concerned with governing the transparency of funding or 
ownership of important institutions (political parties) or corporate 
entities, including the media, and public procurement. A final far-
reaching question concerns the complexity or simplification of the 
regulatory system, which effectively concerns every sector of the 
economy.  
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Table 4.4 Broader corruption-related issues 
 Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Financing of 
political parties 
State funding, with 
limitations on private 
funding. 
State subventions since 2015, 
high thresholds for private 
funding. 
Limitations on private 
funding, state funding since 
2015. 
Media 
ownership 
transparency 
2016, legislation for media 
ownership transparency 
being prepared. 
2015-16 amendments to the 
Broadcasting Code improved 
the transparency of media 
ownership.  
2015 law establishes 
transparency of media 
ownership. 
Corporate 
governance 
Georgia commits in 2016 to 
establishing transparency of 
beneficial ownership. 
2017, legislation on mandatory 
disclosure of beneficial 
ownership being prepared. 
Since 2015 mandatory 
disclosure of beneficial 
ownership. 
Public 
procurement 
Independent state 
procurement agency; 
entirely electronic; system 
wins awards.  
2016 law in compliance with 
EU directives pending 
implementation. 
2015-16, new law and 
electronic tendering, wins 
award. 
Regulatory 
complexity 
Saakashvili regime 
radically de-regulated; 
regulations now relatively 
simple.  
Technical inspectorates 
reluctant to reform. 
Significant deregulation in 
2014-18. 
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Financing of political parties 
In Georgia, the parliament passed amendments to the 2011 law on 
financing political parties in 2013. Parties with 4% of votes in 
parliamentary polls or 3% in local polls will obtain state financing. 
Companies gained permission to grant political parties a maximum 
of 120,000 GEL (about €40,000). Individuals may donate no more 
than 60,000 GEL (about €15,000) to parties. 
In Moldova, a new law on party and campaign funding was 
adopted in 2015 in order to address some previous 
recommendations by international organisations.1 All political 
parties that participated in the last parliamentary and local elections 
are eligible for public subsidies, allocated according to votes 
received in elections. Contrary to international recommendations, 
the parliament has increased the caps on private donations several 
times.2 The 2017 amendments to the Electoral Code3 reduced these 
amounts to some extent and only for election campaigns,4 while the 
excessive donations ceiling for political parties remains. The ban for 
donations from out-of-country sources of income (e.g. the Moldova 
diaspora) also remains in place.5 The vague and permissive 
regulation and disproportionately low fines for any violations 
encourage parties to obscure their sources of funding. A thorough 
revision of the legislation on party and campaign funding is still 
required.  
                                                        
1 https://rm.coe.int/16806c9a94.  
2 The initially proposed caps for private donations (20 average monthly wages 
for individuals and 40 average monthly wages for legal entities) have been 
increased tenfold and currently amount to about €50,000 for individuals and 
about €100,000 for legal entities per year. 
3 Law no. 154 as of 20.07.2017, (http://lex.justice.md/index.php? 
action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=370943). 
4 The caps for private donations were reduced to 50 average monthly wages for 
individuals (more than €13,000) and 100-monthly average wages for legal 
entities (more than €26,000) per election campaign. 
5 See the Constitutional Court decision of 6 September 2016 and the analysis of 
political party financing in the Republic of Moldova in 2016, issued by Promo-
Lex (https://promolex.md/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/raport_ 
EN_web.pdf). 
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In Ukraine, the law on political parties limits contributions by 
individual citizens to not more than 400 times the minimum wage 
(€41,290). Legal entities cannot make contributions exceeding 800 
times the minimum wage (€82,580). In October 2015, a law was 
passed to determine state funding for political parties that won not 
less than 2% of the popular vote in the last general election. These 
measures are broadly in line with Council of Europe standards. But 
Ukrainian politics has hardly become more open and accountable. 
The NACP has so far failed to use its powers to hold party leaders 
and accountants liable for violating legislative requirements.6 About 
a quarter out of 352 political parties registered in Ukraine fail to 
submit mandatory reports to the NACP,7 while the NACP does not 
have sufficient resources to verify the submitted reports properly.8 
In 2017, the NACP levied UAH 338,000 ($13,000) of fines and 
confiscated UAH 1.3 million ($51,000) of illegal contributions.  
Media-ownership transparency 
In Georgia, there are plans to present legislation to assure 
transparency of media ownership to parliament in 2017. This issue 
attracted a lot of attention in 2016-17, notably in the case of the 
largest private TV station, Rustavi 2, which was critical of 
government policies. The government tried to use a legal dispute 
between its former and current owners to change ownership in 
order to obtain a more government-loyal editorial policy. While the 
Georgian court ruled in favour of the government-backed owners, 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg took an 
unprecedented decision to suspend the enforcement of the 
Georgian court decision, until there is a decision at the Council of 
Europe level.  
                                                        
6 Monitoring Report by the Center of Policy and Legal Reform, December 2016 
(http://pravo.org.ua/img/zstored/files/FD(2).pdf). 
7 See https://nazk.gov.ua/news/nazk-rezultaty-analizu-zvitiv-politychnyh-
partiy-pro-mayno-dohody-vytraty-i-zobovyazannya . 
8 See http://pravo.org.ua/ua/news/20872827-nazk-ne-mogee-pereviriti-
faktichni-vitrati-politichnih-partiy-rezultati-zvitu-pro-diyalnist-agentstva-za-
2-roki 
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In Moldova, a detailed 2012 study9 argued that a lack of 
transparency in media ownership leads to concentration in the 
hands of interest groups, jeopardising media pluralism. In 2015, the 
parliament passed the amendment to the Broadcasting Code, 
introducing transparency on media ownership,10 but failed to 
prohibit the registration of media ownership in offshore 
companies.11 Private radio and TV broadcasters were obliged to 
disclose the identity of their beneficial owners and their shares in 
the company. This information was made public in November 
201512 and confirmed that the media market is facing a media 
ownership concentration,13 with over 80% of TV stations owned by 
politicians or people close to political parties.14 These generated a 
highly politicised and polarised media sector, where owners often 
interfere in editorial policy. The sanctions for breaching the 
provision on transparency of media ownership were introduced 
only in March 2017.15 However, the existing regulation on media 
transparency ownership remains inadequate as it allows the 
                                                        
9 Transparency of Media Ownership in the Republic of Moldova 
(http://www.ijc.md/Publicatii/studii_mlu/transparenta%20media%20eng/s
tudiu-transparenta-eng.pdf). 
10 Law no. 28 as of 05.03.15 introduced the provision on transparency of media 
ownership (art. 66, pct. 6). 
11 “The Law on Media ownership transparency voted in Parliament without the 
amendment on offshore zones” (http://media-azi.md/en/stiri/law-media-
ownership-transparency-voted-parliament-without-amendment-offshore-
zones). 
12 Mold-street.com, “TV owners in Moldova: American billionaires, local 
businessmen, Russian banks and millionaires from Tiraspol” 
(https://www.mold-street.com/?go=news&n=4266). 
13 Until May 2017, 5 out of 5 TV stations with a nationwide coverage were 
owned by a single person- the leader of the ruling Democratic Party. 
14 Nations in Transit 2017, Moldova (https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/nations-transit/2017/moldova). 
15 A gradual sanction was introduced, starting with a fine of about €750 up to 
license withdrawal (Law no. 50 as of 30.03.2017). 
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circumvention of legislation by using intermediate entities,16 or 
offshore companies.  
Ukraine adopted a law to ensure the transparency of 
ownership of broadcasting companies in September 2015.17 As a 
result, all national TV radio broadcasters are now obliged to disclose 
information about their final beneficiaries and their political 
affiliations, including the commercial and political ties of their 
families. Around 75% of the audience in TV and radio broadcasting 
is between the hands of four owners: Kolomoisky, Pinchuk, Firtash 
and Akhmetov, which indicates relatively high media ownership 
concentration. Another positive development in the media sector is 
new legislation that resulted in the establishment of the first public 
broadcasting company in January 2017. 
Corporate governance, beneficial ownership of companies. 
Disclosure of beneficial ownership in companies is important to 
ensure business integrity and to prevent conflicts of interest and 
illicit enrichment of public officials.  
Georgia made commitments to explore the feasibility of 
establishing a public central register of beneficial ownership 
information for domestic companies, and seeks bilateral 
arrangements to ensure full access to the beneficial ownership 
information of companies incorporated in partner countries. 
Georgia already has an online public register indicating ownership 
of companies registered in Georgia. But if the company is owned by 
an offshore-registered entity, no information about the real owners 
of the shares is publicly accessible. Only broadcasters are obliged to 
disclose their beneficial owners; Georgia banned ownership of 
broadcasters by offshore-registered firms in 2011. 
In Moldova, under the Anti-money laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing legal framework the reporting entities must 
identify and verify the beneficial owners when suspicious 
transactions or transactions exceeding a certain amount are 
                                                        
16 In May 2017, the media monopolist Vladimir Plahotniuc gave up the 
ownership rights of two TV companies he owned to his image adviser, Oleg 
Cristal. 
17 “Media Ownership in Ukraine” (http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org). 
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involved.18 In addition, Moldovan banks have been obliged to make 
public the identity of their shareholders and beneficial owners since 
October 2014.19 However, the 2015 bank fraud scandal and the 
Laundromat case brought to light the political dependency of the 
reporting institutions, which have failed to apply the existing tools 
and intervene according to their mandate. The bank fraud also 
brought to light the problem of offshorisation faced by the business 
and banking sectors. This resulted in stricter conditions on 
transparency of beneficial ownership imposed by the IMF and the 
EU for resuming the financial assistance.20 In 2016, the National 
Bank launched a process of comprehensive identification of 
ultimate beneficial owners of all Moldovan banks, which was due 
for June 2017, but not completed yet. The new law on money 
laundering, adopted in December 2017, entered into force in 
February 2018.  It bans   the registration of legal entities that refuse 
to submit the information on their ultimate beneficial owners or 
provide incomplete or false information. 
Ukraine was the first country in the region to establish the 
mandatory universal disclosure of beneficial ownership of legal 
entities. Such information is accessible to anyone. In February 2015, 
the parliament extended the scope of information to be disclosed by 
public officials in their electronic annual declarations, notably to 
include the legal entities in which they or their family members are 
beneficial owners. In addition, Ukraine became the first country to 
integrate its national central register of beneficial ownership with 
the Open Ownership Register – a global register of ultimate 
beneficiaries.21 
                                                        
18 Occasional transactions amounting more than 50,000 MDL (about €2,500) and 
wire transfers of more than 15,000 MDL (about €750). 
19http://www.bnm.org/ro/content/recomandari-cu-privire-la-identificarea-
beneficiarului-efectiv-aprobate-prin-hca-al-bnm-nr. 
20https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/05/01/Republic-of-
Moldova-First-Reviews-Under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility-and-Extended-Fund-
44870 
21 TI Ukraine (2017) Information about beneficial owners will be listed in a 
public register (https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/information-about-
beneficial-owners-will-be-included-in-a-public-register/). 
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Public procurement 
This has been always a major arena for corrupt behaviour. The three 
Association Agreements and DCFTAs contain commitments to 
approximate EU legislation in this field to a substantial degree. 
Georgia’s public procurement system has seen progressive 
reform and development since its first law in 1998 and reforms in 
2005 and 2006. The system is being aligned on international best 
practice, with a leading role for its independent State Procurement 
Agency. The system has been entirely electronic since 2010, and has 
won awards for its outstanding quality by the UN and EBRD.  
Moldovan public procurement legislation has been under 
continuous adaptation since its first law adopted in 1997. Digital e-
procurement was under preparation for some years and was 
launched for piloting in 201722, with first totally electronic public 
procurements made in March 2018.23 It is expected that the system 
will be fully deployed by the end of 2018.24 The latest law of April 
2016 comes close to key EU directives.25 However, these significant 
legislative improvements were undermined by delays in recruiting 
key personnel for the Agency for Solving Complaints, which eroded 
confidence in the newly-created institution.26,27  
In Ukraine, government policies are currently engaged in a 
programme of public procurement reform in line with European 
practice. A system of transparent electronic tendering (called 
                                                        
22 https://mtender.gov.md/. 
23 http://mf.gov.md/ro/content/au-fost-realizate-primele-tranzac%C8%9Bii-
de-achizi%C8%9Bie-public%C4%83-deplin%C4%83-%C3%AEn-sistemul-
mtender. 
24 Deadline established by the two-year Action Plan of the Public Procurement 
System Development Strategy for 2016-2020, (http://lex.justice.md/index. 
php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=368482). 
25 http://www.gov.md/en/content/government-approved-new-rules-
public-procurement-systems-work. 
26 https://www.zdg.md/editia-print/investigatii/licitatii-pentru-familia-
sefului-de-la-achizitii/. 
27 Iurie Morcotilo, Position paper “Republic of Moldova - one year without an 
institution for solving complaints in public procurement” 
(http://www.expert-grup.org/media/k2/attachments/ 
NotI_de_poziyie_ANSC.pdf). 
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Prozorro) has been introduced since April 2016, which has won an 
international ‘World Procurement Award’. Anyone, including civil 
society and general public, can check analytical data in real time. 
Ukraine also acceded to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). This allowed GPA 
countries to bid for Ukrainian public contracts and gave Ukrainian 
businesses access to public procurement markets in EU member 
states. Outstanding problems include the quality of the tender 
committees, and controls over execution of the contracts. To engage 
citizens in controlling the process, the Prozorro website provides 
information on how to submit appeals and complaints. 
The overall picture is one of high quality systems in Georgia and 
Ukraine, but delay in reform measures in Moldova. 
Minimisation of regulatory obligations 
It is well recognised that business regulations that require 
inspectorates to verify their implementation are a major source of 
corruption. Visits of the ‘inspector’ often lead to calls for bribes for 
the needed certificate to be delivered. In the typical post-Soviet state 
enterprises are subject to a continuous stream of inspectors. This 
introduces a serious trade-off for policymakers. De-regulation may 
help reduce corruption, but under some circumstances it can 
translate into under-regulation, for example in unsafe food and 
work practices.  
Georgia is the outstanding case of a country whose reformist 
government under President Saakashvili, starting in 2004, adopted 
a radical de-regulatory approach under the slogan, “if an agency 
cannot be reformed, abolish it”. In practice, the traffic police, labour 
inspectorate, technical safety checks for cars and the food safety 
inspectorate were all abolished. The traffic police was replaced by a 
patrol policy with reformed functions, increased remuneration and 
extensive training for police to live up to international standards. 
On the other hand, the Association Agreement and DCFTA with the 
EU have introduced legal approximation requirements to conform 
to EU regulations, many of which have to be backed up by state 
control mechanisms and inspections, in particular for food safety 
and the labour market, where Georgia has had to re-introduce 
inspectorates that had been abolished. There is no particular 
evidence that corruption is being re-introduced as a result, but the 
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risk that this may happen is understood, and the search for minimal 
or more efficient regulations remains an acute concern.  
In Moldova, the general trend is to adopt European 
standards. This is mainly due to the insistence of the national 
standardisation body. According to the Cost of Doing Business 
survey for 2016, the share of companies inspected and length of 
inspections decreased significantly after a moratorium on state 
inspections was applied during 2016. This also cut by half the 
number of companies fined. However, the number of companies 
that paid bribes during inspections has increased compared to 2015, 
with notable black spots in environmental and standards-
monitoring bodies, etc. However, there is considerable resistance to 
reform of traditional regulatory regimes, such as technical 
standards for industrial and food products based on former Soviet 
GOST standards.  
In 2017, Ukraine abolished about a half of mandatory licenses 
and permits for some industry sectors and introduced the principle 
of “silent consent”, whereby companies wishing to engage in a 
certain activity need only to make a declaration to the state, instead 
of requesting permit. The former Soviet system of GOST standards 
has been dismantled, and a completely new system of technical 
regulations was introduced, together with new institutions and 
online services. In 2017, the Government launched an automatic 
system of VAT reimbursement – one of the notorious corruption 
risks for companies. Over 2014-2018, the Cabinet of Ministers 
approved a number of measures aimed to improve the country’s 
ranking in the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ report. The process of 
harmonisation with the EU norms and practices requires further 
efforts.  
Conclusions 
From the above it is clear that anti-corruption policy has extremely 
wide-ranging and cross-cutting aspects. It is far from being a single 
policy that is switched on or off. This paper has identified 20 
headings that range across the broad matters of political will and 
strategy down to many quite technical fields of legislation. It is 
admittedly hazardous and probably contentious to distil this mass 
of information into overarching assessments. Nonetheless, having 
assembled the information item by item, an attempt can be made.  
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Table 4.5 therefore offers a very simple summary of all the 20 
elements treated in this paper. Of course, each item deserves a more 
refined assessment, which the texts above have provided within the 
limits of a compact paper, rather than a whole book. Still, the table 
allows an enumeration of the number of headings that seem to be 
‘more or less’ OK, versus those that remain problematic. The picture 
that emerges is: 
 Georgia scores 17 out of twenty, by far the best score; 
 Ukraine scores 10 out of twenty, with partial progress 
qualified by remaining political ambiguities; 
 Moldova scores 4 out of 20, with many, deep problems 
remaining. 
Of the three countries, Georgia has clearly been the front-runner 
in combatting corruption. This was due to radical policies, 
ruthlessly implemented by the Saakashvili administration 
following the Rose Revolution. Despite scepticism over whether 
this would be sustained under subsequent governments, in fact 
the achievement of a largely de-corrupted society appears intact. 
The encouraging lesson from Georgia is therefore that ‘it can be 
done’, albeit with the caution that this was achieved with a 
particularly strong political will and radical measures that many 
countries are unwilling to implement.  
For their part, Moldova and Ukraine have been trying to catch up, 
with much legislative activity following internationally accepted 
templates for institutional initiatives and specific legislative 
measures. There have been more reforms in Ukraine than in 
Moldova; or, on the negative side, Moldova is a more extreme 
case of oligarchic ‘state capture’ than the bigger and more 
complex Ukraine. However, in both cases there remains 
ambiguity over whether sufficient political will exists at the 
highest level to follow this considerable legislative activity with 
adequate implementation. Establishment of the institutional and 
legislative ‘infrastructure’ for anti-corruption policy has been an 
important and necessary achievement in both Moldova and 
Ukraine. But this infrastructure still lies in wait of adequate 
political momentum to give the declared policy significant 
strategic impact.  
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Table 4.5 Summary assessments of anti-corruption policies 
 Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Strategies and 
institutions  
   
Political will OK Not OK Not OK 
Anti-corruption 
strategies and plans 
OK OK OK 
Anti-corruption 
institutions 
OK Failings Improving 
Integrity of public 
service 
OK Improving Improving 
Integrity of judiciary OK Not OK Incomplete 
Role of civil society OK Undermined? Undermined? 
Legal provisions     
Criminalisation of 
corruption 
OK OK OK 
Corporate liability for 
corruption 
OK OK OK 
Illicit enrichment OK Lax OK 
Sanctions Disproportion-
ate 
Lax Lax 
Asset declarations OK Stalled Uncertain 
Confiscation of assets OK Lax Improving 
Statute of limitations OK OK OK 
Immunities OK Unclear Not OK 
Whistle blowers OK Lagging OK 
Broader corruption-
related issues 
   
Financing of political 
parties 
OK Not OK OK 
Media ownership 
transparency 
Not OK Not OK OK 
Corporate 
governance 
Lags Not OK OK 
Public procurement OK Lags OK 
Regulatory 
simplification 
OK Improving Improving 
Note: ‘OK’ should only be interpreted as ‘more or less’ OK, since each entry can 
be subject to qualifications. The intention is only to provide a broad brush 
summary. 
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5. CAN GREATER GENDER 
EQUALITY IN SENIOR ROLES HELP 
REDUCE CORRUPTION? 
SERENA ROMANO 
Introduction 
Based on the definitions of 
“corruption” adopted by major 
international institutions and of 
“women in power” adopted by the 
United Nations, this contribution 
explores whether an increase in the 
number of women in power 
positions in Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine might help reduce 
corruption in those countries. It also 
analyses the effect of corruption on 
poorer women. This chapter refers to 
the analyses of the linkage between 
gender and corruption in the main 
literature, draws some conclusions 
and proposes a methodology for possible areas of future research. 
The link between gender and corruption is strong, as 
corruption reinforces and amplifies the gender inequalities that 
already exist in all societies. Although corruption affects all 
individuals it will touch women and girls of all status more as their 
social, economic and physical capacity to defend themselves is 
generally weaker. Furthermore, since women form the majority of 
the global poor, the problem is even more serious in the less 
developed countries.  
The presence of women in senior positions may help to curb 
corruption. On this point, some scholars have argued with some 
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success that women intrinsically have a higher sense of integrity 
than men and thus appointing women to powerful positions in 
public administration and in politics will help reduce corruption. 
Others have countered that in countries where democratic 
institutions are solid and women are more easily promoted to senior 
levels, corruption is reduced by the institutions that favour 
transparency, a free press and assured punishment for corrupt 
practices rather than the mere presence of women in power roles.  
It should be emphasised, however, that, more fundamentally, 
the debate about the linkage between women and corruption 
should focus on how women – and men – are selected for and 
appointed to senior positions. Only if their appointment allows 
them to be sufficiently independent of the entity that appoints them 
– for instance political parties – will women be able to act effectively 
against corruption. 
Definition of “corruption” 
The meaning and characteristics of corruption are widely studied 
and analysed by international institutions and development 
agencies in order to better understand and address a phenomenon 
that is considered a hindrance to development and economic 
growth in poor and rich countries alike.  
The definitions of corruption, which focus mainly on the 
concept of abuse of trust, cover many different practices: for 
instance, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) 
defines corruption as “an abuse of trust, power or position for 
improper gain. Corruption includes, among others, offering and 
receiving bribes – including bribery of foreign public officials – 
embezzlement, conflict of interest and nepotism.” 
Transparency International (TI) considers corruption as “the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. It also classifies 
corruption as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts 
of money lost and the sector in which it occurs. For TI, grand 
corruption consists of “acts committed at a high level of government 
that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling 
leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good”. Petty corruption 
refers to “everyday abuse of entrusted power by low and mid-level 
public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who 
180  GENDER EQUALITY 
 
often are only trying to access basic goods or services in places like 
hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies”. Political 
corruption is a “manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of 
procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political 
decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, 
status and wealth”. 
The OECD, the Council of Europe and the UN conventions,1 
which are intended to combat criminal offences, do not define 
“corruption”, but rather establish a range of corrupt offences. The 
OECD Convention establishes the offence of bribery of foreign 
public officials, while the Council of Europe adds trading in 
influence and bribing domestic public officials. In addition, the UN 
Convention refers to embezzlement, misappropriation of property 
and obstruction of justice. Thus, the conventions set international 
standards on the criminalisation of corruption by proposing specific 
offences, rather than through general definitions or offence of 
corruption. 
Because corruption is so difficult to prove, definitions of 
corruption that are too general or vague to be able to produce 
prosecutions or convictions. 
Lately the traditional definitions of corruption are being 
expanded to include actions that are disproportionately 
experienced by women, such as sexual extortion and human 
trafficking. 
There is no consensus, however, among international 
institutions nor among countries as to which specific acts should be 
included in the definition of corruption.  
Definition of “women in power” 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted in 
1995 by 189 governments in the context of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women. In its Area (G) on women in power and 
decision-making, the Declaration specifically calls on governments 
to take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full 
                                                        
1 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, the 
Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption. 
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participation in power structures and decision-making and increase 
their capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership. By 
making specific recommendations at all levels and in all areas, the 
Declaration defined how women’s political, social and economic 
participation can determine their involvement in positions of 
power. The European Commission and the European Institute for 
Gender Equality (EIGE) have adopted Area (G) of the Beijing 
Declaration and established a database to monitor the numbers of 
men and women in key decision-making positions in order to 
provide reliable statistics that can be used to monitor the current 
situation and trends through time. Data regarding women in power 
and in decision making cover mainly the domains of politics, public 
administration, the judiciary, business and finance, social partners 
and NGOs. A study carried out by Romano, Musialkowski and 
Shalayeva (2015) complements EIGE’s information by providing 
data on women’s status in the Eastern Partnership countries2 that 
match the EU-28 data and allows for direct comparison and 
benchmarking with the 28 EU member states.  
Women in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have begun to 
access the structures of power, albeit in a still limited fashion: the 
proportion of women senior ministers was as high as 31.1% in 
Moldova in 2015 compared to 21.1% in Georgia and 5.9% in 
Ukraine. However, whilst the only woman in the Ukrainian cabinet 
was the Minister of Finance, in Moldova six women out of 22were 
senior ministers, the highest number in the Eastern Partnership 
countries. These statistics are positive but it must be stressed that 
four out of the six Moldovan senior ministers were attributed socio-
cultural portfolios with limited money-spending and power-
yielding force. This choice, adopted by many heads of government 
around the world who face the electoral pressure to include women 
in their cabinets, excludes women from the important 
responsibilities related to finance and the economy and assigns 
them ministerial roles in the same socio-cultural fields that women 
traditionally play in.  
In the same three Eastern Partnership countries, in 2015, only 
one parliamentary political party was led by a woman in Georgia, 
one in Ukraine and none in Moldova. It is not surprising then that 
                                                        
2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
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the corresponding proportion of women in their national 
parliaments is also low: 21.8% in Moldova, 12.1% in Ukraine and 
11.3% in Georgia, compared with an EU-28 average of 28%. 
The only data that can be meaningfully related to the linkage 
between women in power and corruption in the countries covered 
by this note are the number of women in the highest-ranking civil 
servant positions. At the first level of those positions,3 there were 
40% of women in Moldova in 2014, 24.4% in Georgia and 22.2% in 
Ukraine in 2015, compared with a 31% EU-28 average. 
As will be analysed further on, the level of corruption 
reported in the three countries is high. Public servants and 
politicians in Central and Eastern Europe are particularly 
susceptible to misconduct due to poorly defined professional 
requirements, inadequate accountability, weak control mechanisms 
and low wages. Their underlying legal and institutional 
infrastructure is weak and insufficient to fight corruption (OECD, 
2008). 
Linkages between women and corruption  
Corruption at senior levels  
Corruption can appear at any level of the public service hierarchy; 
from the economic point of view, the most significant practices of 
corruption will take place at the highest levels of power. In view of 
the small number of women who hold positions of power (in 
October 2016, women held 4.4% of Fortune 500 CEO roles), women 
are less likely to be involved in corrupt offences. Women are still 
generally absent from the informal all-male circles of power, the 
“old boys” clubs, where decisions, legal or not, are formed and 
taken. The general absence of women in illegal activities, combined 
with other factors, has led some scholars to infer that women are 
immune to corruption and thus to recommend their substantial 
insertion in the public service in order to fight corruption. Whilst 
this thesis has some weight, recent studies have brought to the light 
the idea that when more women participate in public services it is 
                                                        
3 For definitions, see Mapping table in Romano et al. (2015, p. 78).  
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because the institutions of the country in general, and democracy, 
in particular, function better.  
The following passages review the major arguments that have 
been advanced concerning the correlation between women and 
corruption.  
In A widely quoted World Bank paper by Dollar, Fisman and 
Gatti (1999) hypothesised that women are more trustworthy and 
public-spirited than men and thus they should be particularly 
effective in promoting honest government. On the parallel 
assumption that men are more individually-oriented (selfish) than 
women, the authors demonstrate that women are less likely to 
sacrifice the common good for personal material gain. To prove 
their point, the authors correlated a larger representation of women 
in parliament4 with a lower level of corruption, as measured by the 
International Country Risk Guide’s corruption index5 (ICRG).6 They 
concluded that, at the country level, higher rates of female 
participation in government are associated with lower levels of 
corruption. Dollar et al. therefore counsel that bringing more 
women into government may bring significant benefits for the 
society.  
These findings were reinforced by Swamy, Knack, Young and 
Azfar (2000), who considered women to be less involved in bribery 
and less likely to condone bribe-taking, based on the literature, 
which sees a greater participation of women in the labour market as 
producing lower levels of corruption. Their paper also pointed to 
the short-run policies designed to increase the role of women in 
commerce and politics, which may reduce corruption at macro 
levels. Using data from 18 surveys in 1981 and 43 surveys in 1990-
                                                        
4 The measure of female involvement in government comes from the Inter-
parliamentary Union’s survey, “Women in Parliaments: 1945-1995” and is 
based on the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women in the upper 
and lower houses in a large cross-section of countries. 
5 According to the authors, the index captures both the likelihood that high 
government officials will demand special payments and the extent to which 
illicit payments are expected throughout low levels of government. 
6 A number of variables were also added by the authors to reduce the statistical 
likelihood of omitted variable bias, as well as dummy variables to include 
specifications. 
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91 from the World Values Surveys on the attitudes and values of 
people in various societies in the world, Swamy et al. concluded that 
self-reported corruption at the micro-level shows differentials 
between women and men7 and that the attitudes analysed point to 
a greater acceptability of bribe-taking on the part of men. This is 
further analysed in a micro-evidence example related to bribe-
paying at corporate level in Georgia. Based on a World Bank study 
of 350 firms that reported an average incidence of corruption as high 
as 9% of turnover, evidence was found that male owners or 
managers of firms were more likely to pay bribes than women 
owners or managers. 
Using the Graft8 and Transparency International indexes to 
measure a combination of petty and grand corruption, and 
quantifying women’s involvement in politics and commerce by 
assessing their presence in national parliaments, governments, as 
high-level bureaucrats and in the labour force, the authors found 
that these variables were correlated. Based on these results, they 
suggested that women could have an impact on corruption not only 
because they would accept less bribes, but also because they could 
influence the enactment of legislation against corruption control, 
reduce the incidence of corruption in judicial or executive branch 
appointments, or encourage the media to focus on the issue. 
Considering that a positive role in curbing corruption can be played 
by political parties (when there is a large number of them that 
control and expose each other’s corrupt practices), by an 
independent judiciary or by independent media, Swamy et al. 
posited that the more women are appointed to high-level positions 
in these institutions the more effectively corruption could be 
curbed. The paper concluded that there is a sufficiently strong case 
for a negative correlation between women and corruption, thus 
leading the authors to favour the choice of policy initiatives to 
reduce corruption.  
                                                        
7 They recognised the methodological difficulty of gauging corruption practices 
that are acknowledged and self-reported or incidental and reported. 
8 The authors cite the Graft index developed by D. Kaufman, A. Kraay and P. 
Ziodo-Lobaton, “Aggregating Governance Indicators”, mimeo, World Bank, 
1999. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  185 
 
Gokcekus and Mukherjee (2002) statistically assessed 
whether the negative correlation between women’s presence and 
corruption is applicable in public-sector organisations. Using World 
Bank survey data9 of nearly 4,000 public officials in six countries 
(including Moldova), they checked the correlation between the 
percentage of women in public sector organisations, on the one 
hand and, on the other hand i) the severity of corruption and ii) its 
probability of being reported. The analysis by Gokcekus and 
Mukherjee shows that increasing the proportion of women public 
officials in countries where it is very low reduces the severity of 
corruption and raises the chances that it will be reported. However, 
empirical evidence also shows that when women’s presence 
surpasses a 45% threshold a reversal occurs: corruption grows again 
and its chances of being reported are reduced. The example of 
Moldova,10 where at the time of the study more than 40% of public 
officials were women, is emblematic: findings showed that raising 
the proportion of women public officials actually increases the 
severity of corruption.  
More recently, some authors have fundamentally disagreed 
with the view that such positive correlation between women and 
corruption exists. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2015) argue that, in 
governments, a link exists between a large women’s representation 
and a low level of corruption only when the risk of corruption being 
detected and punished by voters is high: in other words, when 
voters can identify corrupt officials and punish them at the ballot 
box. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer explain this conditional 
relationship via two theoretical mechanisms. First, on the basis of 
prior research indicating that women on average are more risk 
adverse than men, they consider that women are more responsive 
than men to an increased probability of being caught and punished 
and this more strongly deters them from engaging in corruption. 
Secondly, on evidence indicating that voters hold female candidates 
and officeholders to a higher standard than men, it makes the risk 
of engaging in corruption more salient to women.  
                                                        
9 www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civil service/surveys.htm 
10 In Moldova, among the 672 officials surveyed in 16 organisations, 296 were 
women, corresponding to 44% of the total sample. 
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The same authors identified four contexts in which voters 
should be able to hold elected representatives accountable for 
corruption and, in turn, make corruption riskier: i) when corruption 
is not pervasive, ii) where freedom of the press is respected, iii) in 
parliamentary systems and iv) when electoral rules establish direct 
relationships between voters and members of parliament. They 
checked the level of corruption in these different contexts using a 
dataset of 80 democracies over 20 years to test the hypotheses. 
Following existing research, they measured corruption perceptions 
using three of the most commonly employed measures: 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TI 
CPI), the World Bank Governance Indicators Control of corruption 
measure (WBGI), and the Political Risk Services’ International 
Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) corruption indicator. They found no 
evidence that corruption is associated with female participation in 
government in countries where corruption is pervasive. In other 
words women will engage in corruption as much as men in those 
countries because, according to the authors, they do not perceive a 
risk associated with it. In countries with a free press that can 
investigate and report on political corruption cases, a negative 
empirical association exists between women and government and 
corruption, which does not exist when the press is less free. The 
same relationship applies to countries with a parliamentary system, 
which makes it easier to punish parliamentary representatives for 
corrupt practices, as opposed to presidential systems. The authors 
also posit that in the case of electoral rules that create strong ties 
between political representatives and allow voters to punish 
corrupt political elites, the correlation between women and corrupt 
practices is negative. They therefore suggest that institutional 
reforms against corrupt practices should be implemented in parallel 
with efforts to reach gender parity in governments, in order to better 
fight the phenomenon of corruption. 
Goetz (2003) also disagrees with the assumption that women 
may be inherently more virtuous then men. She points out that 
women’s caring roles in the private arena, which have kept them 
confined at home for many centuries, are now ironically being 
flagged as evidence of good governance, to usher women’s massive 
entry into politics and the administration which would warrant that 
they clean up men’s seedy practices. She warns against recruiting 
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women for the wrong reasons and putting yet another heavy 
burden on their shoulders to justify their presence in arenas that are 
otherwise the sole purview of men. Rather, she argues that women’s 
sense of integrity would be due to their fresh entrance into politics 
and public administration, their lack of experience with corrupt 
practices and links to the business world and a sense of pride and 
public-spirit. This last trait is also witnessed, according to Goetz, 
quoting other authors,11 when a new group of people are hired to 
address degraded public services. New incentives and accounting 
systems produce a sense of collective calling and an excellent 
performance from the new staff that has little to do with gender. 
Goetz goes one step further, arguing that women are in a trickier 
situation than men in dealing with corruption. Forcing their 
entrance into patronage networks may risk putting their sexual 
propriety on the line. Goetz recounts stories of senior women 
officials in South Asia lamenting being shunted into the least 
interesting and attractive positions, linked to their gender, such as 
social development concerns. Their capacity to move to different 
positions in the administration was limited by their inability to 
curry favour with senior men, as this could only be misconstrued, 
or to offer bribes to party workers or senior bureaucrats. Goetz 
argues that what matters is not women’s access to a position but 
rather the means of that access and the nature of the institution in 
which they function that will allow women to effectively address 
corrupt practices.  
A more recent study (Jha Kumar and Sarangi, 2015) provides 
evidence that women’s presence in parliaments has a causal and 
positive impact in reducing corruption while other measures of 
female participation in economic activities are shown to have no 
effect. In addition, the authors demonstrate, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, that the theory that women are less corrupt 
than men holds true even at higher levels of gender parity. 
To establish causality, the authors compare a wide range of 
data sets such as the presence of women in the labour force, 
including the share of women in clerical positions and the share of 
                                                        
11 Merilee S. Grindle and Mary E. Hilderbrand, “Building sustainable capacity 
in the public sector: What can be done?”, Public Administration and Development, 
Vol. 15, No. 5, 1995. 
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women in senior positions such as lawmakers and senior managers. 
The first type of data measures the presence of women in potential 
bribe-taking positions, the second indicates their positions in 
decision-making posts and hence whether they are potentially 
capable of influencing legislative decisions and decisions on 
corruption. In their view, in some circumstances lawmakers could 
more easily be bribe-takers whilst senior managers could more 
likely find themselves in the role of bribe-givers. Other variables 
assessed by Kumar Jha and Sarangi relate to political rights, civil 
liberties, openness to trade and gender equality and were selected 
to control whether there is less corruption in countries where 
women fully enjoy civil rights. This is done by using the civil 
liberties index,12 developed by Freedom House to measure the 
degree of liberal democracy by taking into account the personal and 
social freedom of women, including their choice of partner and 
family size. None of these relationships appears to be statistically 
meaningful except, as previously observed, the correlation between 
corruption and the number of women in parliament.  
Another interesting finding is related to gender differences. 
In previous studies, some authors such as Goetz (2003) argued that 
women, being less involved in socio-economic roles, may also be 
less involved in corrupt practices so that they would tend to be more 
virtuous. However, they posited that such an effect might wear off 
as soon as greater equality between women and men is reached. 
Kumar Jha and Sarangi point to the contrary. Their findings show, 
in fact, that there is less corruption in societies where women enjoy 
greater equality of status, possibly because they are better able to 
affect policy-making. In the authors’ analysis, such a difference with 
men might lead to women reducing corruption. The authors 
acknowledge the need, however, to conduct further research to 
understand how women effectively reduce corruption. 
As for the countries that are the subject of this note, studies on 
women and corruption could only be found for the Republic of 
Moldova. Based on the data disaggregated by gender from an 
opinion poll carried out in that country in November 2000 with 504 
businesses and 502 households, Lilia Carasciuc (2000) remarks that 
                                                        
12 Published by Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world-2016/table-scores). 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  189 
 
Moldovan women see corruption as a more acute problem than do 
men, that they are less likely to accept bribes and that they reported 
feeling more angry and humiliated about paying bribes. In general, 
Carasciuic considers that women have towards the issue of bribes 
more negative feelings than men. A more recent survey by 
Barbaros ̦ie, Aliona, Vlădicescu and Terzi-Barbaros ̦ie (2016), 
analysed perceptions and experiences of civil servants working in 
three central public administration institutions in Moldova with 
regard to the level of corruption, its forms, the transparency of the 
decision-making process and the impact of these phenomena on the 
career development practices among men and women. Whilst some 
differences emerged between men’s and women’s perceptions 
regarding corruption, the persons interviewed share the opinion 
that the corruption phenomenon in the central public 
administration is determined by factors other than gender. They 
considered that low salaries and poor living standards in Moldova 
equally affect all civil servants, regardless of their gender. Rather, 
they felt that involvement in corruption-related activities depends 
on the position held by the individual in the institution, the political 
allegiance of the employee and his or her personal relationships and 
connections with the heads of the institutions analysed.  
In conclusion, the issue of the relationship between women 
and corruption generates contradictory views and positions. It also 
makes it difficult to find a clear demonstration of the hypothesis that 
an increase of women’s presence in senior positions in a given 
country will decrease its level of corruption. In addition, corruption 
is difficult to measure because it is not reported. What is generally 
reported are measures based on the international investors’ 
perceptions, which do not really account for what is happening in 
the field (Goetz, 2003). 
Rather, a reduction of corruption can be the result of several 
intertwined factors, including a greater presence of women in senior 
roles. Promoting the presence of women at all levels and applying 
gender mainstreaming to the public administration may have a 
substantial impact on the entire society and have the effect of 
reducing corruption. As gender-mainstreaming changes the way in 
which decisions are taken, it may, together with a greater presence 
of women, disrupt the existing pattern and extent of corrupt 
practices, establishing a negative correlation with corruption. As 
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analysed in the literature discussed above, this process would be 
enhanced by the workings of a truly free press. For example, the 
enforcement in 2012 of Italian Law 120/2011, which provides for the 
mandatory representation of women on the boards of companies 
listed on the stock exchange and of publicly-owned companies, 
prompted an uproar amongst male board members who requested 
that female candidates could only be appointed if a curriculum vitae 
describing their abilities had been submitted. Women candidates 
complied but retorted that the same rule should apply to men 
candidates. If it can safely be said that one of the positive 
consequences of Law 120 was to improve the transparency of board 
appointments, which had so far been opaque, can it be held that this 
is due to women’s higher moral ground? It is more probably due to 
the gradual implementation of a democratisation process, triggered 
by a law that fosters greater equality between women and men.  
In itself, the argument that women’s gender generates higher 
probity (UNDP and UNIFEM, 2010) has little significance. Integrity, 
as mentioned by Helen Clark (quoted in Dawson, 2012) who served 
for nine years as prime minister of New Zealand, may be more a 
function of opportunity and the way society operates than of 
gender. 
Corruption related to development and poverty  
Corruption is a major impediment to development and economic 
growth in developing countries and the relationship between 
women and corruption is closely linked to development and 
poverty. International institutions and development agencies have 
consistently described the damaging effects of corrupt practices on 
poor women. Indeed, corruption disproportionately affects those 
living in poverty and further marginalises poor women, who are 
already vulnerable, putting basic public services and goods out of 
their reach, and leaving them lagging in the economic, social and 
political development of their country (Sida, 2015). 
Since women make up the majority of the world’s poor, 
corruption disproportionately affects women and girls and impedes 
progress towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development 
Goals (UNDP, 2010). In many settings and in many ways, women 
are more exposed to corruption and its consequences than men. 
When poor women do not have funds to spare for corrupt officials 
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or persons holding positions of any level of power, they risk being 
exposed to physical abuse, sexual extortion and exploitation; 
women’s lower status and position in society also makes them 
disproportionately vulnerable to corruption and its social and 
personal effects (Transparency International, 2014).  
In this light, Transparency International (2014), UNDP and 
Sida have contrived to identify four areas in which women are 
especially subject to corruption and its effects. 
Firstly, women are particularly vulnerable to corruption 
when accessing basic services and markets: corruption creates 
additional obstacles for women to access and use public goods. 
Women, particularly in rural areas, have more occasion than men to 
require the assistance of public services for themselves and for the 
people that they take care of, children or the elderly. Services in 
healthcare, education, water, sanitation and electricity may generate 
corrupt practices. Other administrative services such as licences, 
residency and identification papers also susceptible to corruption. 
Poor women who cannot afford to pay bribes may be forced into 
unwanted sexual relationships, girls may be forced to abandon 
school. In turn, this deprives women of the opportunities to access 
the labour market and eventually reach positions of power. 
Corruption shrinks public revenue and welfare budgets and 
thus limits the provision of essential public and state services on 
which women rely more than men. 
Corruption also hampers women from accessing credit, 
conducting business and obtaining a job. In the informal sector, 
which is largely constituted by women and is more subject to 
corrupt practices, women will be under more pressure than men to 
give in to corruption. Women also tend to lack the information, the 
experience and resources to engage effectively with corrupt 
networks.  
Secondly, women become more exposed to corruption when 
they try to engage with the political arena. Corrupt political parties 
create an unfair environment for women, as they, less often than 
men, will agree to participate in vote-buying and will also have less 
opportunities to be promoted through personal connections. 
Women in general are discouraged from joining politics, a field 
where career advancement is often gained through ’old boy’ 
networks. When promotions are not based on merit, corrupt 
192  GENDER EQUALITY 
 
practices have opportunities to thrive. In these circumstances, 
corruption, directly and indirectly, reduces the number of women 
in politics.  
A third area relates to the violation of specific rights of women 
and girls. In many poor countries women and girls may be forced 
into early marriage or may have to defend their rights in case of 
divorce, domestic abuse, rape or adultery. Judiciary systems and 
officials that are corrupt may not effectively protect women’s and 
girls’ rights when accepting money or favours from their 
adversaries. In this competition for money or favours, the losers will 
be the women and girls who do not have the financial resources to 
fight a corrupt legal system.  
The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer reports that the police 
and the judiciary are perceived as the most corrupt institutions in 
the 109 countries surveyed.  
The fourth area is linked to negligence and mismanagement. 
Women who are refugees or displaced persons are often subject to 
sexual abuse or other forms of exploitation as they can fall prey to 
men aid workers and peacemakers. In a nutshell, corruption 
reinforces existing gender discrimination.  
Proposed areas of further research and methodology 
The analysis presented above shows that, based on some evidence, 
corruption may to some extent be reduced by the presence of 
women in power. Scholars differ in their explanation as to why this 
occurs or whether in fact a direct correlation exist. For example, 
Esarey points to an indirect, non-causal correlation between the 
progress of democratic institutions and the women’s capacity to 
reduce corruption. It is also interesting to consider, as mentioned by 
Goetz, the importance of how women are appointed. Indeed, she 
questions whether women who come through a democratic process 
that connects them to a social base will monitor the results that they 
will deliver. Along a similar line, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2015) 
consider that the more accountable elected representatives are 
towards their voters, the less likely it is that women become 
involved in corrupt practices.  
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We have also seen that poverty creates further imbalances 
between men and women, which disproportionally affect the latter 
when corruption is pervasive.  
In light of the above observations, the link between women 
and corruption might be studied by analysing how women accede 
to senior positions in countries where, once in power, they have the 
possibility to reduce corruption. In other words, provided that the 
rules to appoint, promote and sanction their careers are meritocratic 
and transparent, women may well be the key to unlocking a closed 
system of (mainly) male power and ushers in a more egalitarian 
system that has regard for both sexes and not just an elite mainly 
composed of men.  
Further research could therefore be undertaken by comparing 
the level of corruption with the way in which women are selected 
and appointed in the fields of politics, the judiciary and public 
administration.  
The following sections propose an analysis and methodology, 
for further study on how women in politics, in the judiciary and in 
the public administration are selected and appointed.  
Women in politics  
Politics is an area where women may have a substantial possibility 
of positively impacting corruption, both passively, by refusing to 
get involved, and actively, by promoting anti-corruption legislation. 
By way of example, in Italy, Paola Severino introduced, during her 
mandate as Minister of Justice in Mario Monti’s government in 2012, 
decrees that stipulate that any parliamentarian who is definitively 
sentenced to more than two years in prison should be expelled from 
parliament and prohibited from public office. Under the terms of 
the so-called Severino law, Mr Berlusconi, a former Italian Prime 
Minister, was expelled in November 2013 from the Italian Senate 
and banned from holding public office for six years. The Decrees, 
co-drafted by Ms Severino and promulgated under her name, 
provide for a wide range of anti-corruption measures that have 
improved the transparency of public office and increased the 
penalties related to corruption crimes in Italy. Ms Severino, a lawyer 
and university professor, was not from the circles of political power.  
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However, if women are appointed purely to fulfil a party’s 
objectives and not to pursue their own political agenda, their 
capacity to deter corrupt practices may be limited. A first area of 
research should include an analysis of the process by which women 
are selected to stand in an election and an enquiry into how different 
electoral systems may enhance or reduce the opportunity for 
candidates to act.  
The first area of research should analyse the manner in which 
women are elected to define which electoral system offers the 
greatest opportunity for women to act.  
 Feminist movements and a gradual acceptance by society 
have led to the understanding that a government can only 
effectively represent a society if all groups and their interests 
are reflected in the decision-making process. One of the 
central questions regarding women’s representation is when 
they will make a difference. Whilst a few women in high-level 
positions will often be marginalised if surrounded by a 
majority of men, the size of the minority is crucial in order to 
bring about fundamental change for women in politics. If the 
minority reaches 30% – or the critical mass – then the group 
of women is able to begin taking actions in its interest 
(Dahlerup, 1988). It is estimated that gender balance is 
basically attained when women reach the level of 40% of an 
electoral assembly and that gender parity really exists at 50% 
of the representation (European Institute of Gender Equality, 
2015). These percentages have been taken into consideration 
by governments that wished to introduce quotas for women’s 
representation in order to ensure the effectiveness of their 
measures. It is now recognised that reaching a percentage of 
women lower than 30% of an electoral assembly limits their 
impact on the decisions of that assembly. In this respect, it will 
be interesting to analyse the implementation of Moldovan 
Law No. 180 of 15 May 2014, adopted in April 2016 which sets 
a minimum of 40% women represented on the electoral lists 
of political parties, the composition of the government and in 
the permanent bureau of the elected parliament (Emerson 
and Cenușa, 2016) 
 Research should therefore focus on several selected 
parliaments (a minimum of five) that have reached – or 
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almost reached – the 30% threshold. According to the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, the criterion is met by 49 parliaments, 
from 61.3% of women representation in Rwanda to 29.5% in 
the Philippines.  
 Although the percentage of women elected in the last 
parliamentary election in the researched countries falls short 
of 30% (according to the database maintained by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, it was around 12% in Ukraine, 16% in 
Georgia and 22% in Moldova, against the EU-28 average of 
28%, attested to by EIGE), the three countries should be added 
to the research as elements of comparison.  
 The next factor to research should be the type of electoral 
system that makes women more effectively able to act against 
corruption. Recent literature has focused on the electoral 
systems that produce the highest women’s representation. 
For instance, plurality–majority or majoritarian systems were 
found to be the least favourable to women’s representation. 
Conversely, countries that have proportional representation 
systems tend to have a higher representation of women. In 
mixed systems, women are considerably more likely to obtain 
seats via party lists, rather than winning individual seats. In 
addition, proportional representational systems encourage 
the adoption of quotas, for instance via a ‘zipper system’, 
which requires parties to alternate between female and male 
candidates on their lists (EIGE).  
 However, this analysis tends to concentrate on which system 
will increase women’s representation in Parliaments to reach 
the magical 30% quota that allows women to act. It does not 
take into consideration whether the electoral system itself can 
provide sufficient independence to an elected candidate to 
allow her to take measures, for instance to curb corruption. 
However, when deputies are elected directly and are 
accountable to their electorate, as in majoritarian systems, 
they have more opportunities to act according to their own 
will and beliefs than in proportional representation systems 
where they need to abide more to the party line.  
 It is therefore proposed to select, for the analysis, parliaments 
that have members elected according to proportional 
representation systems and mixed systems and that have 30% 
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women’s representation.13 If this proves too difficult, to add 
for research purposes one or two countries14 that have a 
proportional representation system with a women’s 
representation close to 30%.  
Georgia and Ukraine have a majority system whereas 
Moldova has proportional representation, although a major debate 
is taking place in these countries to switch to a majoritarian system. 
In Moldova the discussion centres on the introduction of 
uninominal voting in the 2018 the legislative elections. 
 Once the different parliamentary systems have been 
identified and analysed, the legislation of these countries 
should be examined to search for major legislation concerning 
corruption, legality, transparency in public administration 
and governance enacted in the country in the five years 
previous to the study and to assess whether, and how, women 
were involved in its promulgation.  
 In addition, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) during the same five-year period 
should be monitored to check for variations subsequent to the 
implementation of such measures. The 2016 CPI, which 
ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), is low for 
Ukraine (29) and Moldova (30), less so for Georgia (57).  
The conclusions should be drawn on:  
 women’s capacity to curb corruption and to promote legality 
and transparency in the public administration and 
governance;  
 women’s capacity to take decisions in favour of their 
electorate and for the public good; and 
 how electoral systems that make parliamentary 
representatives more accountable to citizens can ensure a 
sufficient presence of women to curb corruption. 
                                                        
13 The UK for instance has a majoritarian representation system and 30% of 
women in parliament (House of Commons). 
14 France also has a majoritarian representation system but 25.8% of women in 
parliament. 
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Women in the judiciary  
The hypothesis that women judges can significantly curb 
corruption, if they operate in an independent judiciary system 
needs testing. 
The application by the judiciary of the anti-corruption laws is 
a bulwark against corrupt practices, provided that judges are truly 
independent from the other powers of the state. In this light, it has 
been posited that if in general women tend to condone corruption 
less than men do, the same must hold true in the judiciary. Although 
in many EU member states the initial access to the judiciary is based 
on an applicant’s success in passing the entrance exams (in which 
women, have excelled), the number of women judges in senior 
positions remains low in the EU. This is also true in Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. In Georgia, although a system of exams 
based on qualifications results in a higher number of women judges 
than men (51% to 49%, respectively), the senior judicial posts are 
still mainly populated by men. In comparison with Armenia in 2013, 
women judges, who are selected through exams, interviews and the 
Armenian President’s agreement, constituted 24% of the total 
number of magistrates. In both countries’ courts, chambers and 
tribunals are headed by men (Romano et al., 2015).  
 Therefore, a second area of research could focus on how 
senior judges are appointed and how judges become 
presidents of chambers and tribunals. The independence of 
justice should also be evaluated in parallel with the 
mechanisms of promotion in the judiciary, in order to assess 
their impact on the process of reduction of corruption.  
 Given that very limited research was undertaken on women 
in the judiciary in the EU-28 member states or in Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, it is proposed to review the way in 
which judges are appointed in a number of EU countries (at 
least five) and to also review for comparison the same 
mechanisms in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.  
 Based on the analysis of existing laws and regulations, 
literature and interviews from relevant stakeholders, the 
exercise should be conducted to evaluate whether the 
appointment system is objective, transparent and based on 
merit.  
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 In the same countries, the promotion mechanisms should be 
analysed, in particular as regards the process by which judges 
become heads of chambers, tribunals and courts. In this light, 
data should be collected on the number of judges and 
presidents of the highest courts, disaggregated by sex. 
 The analysis should also compare the information and data 
collected with the available information on the independence 
of the judiciary, such as the index of Judicial Independence of 
the World Economic Forum (2001-2014), which covers 46 
countries. Although Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are not 
included in the WEF study, these three countries should also 
be analysed based on independent reports either from 
national NGOs or from organisations such as Human Rights 
Watch.  
 The results should be compared with indexes such as the one 
compiled by Transparency International,  
The conclusions should be drawn on the basis of the following three 
questions:  
 Which appointment systems facilitate women’s access to the 
judicial professions?  
 How should promotions be made in the judiciary to ensure a 
fair representation of women in senior promotions? 
 Which measure should be taken to protect the independence 
of judges?  
Women in public administration  
The third area of research should focus on how women are 
appointed in public administration. 
The staff of public administration, at all levels, can be a crucial 
tool in combating corruption. In this sector, too, women can be of 
significant importance, since in the EU-28 countries, as well as in 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, a great number of women work in 
public administration. In most countries recruitment is done 
predominantly but not exclusively by way of state exams. As 
already seen, however, the higher echelons of the administration are 
still populated mainly by men. Therefore, a third area of research 
could focus on the mechanisms of access, selection and promotion 
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in public administration to gauge their transparency and their 
respect of the merits and independence of candidates. 
The share of ministers and top-ranking bureaucrats is another 
measure of women’s participation in politics (Swamy et al., 2000). 
Increasing the number of women in public administration has a 
positive effect on public-sector responsiveness to women’s needs. 
For example, high numbers of female teachers improve the 
retention of girls in school (UNESCO, 2003). As elsewhere, power 
structures in public administration are mostly male-dominated. 
Increasing the number of women in public administration can, here 
also, help to weaken power mechanisms. Here again, however, the 
same types of conditions will apply as elsewhere: women should 
represent a critical mass of at least 30% of personnel, they should be 
sufficiently represented in the higher levels of public administration 
to be able to make a difference and their appointment should be 
objective, transparent and meritocratic.  
It is therefore proposed to select a minimum of six 
administrations, including in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, such 
as a ministry, an independent authority or a government agency, in 
which at least 30% of positions have already been staffed with 
women and at least one of their highest-ranking civil servant 
positions is held by a woman, for purposes of analysing the 
following questions:  
 How are job applicants recruited and hired?  Is the hiring 
system transparent, objective and unbiased towards women 
and based on merit?   
 How are civil servants promoted and according to which 
rules? And are the rules transparent, objective, unbiased 
towards women and based on merit?   
Interviews will be conducted with a selected number of 
representatives (a minimum of four from senior positions and four 
from middle management) from the relevant administrations to 
collect their views on their ability to combat corruption.  
Finally, the results would be compared with indexes such as 
Transparency International’s, with the aim of drawing conclusions 
on the following questions:  
 Do hiring systems in the public administrations analysed 
favour women and do they have, both from the information 
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collected and the interviews held, the ability to curb 
corruption?  
 Do the rules related to promotion analysed in the public 
administrations favour women and do they have, both from 
the information collected and the interviews held, the ability 
to curb corruption?  
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6. INCOMPLETE HEGEMONIES, 
HYBRID NEIGHBOURS: IDENTITY 
GAMES AND POLICY TOOLS  
ANDREY MAKARYCHEV 
Introduction 
This paper applies the concepts of 
hegemony and hybridity as 
analytical tools to help understand 
the structural changes taking place 
within the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) countries and beyond. The 
author points to the split identities 
of many post-Soviet societies and 
the growing appeal of solutions 
aimed at balancing Russia’s or the 
EU’s dominance as important 
factors shaping EaP dynamics. 
Against this background, he 
explores how the post-Soviet 
borderlands can find their place in 
a still hypothetical pan-European space, and free themselves from 
the tensions of their competing hegemons. The EaP is divided into 
those countries that signed Association Agreements with the EU 
and those preferring to maintain their loyalty to Eurasian 
integration. Bringing the two groups closer together, however, is 
not beyond policy imagination.  
The policy-oriented part of this analysis focuses on a set of 
ideas and schemes aimed at enhancing interaction and blurring 
divisions between these countries. The author proposes five 
scenarios that might shape the future of EaP countries’ relations 
with the EU and with Russia: 1) the conflictual status quo in which 
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both hegemonic powers will seek to weaken the position of the 
other; 2) trilateralism (EU, Russia plus an EaP country), which has 
been tried and failed, but still is considered as a possible option by 
some policy analysts; 3) the Kazakhstan-Armenia model of 
diplomatic advancement towards the EU, with some potential 
leverage on Russia; 4) deeper engagement by the EU with the 
Eurasian Economic Union, which has some competences for tariffs 
and technical standards; and 5) the decoupling of security policies 
from economic projects, which is so far the most difficult option to 
foresee and implement in practice. 
The concept of hybridity 
This concept is widely used to describe an important institutional 
feature of most of the post-Soviet regimes. Less studied are cultural 
elements of hybridity, mostly related to in-between identities of 
borderlands located at the intersection of different civilizational 
(societal, religious, ethnic and linguistic) spaces and flows. This 
paper first discusses how cultural hybridity impacts upon 
institutional politics in the countries of the EU-Russia common 
neighbourhood. It then looks at how the EU and Russia as two 
major powers in the post-Soviet region deal with the hybrid – and 
thus unstable and dislocated – identities of their neighbours. 
The concept of hybridity is not only used to describe post-
Soviet liminal countries, but also the EU’s and Russia’s policies. For 
example, Richard Youngs conveys the idea of a new EU “hybrid 
geopolitics … mixing offensive and defensive tactics, and of the 
Union using its distinctive tools aimed at deepening cooperation 
with Eastern Partnership (EaP) states, interdependence and political 
transformation, both more instrumentally and more variably to 
further immediate-term security interests. The category, i.e. of 
“hybrid geopolitics”, is ‘redux’ liberal in the sense of the EU using 
core liberal-cooperative practices in ways that are more selective 
and calibrated than in previous European policies, and 
superimposed with a layer of geo-strategic diplomacy.”1 In the 
meantime, EU-Russian relations may also be dubbed hybrid, in the 
sense that they are grounded in two overlapping systems of 
interaction – an old one inherited from the times of the Cold War, 
                                                        
1 Richard Youngs, “Is ‘hybrid geopolitics’ the next EU foreign policy doctrine?”, 
London School of Economics and Political Science blog, 19 June 2017.  
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with hard security concerns and spheres-of-influence type of 
thinking, and an allegedly emerging new approach that Andrey 
Kortunov relates to the still hypothetical reinvigoration of “common 
spaces” or “regimes of communication”.2 
Unlike some realist voices, this paper assumes that the 
comeback to the Cold-War-style spheres of influence is not a viable 
option for the EU-Russia common neighbourhood. As the recent 
dynamics in the Russia-loyal Kazakhstan, Armenia and – to some 
extent – Belarus shows, institutional partnership with Russia does 
not preclude them from looking for better and deeper relations with 
the EU. One observes a similar shift towards an enhanced 
relationship with Brussels in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Moldova 
is a different example of searching for a new balance in the EU-
Russia conundrum: under Igor Dodon’s presidency, Chisinau 
overtly shows interest in freezing its previous commitments taken 
within its Association Agreement with the EU and build new 
bridges to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Of course, one 
should not project this demand for compromise and equilibrium to 
all post-Soviet areas, yet the examples given above attest to a need 
for more nuanced political arrangements to avoid further escalation 
of confrontation in the wider Europe.  
The search for new solutions should take into account some 
characteristics shared by the EU and Russia, despite the 
dissimilarities in their foreign policies. Both Brussels and Moscow 
have developed and put into practice certain combinations of 
inclusive and exclusive policy tools, and their hegemonic roles are 
doomed to remain incomplete.3 The idea of incompleteness – and, 
therefore, fluidity and volatility – of the post-Soviet transformation 
and the hegemonic roles of Russia and the EU in this process have 
been already discussed by analysts from different perspectives.4 In 
the context of my analysis, incomplete hegemony might be 
understood as a two-pronged concept. On the one hand, it suggests 
                                                        
2 Andrey Kortunov, “Gibridnoe sotrudnichestvo - Kak vyiti iz krizisa v 
otnosheniyakh Rossii s ES”, Moscow Carnegie Center, 29 August 2017. 
3 Andrey Makarychev and Vlad Strukov, “(In)complete Europe vis-à-vis 
(in)complete Russia”, PONARS-Eurasia website, 5 June 2017. 
4 See Andrew Wilson, “Partners for Life: Europe’s Unanswered ‘Eastern 
Question’”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 27 October 2017. 
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that there are no ‘natural’ borders delimiting the area of their 
normative (in the case of the EU) or civilisational (in the case of 
Russia) extension. These borders are shifting depending on 
different circumstances, including those beyond the reach of either 
Russia or the EU (for example, China’s policies are of the highest 
importance in this respect). On the other hand, both hegemonies are 
incomplete in the sense that neither the EU nor Russia can fully and 
comprehensively (i.e. institutionally, normatively, economically or 
security-wise) integrate their neighbours within their normative 
and civilisational projects. Thus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
demand much more – including the membership perspective – than 
the EU can supply at this juncture. The same goes for Armenia, 
which expects Russia to stop arms sales to Azerbaijan, and for South 
Ossetia and Transnistria, which wish – to no avail so far – Russia to 
absorb them. Concomitantly, each of the two dominant actors faces 
the necessity to meet elevated expectations of some of their 
neighbours, on the one hand, and set certain limitations in 
associating with them, on the other. 
This paper primarily focuses on the most recent experiences 
of those countries that are experimentally looking for carving out 
policy niches for their own subjectivities in a situation of EU-Russia 
institutional and political split. Some post-Soviet states (such as 
Armenia5) and non-recognised territories (such as Transnistria6) 
wish to assert themselves as “bridges between Eastern and Western 
Europe”, yet these self-descriptions largely remain linguistic 
metaphors lacking practical content and substantiation. In 
manoeuvring between the two hegemonic projects, countries 
located in-between look for solutions and compromises that 
transcend the binary either-or logic conducive to deep political rifts 
and ruptures, and it is these endeavours that are of primary interest 
to the present analysis.  
Two questions in particular are addressed at this point: 
                                                        
5 Aram Terzan, “The evolution of Armenia’s foreign policy identity”, in 
Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov (eds.), Values and Identity as Sources 
of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia, Tbilisi: Universal Publishing House, 
2016, p. 148. 
6 Rory Maclean, “Heroic Adventures in Transnistria”, New Eastern Europe, No. 
4 (IX),2013, p. 158. 
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1) How far might these in-between identities and the 
concomitant policy practices lead these countries and how 
sustainable will these hybrid models will be in mid-/long-
run? 
2) Will the multiple areas of overlapping EU-Russian policies, 
interests and jurisdictions require Moscow and Brussels to 
change their policy tools and power resources?  
In tackling these questions, most of the attention is focused on 
Moldova and Armenia, but with reference to the experiences of 
Georgia and Ukraine as well. 
The empirical base includes primary (official documents, 
statements and speeches) and secondary (media) sources in English 
and Russian languages, as well as interviews with experts 
(policymakers, scholars, civil society activists, journalists) 
conducted during fieldwork in Georgia (n=10), Ukraine (n=10), 
Moldova (n=10) and Armenia (n=10) in the summer of 2017. 
Hybridity in the common neighbourhood 
This paper defines hybridity through a set of characteristics of post-
Soviet transformation that allow for co-existence of different 
political features and cultural trends, including those that in certain 
contexts might be seen as contradictory to each other. The post-
Soviet region in this respect may be addressed as a peculiar and 
paradoxical combination of archaic forms of social, economic and 
cultural practices, on the one hand, and a post-modern de-
ideologisation (the proverbial end of ‘grand narratives’), with the 
ensuing fluidity and uncertainty of most of the forms of political 
identification. It is this mix of seemingly hardly compatible types of 
policy practices and power relations that defines the high volatility 
of political processes in many of these countries, and multiple U-
turns in their foreign policy orientations. Examples are Moldova’s 
fluctuation from a ‘soft balancing’ between Moscow and Brussels 
under Vladimir Voronin’s presidency to the drastic shift towards 
explicitly pro-EU policies in 2009, followed by the rise of pro-
Russian forces and the subsequent presidency of Igor Dodon since 
2016. Georgia too went through a series of U-turns from the 
nationalist leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the early 1990s to 
a more balanced presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, followed by 
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the ‘Rose Revolution’ and the ascension to power of Mikhail 
Saakashvili, whose trajectory in a matter of years transformed 
Georgia from a pragmatic partner of Moscow in 2004 to Russia’s 
enemy in 2008. The rise and fall of the “Orange coalition” in 
Ukraine, its electoral defeat by the Moscow-friendly Viktor 
Yanukovych and his deposition as a result of the Euromaidan of 
2013-14 attests to the high turbulence in Ukrainian politics as well, 
which the Ukrainian political analyst Volodymyr Gorbach terms an 
“unfinished revolution”7 – an idea that again, albeit in a different 
context, points to the incompleteness of many political 
characteristics of the post-Soviet transformation. 
Important elements of these transitory complexities are 
relatively vague and blurred political loyalties. Being considered as 
a Moscow-loyal, President Voronin ultimately refused to sign the 
Kozak memorandum drafted in the Kremlin as the basis for the 
settlement of the conflict in Transnistria. By the same token, 
President Shevardnadze, being very close to Moscow in many 
respects, left open doors for cooperation with NATO and the EU. 
Moscow was able to prevent the pro-EU drift of yet another ally 
Viktor Yanukovych, but at a high price of forcing him to abandon 
the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU and thus provoking a 
deep political crisis in Ukraine with global security consequences.  
In a general sense, the high political volatility in the post-
Soviet countries can be explained by the complexities of their nation 
building. More specifically, the most substantial element of this 
complexity is the disharmony between political identity as a system 
of loyalties and sympathies, ethnicity, the institution of citizenship 
and religious affiliations. For example, Georgia and Moldova reveal 
meaningful contradictions between the idea of (re)building nation 
states and religious loyalties largely influenced by (and associated 
with) the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Besides, in Moldova one 
may see disconnections between political identities and citizenship 
in the sense that the possession of Romanian passports does not 
necessarily define pro-Russian or pro-EU sympathies of its holders.  
                                                        
7 Volodymyr Gorbach, “Незавершена революція”, Ukrainskiy Interest web 
portal, 1 December 2017. 
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An illustrative example of the post-Soviet hybridity is 
Georgian identity: “de-Sovietisation is part of Georgia’s efforts to 
join the EU”8, but Georgian sympathies towards Stalin, with their 
strong nationalist roots, are quite strong in the society as well. This 
bifurcation is exacerbated by the precarious European identity of 
Georgians: “During the different periods in its history, Georgia has 
been the part of the Persian and Ottoman Empires, the Mongolian 
and Russian Empires, and the Soviet Union; but Europe has hardly 
ever been involved. Thus, saying that Europe is a natural habitat for 
Georgia and that its people aspire to go ‘back’ to Europe, is only 
loosely related to the actual course of Georgian history.”9 As a 
Georgian expert argues, European identity in this country is not 
based on “cultural appeal, values and norms; rather people are 
drawn to the economic prosperity that is perceived as a result of a 
deeper cooperation between Georgia and the EU”.10 As for the 
political meanings of the institution of citizenship, there are two 
competing – yet co-existing - narratives in Georgia – a liberal, pro-
Western one grounded in civic identity, and “ethno-religious 
national narrative”11 based on the values of ethnicity and religion. 
Against this backdrop, to properly analyse the post-Soviet 
reality on the ground, a new understanding of hybridity is needed– 
not only as a characteristic of political systems, but also as an in-
between cultural positioning with meaningful political effects. As 
any type of diversity, cultural hybridity may have various effects – 
it might be conducive to the building of a civic nation where ethnic 
identity would not be the key criteria of belonging to the nation, but 
it can also lead to separatism, which is particularly dangerous if 
supported or ignited from the outside. 
                                                        
8 Ana Dabrundashvili, “Shadows of Joseph Stalin”, New Eastern Europe, N 3 
(VIII), 2013, p.45. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Levan Kakhisvili, “Accounting for the “selfless” self-perception among 
the Georgian public”, in Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov (eds), 
Values and Identity as Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia, Tbilisi: 
Universal Publishing House, 2016, p. 77. 
11 Tamar Pataraia, “The civic dimension of Georgian national identity and its 
influence on foreign policy”, in Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov 
(eds.), Values and Identity as Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia, 
Tbilisi: Universal Publishing House,2016, p.94. 
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Speaking about how in-between identities trigger 
institutional effects, one needs to see a wider picture of the post-
Soviet political space. Most of these countries have all the 
institutions central to democracy (elections, separation of powers, 
civil society organisations, the media), but their functioning is a far 
cry from European standards. All of them consider their national 
identities European by culture, history and geography, yet the 
political distance from EU norms and standards of democracy 
might be quite substantial. This ambiguity expands the space for 
manoeuvring: Armenia – a member of the Eurasian Economic 
Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – 
continues to develop relations with the EU and NATO; and 
Moldova – a country that signed an AA and a DCFTA (Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement), and was a pioneer in 
enjoying a visa-free regime with the EU – under Dodon’s presidency 
is increasingly leaning towards Moscow.  
Ukrainian and Georgian hybridities manifest themselves in a 
symbiotic co-existence of strong pro-European drive – basically 
engendered by a consistent desire to break away from Russian 
patronage – with the resilient attraction of the nation state as the 
locus of power and the embodiment of ethnic/national authenticity. 
In particular, Georgia’s identity combines a clear sympathy and 
penchant towards Europeanisation (presupposing liberal reforms) 
with the strong attachment to Orthodoxy with its obvious 
conservative underpinnings. Yet the nation-state model of 
governance, with the inherent conservative momentum, contradicts 
the overwhelmingly liberal logic of EU-led supra-national 
integration. The Georgian Orthodox Church, the most trustworthy 
institution in the country, shares a lot in its conservative and 
Western-sceptic rhetoric with the ROC, which only adds to the 
ambiguity mentioned above. In Ukraine the ROC, widely referred 
to in the official discourse as the Church of the intruding country, is 
a major Orthodox institution whose parishes outnumber those of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv patriarchate. A specific 
element of hybridity in Ukraine is the proliferation of the practices 
of dual citizenship as an effect of policies of neighbouring countries 
– Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Russia aimed at distributing 
national passports or ID cards (Karta Polaka) in addition to the pre-
existing Ukrainian citizenship.  
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Moldova is an interesting example of a country where the 
redrawing of borders in the past (i.e. geopolitical and territorial 
reshuffling) caused strong hybridising effects in cultural and 
political domains. The country’s strong connections to both Russia 
and Romania unleashed deep splits in national identity.12 In the 
meantime, Moldova is an illustrative story of the fragility of 
‘successful’ Europeanisation13: the electoral victory of the Alliance 
for European Integration could not drive this country away from 
the oligarchic ‘state capture’ and corruption scandals. The 
presidency in Moldova – as exemplified by Igor Dodon’s tenure – is 
not a consolidating institution, but rather a divisive one. To this one 
should add the spill-over effects of the events in Ukraine – an 
anticipation of possible political destabilisation and the growing 
uncertainty when it comes to security.14 As a result, not much room 
is left in Moldovan politics for value-based policies – the country 
incarnates a post-Soviet, post-ideological and post-normative 
regime of power, with pragmatic considerations (economics, 
finances and security) trumping any possible ideational allegiances. 
The widespread practice of double citizenship adds to the existence 
of multiple zones of shifting loyalties and dislocated identities. For 
example, it is imaginable that Moldovan holders of Romanian 
passports would not necessarily be pro-European when it comes to 
their voting preferences. This type of post-political and even post-
national citizenship is primordially a matter of practical 
convenience, which distinguishes Moldova from, for instance, the 
Baltic states where – especially in Estonia and Latvia – post-Soviet 
citizenship was closely associated with political loyalty to the nation 
states that regained their independence. 
Religion is another factor that adds to the hybridity of 
Moldovan identity. The role of the ROC in the country is huge: most 
of the parishes in Moldova are controlled by the Moscow Patriarchy, 
which, according to the testimonies of many Moldovan experts, is 
                                                        
12 Rumer, Eugen, “Moldova between Russia and the West: a Delicate Balance”, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 May 2017.  
13 Dovile Suslite (ed.), “Экономические Вызовы, Стоящие Перед Украиной 
и Молдовой на Пути в ЕС”, Eastern European Study Center and Foreign 
Policy Association, Chisinau, November 2015, p.16. 
14 Glavkom, “Угроза пророссийского переворота в Молдове. К чему 
готовиться Украине?”, 13 January 2017. 
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more a political than a theological institution, and is widely known 
for using religious ceremonies to propagate the doctrine of the 
Russian world. Therefore, clashes between the ‘pro-European’ and 
‘pro-Russian’ standpoints hide a much more complex picture of 
numerous conflicting affiliations and disconnections involving 
issues of ethnicity, religious affiliation and citizenship. 
Armenia – sharing with Moldova an in-between 
manoeuvring in search of its own system of multiple balances – is 
different from the three countries that signed AAs and strengthened 
their relations with the EU through visa-free agreements in at least 
one important respect: it did not lose territory to separatists. On the 
contrary, it supported the de-facto second Armenian state in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory that before 1991 was 
administratively part of Azerbaijan. Against this background, 
Armenian foreign policy choices are more geopolitical than 
normative, which is predetermined by its complicated 
neighbourhood, including locked borders with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. In these conditions the EU appears as one of few options 
to balance Russia’s influence. In the Armenian discourse there is a 
feeling of belonging to a cultural space of Europe from which the 
Armenian nation state is distanced, if not detached 
geographically.15 As an interviewee in Yerevan put it, “we are 
Europeans even if Europe does not know that”. 
In the meantime, Armenian mainstream discourse 
vehemently discards any meaningful anti-Russian attitudes in this 
country, preferring to see them as marginal and politically 
insignificant. Moreover, as another interviewee in Yerevan said, 
“we are not Georgians – we don’t contradistinguish Russia and 
Europe”. For Armenia, Russia is a security guarantor, while the EU 
is an economic partner. Within the CSTO, Armenia tried to offer its 
experience of international peacekeeping: “The self-sufficiency 
stems from Armenia’s expanding capacity to participate in 
peacekeeping operations separate from its role as a member of the 
Russian-dominated CSTO and distinct from its security partnership 
                                                        
15 Alexandr Iskanderian, ЕАЭС - не интеграционный проект, это форма 
подтверждения лояльности России, Yerevan: the Caucasus Institute, 22 
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with Russia”.16 In the security terrain, this is exactly what defines 
Armenia’s attempts to diversify its external communication under 
the condition of heavy dependence on Russia. 
Hybrid hegemonies: The EU and Russia 
The academic literature is replete with realist and geopolitical 
approaches to a plethora of issues pertaining to EU-Russian 
interactions in the common neighbourhood area. A Russian expert, 
for example, argues that the EU is driving towards a more 
geopolitical – as opposed to pragmatic – approach to its eastern 
neighbours.17 However, the EU’s and Russia’s policies towards their 
common neighbours, being undoubtedly hegemonic, in many 
respects remain incomplete, which may be understood as a 
structural impediment to hegemonic impositions from either of two 
major power centres – Moscow and Brussels – due to the hybrid 
nature of societies forming the neighbourhood area. By the same 
token, EU and Russian policies themselves might be approached 
from the perspective of hybridity, which in this specific context 
means a complex structure of hegemony without one single logic 
behind it. 
From a practical perspective, the EU and Russia have their 
own advantages. The EU acts through a variety of channels, thus 
combining diverse forms of influence – through the mechanisms of 
official agreements, state-based policies and the multiplicity of non-
state actors involved, including foundations, professional 
associations, think tanks, and so forth. Russia, for its part, is stronger 
in non-democratic environments dealing with opaque and often 
corrupt interest groups. This section discusses the EU’s and Russia’s 
hegemonic strategies in their complexity and multiplicity, and from 
the viewpoint of their hybrid nature. 
Europeanisation as a hegemonic strategy 
The hybrid structure of political identities and affiliations in 
countries of common neighbourhood is a serious challenge to the 
                                                        
16 Richard Giragosyan, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Armenia”, 
Providing for Peacekeeping website, November 2015. 
17 Andrey Deviatkov, “Восточное партнерство ЕС: геополитика побеждает 
прагматику?”, Evrazia Expert, 19 June 2017  
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EU’s policy in its eastern neighbourhood. In the meantime, Brussels’ 
incomplete hegemony stems from the very limited nature of EU 
external projection, which puts a premium on norms, values, rules 
and institutions, and intentionally downplays the role of coercive 
instruments.  
One of the lessons of EaP implementation is that the EU failed 
to duly understand that elite groups in some post-Soviet countries 
rhetorically used pro-Europe/pro-democracy narratives for 
attaining three practical goals having very little to do with 
Europeanisation. First, in their role as EU political partners and 
promoters of EU-compatible agenda, they aimed at receiving 
immunity and impunity from criticism, if not a carte blanche, from 
the West for their actions. As Andreas Umland argues, the clan-like 
system in Ukraine reproduces itself under European slogans.18 
Second, many post-Soviet elites were eager to obtain palpable 
material advantages from the EU and its member states, including 
new funding. Third, they need EU backing for boosting their 
independence and autonomy – that might contravene EU’s ‘post-
sovereign’ approach – “in order to ease their dependence on 
Russia”.19 As seen from the elites’ perspective, this strategy was 
quite rational and effective in the short run. However, the long-run 
result was widespread disappointment in societies not only with 
local political elites due to multiple corruption charges, but also 
with the EU that supported these elites and turned a blind eye in the 
meantime on their wrongdoings. 
Evidence of the EU’s lack of institutional resources in 
projecting its normative power eastward is most apparent in recent 
changes in electoral laws in Armenia, Moldova and Georgia. 
Despite the dissimilar trajectories of these changes, none of them 
was aimed at improving the quality of democratic governance, but 
– as consensually understood by policy experts – at securing the 
                                                        
18 Andreas Umland, “Сегодня клановая система в Украине воспроизводит 
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216  INCOMPLETE HEGEMONIES, HYBRID NEIGHBOURS 
 
power base of the ruling elites.20 In the words of the EU’s official 
statement concerning the 2017 Moldovan changes in electoral rules, 
“we continue to share the view of the Venice Commission and the 
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights that the 
proposed changes raise serious concerns regarding effective 
democracy in the current political context”.21 Other political voices 
in Europe equally condemned the new Moldovan legislation.22 
Thus, it is hard to establish a solid and unambiguous 
connection between EU policies – including the visa-free decision23 
– and domestic transformation in Moldova. On a more general note 
one may say that the pro-EU enthusiasm of 2009, when the Alliance 
for European Integration came to power in Chisinau, transformed 
in a matter of a few years into disappointment and disillusionment 
that created a fertile ground for Russian interference. As observed 
by Moldovan interviewed in Chisinau: “The EU is viewed through 
the prism of allegedly pro-European politicians who monopolised 
the representation and interpretation of the idea of Europe… All 
these years since 2009 the EU tried to dissuade us from criticising 
the government formed upon the Alliance for European Integration, 
and convince us ‘to give them a chance’.” 
After the 2009 electoral success of the Alliance for European 
Integration, the EU aimed at “building Moldova into the success 
story” of Europeanisation, constantly praising the pro-EU 
government as effective and “European”. However, this didn’t 
prevent the society from huge disappointment with Europe, as 
expressed by another Moldovan interviewed: “This sounds 
unbelievable, but in the process of system transformation, the return 
to the previous system and subsequently a refusal to further pass on 
                                                        
20 “Change of Electoral Systems in EaP Countries: Bolstering Dictators or 
Causing Maidan”, Moldovan Politics, 29 June. 2017. 
21 Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn, “Statement by the HR/VP 
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23 Denis Cenusa, “Moldova after three years of visa-free regime with EU and 
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power is more probable.”24 Many Moldovan intellectuals 
themselves recognise that the country is getting more conservative 
and patriarchal, and its low living standards stimulate mass 
migration.25 Institutions of the state are subdued to practices 
emerging from the shadow, if not criminal, businesses that operate 
widely throughout the country (neutralisation of opponents, 
cleaning of political field, blackmail, money laundering through 
sophisticated financial schemes, etc.). Another hot point is the 
debate about amendments to the Moldovan legislation 
complicating the operational activity of local NGOs: “The proposed 
provisions are contrary to the AA between the Republic of Moldova 
and the EU, which encourages the involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders, including civil society organizations, in developing 
policies and reforms in the Republic of Moldova”.26 
Against this background there are strong voices arguing, in 
the words of one interviewee, that “power in Moldova has been 
captured by Vlad Plahotniuc, who is neither a democrat nor a 
reformer and who, under the cover of false pro-European rhetoric, 
is petrifying the weaknesses of the state”.27 Plahotniuc tried to 
pragmatically monopolise the pro-European flank of Moldovan 
politics, but by so doing he, as some analysts think, turns Moldova 
further away from European standards,28 which creates fertile 
ground for Russia.29 As a Russia-loyal journalist in Moldova 
mentioned in an interview, “the European vector was non-existent 
in Moldova… There are only business interests here, no ideologies 
                                                        
24 Pawel Kowal, “The Moldovan Gambit”, New Eastern Europe, N 4 (IX), 2013, p. 59. 
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at all” – a post-political milieu that is quite convenient from the 
vantage point of projecting Moscow’s interests. 
In Armenia, with all its dissimilarity from Moldova, the EU 
faces the same type of trouble attesting to the very limited nature of 
EU influence over domestic transformation. The shift from the semi-
presidential system, with elections part proportional 
representation/part first-past-the-post, to a parliamentary republic 
with a full proportional representation system, is widely assessed 
as a “reform from above”, and even as a “counter-revolutionary 
putsch from above aimed at creating a one-party state”.30 For 
example, the Armenian government received from the EU €7 
million for the purchase of special electronic equipment used during 
the parliamentary elections, yet afterwards refused to engage with 
the EU-initiated debate on the quality of the electoral process, 
accusing the EU envoy in Yerevan of interference in Armenia’s 
domestic affairs.31  
Brussels, however, has been obliged to adjust its policies to 
the new commitments and obligations undertaken by Yerevan after 
its refusal to sign the AA. In 2013 the Armenian government 
proposed a shorter version of this document as a compromise, but 
the EU initially rejected this text, insisting on an ‘either all or 
nothing’ principle. After that Brussels adopted a more flexible 
approach and agreed to renegotiate the agreement, which was 
ultimately signed in November 2017. 
Russia’s neighbourhood strategies 
Russia’s toolkit for dealing with its ‘near abroad’ looks more diverse 
than the EU’s. It includes two pillars – Eurasian integration and the 
idea of the Russian World, which embraces ethnic, religious and 
linguistic dimensions – that are absent in the case of the EU. Besides, 
as Russia’s support for military insurgency in eastern Ukraine made 
clear, the Russian World ideology might have a substantial military 
                                                        
30 Ingar Solty and Davit Stepanyan, “Post-democracy in Armenia? How the New 
Constitution will Depoliticize Armenian Society”, Open Democracy, 25 November 
2015. 
31 Nana Sahakian and Astghik Bedevian, “EU Envoy Rejects Criticism from 
Armenian Government”, 2017. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  219 
 
component – again, non-existent in the EU. Nevertheless, as many 
experts conclude, the overtly militarised imperial Realpolitik brings 
scant palpable results to Moscow.32  
Indeed, from the geopolitical perspective, Russia’s hegemony 
in the near abroad looks like a series of policy improvisations 
lacking any coherent or consistent design. The Kremlin vociferously 
proclaims the South Caucasus its sphere of interest, but in the 
meantime has withdrawn its military infrastructure from Adjara 
(Georgia) and Quabala (Azerbaijan). Moscow was fully aware of the 
negotiations that Viktor Yanukovych was conducting for years 
between its satellite Ukraine and the EU on the AA and DCFTA, but 
did nothing to clarify the way Russia understands its interests were 
being affected by this agreement. The same happened with 
Armenia: Russia abruptly reconsidered its de-facto disregard of 
Yerevan’s intention to use the EaP for qualitatively boosting 
relations with the EU, and at the very last moment started 
pressuring President Serzh Sargsyan to prevent the AA from 
materialising. Moreover, Moscow – despite its insistence on being 
taken seriously when it comes to post-Soviet neighbours – failed to 
capitalise on the EU’s readiness to conduct the trilateral EU-Russia-
Ukraine negotiations. Due to inadequately justified and artificially 
elevated demands from Moscow, the talks ultimately failed in 2015, 
and the trilateral format discredited itself, largely to Russia’s 
disadvantage. 
As a result of this chronic inconsistency, Russia is gradually 
losing influence in what it considers its ‘sphere of vital interests’. 
Paradoxically, Russia – whose government tends to see the world 
basically through a geopolitical prism – is in some respects 
outperformed by the EU, an actor that by no means perceives itself 
in geopolitical terms. The vulnerability and weakness of Russia’s 
policies to a large extent stem from its geopolitically self-defeating 
policy of aligning with secondary actors and simultaneously losing 
ground in its relations with more important ones. Geopolitically, 
relations with Georgia are more important than with Abkhazia and 
– moreover – South Ossetia; relations with Chisinau are more 
important than with Tiraspol or Komrat, and relations with Kyiv are 
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more important than with Donetsk or Luhansk. The same logic, by 
the way, can be applied to Russia’s European policies: Moscow in 
fact exchanged normal and stable working relations with power 
holders in France and Germany for directly identifying Russia’s 
interests with second-ranking (at best) anti-establishment forces. 
The priority given to often marginal and peripheral groups seems 
to be a major factor compromising Russia’s geopolitical positions in 
a wider Europe. As a result, Russia lacks an effective long-term 
strategy in its so-called near abroad. Russia can contribute to 
splitting societies along the pre-existing divisive lines (for example, 
in Moldova), but it can’t efficiently play a consolidating game, 
basically due to the lack of a strong normative appeal. 
The deficiency of Russia’s normative strategy became 
particularly evident in August 2008, when it recognised the two 
break-away Georgian territories. This political gesture was an 
abrupt departure from the previous strategy that Russia tried to 
implement within the global framework of its normative stance, 
which included two main pillars. First, Russia acted out of its 
consensually recognised status as the successor of the Soviet Union, 
which initially was interpreted in Moscow more from the viewpoint 
of Russia’s special responsibilities rather than extraordinary rights. 
In accordance with this logic, Russian troops in Georgian territory 
received international legitimacy as peacekeepers. Secondly, Russia 
consistently insisted on the inappropriateness of instigating 
independence movements and fuelling separatism within sovereign 
polities. In accordance with this logic, Moscow not only considered 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia legal parts of Georgia, but also 
imposed sanctions upon them. 
In August 2008, both pillars were either destroyed or 
significantly reconfigured. By applying military force, Russia first 
shifted its discourse from responsibilities to the right to intervene. 
Second, by recognising the separatist entities, the Kremlin forfeited 
its previously earned normative capital and the reputation as the 
most consistent advocate of the principle of territorial integrity of 
states. The trajectory that Moscow has chosen to follow has driven 
it from the principled non-recognition of break-away territories to 
recognition and then – in 2014 – to the annexation of Crimea where 
separatism was almost non-existent before Russia’s interference. 
Russia’s collective self, both national and imperial, started 
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symbolically appropriating territories beyond national borders. 
Crimea and Novorossiya are two recent examples of this proclivity to 
refer to neighbouring lands as allegedly central – if not constitutive 
– of Russia’s sense of identity. This possessive feeling, being a sign 
of a deep non-self-sufficiency, can be extended to the entire Ukraine, 
a country that many Russians consider as their subaltern, yet – 
paradoxically – in the meantime as an indispensable element of the 
proverbial Russian World.  
From a global geopolitical perspective, this devolution 
produced disastrous effects: from a member of the G8 and a 
strategic partner of both the EU and – even though only verbally – 
NATO, Russia turned into an object of harsh international criticism, 
economic and political sanctions, and found itself in a situation of 
political isolation vis-à-vis the West. It is this situation that Russia 
exploited to a full swing debunking the ‘European choice’ of its 
neighbours as a rhetorical cover for interest-based group policies of 
personal enrichment. Moreover, Russia entangled itself in a knot of 
unresolvable controversies: it wishes to de-legitimise the West from 
a normative perspective, but in the meantime is eager to legitimise 
its Ukraine policy among Western governments and opinion-
makers. 
A good example of the geopolitically dichotomist thinking is 
the following statement made by a Moscow-based policy analyst: 
“The crucial question is whether we consider Georgia completely 
lost for Russia and the Russian world. If this is the case, the best 
strategy would be to arrange a referendum on incorporation of 
South Ossetia into Russia and then to fend off with a well-equipped 
border against an inimical country. But if this is not the case, we 
should think of a strategy of extended dialogue with Georgia, 
keeping Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Russia’s allies”.33 The 
question is still pending.  
In Moldova, Russian policy has developed under the impact 
of two political failures. The first painful episode was the fiasco with 
the Kozak memorandum that was ready for signing but at the very 
last moment rejected by the President Vladimir Voronin under US 
pressure. The second episode of unsuccessful policy was the 
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mission of Sergey Naryshkin, who in December 2010 visited 
Chisinau in his capacity as the head of presidential administration. 
Naryshkin’s unofficial arrival was meant to create a left-centric 
coalition of the Communist Party and Democratic Party under 
Russian mediation.34 These two examples show Russia’s weakness 
as a mediator in political clashes in Moldova. Yet even in 
Transnistria, as some journalists suppose, “Russia in fact decides 
close to nothing. It preferred to detach itself from the development 
over there. The pro-Russian orientation in Transnistria is a matter of 
imagery. In the future it can re-orient to the EU, if needed”.35 For 
example, Russia did nothing to avoid conflict between the ‘Sherif’ 
group and Evgeniy Shevchuk in Tiraspol, preferred not to interfere 
and observed at a distance Shevchuk’s escape from Transnistria to 
Chisinau in June 2017. Even with a pro-Russian president as the 
head of state, Moscow can do little when Russian diplomats are 
expulsed from Chisinau, or the Moldovan Foreign Ministry 
declared Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin persona non grata. 
Therefore, Russia does not always meet the high political 
expectations of its clientele and effectively interfere.  
Many analysts refer to these shortcomings to make a case for 
the fragility of Russia’s hegemonic (im)positions in Moldova; some 
authors argue that Moscow lacks a policy of its own, instead is 
simply trying to fill the vacuum left by Brussels.36 My argument is 
different, however: Moscow has too many policies that might 
contradict and potentially block each other. 
Russia’s first policy boils down to ‘disciplining’ Moldova by 
creating impediments for bilateral cooperation (such as sanctions) 
and then lifting them as a political resource, thus investing in 
relations with loyal politicians (such as Igor Dodon) giving them a 
chance to publicly claim that they can deal with Moscow and tackle 
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the most controversial issues annoying Moldova. The two cases in 
point are restrictions imposed against Moldovan wine in the 
Russian market and complications for Moldovans working in 
Russia. The rise of Dodon as a political leader is illustrative of this 
type of policy: in his capacity as leader of the Socialist Party, prior 
to his presidency, he met in Moscow with the head of Russian 
Migration Service Konstantin Romadanovsky with whom he has 
settled the judicial issues concerning dozens of hundreds of 
Moldovans working illegally in Russia. By taking a permissive 
stand, Russia polished the political credentials of Dodon in 
Moldova and simultaneously tried to diminish the importance of 
the visa-free agreement with the EU by showing the attractiveness 
of the Russian labour market.37 Later Russia lifted its earlier 
reservations and agreed to accept Moldova’s participation in two 
free trade areas – but only when Dodon came to power in 
Chisinau.38 Moreover, Dodon received a chance to directly associate 
himself with Putin as a strong leader who was the only foreign head 
of state attending the May 9 military parade in Moscow in 2017.39 
Secondly, in communicating with Chisinau, Moscow plays 
the Eurasianist card, and does it in two different ways. It supported 
pro-Eurasianist sympathies in Transnistria and Gagauzia in 2014, 
implying a possible integration with the Russian-sponsored 
Eurasian Union.40 Another channel for Eurasianist ideas in Moldova 
is the activity of several Russian-affiliated organisations (such as the 
local branch of the Izborsk Club41) and individuals (such as Yuriy 
Roshka, the most active promoter of Alexander Dugin’s ideas in 
Moldova). The Eurasianist discourse as articulated by Dugin 
himself in Moldova is a hybrid appeal that contains both right-
wing/conservative and leftist ingredients. This Eurasianist blend of 
stereotypes and misperceptions includes statements that can be 
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easily disproven empirically – such as, in particular, the case of 
Dugin’s assertions that the EU completely disregards issues of social 
justice, or that the populations of Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are 
eager to leave the EU. But this discursive mixture has more 
consumers – and therefore more chances for circulation – in 
normatively de-politicised societies, which tend to be politically 
inert and insensitive to value-based narratives. Paradoxically, 
Dugin’s and Roshka’s appeals to “salvaging the souls” as the top 
policy priority for the “Eurasian alternative” might have some 
audience in post-political (even post-democratic) social and cultural 
environments, with disillusionment in the material benefits of 
European democracy and the search for an alternative illiberal 
identification. 
Positively assessing the operation of the Izborsk Club in 
Moldova, Roshka, a leading Moldovan Eurasianist, called for a 
hybrid trans-ideological consensus, based on two pillars that share 
anti-liberal views: “genuinely left and genuinely right/conservative 
intellectuals and politicians”. On the left side Roshka imagines 
issues of social justice and anti-colonial struggle against the US-
based oligarchic elite, while on the right-wing flank, he sees the 
accentuation of cultural and civilizational issues. In his account, 
Moldova can be a pilot project of a Russia-patronised “Eastern 
Civilization”.42 On a different account, he claimed that “there are no 
more left and right, only different shades of patriotism”.43 This 
makes the Eurasianist message sent to Moldova a hybrid of leftist 
resistance to capitalism (anti-oligarchic rhetoric and references to 
“people’s interests”) and civilizational conservatism/traditionalism 
(including anti-secularism and anti-nationalism). 
At this point, the most interesting is Dugin’s and Roshka’s 
insistence on “Moldovan-Romanian common cultural and 
philosophic legacy” as a basis for the national conservative revival 
(“We are interested in strengthening Moldovan and Romanian 
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identity as part of a single civilization.”44). This argument, first, 
contradicts the logic of supporters of federalisation in Moldova45 
based on the stimulation of anti-Moldovan and anti-Romanian 
discourse in Transnistria. Second, the premium placed by 
Eurasianists on the Moldovan-Romanian cultural, civilisational and 
religious unity does not sit well with the proponents of the Russian 
World in Moldova. In this sense the Russian World represents a 
separate policy (or a set of policies) aimed at culturally 
distinguishing Transnistria as an island of Russian language and 
culture endangered by the so-called Romanisation.46 Dodon’s 
openness to discuss a return to Cyrillic transcription of the 
Moldovan language47 in this context is not only a cultural, but a 
political gesture as well. 
Yet, of course, each of the policies briefly introduced above – 
the “Eurasian pathway” or the Russian World – is not only about 
narratives and public debates. Many Russian discourse-makers play 
more than one role in Moldova. For example, Alexey Martynov, 
Director of the Moscow-based International Institute of Newest 
States, who in 2015 was detained at the Chisinau airport and denied 
entry to Moldova, is known less as a specialist in policy analysis and 
more as a person close to authorities in Tiraspol, which explains the 
fact that he has been awarded a medal of honour in Tiraspol.48 In a 
similar way, the authorities in Chisinau banned Sergey 
Mokshantsev, Director of the local branch of the Russian Institute of 
Strategic Studies (RISI), from entering Moldova. His organisation 
has a strong reputation of being in close touch with the Russian 
government and intelligence community.49 RISI directly called 
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upon the Kremlin to recognise the independence of Transnistria.50 
It is telling that the opening of the RISI Center in Tiraspol was staged 
not as an academic, but rather as an openly political event attended 
by the head (bashkan) of Gagauzia Mikhail Formuzal, the head of 
Transnistrian government Tatiana Turanskaya and the Foreign 
Minister of the unrecognised republic Nina Shtansky, along with 
the Defence Minister Aleksandr Lukianenko, the archbishop of 
Tiraspol and Dubossary Savva, as well as representatives of social 
movements “Motherland – Eurasian Union” and “Our Serbia”.51 
The Priznanie (“Recognition”) Foundation funded by 
Moscow is another hybrid actor that serves more as a partisan 
platform for influencing public opinion and giving the floor to a 
wide range of Russia-friendly speakers – from the former President 
Vladimir Voronin52 to the former head of Transnistria Evgeniy 
Shevchuk – than as an independent unit.53 Priznanie operates as a 
testing ground for identifying the most promising Moldovan 
politicians worthy of support from Moscow, and in the meantime 
as a litmus test for their loyalty to Moscow.54 The foundation also 
pledged to support those Russian-language media in Moldova that 
face so-called discrimination,55 thus in practice investing its 
resources in one of the Russian World’s policy priorities.  
In Georgia, Russia uses a similar set of policies, relying on a 
local clientele group of Russian loyalists reproducing Putin’s 
discourse and customising it for local conditions.56 These tactics 
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include over-securitisation of the situation on the ground (for 
example, related to hyper-dramatisation of conflictual elements of 
relations with Turkey) and the propagation of Kremlin-compatible 
anti-Western narratives.57 Another important pillar of the Moscow-
translated discourse are the constant appeals to geopolitical 
pragmatism, as opposed to embracing EU-generated norms and 
values. In particular, using its support groups and individual 
speakers in Georgia, Moscow claims that Russia’s retreat from 
Georgia would automatically mean a fertile ground for Turkish 
expansion,58 and that NATO has much less to offer Georgia than 
Russia.59 Russia is portrayed as a friendly country where many 
Georgians in the past made their names and careers, which adds a 
strong nostalgic element to Russian propaganda.60 
Armenia in this context differs from Moldova and Georgia, 
since it has chosen to exchange its AA with the EU with the enforced 
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Nevertheless, with 
all institutional connections to Moscow, Armenian political debate 
includes issues questioning the efficacy of its pro-Eurasian turn: 
“Russia faces negative consequences of the fall of world oil prices, 
paralleled by Western sanctions, which led to the 39% drop of 
remittances from Armenians working in Russia, and to an 18% drop 
in export volumes. Therefore, the anticipated benefits of Armenia’s 
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union have not so far 
materialised.”61 Moreover, the April 2016 resumption of hostilities 
with Azerbaijan boosted the voices in the Armenian society who are 
doubtful of the expediency of security cooperation with Russia: “It 
was Aliev who received endless compliments and assurances in 
eternal friendship. No one considered appropriate to court Yerevan: 
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Armenia has no place to go anyway”.62 Thus, Russia’s role in the 
security sphere in Armenia is not undisputable.63 Armenia should 
not count on Russia too much as a key strategic ally, according to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan.64 He warned that 
“[n]ot only did Russia not come up with clear support towards 
Armenia, but high-level Russian officials including Deputy Prime 
Minister Rogozin made statements that Russia would continue to 
provide Azerbaijan with modern assault weaponry, part of which 
was actively used against Armenian forces during the four-day 
military escalation.”65 Some Armenian political analysts deem it 
dangerous to rely only on Russia, and call for diversification of 
foreign policy partners to include the EU and Iran.66 
As for the reverberations of the Russian World ideas in 
Armenia, the space for this policy is very limited, which became 
evident in the very critical reception given to a proposal made by 
the deputy head of the State Duma to introduce Russian as the 
second official language in Armenia.67 One Armenian politician 
dubbed as a “mental disorder” a suggestion by the Russian Minister 
of Education to use Cyrillic in all CIS countries,68 which attests to 
the strong resistance by the Armenian polity to attempts at 
Russification.  
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Options and scenarios 
Russia – supported by realist thinkers in the West – claims that the 
only alternative to spheres of influence would be continuing 
military conflicts in the whole post-Soviet area. Some authors deem 
that Russia’s legitimation of spheres of influence has already 
yielded fruit: “Allegedly, Russia has an indirect veto right on the 
EU’s and NATO’s expansion policy in its near abroad and no longer 
tolerates Western expansion in the former Soviet states.”69 Yet, as 
this paper has argued, it is the phenomenal hybridity of the post-
Soviet states and societies, along with hybrid forms of interaction 
and blurred lines of identification that make the practical 
implementation of spheres of influence and other realist schemes 
impossible. This is exactly what constitutes the most dramatic 
element of the whole story of post-Soviet transition: most of the 
post-Soviet countries as they exist nowadays can’t be smoothly 
integrated with either the EU or Russia. Both dominant actors are 
incapable and often hesitant to fully absorb or incorporate these 
countries, thus making their political trajectories even more 
complicated. The territorial division of a wider Europe into spheres 
of influences looks from the vantage point of this analysis 
impractical. The crux of the problem – pace John Mearsheimer – is 
not Western discord with Russia’s insistence on a new division 
within a wider Europe, but the impossibility of any form of 
territorial partitions and divisions in principle. The language of 
political realism – with Russia’s “orbits”, “doorsteps” and 
“backyards”, the revitalisation of the concept of ‘buffer state’ and 
the explicit ‘right-wrong’ distinction70 – is desperately obsolete, at 
least in this part of the world. The same goes for the advocacy of 
status-quo policy and the idea of ‘red lines’ as its conceptual 
substantiation.71 
Neither the EU’s ‘complete hegemony’ in the form of full 
membership for EaP states, nor Russia’s monopoly over its near 
abroad seems to be a feasible policy option. Equally unimaginable 
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is Russia’s open and unequivocal identification with the basic 
norms of Europeanisation. Under these circumstances, several other 
options can be discussed. 
Option 1 is the maintenance of the unsatisfactory status quo, 
with alternating cycles of the EU’s and Russia’s reactions to each 
other’s policies. Thus, NATO’s indecision at the Bucharest summit 
of April 2008 was perceived by Moscow as a sign of weakness that 
(indirectly) paved the way to Russia’s military operation against 
Georgia in August of that year. This war intensified the EU’s launch 
of the EaP, which a few years later led to Russia’s heavy pressure 
over Kyiv (and Yerevan). Consequently, the Euromaidan was a 
response to Ukraine’s (temporal) deviation from the European 
route, followed by the Russia-instigated anti-Maidan, the 
annexation of Crimea and EU sanctions against Russia. This 
scenario implies indirect communication through mutual reactions 
to the moves of each other: Russia and the EU in this case build their 
policies via constant reciprocal retaliations. 
This option is basically guided by the logic of Russia’s 
intransigent view of any forms of EU institutional presence in the 
post-Soviet space as “not just as contradicting (Moscow’s. – A.M.) 
interests, but as being bluntly anti-Russian… (which – A.M.) only 
increases Russia’s concerns about the EU’s ambitions and actions in 
the post-Soviet space, including through targeted EaP states. 
Despite the obvious scope for economic linkages, chances are low to 
see in the foreseeable future the post-Soviet space as a space of EU-
Russia cooperation. In the future, sharp competition and 
protectionism will determine economic relations between Russia 
and the EU in the post- Soviet space.”72 Under this narrative of 
confrontation, Russia will continue looking to debilitate the EU by 
supporting non-mainstream parties in Europe (mainly national 
conservative, but also leftist), thus attacking European unity and 
solidarity. Concomitantly, in its post-Soviet neighbourhood Russia 
will invest in relations with the most Eurosceptic and anti-European 
parties and groups.  
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In this situation, the EU might pursue a policy of ‘benign 
neglect’ of the Eurasian Economic Union, indirectly obliging Russia 
take ever greater commitments and obligations towards common 
neighbours, which ultimately might lead to a cul-de-sac and 
Moscow’s ‘imperial overstretch’. The EU might ultimately profit – 
though indirectly - from the vicious circle of financial 
responsibilities to its satellites that Moscow is already trapped in. 
Indeed, in the absence of functional and effective soft power, 
Moscow needs to offer purely material bonuses and advantages to 
its partners and interlocutors, which eventually might be 
burdensome to the Russian budget, if implementable at all. 
This scenario, however, still implies a danger of escalating the 
mutually containing moves and entanglements in an endless series 
of reactions and reciprocation. Therefore, the remaining scenarios 
will be grounded in a different logic that does not envisage 
immediate and direct ripostes to the other party’s policies, but 
rather, envisages positive interaction between Moscow and 
Brussels.  
Option 2 is a comeback to the trilateral format and direct talks 
on conditions and mechanisms of compatibility between 
implementation of EU-led and Russia-led integrative processes. 
Some political leaders in post-Soviet countries verbally support this 
option, yet so far, all attempts to coordinate the EU’s and Russia’s 
policies have failed whether in a bilateral format (the Meseberg 
memorandum on Transnistria signed by Russia and Germany in 
2010), in regional organisations or within ad-hoc trilateral working 
groups (such as the EU-Russia-Ukraine negotiations73) –. In the 
latter case, Russia’s strategy ultimately led to the discontinuation of 
tripartite talks, which demonstrated that Moscow didn’t care much 
about the future potential of this format and was not seriously 
interested to reproduce it in other situations (in Moldova or 
Armenia, for instance). Russia did stay in touch with its EU partners 
over coordinating their policies in Eastern Europe, yet this 
cooperation had clear limits, mostly set by the Russian side. Perhaps 
the continuing EU-Russia consultations on the Western Balkans in 
the context of EU enlargement can serve as a potentially better 
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example that can be replicated in the common neighbourhood as 
well.74 
Yet, even without formal negotiations, there is still some – 
although modest in scope – space for compromises. For example, 
Moscow de facto accepted the perspective of a parallel functioning 
of different “norms of technical regulations” in Moldova, and 
reduced its demand to Chisinau to abstain from introducing 
discriminatory measures against Russian agricultural producers 
and the exchange of customs information.75 In the security sphere – 
when it comes to Donbas, Transnistria or Nagorno Karabakh – 
Russia and the involved EU member states are in direct touch with 
each other, which might be regarded as a specific form of a 
multilateral format. 
Option 3 can be titled the “Kazakhstan-Armenia model” in 
the sense that these Russia-loyal countries have signed – apparently 
without open conflicts with Moscow – cooperation agreements with 
the EU, which however are consistent with their previous 
commitments vis-á-vis the Eurasian Economic Union. Following 
Armenia’s example, Belarus also started to talk about a new format 
of relations with the EU. “Signing an agreement on partnership and 
cooperation is a matter of a short-term perspective”, said the 
Foreign Minister of Belarus Vladimir Makey.76 And Azerbaijan too 
in early 2017 resumed negotiations with the EU on a new 
partnership agreement.77  
Kazakhstan was the first post-Soviet country to move in the 
direction of balancing its Eurasian commitments with strengthening 
the EU vector. Luc Devigne, Deputy Managing Director for Europe 
and Central Asia in the European External Action Service, 
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mentioned that “the EU’s relationship with Kazakhstan has never 
been any stronger or any better”.78 This success story is grounded 
in a carefully crafted policy of the government of Kazakhstan to 
create a positive image of this country in the West not only as a 
stable partner of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also 
as a modernising economy open to foreign markets. The 
Kazakhstani government used a variety of tools to create a basis for 
its acceptance in Europe as a Central Asian leader and to lobby for 
boosting investments and technology transfer from the EU and 
particularly from Germany. The Eurasian Club in Berlin and 
Eurasian Council on Foreign Affairs were instrumental in 
advertising and promoting Kazakhstan in the EU. Given Central 
Asia’s interest in the EU, the examples of Kazakhstan and Armenia 
potentially might be replicated, for instance, by Kyrgyzstan which 
also looks for its own balancing mechanisms when it comes to 
relations with major foreign actors. 
The 2017 Armenia-EU agreement on enhanced partnership 
(CEPA) was almost consensually characterised as a “win-win” 
compromise suitable to Yerevan, Moscow and Brussels. Russia’s 
mainstream discourse looks quite constructive as well: it not only 
accepts the very idea of ‘external diversification’ preventing the 
reduction of foreign policies “to a diametric choice between Russia 
and the West, or a competition of value systems”, but also praised 
Armenia for “becoming a space for dialogue between Russia and 
the EU” that rejects an “either/or” approach to integration, and 
moves both Moscow and Brussels in a “both/and” direction.79 
Within this discourse Armenia can be portrayed as a country that 
“now achieved what Ukraine and Georgia could not: the benefits of 
both EEU and EU integration”.80 
In the Armenian discourse on the CEPA agreement, the key 
words are “geopolitical pragmatism”, “manoeuvring” and 
“realism”, although many voices in Armenia celebrated the 
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agreement as a further drift away from Russia’s patronage81 and as 
an alternative – rather than a supplement – to the EAEU. CEPA – 
apart from its institutional effects – became a turning point for 
legitimising a Russia-sceptic discourse grounded in a number of 
arguments replicable beyond Armenia. Russia is treated as an 
internationally sanctioned country, which prevents it from 
investing in partners’ economies and offering reduced gas prices, 
notwithstanding earlier promises. It is a mainstream point in 
Armenian discourse that the country primarily needs what Russia 
can’t supply – modernisation, structural reforms and anti-
corruption measures. Due to new customs duties, Armenia’s trade 
with Georgia and Iran is tending to decrease, weakening trans-
border cooperation. Armenian experts openly complain about the 
lack of any Russian assistance in the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh; moreover, Russia is accused of selling arms to 
Azerbaijan, which, as seen from Armenia, leads to further 
militarisation of the region and contradicts Russia’s role in the 
Minsk Group. Apart from that, Moscow is widely seen as an 
inefficient soft power, with a poor record of successful cultural and 
humanitarian projects.82 As one can see, the list of claims toward 
Russia is quite long, and CEPA became an important point for 
articulating a strategic alternative to the status of Yerevan as 
Moscow’s satellite, with possible spill-over effects in other Russia-
dependent countries. 
Option 4 would be the launch of a process of EU’s recognition 
of the Eurasian Economic Union as a legitimate interlocutor (at 
least) and (perhaps in the long-run prospect) an economic partner. 
This scenario, as it is discussed nowadays, looks feasible under two 
conditions. The first one is de-politicization of the whole spectrum 
of European relations from both sides, which in particular implies 
the bracketing out of the Russia-Ukraine military conflict from the 
political agenda. Secondly, this option requires the recycling of the 
old doctrine of “engaging Russia” – in fact, a new edition of Wandel 
durch Handel that unfortunately didn’t work earlier. 
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Nevertheless, this option has many proponents in Europe. For 
example, the recent Friedrich Ebert Stiftung report claimed that the 
EU “perhaps had gone too far in its actions and failed to consult 
with Russia on an equal basis. Instead, the EU presented Russia with 
a fait accompli… (Therefore. – A.M.) the EU should involve Russia 
as a neighbour with its own interests in negotiations about a vision 
for this region’s future… Russia’s interests in the region are to be 
recognized and taken seriously”.83 This approach is similar to 
multiple voices coming from Moscow: “The Ukrainian crisis shows 
that there is an urgent need to identify viable and acceptable-to-all 
strategies for economic integration across the triangle EU-EaP-
EAEU… The “Lisbon to Vladivostok” working group of the 
German business is regularly conducting meetings with the 
Chambers of Commerce of Poland and Ukraine to convince them to 
support deepened cooperation between the EU and the EAEU”.84  
Support for this policy of rapprochement, however, is based 
on empirically questionable premises: “Recently, Russian 
leadership has been sending clear signals that it is committed to 
economic transformation and seeks to diversify and reform the rent-
dependent and corruption-ridden economy… In the long run, 
economic liberalization and convergence (or at least closer 
cooperation) with the EU may also promote political 
liberalization”.85 Apparently, the demand for modernisation and 
structural reforms is much more articulated in Armenia or 
Kazakhstan than in Russia. What is even more important is that 
option 4 is not easy to imagine, unless there were some de facto slide 
towards the 'Transnistrianisation' of the region of Donbas, signalled 
by a true cease fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons and safe opening 
for cross-border movement of people and trade.86 
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Arguably, the rationale for a potential policy change towards 
EAEU should be related not to “engaging Russia” (time and again), 
but in stimulating alternative visions of regionalism that 
hypothetically can counter-balance Russia’s predominance and 
prevent the Russia-centric bias in this organization. In this respect 
Kazakhstan plays the pivotal role. In particular, “Kazakhstani 
Eurasianism does not view itself as a geopolitical space distinct from 
both Europe and Asia, but as embodying the positive meeting space 
between Europe and Asia, drawing on both”.87 In cultural sphere 
Kazakhstan has declared the transformation of its alphabet into 
Latin graphics, thus clearly distancing from the idea of Russian 
World to which the Kremlin strongly committed itself. 
Against this backdrop, option 4 makes sense basically as a 
policy of establishing some kind of working relations with EAEU 
with a premium put on the role of Kazakhstan, as mainly Brussels’ 
deal with Astana rather than with Moscow. The choice of 
Kazakhstan as EU’s main Eurasian interlocutor might be duly 
appreciated by Astana and supported by analytical and expert 
resources of such organizations as Eurasian Club and Eurasian 
Council on Foreign Affairs. In the meantime this type of policy 
would imply that the EU is more sympathetic with the Kazakhstani 
vision of Eurasianism rather than with its Russian (more 
imperialist) version, which appears to be only logical in the 
circumstances of Russia’s detachment from most of the policy tracks 
earlier developed in conjunction with the EU. Unlike Russia, 
Kazakhstan never downgraded the importance of modernization 
and economic openness88 as structural conditions of its 
engagements with Europe, and pursued a security policy – with de-
nuclearisation at its core89 – its Western partners find responsible 
and contributing to peace and stability. 
Option 5 seems to be the most complicated one. It implies that 
the EU and Russia would refuse to compete with each other over 
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establishing control of specific territories, and try to find more 
innovative non-territorial (or trans-territorial) forms of responsible 
influence over their common neighbours. This scenario requires 
functional division of areas of interest and responsibility between 
the two dominant actors. More specifically, this option would 
necessitate decoupling security affairs (where Russia might play the 
first fiddle) from economic integration (where the EU might become 
the engine), and multilateral policies aimed at avoiding clashes 
between the two.  
Of course, option 5 looks unrealistic without a mutual 
structural adjustment of EU’s and Russia’s policies in economic and 
security spheres. It also seems to be unfeasible in situations when 
Moscow wouldn’t accept the EU as the most attractive economic 
and normative model for most of the common neighbours. In the 
meantime, the chances for this scenario would increase with the 
stronger commitment of Russia’s neighbours to a neutral status, 
along the lines of Finnish, Swedish or Swiss non-bloc security 
policies, which would debunk Moscow’s obsession with the alleged 
threats triggered by a hypothetical NATO enlargement. 
Potentially – in the long run – this scenario might lead to more 
sophisticated networking relations of engagement and 
communication in the post-Soviet space. As Clifford Kupchan 
posits, “the time for formal association mechanisms that clearly 
define which countries are ‘in’ or ‘out’ of a given regional grouping 
has passed. Today, strategies such as China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) that allow states to flexibly join parts of an initiative 
without necessarily committing to it irreversibly, foregoing 
competing offers, or integrating all aspects of their socio-political 
life have the upper hand”.90 Should this model be considered as 
beneficial for the EaP, it might open new chances for EU’s other 
engagements in the East, including Central Asia and China. 
Of course, some of these options may overlap and form more 
intricate policy combinations. The Kazakhstan–Armenia model 
might in due course boost chances for an EU-EAEU deal, which 
could bring Eurasia-loyalists more in line with EU economic rules 
and technical standards without politically antagonising Moscow. 
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Moreover, at certain point there might be chances to balance the EU-
centrism of a (still potential) wider European economic area by the 
important roles that Turkey and the post-Brexit UK can play in its 
reification, which might correspond to Russia’s vision of a 
multipolar Europe without damaging EU’s positions.  
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7. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE IN THE BALKANS 
VS EASTERN EUROPE  
MICHAEL EMERSON & GERGANA NOUTCHEVA 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to compare the 
quality of governance of the non-
EU member states of the Western 
Balkans (hereafter known simply 
as the Balkans) and of Eastern 
Europe, namely Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine, which share 
Association Agreements with the 
EU, including Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(hereafter the ‘DCFTA states’). 
Both groups of states aspire to full 
membership of the EU. While the 
EU differentiates between the two 
groups, acknowledging the 
‘European [i.e. EU membership] perspectives’ of the former, but not 
of the latter, the commitments to adopt or approximate to EU law 
and policies made by both groups have much in common. This 
makes comparisons between the Balkans and the DCFTA states 
both feasible and politically significant.  
These comparisons are facilitated by numerous sources, 
qualitative assessments and formal rankings or ratings. Particular 
use is made of two sources: on the one hand the regular annual 
reports on the Balkans and Turkey prepared by the EU institutions, 
and on the other the three ‘Handbooks’ on Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine published by CEPS and its partners (see list of references). 
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Overall, these assessments reveal that the political and 
economic governance in the two groups is comparable, even when 
taking into account the wide range of ratings seen within each of the 
two groups between their respective states.  
Concretely, the EU has now established what independent 
observers can recognise as a three-tier graduation of  accession 
prospects for the Balkans and Turkey. In February 2018,  the 
European Commission proposed that 2025 be viewed as a feasible 
accession date for Serbia and Montenegro, which signalled these 
two countries as the Balkan front-runners, or tier one, even if the EU 
Council has not endorsed this date. A second tier was estabished by 
the Council in June 2018, when 2019 was signalled as a possible, 
conditional date for opening accession negotiations with Albania 
and Macedonia. The third tier then consists of Bosnia and Kosovo, 
which have no dated prospects, and Turkey, whose negotations are 
deemed to be at a standstill. By comparison, combining both 
political and economic indicators, Georgia is comparable but 
slightly more advanced than the Balkan tier-one states,  while 
Moldova and Ukraine are roughly comparable to the Balkan tier-
two states, and ahead of the tier-three states. This is the broad 
picture, which is of evident political significance, although there is 
room for debate about the many indicators used in this paper, 
justifying more nuance in finer-grained conclusions. 
The overall picture calls into question the objectivity of the EU 
in extending membership perspectives to the Balkans as a group, 
while denying it to the DCFTA states as a group. It also calls for a 
more careful consideration of the common assumption that the 
incentive of membership determines the effectiveness of reform 
processes and the extent of convergence of these neighbouring 
states on EU values and laws. It further questions the pertinence of 
the EU’s neighbourhood policy which, it has been argued, has 
become obsolete.1 At the end of this chapter, we develop three 
options for how the EU might respond to this state of affairs. 
                                                        
1 See Steven Blockmans, The Obsolescence of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2017. 
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Political governance 
The political geography of the EU’s immediate vicinity features 
three groups of countries that in official EU doctrine differ with 
regard to their EU integration prospects. The Balkans are by far the 
most privileged group that received the conditional promise of EU 
membership as early as 2000. Three of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, but not Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Belarus) come next, having taken up the EU’s offer 
of deep and comprehensive free trade and close political 
association, which nevertheless falls short of full EU membership. 
The countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are 
in third place with a lower likelihood of achieving as advanced a 
degree of EU integration as the eastern neighbours, owing to 
various domestic and regional obstacles, or lack of interest on the 
part of the countries concerned.  
The EaP neighbours are thus in a middle category, but are 
themselves now split between countries that harbour EU accession 
aspirations and have signed advanced association agreements with 
the EU, and those unwilling or unable to undertake such close 
contractual commitments with the EU. The EaP countries are also 
‘European’ states, which if democratic are eligible to apply for full 
EU membership according to Article 49 of the Treaty, unlike the 
southern neighbours.   
The EU membership perspective has been considered the 
strongest external driver of domestic political change in countries 
surrounding the EU. Scholars have argued that the quality of 
democratic governance in the wider neighbourhood strongly 
correlates with the strength of the incentives offered by Brussels 
(Boerzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017). Countries that enjoy a credible 
prospect of EU accession experience more sweeping democratic 
change. It has been argued that countries that have association and 
partnership agreements with the EU are not undergoing the same 
degree and pace of democratic improvement as the EU accession 
candidates (Boerzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017). These arguments 
now seem to warrant some qualification, however.  
A closer look at the political governance map of the EU’s 
neighbourhood in 2018 reveals a much more plural environment; 
one that defies both the regional divisions drawn by the EU’s official 
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enlargement and neighbourhood policies and scholarly 
expectations that the EU membership prospect generates political 
change unequivocally. A key point here has to be the credibility of 
the membership perspective. Almost two decades after the EU 
extended the membership prospect to the Balkans, accession is still 
not in sight, even for the front-runners of the region. After more 
than a decade since the EU launched the ENP, the political realities 
are quite mixed, with frontrunners and less advanced states in each 
region challenging attempts at regional stereotyping – see Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Democracy scores in the EU neighbourhood 
 
Note: These results are broadly consistent with those from another frequently 
quoted source, Freedom House.  
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Democracy Status. 
One of the most pronounced tendencies is the steady decline 
in political governance standards in all the countries to which the 
EU has extended a membership perspective. Turkey’s democratic 
backsliding is the most spectacular, but the Balkan accession 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Albania 7.25 7.5 7.55 7.25 6.7 6.95 7.1
Croatia 9.1 8.85 8.5 8.4 8.45 8.4 8.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.35 6.3 6.1
Kosovo 6.95 6.7 6.6 6.65 6.5
Macedonia 7.55 7.75 7.95 7.6 7.2 6.65 6.5
Montenegro 7.4 7.85 7.8 7.6 7.9 7.85 7.6
Serbia 7.4 7.75 8 8.05 7.95 7.85 7.7
Western Balkans 7.58 7.73 7.61 7.43 7.31 7.24 7.13
Turkey 7.05 7.05 7.65 7.65 7.55 7.25 5.6
Armenia 5.2 6 4.92 5.25 5.35 5.23 5.1
Azerbaijan 3.8 3.8 3.92 4.02 3.92 3.48 3.4
Belarus 3.97 3.93 4.08 3.93 3.93 3.93 4.3
Georgia 6.1 6.85 6.05 6.15 6.5 6.7 6.8
Moldova 5.4 6.85 6.65 7.05 7.15 6.7 6.2
Ukraine 7.1 7.35 7 6.1 6.1 6.75 6.9
Eastern neighbourhood 5.26 5.80 5.44 5.42 5.49 5.47 5.45
Algeria 4.23 4.27 4.37 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.8
Egypt 4.12 4.4 4.22 4.08 4.92 3.93 3.7
Jordan 4.1 3.98 4.02 3.92 4.1 4.03 4.4
Lebanon 5.6 6.25 6.25 6.15 6 5.7 4.9
Libya 3 2.98 3.2 3.1 4.13 2.38 2.6
Morocco 4.48 4.4 4.05 3.9 4 3.83 3.8
Syria 3 2.6 3.23 3.18 2.03 1.7 1.8
Tunisia 3.83 3.95 3.78 3.85 5.8 6.3 6.5
Southern neighbourhood 4.05 4.10 4.14 4.06 4.47 4.08 4.06
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candidates also appear to be profoundly affected by a democratic 
malaise that promises to prolong if not completely derail their EU 
membership trajectory. The frontrunners in the region by political 
criteria – Serbia and Montenegro – are not spared the regional trend, 
even though their decline is less steep compared to the other Balkan 
states, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. 
Very recent developments in Macedonia suggest an improvement 
in political governance, which remains to be confirmed in new data. 
Against this negative trend, the recent democratic gains 
among the EaP frontrunners between 2012 and 2016 may be 
puzzling for scholars. However, these were years when the DCFTA 
agreements were being concluded, and this was an incentive that 
carried some weight. The three DCFTA countries – Georgia, 
Ukraine and Moldova – have not only improved the quality of their 
democratic governance in that period but have also caught up and 
overtaken the Balkan laggards. They have also widened the gap 
between frontrunners and less advanced states within the EaP 
group and have effectively detached themselves from the other 
eastern neighbours. Of the non-DCFTA countries, Azerbaijan and 
Belarus have remained authoritarian regimes, on a par with the 
average of the southern neighbourhood throughout the last decade. 
Only Armenia saw a new burst of democratic activism, in April 
2018. 
The relatively positive quality of democracy in the DCFTA 
countries is impressive against the background of general 
authoritarianism in the EU’s borderlands and heightened 
geopolitical tensions in the eastern neighbourhood during this 
period. Not only has Russia sought to actively derail these 
countries’ pro-Western trajectories by imposing costs on their pro-
EU policies, but EU-Russian relations have also taken a distinctly 
antagonistic turn with the mutual imposition of quid-pro-quo 
sanctions and a return to open confrontation over various crises in 
the common neighbourhood.   
One of the main manifestations of poor governance across the 
wider neighbourhood has been widespread corruption and 
impunity for officeholders. Weak rule of law and inefficient law 
enforcement institutions have been commonplace in nearly all 
neighbouring states and have allowed incumbents to act with 
impunity while in office. Control of corruption has thus proven 
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difficult, yet the evidence from both regions shows that Georgia 
distinguishes itself not only from its DCFTA partners, but also from 
all the Balkan states, including even the Balkan EU member states, 
by achieving ratings closer to the average of OECD and EU 
countries. On the other hand, Moldova and Ukraine are ranked 
below the least performing Balkan states on this count (see Tables 
7.2 and 7.3 with consistent findings from two different sources). 
Table 7.2 Corruption rankings out of 180 countries worldwide, 2017 
Croatia 57 
Bulgaria 71 
  
Montenegro 64 
Serbia 77 
Kosovo 85 
Bosnia 91 
Albania 91 
Macedonia 107 
  
Turkey 81 
  
Georgia 46 
Moldova 122 
Ukraine 130 
Source: Transparency International. 
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Table 7.3 World Bank’s Enterprise Survey – corruption ratings 
 Bribery 
incidents1 
Bribery 
depth2 
Gifts to tax 
officials 3 
Gifts for 
government 
contracts4 
Gifts for 
construction 
contracts5 
Gifts to 
officials 6 
Corruption 
constraint 7 
OECD 2 1 1 11 2 8 11 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 6 28 17 n.a. n.a. 
Serbia n.a. n.a. 7 40 16 n.a. n.a. 
Albania n.a. n.a. 18 34 38 n.a. n.a. 
East-Central Europe 17 14 13 26 25 20 22 
Georgia 2 1 0 1 12 2 3 
Moldova 31 22 14 11 49 16 38 
Ukraine 50 45 50 99 73 73 38 
1 Bribery incidence - % of firms experiencing at least one bribe request. 2 Bribery depth - % of public transactions where bribe requested. 
3 % of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials . 4 % of firms expected to give gifts to secure government contracts. 
5 % of firms expected to give gifts to get a construction contract.  6 % of firms expected to give gifts to public officials to get things done. 
7 % of firms identify corruption as a major constraint. 
Source: OECD (2016), based on WB Enterprise Surveys conducted in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2013. 
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A similar but somewhat different picture emerges from rule 
of law rankings in Table 7.4. Here again, Georgia is way ahead of all 
the Western Balkan states and ranks among the EU member states 
of the Balkan region (similar to Croatia, and much better than 
Bulgaria). The two other DCFTA states, Moldova and Ukraine, are 
ranked close to Serbia, which on this count, however, is not the 
regional front-runner.  
Table 7.4 Rule of law rankings 
Croatia 35 
Bulgaria 55 
  
Montenegro - 
Serbia 76 
Kosovo - 
Bosnia 56 
Albania 68 
Macedonia 57 
  
Turkey  101 
  
Georgia 38 
Moldova 78 
Ukraine 77 
Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018. 
These developments challenge the dominant assumption in 
policy circles and academia alike that a credible EU membership 
perspective consistently generates a domestic environment 
conducive to democratic change. The EU accession prospect has not 
spurred a robust democratisation dynamic in the Western Balkan 
countries, which after initial gains on political rights and civil 
liberties in the early 2000s have regressed over the last decade in 
every aspect of democracy. The reasons for that are well known. On 
the EU side, interest in the stability of the region has trumped 
concerns about growing authoritarian tendencies there (BiEPAG, 
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2017; Richter, 2012). Most of the EU’s accession leverage has gone 
on pressuring Balkan strongmen to deliver on security by de-
escalating latent conflicts and moving towards a normalisation of 
neighbourly relations (Vachudova, 2014) and cooperating with EU 
governments on migration and counter-terrorism issues (Bechev, 
2016). Thus, Brussels has insisted on advances in the normalisation 
of relations between Belgrade and Pristina in the framework of EU-
facilitated High-Level Dialogue between the two parties, putting 
aside questions of democracy and rule of law. Similarly, the 
cooperation of the Balkan governments was instrumental for the 
closure of the so-called Balkan migrant route in 2016, thus bolstering 
EU border security and avoiding criticism of domestic political 
governance issues.   
As a result, democratic backsliding in the region has gone 
unchecked, leaving local leaders to get away with deteriorating 
media freedom, political control over nominally independent 
institutions and extreme forms of political graft. In other words, the 
EU has not consistently applied political pressure to sanction 
democratic regression in the region but has sent the wrong signal to 
a Balkan political elite only too ready to cling to power and enjoy 
the spoils of public office (Pomorska and Noutcheva, 2017). 
Domestic political actors in the region have used the space offered 
by the EU’s hesitation in applying negative democratic 
conditionality to block or reverse democratic reform.   
On the domestic side, there has been no consistent, robust 
societal push to dislodge vested interests in the status quo, even 
though sporadic societal protests have occasionally voiced the 
public’s discontent with the ruling political class. On the whole, 
Balkan societies have been too preoccupied with economic survival 
and closing the wounds of the 1990s conflicts to resist the capture of 
state resources by predatory elites. Furthermore, the EU’s 
democratic credentials have suffered as a result of democratic 
challenges within the EU. Hungary and Poland’s democratic 
backsliding and the EU’s reluctance to stand up for its fundamental 
political values has shaken the image of the EU as a democracy 
promoter abroad.  
The experience of the three DCFTA countries, however, 
suggests that a particular constellation of domestic and regional 
factors can enable a push for democracy from within in the absence 
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of a strong external ‘carrot’, even though the process can be fragile 
and subject to reversal as the democracy data for the last two years 
indicates – see Figure 7.1. The motivation to proceed on the 
democracy path in the three DCFTA countries, notwithstanding the 
weak EU incentives and strong Russian disincentives, is linked to a 
combination of elite calculations and societal values. At the elite 
level, the determination to break free from Russia’s sphere of 
influence is amplified by Russia’s aggressive strategy in its ‘near 
abroad’. The more Russia multiplies attacks on the statehood and 
sovereign rights of these countries to determine their future path, 
the greater the resolve of these states’ leadership to pursue a 
rapprochement with the EU, which goes with embracing EU values 
(Delcour and Wolczuk, 2015). A similar dynamic can be observed at 
societal level. In countries such as Georgia and Ukraine – both of 
which have been the targets of Russian military aggression, societal 
orientations have turned decidedly away from Russia and in favour 
of the EU and its softer ways of pursuing the political and economic 
transformation of the region (Shevel, 2014; Popescu, 2018). Russia 
has thus had an indirect and unintended positive effect on the 
democratisation dynamics of the DCFTA countries.  
In general, the EU is seen slightly more positively in the 
eastern neighbourhood (44%) than in the Western Balkans (42%) 
even though Kosovo (90%) and Albania (81%) are individually the 
most convinced EU-enthusiasts – see Figure 7.2. The majority of 
citizens in Georgia (59%) and Macedonia (54%) also view the EU 
favourably. The most negative perceptions of the EU, however, are 
paradoxically registered in the Balkan frontrunners, Serbia and 
Montenegro, where as many as 30 and 22 percent of the population 
respectively sees the EU in a negative light. Collectively, the EU has 
a negative image among more citizens of the Balkans (19%) than of 
the eastern neighbourhood (13%). In both regions, younger cohorts, 
more educated people and people with higher social status tend to 
view the EU more positively. In the Balkans, EU membership is 
most often associated with freedom to study and work in the EU 
(35%), economic prosperity (31%) and freedom to travel (30%) 
(Balkan Barometer 2017). In the EaP countries, the EU is clearly 
associated with the political values it stands for, in particular human 
rights (77%), rule of law (74%); freedom of speech (74%), democracy 
(70%), freedom of religion (72%), respect for other cultures and 
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minorities (67%), freedom of the media (73%) (EU Neighbours East, 
2017). Importantly, in the EaP region where the EU is not the only 
integration alternative, the EU is seen as a more attractive and 
trustworthy integration project compared to the Russia-led 
Eurasian Economic Union, even among the members of the latter – 
see Figure 7.3.  
Figure 7.1 Political governance in the Western Balkans and the European 
neighbourhood 
 
Notes: Rating on a scale of one (the lowest value) to 10 (the highest value).  
Western Balkans: Croatia and all candidate and potential candidate countries 
from the region. Kosovo is included with a separate rating as of 2010 onwards. 
WB frontrunners: Serbia and Montenegro. 
WB other: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Kosovo 
is included with a separate rating as of 2010 onwards. 
DCFTA countries: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova. 
Non-DCFTA countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus.  
Southern Neighbourhood: Israel and Palestine are not included in the average 
score.  
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Democracy Status. 
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Figure 7.2 The EU’s image in the Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood, 
2017 
 
Note: Question posed to Balkan citizens: “Do you think that EU membership 
would be (is, for Croatia) a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” 
Question asked to EaP citizens: “Do you have a very positive, fairly positive, 
neutral, fairly negative or very negative image of the European Union?” 
Sources: Data on the Balkans – Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey, 
Regional Cooperation Council, 2017. 
Data on the EaP countries – EU Neighbours East, Annual Survey Report: 
Regional Overview, June 2017. 
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Figure 7.3 Trust in the EU and the EEU in the EaP countries, 2017 
 
Note: Percentages of citizens polled. 
Source: EU Neighbours East, Annual Survey Report: Regional Overview, June 
2017. 
Overall, it can be said that high quality democracy has not 
taken root anywhere in the two regions where democratic 
breakthroughs are frequently followed by democratic reversals. The 
political changes are particularly worrying across all the Balkan 
countries but are less discouraging in the DCFTA countries. The aim 
to anchor the political trajectories of the Balkan accession candidates 
to the EU comes as the region is edging closer to authoritarianism; 
the challenges to political reform are thus formidable. Political 
improvements in the eastern neighbourhood are fragile and have 
occurred in a less favourable geopolitical climate, so they are no less 
worthy of EU support and encouragement. The moment is thus ripe 
for the EU to live up to its international reputation of democracy 
supporter and make a difference where only it can do so. 
Economic development and governance 
GDP per capita. The gap in GDP per capita between the Balkan 
economies and the DCFTA economies on the one hand and those of 
the EU member states on the other is substantial. The present 
situation is that the average GDP per capita, PPP-adjusted, of the 
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Balkan states is roughly one-third of the EU 28 average, whereas for 
the DCFTA economies it is roughly one-fifth.  
A key issue for comparison is how far the countries of these 
regions have progressed in converging to European levels of 
economic performance since the end of the communist period in or 
around 1990. Over the period 1990 to 2016 the EU28’s average grew 
2.6 times. Convergence for the non-EU economies means therefore 
increasing GDP per capita faster than this reference (see Table 7.5). 
While data is not available for all economies, it is observed that 
Albania and Turkey both scored significant catch-up progress, 
whereas Macedonia and Belarus were roughly stable on this 
account.  
The DCFTA states performed poorly by comparison. There 
will have been many political and economic reasons for this. One 
factor stands out, however, namely the relative severity of the post-
Soviet versus post-Yugoslavia economic shocks. While Yugoslavia 
considered itself in political terms to be ‘communist’ until its 
disintegration, in reality it had long been experimenting with 
elements of market economics. Liberalising reforms had already 
been at work. The immediate post-Yugoslav reality was not one of 
systemic economic collapse as in the case of the post-Soviet states.  
The economic losses of the 1990s were thus less, although both 
regions had to suffer the costs of wars that followed political 
disintegration. 
All three DCFTA states suffered deep economic losses 
immediately after independence.  Ukraine especially has fallen 
behind compared to the EU and other CIS states (but several of the 
latter enjoyed petro-state advantages). The poor performance of 
Ukraine would seem to be explained by an accumulation of factors. 
Its industrial structure was most vulnerable to the break-up of the 
Soviet economy, with many crucial supply chain linkages to 
Russian industry eroded from the onset of independence, and 
finally destroyed with the conflict that started in 2014. In addition, 
Ukraine suffered extremely poor economic governance and denial 
of reform measures at least until the first Maidan of 2006. But 
serious economic reforms did not really begin until after the second 
Maidan of 2014, and even these have so far been incomplete, while 
corruption remains rampant.   
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Georgia and Moldova also suffered deep economic losses. In 
Georgia it was not until 2006 that a radical reformist agenda was 
adopted, and has been broadly sustained since. As a result Georgia 
has the highest GDP per capita of the three DCFTA states, but this 
only puts it on a par with the weakest of the Balkans. As for 
Moldova, a strong pro-European reform agenda was adopted over 
the past decade, but this has tended to be much less strong in 
practice than political pronouncements, and the economy remains 
the poorest in Europe by a significant margin.  
For all three DCFTA states the present situation signals a huge 
underperformance of their economies.  
Table 7.5 GDP per capita, ppp, 1990 and 2016 ($) 
Balkans 1990 2016 DCFTAs 1990 2016 
Albania 2,722 11,540 Georgia 5,174 10,004 
Bosnia n.a. 12,172 Moldova n.a. 5,332 
Kosovo n.a. 10,063 Ukraine 6,763 8,269 
Macedonia 5,256 14,492 DCFTA average  7,868 
Montenegro n.a. 17,633    
Serbia n.a. 14,515 EAEU/other   
Balkan average  13,403 Armenia 2,418 8,832 
   Azerbaijan 5,502 17,256 
Croatia n.a. 23,422 Belarus 5,399 18,060 
Turkey 6,146 25,247 Russia 8,012 24,788 
   Kazakhstan 8,435 25,285 
EU average 14,994 39,610 EAEU/other 
average 
 18,844 
Source: World Bank. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Index. Most of the countries from the two regions 
belong to the group of countries with “high human development” 
as measured by UNDP’s Human Development Index, which takes 
into account not only the economic level of a nation, but also the 
health dimension assessed by life expectancy at birth, and the 
education dimension assessed by years of schooling – see Table 7.6. 
Montenegro distinguishes itself here with “very high human 
development”, outperforming EU member states Romania and 
Bulgaria, whereas Moldova is at the bottom with “medium human 
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development”. Georgia ranks close to a Balkan front-runner, Serbia, 
while Ukraine ranks close to a Balkan laggard, Bosnia.  
Table 7.6 Human Development Index, 2015 
 HDI Ranking 
Very High Human Development   
Croatia 0.827 45 
Montenegro 0.807 48 
Romania 0.802 50 
   
High Human Development   
Belarus 0.796 52 
Bulgaria 0.794 56 
Serbia 0.776 66 
Georgia 0.769 70 
Turkey 0.767 71 
Albania 0.764 75 
Azerbaijan 0.759 78 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.750 81 
Armenia 0.743 84 
Ukraine 0.743 84 
   
Medium Human Development   
Moldova 0.699 107 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2016. No data available on 
Macedonia and Kosovo. 
It is notable that the ranking of the Balkan and DCFTA states 
is more similar according to this Human Development Index than 
according to GDP per capita data. This suggests that human capital 
levels have proved much more resilient than the macroeconomy, as 
the relatively high educational achievements of the Soviet Union 
could be carried over into the independent states to a higher degree 
than their economic structures. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
Transition indicators. Given that both regions have had to make a 
difficult transition from socialist to market economies, the EBRD has 
developed a comprehensive set of transition indicators to measure 
how successful this process has been. The results are given in Table 
7.7, for several groups of countries: the Balkan non-member states, 
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the three DCFTA states, the two strongest performing South 
Mediterranean states, and for reference, selected EU ‘new’ member 
states. 
The averages of the non-EU Balkans and DCFTA states are 
virtually the same, ranking 5.04 for the DCFTAs, which is slightly 
better than the 4.99 for the six Balkan states. However, the Balkan 
average is weighed down by the worst-performing Kosovo, which 
is a special case since it does not have the full attributes of statehood. 
Excluding Kosovo, the five Balkan states score 5.13, slightly above 
the DCFTAs. 
Both groups have quite a wide dispersion of performance. 
The best performing state is again Georgia, scoring 5.41, slightly 
ahead of the best performing Balkan states – Montenegro at 5.38, 
Serbia at 5.36, and Macedonia at 5.26.  
The two less well-performing DCFTA states, Moldova and 
Ukraine, score close to or a bit better than the less well performing 
Balkan states (Albania and Bosnia), and much better than Kosovo.  
Comparisons may also be made with the EU’s ‘new’ member 
states, among which Estonia is the best performer, and Croatia and 
Bulgaria the poorest performers. For their part Georgia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia are ranked a little behind 
Bulgaria. The two best performing Mediterranean states, Morocco 
and Tunisia, are ranked in the same league as the weakest 
performing Balkan and DCFTA states. 
The overall message from this mass of transition indicators 
from the EBRD is that the Balkans and DCFTA states are 
comparable on average. More precisely the best of the DCFTAs 
(Georgia) is comparable to the best of the Balkans, and the other 
DCFTAs states (Moldova and Ukraine) are comparable to middle-
ranking Balkan states. 
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Table 7.7 EBRD transition indicators, 2017 
 Competitive Well-governed Green Inclusive Resilient Integrated Total 
Estonia 7.58 7.58 6.44 7.30 8.19 7.77 7.47 
Croatia 5.75 5.14 6.03 6.03 6.61 6.85 6.06 
Bulgaria 5.96 4.69 5.82 5.33 6.54 6.86 5.86 
        
Montenegro 4.89 5.12 5.15 5.62 5.93 5.59 5.38 
Serbia 4.94 4.39 5.77 5.16 5.55 6.39 5.36 
Macedonia 5.39 5.20 4.91 4.72 5.31 6.04 5.26 
Albania 4.41 4.31 4.85 5.11 4.86 5.76 4.88 
Bosnia-H 4.74 3.66 4.85 4.83 5.35 5.47 4.81 
Kosovo 3.37 3.73 3.80 4.70 5.09 4.89 4.26 
        
Georgia 4.54 5.98 4.58 5.14 5.71 6.54 5.41 
Ukraine 4.68 3.58 5.54 5.88 4.60 5.04 4.88 
Moldova 4.87 3.94 4.14 5.19 5.27 5.64 4.84 
        
Morocco 3.98 4.35 5.47 4.16 6.06 5.45 4.91 
Tunisia 3.94 4.33 4.78 4.72 4.75 4.70 4.53 
Note: The six EBRD transition indicators are composed of the following sub-components: 
Competitive: Market structures for competition and business standards and capacity to add value and innovate. 
Well-governed: National-level governance and corporate-level governance. 
Green: Mitigation of climate change, adaptation to climate change, and other environmental areas. 
Inclusive: Gender equality, regional disparities, and opportunities for young people. 
Resilient: Financial stability, and resilient energy sector. 
Integrated: Openness to foreign trade, investment and finance, and domestic and cross-border infrastructure. 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, 2017-18. 
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World Bank, Ease of Doing Business. The conditions for 
doing business in both regions are improving, with Georgia and 
Macedonia catching up with the developed economies and earning 
a place among the top performers in the World Bank Ease of Doing 
Business ranking – see Table 7.8.1 Yet improvement is not uniform 
– the Ukrainian and the Bosnian economies are the worst in the two 
regions in terms of regulatory environment and hardly an attractive 
place to stimulate investment and local business initiative.  
Table 7.8 Ease of Doing Business ranking, 2017 
Economy Rank 
Georgia 9 
Macedonia 11 
Russian Federation 35 
Belarus 38 
Kosovo 40 
Montenegro 42 
Serbia 43 
Moldova 44 
Romania 45 
Armenia 47 
Bulgaria 50 
Croatia 51 
Azerbaijan 57 
Turkey 60 
Albania 65 
Ukraine 76 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 86 
Legend: Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1-190. A 
high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is 
more conducive to the start-up and operation of a local firm. 
Source: World Bank. 
                                                        
1 We must express some reservations with regard to this source, however. For 
example, the high ranking of Macedonia seems anomalous since most of the 
components (not shown here) of the survey are much less favourable than the 
overall ranking in Table 7.8. 
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Financial-economic ratings. There are several reputed 
international rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poor, Fitch), 
which rate states according to their credit worthiness, relying on a 
mix of financial and macroeconomic criteria, including political 
assessments that may affect credit worthiness. Since the 
assessments supplied by the several rating agencies are largely 
convergent, we present here only the current ratings of one of them 
– Moody’s.  
The highest ratings carry the A or coveted AAA rating, which 
only the strongest market economies are granted, and which means 
that they are considered risk-free for an investor in their bonds. 
None of the Balkan and DCFTA states achieve this rating. 
All of those in the B or C categories are considered risky or 
speculative investment prospects, with the graduations indicated in 
Table 9. Two states are in the best of the ‘speculative’ ratings, Serbia 
and Georgia, with Georgia one notch higher than Serbia. 
Montenegro and Albania are the best of the next ‘highly speculative’ 
category, followed by Bosnia and Moldova. Finally, Ukraine alone 
is in the ‘extremely speculative’ category, meaning that investors 
must beware of a serious risk of losing their investments. 
Overall, this is a further instance in which Georgia scores on 
a par or even slightly ahead of the best of the Balkans, while 
Moldova is on a par with the weaker of the Balkans, with Ukraine’s 
current financial difficulties putting it in a category below.    
Table 7.9 Credit ratings of Balkan and DCFTA states 
Serbia Ba3 Speculative 
Montenegro B1 Highly speculative 
Albania B1 Highly speculative 
Bosnia  B3 Highly speculative 
   
Georgia Ba2 Speculative 
Moldova B3 Highly speculative 
Ukraine Ca Extremely speculative 
Note: The letters A, B and C are in declining order of quality, as are the 
numbers 1, 2 and 3. 
Source: Moody’s. 
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Economic governance according to EU standards. Since all the 
Balkan and DCFTA states aspire to full EU membership, it is logical 
that all have made commitments to comply with EU regulations and 
standards. While the two groups differ in terms of the EU’s 
willingness (or not) to acknowledge their membership perspectives, 
in practice both groups are engaged in similar programmes of 
progressive compliance with the EU acquis. For accession 
candidates the process is structured around ‘chapters’, which take 
EU policies block by block. However, it is largely the same 
‘chapters’ that are found in the DCFTA agreements, and the EU’s 
regular progress reports for the Balkans, Turkey and the DCFTA 
states largely cover the same ground. This means that there is a well-
structured basis for comparison between all individual states and 
the two groups.  
The Commission facilitates this task through the 
methodology they have adopted for distilling the essence of this 
very complex material in summary ‘coded language’. Each chapter 
in their assessments concludes with a grading of three degrees of 
preparedness for EU membership, with ‘some’, ‘moderate’, or 
‘good’ levels of preparedness. As explained in Annex A, we 
translate these grades into numerical terms: 1, 2 or 3, which permits 
summation and comparison.  
For the DCFTA states the Commission and the EEAS make 
comparable but briefer assessments on the essential issues of 
substance, namely how far the EU acquis has been legislatively 
approximated and how far effectively implemented, but abstains 
from the ‘coded language’ summaries. The work carried out for the 
three Handbooks and notably their forthcoming second editions 
(see references), does permit comparability of these findings with 
the Balkans, however. In particular, the Handbooks provide a more 
detailed monitoring of implementation of the EU acquis. This has 
made it possible for the authors to apply numerical ratings on the 
same scale as for the Balkans.   
The detailed ratings for 20 economic chapters of common 
applicability to both groups are set out in Annex Table A.2, together 
with more details on the methodology used. The summary results 
for the economic chapters are given in Annex Table A.1 and Figure 
4, which may be read alongside the political ratings.  
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In the economic rankings Georgia ranks with or above the 
highest performers of the Balkans (Montenegro, Serbia and 
Macedonia), whereas Moldova and Ukraine rank ahead of Albania, 
and probably Bosnia for which EU has not published full data. The 
high rating for Georgia is explained by its top marks for several 
chapters: anti-corruption, openness of goods and services markets, 
and quality of customs services and public procurement. 
Common instruments of economic policy. In practice the EU 
has been applying an increasing number of common instruments of 
economic policy to both the Balkans and DCFTA states, despite the 
political (or rhetorical) differentiation between the two groups on 
account of the membership perspectives categorisation. There has 
been an ‘under the political radar’ convergence in actual EU policies 
towards the two groups (i.e. the many rather technical measures are 
not promoted together as a strategy). The Association Agreements 
and DCFTAs have operationally raised Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine into much the same category as the Balkans, while the 
enlargement process for the Balkans has itself not advanced.  
As listed in Table 7.10, and elaborated more fully elsewhere 
(Emerson, 2018), the basis for this commonality has been the 
creation of deep free trade areas of somewhat different content with 
the EU: thus the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) 
with the Balkans, the customs union with Turkey and the DCFTAs 
for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The core tariff-free trade 
elements are being complemented by the pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
(PEM) Convention for common rules of origin and diagonal 
cumulation of value added, common product standards, specific 
blocks of sectoral policies, including for energy and transport, 
financial and investment mechanisms (EIB, EBRD, EU budget), etc. 
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Table 7.10 Instruments of EU economic policy used in the Balkans, 
Turkey and DCFTA states 
 Deep FTAs – various form, SAA, Customs Union, DCFTA 
 Pan Euro-Med Convention for Preferential Rules of Origin and 
Diagonal Cumulation (PEM) 
 European Standards Organisations (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) 
 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations (SPS) 
 European Accreditation, Multilateral Agreements (EA-MLA) 
 Agreements for Conformity Assessment and Analysis (ACAA) 
 European Association of National Metrology Institutes 
(Euramet) 
 Union Customs Code (UCC) 
 Common Transit Convention 
 New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) 
 Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) 
 Shared Border Crossing Points 
 Energy Community Treaty 
 Central and South Eastern European Connectivity network 
(CESEC) 
 European Network of transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSOE) 
 Transport Community Treaty 
 Pan-European Corridors 
 Trans-European Transport network (TEN-T) 
 European Civil Aviation Agreement (ECAA) 
 Civil Aviation Agreements (CAA) 
 Agencies of the EU – e.g. European Environmental Agency  
 Programmes of the EU – e.g. Horizon 2020, Erasmus+ 
 Visa-free travel 
 European Investment Bank (EIB) 
 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
 EU Budget grants 
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Comprehensive comparisons and policy 
implications 
When putting together the findings on both political and economic 
governance, an overall pattern emerges. The two groups, the Balkan 
and DCFTA states, are comparable, with differentiations within 
each of the two groups, however. As regards the Balkans the EU has 
now in June 2018 established for policy purposes what may be 
described as a three-tier system. Serbia and Montenegro were 
already established as frontrunners given their accession 
negotiations already underway (tier one), while Albania and 
Macedonia are now out in a tier two with the conditional possibility 
of opening accession negotiations in 2019, which leaves Bosnia and 
Kosovo in a tier 3 with no dates suggested for the opening of 
accession negotiations. This three-tier structure provides a more 
precise structure for making comparisons with the DCFTA states. 
More precisely, on the political criteria, Georgia scores the 
highest rating ahead of the Balkan tier-one frontrunners 
(Montenegro and Serbia). While the quality of its democracy is not 
outstanding, its anti-corruption policy has been uniquely 
successful, and this weighs in the overall political rating. They are 
followed by Macedonia and Albania as tier-two Balkan states, 
comparably, alongside Ukraine and Moldova. Turkey now comes 
last by a substantial margin because of its departure from basic 
democratic norms in recent years. Regarding societal perceptions, 
the DCFTA states view the EU more favourably than do the Balkans 
on average, especially Georgia by a large margin, and much more 
so than for Serbia, Bosnia and even member state Croatia. The EU is 
also much more favourably viewed by Georgia and Ukraine than 
the Eurasian Economic Union, but only a little more so in the case 
of Moldova (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3 above). 
On the economic governance criteria Georgia again has the 
highest rating, in this case alongside Macedonia, followed by 
Montenegro and Serbia. Turkey scores relatively well here too. 
Moldova and Ukraine are ahead of Albania and Bosnia as weaker 
performing Balkan states. On the other hand, the macroeconomic 
performances of the DCFTA states, measured in GDP per capita, are 
still way behind the Balkans. Their relatively favourable governance 
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ratings, if sustained, should lead to a macroeconomic catch-up in 
due course.  
In Figure 7.4 below, we combine the political and the economic 
governance ratings, with both aggregates given equal weight. The 
leader is Georgia, ahead of the three most-advanced Balkan states 
(Montenegro, Serbia of tier one, and Macedonia of tier two). 
Moldova and Ukraine come next, scoring above tier-two Albania, 
and well above tier-three Turkey. Note that Bosnia and Kosovo have 
not been included in these aggregate data. The data for Bosnia are 
incomplete, but together with Kosovo, the country would most 
probably feature in tier three. Thus, while the best-performing 
DCFTA state (Georgia) is ranked above the tier-one Balkan states, 
Moldova and Ukraine are comparable to the tier-two Balkan states, 
and well ahead of the tier-three Balkan states.   
Figure 7.4 Political and economic governance ratings 
 
Source: Own calculations. See Annex A for methodology and Annex Table A.7.1 
for data. 
 
There are policy implications for the EU to consider in light of 
these findings, which have so far not been put together with such a 
striking result.  
The overarching issue is what to do now that two groups of 
EU neighbours, the Balkans and DCFTA states, share five very 
important characteristics:  
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 Direct neighbourhood/proximity to the EU;  
 Common objective of full membership of the EU;  
 Entitlement as European democracies to apply for EU 
membership (Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty) 
 Progressive adoption of the EU’s political and economic 
norms and standards, and  
 Comparability of political and economic governance 
performance.  
How should this anomaly be viewed and handled looking 
forward? There are several conceivable ways in which the EU could 
treat the Balkans and DCFTA states in a fairer and more equal 
manner.  
Firstly, one approach might see the EU become more consistent 
in its political stances towards the Balkan and DCFTA states. 
Concretely this could mean extending the ‘membership 
perspective’ ranking to Georgia, given its relatively favourable 
performance, and as an incentive to the other DCFTAs. In addition 
to the standard (Article 49) argument, the geopolitical case in favour 
of this approach has been enhanced by the realities of Russia’s 
multiple interventions all over Europe, including but going way 
beyond what it terms its ‘near-abroad’. The AA/DCFTA process is 
a bulwark against Russian aggression in the overlapping 
neighbourhoods, but it needs strengthening.  The EU aims to boost 
the resilience of the political regimes of its close partners and 
neighbours through its foreign and security policy. In the absence 
of a membership perspective the states feel condemned to live in 
limbo between the EU and Russia, which makes them vulnerable to 
de-stabilisation.  
Strong as this enhanced geopolitical argument may be, the 
objections to further EU enlargement even into the Balkans have 
also strengthened. In the view of some member states, EU 
enlargement has already gone far enough. While the Commission 
recently made a political gesture towards Serbia and Montenegro 
citing 2025 as a possible accession date for accession, this was not 
taken up by the foreign ministers’ Council in its detailed 
conclusions on the Western Balkans and Turkey of 26 June 2018, 
which were endorsed by the European Council on 29 June. Albania 
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and Macedonia did receive some conditional encouragement, since 
the Council’s conclusions “sets out the path towards the opening of 
accession negotiations in 2019”. Turkey’s accession process is said 
to have “effectively come to a standstill”. The spoken and unspoken 
objections to further enlargement now run deep. In his speech to the 
European Parliament in April 2018, President Macron argued that 
there should be no more enlargement before institutional reforms in 
the EU itself. The rise of authoritarian populism in some new 
member states (namely Hungary and Poland) is a warning that even 
full EU membership is no longer the guarantee of liberal political 
values once supposed. There are also many vulnerable democracies 
among the would-be member states, and the EU itself is in a fragile 
state, including some old member states (as Brexit and Italian 
populism etc. demonstrate).  
Another, second approach would therefore be to recognise that 
since even the existing membership perspectives for the Balkans 
have ceased to be fully credible, the case for extending application 
of the concept does not make sense. Elements of political discourse 
have become obsolete, but the perceived political costs of changing 
rhetorical doctrine (about membership perspectives, for example) 
deter any change, either to renounce the membership perspective 
for the Balkans, or to extend it to the DCFTAs. At the same time, 
however, the concrete policies of the EU are increasingly being 
applied equally to both the Balkans and the DCFTAs and bring both 
groups into closer functional integration with the EU (as illustrated 
in Table 10). The EU institutions are at work below the radar of high 
politics, yet with much substance. Implicitly, the DCFTA states are 
being invited to observe that concretely their group is being treated 
on a par with the Balkans, and each state of either group has an open 
road to advance as far and fast as they wish, only falling short of full 
membership for the time being. In particular, they are being invited 
to set aside their focus on the membership perspective question, 
since this is not now of operational significance. Further, they are 
invited not to view the refusal of a membership perspective as 
disinterest, but just the reality that the EU has to first work out some 
very substantial challenges for its own future. The advantage of this 
approach is that it is actually working in practice to a useful degree.  
Nevertheless, this second approach has its weakness. It does 
not appear to be a strategy and is not presented as one. It is also very 
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difficult to communicate – all too nuanced and complicated. It 
leaves the field wide open for populist arguments that have no place 
for such complications. It also carries a higher risk of reversal and 
backsliding of the reform trajectories of the front-running states. 
In a third approach, the process could be given more strategic 
content and profile. But how could this be done? One idea would be 
to consolidate the many existing instruments (as in Table 10) into an 
extended, more standardised and institutionalised system, which 
would be given a name such as a Wider European Economic Area, 
or Space, or Community, for example. The system would have 
privileged access to the EU institutions and would be profiled as a 
distinct tier to European integration. This would connect with the 
current renewal of interest in the longstanding debate about multi-
tier or multi-speed Europe. This debate can focus either on 
developing a more restricted top-tier group, or on a wider outer-
level group, or both. Today the focus is mostly on the top-tier 
questions, which is proving to be extremely difficult to implement, 
including in the sectors already subject to selective membership (the 
euro, Schengen, and defence). Yet the question of an outer tier is 
growing in pertinence, not only for the Balkan and DCFTA states, 
but also for Turkey and in due course, Brexit-UK. There will be 
predictable resistances to a common institutionalisation, as various 
neighbouring states give priority to their bilateral relationships with 
the EU, and try to cut their own special deals. When it comes down 
to practical instruments of cooperation, however, these naturally 
become highly standardised. And the EU institutions are very wary 
about making special deals with one state that will be used as a 
precedent in negotiations with others. So for reasons of both 
administrative and legal simplicity, and also of political negotiation, 
there is a case for rationalisation and some kind of soft 
institutionalisation, with degrees of flexibility. The clinching 
argument is the current strategic context, with the EU and wider 
space of European values being under serious threat from within 
and outside. The EU thus needs to get its act together more 
decisively in its neighbourhood. 
Such important changes to the EU’s current enlargement and 
neighbourhood doctrines would encounter resistance for sure, 
given the huge political investments that have been made in the 
status quo. This status quo is obsolescent, however. As shown 
272  POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: BALKANS VS EASTERN EUROPE 
 
above, the actual policies of the EU towards the Balkans and DCFTA 
states have been evolving more than the outmoded rhetorical 
doctrines and now converge in content, but so far ‘under the radar’ 
of high politics. This convergence could be strengthened and given 
more explicit strategic articulation.  
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Annex A. Methodologies 
The purpose of Tables A7.1 and A7.2 in this Annex is to compare 
the respective governance performance of the Balkans, Turkey and 
the three states of Eastern Europe that have Association Agreements 
and DCFTAs with the EU (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). The 
data in the tables are derived from the sources indicated below, 
which provide a substantial basis for comparisons, supplemented 
by qualitative judgements. The list of policies detailed in Table A7.2 
are a large selection of chapter headings in the three Handbooks on 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, excluding chapters that are not 
relevant for the present purpose. There is corresponding material in 
the Commission’s 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy.  
For the Balkans and Turkey, the large majority of chapters in 
the Commission’s 2018 Communication allow for simple translation 
of the standardised wording used in the Commission’s summary 
assessments into the numerical ratings given in the table. However, 
the Commission abstains from using this summary wording for the 
political chapters. Yet the descriptive material provided allows such 
ratings to be estimated, especially since other sources have 
developed numerical ratings that have been factored in to the 
judgements made by the authors in Tables A7.1 and A7.2. These 
other sources include Freedom House, Bertelsmann Stiftung, EBRD, 
Transparency International, and the World Justice Project.   
For the DCFTA states, the materials assembled in the 2nd 
editions of the Handbooks allow comparable ratings to be made (by 
the authors). The Commission publishes annual implementation 
reports on these agreements, but makes no summary assessments 
in the same manner as for the Balkans and Turkey. The political 
reasoning of the Commission is that these three states are not 
granted by the EU the status of ‘membership perspectives’, but this 
does not invalidate the assessments made (by the authors) since the 
content and normative basis of the DCFTAs is so similar, indeed 
often identical, to the chapters of accession negotiations.  
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Table A7.1 Summary political and economic governance ratings 
 Political Economic Total 
Montenegro 2.1 2.2 2.1 
Serbia 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Macedonia 1.9 2.3 2.1 
Albania 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Turkey 0.6 2.0 1.3 
Georgia 2.4 2.3 2.3 
Moldova 1.6 1.8 1.7 
Ukraine 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Note: The political rating averages the ratings for the five chapters, and the 
economic rating for the twenty chapters listed in Annex Table A.7.2. 
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Table A7.2 Comparative ratings of political and economic governance of the Balkans and DCFTA states 
    
 Montene. Serbia Macedon Albania Turkey  Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Political principles, the rule of law           
Political institutions  
 2.5 2.5 2 2 0.5  2 1.5 2 
Human rights   
 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5  1.5 2 2 
Rule of law   
 2 1 1.5 1 0.5  1.5 1 1.5 
Anti-corruption   
 1.5 1.5 1 1 1  3 0.5 0.5 
Visa regime, movement of people  1 2 1.5 1 0  1.5 1.5 1.5 
    
 8.5 8.5 7.5 6.5 2.5  9.5 6.5 7.5 
Deep & Comprehensive Free Trade           
Market access   
 2 2 2 1.5 3  3 2 1.5 
Customs services   
 2 3 3 2 3  3 2 1 
Technical standards (TBT)  
 2 1.5 2 1.5 3  2 2 2 
Food safety (SPS)   
 2 2 3 1 1  1 2 1.5 
Services    
 2 2 2 2 0.5  3 1 1.5 
Public 
procurement   
 
2 2 2 1 2  3 2 2 
Intellectual property rights (IPR)  3 3 2 1 3  2.5 1.5 1 
Competition policy  2 1.5 2 1.5 1  2 2 1.5 
Statistics    
 2 2 2 2 2  2 1.5 2 
    
 19 19 20 13.5 18.5  21.5 16 14 
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Economic Cooperation  
 
         
Macroeconomics   
 2 2 3 2 2.5  2.5 1.5 1.5 
Financial services   
 2 2 2 2 3  2 1.5 1.5 
Transport    
 2 2.5 2 1 2  2 1 1 
Energy    
 3 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 
Environment   
 1 1 1 1 1  2 2 1.5 
Digital (ICT)   
 2 2 2 2 1  2 2 2 
Consumer protection  
 2 2 2 0.5 3  1 1 1.5 
Company law   
 3 3 3 2 3  1.5 1.5 2.5 
Agriculture   
 2 1 2 1 1  1 1 1.5 
Employment, social policy  
 1 2 2 1 1  2 2 1.5 
Education, culture   
 3 3 2 2 2  2.5 1.5 2.5 
Civil society   
 1 0 2 1 0.5  3 3 2.5 
    
 24 22.5 25 17.5 22  23.5 20 21.5 
Notes: Numerical ratings for the Balkans and Turkey relate to degrees of ‘preparation for EU membership’ (Commission terminology). 0 = 
no preparation; 0.5 = early preparation, 1 = some preparation, 2 = moderate preparation, 3 = good preparation.  
For the DCFTA states the same numerical ratings are used to assess degrees of achievement in terms of meeting the EU acquis, norms and 
standards contained in the Agreements, which are largely the same as in the ‘chapters’ of EU accession negotiations, referring to the same 
EU acquis. 
Sources: For the Balkans and Turkey, European Commission, 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 17 April 2018.  For the 
DCFTA states, GE, MD, UA, Handbooks, 2nd editions. 
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8. DEMYSTIFYING THE 
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS  
KATARYNA WOLCZUK 
Introduction 
This chapter the three Handbooks 
on the Association Agreements 
with Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. It examines the role of the 
Association Agreements in the 
Europeanisation of the three 
countries, drawing attention to the 
dual role of the Agreements as 
frameworks for both economic 
integration and modernisation. The 
paper analyses the content of the 
Handbooks and draws attention to 
the complex and varied nature of 
the legal commitments made by the 
association countries. In the final 
section, it focuses on the process of 
implementation of the Agreements and the considerable challenges 
this presents for the EU and the three countries in question. 
The EU is the most legalised international organisation in the world. 
Not only it has an extensive and sophisticated corpus of law (acquis 
communautaire), but it is also engaged in the export of its laws to 
other states. The EU’s foreign policy exemplifies a “transformative 
engagement through law” (Magen, 2007: 362).  
The scope and intensity of the export of the acquis varies 
greatly across the countries and regions. The latest and most 
interesting widening of the EU legal space involves a select group 
of eastern neighbours – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The 
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mechanism is the Association Agreements (AAs) including Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). 
The conclusion of the AA-DCFTAs represents a shift in the 
EU’s eastern policy: they offer advanced market access while 
ensuring long-term modernisation and development of these 
neighbouring countries, thereby underpinning their ‘European 
choice’. However, this fundamental change takes the EU and 
partner countries into uncharted territory: a sophisticated and 
complex corpus of rules developed within the EU is now being used 
to modernise countries struggling to reform (with the partial 
exception of Georgia) on their own accord. In other words, a body 
of detailed and complex legislation is imported by a third country 
for the purposes of cooperation and development.  
From the EU side, it offers an alternative to enlargement, 
while the partners are driven by a plethora of political, security, 
cultural and economic motives, comparable to East-Central 
European countries. But in contrast to the latter, they are to be 
included in the EU’s legal space below the “threshold of 
membership” (Wolczuk, 2016). 
Because of their ambition and complexity, the Agreements 
pose a challenge of an entirely new order for policymakers and 
experts. To understand the impact of the AA-DCFTA, they need to 
grasp the content of the agreement and its domestic 
implementation. This is not an easy task: to gauge the 
transformative power of the EU’s foreign policy one needs to 
examine changes to the institutions and decision making of the 
partner countries.  
The trilogy of Handbooks is indispensable in this respect. The 
Handbooks were delivered under the auspices of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) by national teams of researchers in 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with the support of the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA).1  
                                                        
1 It is not the first time that SIDA has offered crucial support for Ukraine’s 
integration with the EU. In 2007, the organisation supported a study, “Free 
Trade between Ukraine and the EU an Impact Assessment”, delivered by the 
International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS), Kyiv Ukraine. 
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Each handbook offers a systematic, accessible guide to the 
content of the Agreements and sheds light on the implementation 
process. No similar guidance has been produced, despite significant 
demand: an EU expert working on the implementation of the AA in 
Ukraine referred to the Handbook as a “bible”.2  
This review has several aims: first, to elucidate the 
significance of the AA-DCFTAs and to explain the challenges to 
understanding their content; second, to analyse the content and 
assess it from a comparative perspective; and, finally, to explore the 
process of implementation and, while doing so, to identify key 
challenges. 
Step change: From the ENP to DCFTA  
The need for the Handbooks reflects a major upgrade in the EU’s 
relations with the three countries in question. The AAs are novel 
types of agreements, so the literature on the other integration-
oriented agreements, such as the EFTA or Swiss-style sectoral 
agreements, are of relatively limited relevance. The AAs need to be 
studied in their own right. 
For over a decade, the eastern neighbours have participated 
in a framework of relations with the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). The ENP was described as “a bureaucratic response 
to a political question”.3 The political question was where the final 
borders of the EU should be drawn. Avoiding a direct answer, the 
ENP facilitates the projection of the EU’s ‘normative power’ in the 
Union’s neighbourhood by offering the neighbours credible and 
effective integration without membership. By lowering the barriers 
between the EU and its neighbourhood, the ENP serves as an 
alternative to enlargement, with the aim of reducing the 
membership aspirations of neighbouring states. The policy allows 
the extension beyond the borders of the EU of its internal modes of 
governance, while minimising the effects on the internal 
functioning of the Union. If during enlargement the EU 
endeavoured to create “ideal members” (Mayhew 2000), the ENP 
aims to create ideal neighbours. Thus, from the very beginning, 
                                                        
2 Author’s interview, Kyiv, February 2017. 
3 Author’s interview with a European Council official, March 2006. 
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ambiguities and tensions were built into what carried the promise 
of being the most ambitious and sophisticated foreign policy ever 
launched by the EU. 
The ENP has been met with scepticism regarding its structural 
features and effectiveness. From the early days of the ENP the view 
prevailed that in the absence of membership conditionality, the 
incentive package of the ENP would not be sufficient to drive domestic 
legal reform in neighbouring countries, let alone emulate the success of 
the eastern enlargement (Kelley, 2004; Cremona and Hillion, 2006). Its 
key instrument was the ENP Action Plans, which contained general 
reform guidance for the neighbouring countries. They tended to 
contain only vague references to adopting key aspects of the acquis. 
Both the obligations and incentives were underspecified.  
Indeed, the comprehensive literature review on the ENP by 
Konstanyan (2016) confirms the validity of this scepticism. A weak 
system of incentives in the absence of a membership perspective has 
been consistently identified as the key flaw of the ENP. The ENP 
policy has not been able to stimulate comprehensive domestic 
change; at best, some results were delivered at a sectoral level, 
mainly when the EU provided clear sector-specific conditionality 
and tangible rewards (for example, the success of visa liberalisation 
in Moldova, granted by the EU in 2014).4 Nevertheless, closer 
interactions under the ENP generated strong domestic demand for 
reform templates amongst some of the eastern neighbours. 
While a membership prospect did not emerge, and if anything 
is more remote than ever, the EU has proceeded to a new phase of 
relations with its eastern neighbours. But this time it was only with 
a select, ‘willing’, group, which had actually indicated an interest in 
deepening relations through fostering a new Agreement. Ukraine 
demanded such an agreement for half a decade before the EU 
agreed to launch negotiations in 2007. Despite its initial 
recalcitrance, in recognition of the need to respond to demand from 
the neighbours and strengthen the offer, the EU agreed to move to 
a new legal framework – the AA-DCFTA.  
                                                        
4 For an overview of the well-structured and comprehensive process of setting 
conditions and monitoring see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-
moldova-ukraine-and-georgia_en. 
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This new legal framework represents a fundamental shift 
from the original ENP formula relaying on ‘soft law’ with ‘low 
precision and high selectivity’ to ‘high precision and low 
selectivity’. The upgraded integration offer to Ukraine was then 
rolled out to other Eastern Partnership countries. At first, four 
countries negotiated the agreements with Armenia dropping out as 
a result of receiving a sudden offer from Russia to join the Eurasian 
Economic Union in September 2014 (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2015; 
Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2017). 
Why the AA-DCFTA? 
The new agreements – Association Agreements with a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area at their core – are to advance a new 
type of relations between the EU and the vanguard of the ‘willing’ 
neighbours. They offer advanced and multi-faceted relations but 
without reaching the threshold of membership as encapsulated in 
the formula of “economic integration and political cooperation”. 
The Agreements provide a vehicle for an unprecedented degree of 
wholesale export of law – 90-95% of trade-related acquis is included 
in the DCFTA part of the AA (Duleba et al., 2012).  
The AA-DCFTA is a truly innovative legal instrument in the 
EU’s external relations because of its comprehensiveness, 
complexity and conditionality. The AAs belong to a very small 
group of ‘integration-oriented agreements’. Because of the 
advanced nature of integration this entails, the AA-DCFTAs are an 
exceptional phenomenon in the EU’s external action. They compare 
to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which extends 
the entire EU Internal Market acquis to the participating states, such 
as Norway, although with greater selectivity, as they do not go as 
far as the EEA Agreement.  
The extensive reliance on the acquis in the Agreements serves 
two interrelated purposes: 
Access to the single market 
The main justification for EU’s export of the acquis, especially in the 
area of the internal market, is a functional one. Acquiring a stake in 
the internal market requires “progressive convergence with internal 
market rules, coupled with stepped-up consultation and co-
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operation, as well as adaptation of institutional practices to EU 
standards” (Dodini and Fantini 2006: 511). The Union cannot open 
up its internal market to countries that are too ‘different’ without 
jeopardising the achievement of its economic integration and high 
degree of cohesion between the member states. 
Because this access depends on compliance with the rules and 
standards of the internal market, the countries in its neighbourhood 
adopt significant parts of the trade-related acquis. This includes 
institutional harmonisation in the economic sphere, which is wide 
in scope and encompasses all major horizontal policy areas, 
although the degree of harmonisation differs across policy areas, 
being the highest for technical standards (TBT), sanitary and phyto-
sanitary standards (SPS), public procurement and competition 
policy.  
The complexity of the AA lies in its comprehensive nature and 
ambition: the aim is to achieve partners’ economic integration in the 
EU internal market. For the EU, this kind of arrangement poses a 
challenge: how to ensure uniform interpretation and application of 
EU rules within a shared legal framework with non-members. To 
this end, the Association Agreement contains principles, concepts 
and provisions of EU law which are to be interpreted and applied 
as if the third State is part of the EU, according to van der Loo et al. 
(2014). So, this challenge is addressed by adopting a robust 
institutional system, explicit conditionality, wide-ranging 
mechanisms for legal approximation and a refined system for 
dispute settlement. 
Transfer of EU rules is equated with broad developmental 
benefits 
Implicit in the ENP is the EU’s reliance on the inherent ‘power of 
attraction’ of the EU as a model of development that inspires others 
to emulate it. As a result, there is a strong correlation between the 
acquis and modernisation. The EU-Ukraine Handbook (2016: 2) 
aptly defines the Agreement as a “charter to Ukraine’s 
modernisation through alignment on EU norms, which generally 
correspond to best international practice”.  
The beneficial effects of rule transfer are not limited to 
welfare-enhancing benefits from trade but include increased 
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investment, enhanced competition and reduced corruption, which 
lead to better governance, higher economic efficiency, growth and 
welfare in partner countries. The process of alignment with the 
regulatory mechanisms developed in the EU is expected to 
transform the public policies of the neighbouring states, resulting in 
growth, stability and prosperity.  
Therefore, the EU goes beyond this immediate functional 
justification in emphasising the broad developmental benefits in 
transferring EU rules. According to the Commission officials, 
Dodini and Fantini, these states face the choice of either adopting 
the EU acquis or developing a regulatory framework from scratch. 
In their view, the EU model is superior to that of other international 
actors in terms of, first, the quality and density of its regulation; 
second, the comprehensiveness of the reform it entails, and, third, 
the degree to which it avoids controversies surrounding the 
activities of some international institutions (Dodini & Fantini 2006: 
513).  
In the case of the DCFTA, the attractiveness of EU rules stems 
from being offered as a ready-made corpus of rules in the absence 
of effective domestic policymaking. In particular, the internal 
market acquis – the densely institutionalised area of European 
integration – is regarded as a template for successful socio-economic 
modernisation, in the view of a Commission official.  
Indeed, the application of EU law has some bearing on almost 
every aspect of public policymaking and implementation. 
However, the nature of the rules creates challenges for the post-
Soviet states. So far, the granting of access to the internal market and 
institutional harmonisation has been employed by the EU to deepen 
economic cooperation between developed market economies, 
which chose to eschew EU membership, but were keen to gain 
access to its single market, such as Norway or Switzerland. Now, 
the EU endeavours to export a highly regulatory model requiring 
an effectively functioning state to countries without the institutional 
capacities to enact such a model (Wolczuk, 2009). The difficulty is 
compounded by the lack of the legislative and administrative 
capacity to enact the acquis and the high costs involved in making 
regulatory adaptations in several sectors, such as environmental 
protection.  
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Given these challenges, some European officials argued that 
it is more appropriate to regard the DCFTA as a gradual process of 
economic integration, rather than a defined project of full market 
integration (Dodini & Fantini 2006: 512). The analysis in the 
Handbooks is evidence of the gradual and long-term nature of the 
process. 
Understanding the agreements  
Despite or rather because of them being amongst the most 
sophisticated and complex legal agreements in the world, the AA-
DCFTAs have been relatively neglected in scholarly and expert 
analysis (for exceptions, see van der Loo, 2015; van der Loo et al., 
2014). Because of Russia’s endeavours to punish Ukraine for its 
“European choice”,5 the geopolitical prism – a tug of war between 
the EU and Russia – has dominated analysis. Often highly 
normative (yet not always well informed) views prevail. For the 
supporters, the AA-DCFTA seems a quick-fix solution for the 
modernisation of the eastern partners, whereas critics decry it as an 
act of legal imperialism on behalf of the EU (Sakwa, 2014). Few 
experts and scholars have actually made the effort to trace the 
origins of the Agreements, let alone to familiarise themselves with 
their contents. 
There are prosaic reasons for the neglect – the agreements are 
exceedingly long and complicated. These documents are state-of-
the-art in terms of EU’s export of the acquis but largely impenetrable 
to readers not steeped in the arcane subject of EU law.  
At first glance, the main part of the agreement is fairly 
accessible – there are 486 articles in the EU-Ukraine agreement – 
many of them of a general nature, not that different from the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). But some of the 
articles already refer to specific EU Directives (e.g. art. 148 on public 
procurement in the EU-Ukraine AA-DCFTA). More frequent are 
references to the Annexes for the detailed list of actual commitments 
with regard to legal approximation. In this way, it is the Annexes in 
general and, in particular, the Annexes related to “Trade and Trade-
                                                        
5 There is often little appreciation that, with regard to trade, Moldova and 
Georgia had been actually punished by Russia even earlier (see Cenusa et al. 
2014).  
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Related Matters” that make the Agreements stand out – the shift in 
terms of precision, details and the extent to which commitments are 
binding is striking in comparison to the PCAs. By extending the 
legal boundaries of the EU to neighbouring countries, the 
agreements thoroughly underscore the nature of the EU as a law-
based community. Yet their role and significance for the domestic 
reforms can only be gauged through analysis of the content – 
namely, the actual commitments made across a number of sectors. 
Content 
While the Agreements are necessarily couched in legal terms, their 
sheer length and complexity it makes them inaccessible, even for 
professional readers. This is where the Handbooks come in: they de-
mystify the AA by explaining, in an accessible style, the content of 
its numerous chapters and what each entails for the partner 
countries. The Handbooks aim to make it possible for anyone to 
gain a basic understanding of “what each chapter in the Agreement 
means, in terms of both the nature of the commitments that the 
parties undertake and the prospects for their implementation” (EU-
Ukraine Handbook, 2016: ix). In essence, they act as a one-stop-
guide to the content of the Association Agreements. 
The three Handbooks have an identical structure and consist 
of four parts: 
 Part I. Political Principles, Rule of Law and Foreign Policy 
 Part II. DCFTA 
 Part III. Economic cooperation 
 Part IV. Institutional Provisions 
Part I deals with the political (i.e. non-economic) content of 
the AAs and focuses on issues ranging from democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, anti-corruption policy and foreign and security 
policy. Arguably this is the ‘soft law’ part of the Agreement. Yet 
with values being defined as an essential part of the Agreement 
(EU-Ukraine Handbook, 2016: 10), art. 478 of the EU-Ukraine AA 
stipulates that violations of these principles can result in suspension 
of the Agreement.  
The DCFTA is the focus of Part II, which deals with the ‘hard 
core’ of the economic content of the agreements. Crucially for the 
reader, this part of the Handbooks offers an integrated analysis – 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  287 
 
both the main part of the agreements as well as extensive Annexes 
are covered in each chapter. This is of considerable assistance when 
analysing the agreements, otherwise the reader would be constantly 
flicking between the main part and very detailed and lengthy 
Annexes (some of which, rather unhelpfully, do not have page 
numbers). 
The most advanced mechanisms of legislative approximation 
are found in this Part. This is because, as noted above, ‘deep’ 
economic integration requires extensive legislative and regulatory 
approximation, including sophisticated mechanisms to ensure 
uniform interpretation and effective implementation of relevant EU 
legislation. In particular, unlike the PCAs, the agreements are 
future-oriented and include several mechanisms to deal with the 
dynamic evolution of the EU acquis that has been incorporated.    
An important feature (and difference from the EEA) is that 
the DCFTA is premised on far-reaching conditionality: market 
access is subject to specific and continuous compliance monitoring. 
National governments are obliged to provide reports to the EU in 
line with approximation deadlines specified in the Agreement. The 
monitoring procedure may include “on-the-spot missions, with the 
participation of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, non-
governmental bodies, supervisory authorities, independent experts 
and others as needed” (art.451, EU-Moldova Association 
Agreement).   
The fact that the DCFTAs are subjected to permanent scrutiny 
reflects the essential differences between the eastern neighbours, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, on the one hand, and the EEA 
countries such as Norway, on the other, in terms of economic 
development, quality of governance, the rule of law, etc. This strict 
conditionality stems from the EU’s cautious approach to opening up 
its single market to post-Soviet countries, which have a less 
developed political and economic system than the EEA countries. 
Part III deals with economic cooperation – this is a broad 
chapter including 14 ‘sectoral’ chapters, such as energy, transport, 
financial services, agriculture and civil society, etc. Once again, this 
Part straddles the main parts of the Agreements as well as the 
Annexes, thereby, once again, saving a great deal of work for the 
reader, especially when dealing with particularly complex areas, 
such as services. This is a very-wide ranging Part, which is 
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testimony to the sheer breadth of the agreement – it is indeed an all-
encompassing and comprehensive treaty. 
Part IV is on the Legal and Institutional Provisions. The AA 
has a sophisticated dispute resolution mechanism and institutional 
set-up (chapters 29 and 30, respectively). Within the institutional 
set-up, a key body is the Association Council. The Council meets at 
ministerial level – it operates as a forum for exchange of information 
and is also competent to update or amend the agreement’s Annexes 
to keep pace with evolutions in EU law.  
The dynamic nature of the AA makes it distinct from its much 
simpler predecessors. Whereas the PCA was essentially a fixed and 
static agreement – the common bodies could not change and adapt 
its content – the AAs provide opportunities for updates and 
amendments. But, as noted in the Handbooks, the revisions are only 
possible with regard to the Annexes – the Council cannot change 
the main body of the text (as this would trigger a complex procedure 
of ratification by the two sides, with a particularly drawn-out 
procedure in the EU). 
This raises some interesting questions on the nature of 
commitments across different sectors. For example, commitments 
with regard to public procurement are listed in the main body of the 
agreement (e.g. art.148 of EU-Ukraine agreement). This means that 
with regard to public procurement, neither side can deviate from 
the commitments.  
In other sectors, such as TBT or SPS, the actual scope of legal 
approximation can be elaborated and negotiated. This is not an 
accidental inconsistency. The costs of compliance with SPS and TBT 
are very high and need to be aligned to the priorities and capacities 
of the partner countries. In contrast, public procurement acquis is 
much more straightforward and easier to implement, while at the 
same time being highly sensitive in political terms. It is therefore 
eminently sensible to place those commitments in the main body to 
eliminate any scope for self-serving interpretations by the domestic 
governments (often driven by vested interests and high rents gained 
when awarding public contracts).  
But even when the commitments are yet to be elaborated, the 
partner countries face tough scrutiny. Only the Association Council 
(or the Trade Committee) can decide on a progressive market 
opening when assessing sufficient implementation and 
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enforcement by the partner countries. Significantly, 
recommendations or decisions of the joint institutional bodies as 
well as a failure to reach decisions cannot be challenged under the 
specific DCFTA dispute settlement procedure. This means that the 
non-DCFTA parts of the agreement are more open to negotiations 
than the DCFTA and the ‘market opening’ conditionality is very 
strict. The EU decides on the pace and scope of market opening, 
thereby providing associated countries with strong incentives to 
comply in key sectors as a matter of priority.  
Three agreements: What’s the difference? 
At first glance, there is a high degree of uniformity across the three 
agreements. Indeed, the Ukrainian DCFTA, negotiated from 2008 to 
2011, served as a template for its Moldovan and Georgian 
counterparts. But the agreements are not identical – there are 
national imprints in their contents.  
The differences can only be gauged by comparing 
commitments and implementation at a sectoral level. It is not only 
the content of the agreement, but its actual implementation which 
determines the scale of alignment with the acquis. So while the 
identical structure and headings in each of the Handbooks6 may 
give an impression of uniformity, the Handbooks actually highlight 
important differences. 
For example, at first, the Moldovan agreement seems less 
onerous than the Ukrainian DCFTA. Important differences are, inter 
alia, that approximation clauses in the area of competition and 
‘internal market treatment’ in the area of establishment of business 
are not foreseen under the Moldovan DCFTA. In addition, the 
provisions on trade-related energy and intellectual property rights 
are less detailed in the EU-Moldova agreement.  
However, the Moldovan agreement turns out to be very 
ambitious when it comes to agriculture and SPS. The scope of legal 
approximation in SPS is not specified in the Agreement itself. 
Instead, the Agreement left it to be agreed within three months after 
it enters into force. As is evident from comparing the three 
                                                        
6 The structure of the actual Agreements are not identical: for example, in 
Moldova’s Agreement, the DCFTA is the 5th chapter, while in Ukraine’s it is the 
4th. However, the Handbooks’ structure is identical. 
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Handbooks, Moldova has, like Georgia and Ukraine, adopted a 
maximalist approach to the SPS sector. The list was worked out in 
2015 and jointly adopted at a meeting of the SPS in June 2016. As 
argued above, this staggered, country-specific approach to legal 
approximation is eminently sensible given the sheer scale of this 
sector and its importance for all the countries. Moldova’s list of SPS 
legislation is very ambitious, covering 235 EU directives and 
regulations (EU-Moldova Handbook, 1916: 65).7 Many of the 
directives relate to animal-based products, for which the adoption 
of SPS is the most onerous and costly, and yet the implementation 
periods are relatively short: up to five years (i.e. 2020). In a similar 
vein, Moldova adopted a very maximalist approach to 
approximating agriculture-related directives. Is it going to work? 
The Handbook notices that perhaps “Moldova has made too many 
commitments too fast” (EU-Moldova Handbook, p.176). Indeed, the 
excessively ambitious list may lead to implementation delays and 
failures, hence – in the longer term – weakening the resolve to 
implement the Agreement. 
As the reading of the EU-Georgia Handbook reveals, Georgia 
has been most cautious about commitments, but, once again, there 
are big differences between the sectors. As the EU-Georgia 
Handbook notes, Georgia undertook serious and, indeed, by post-
Soviet standards, an unprecedented, unilateral liberalisation of the 
economy. The country stands out amongst the post-Soviet states 
because Georgia implemented radical economic liberalisation in the 
2000s. This reduced corruption and created a favourable business 
environment – it is one of the very few success stories of this kind 
in the international arena, resulting in Georgia shooting up the 
global rankings.  
Georgia was not too keen on the DCFTA, favouring instead a 
simple, classic FTA. Yet the DCFTA was the only proposal on table. 
The elimination of tariffs means that there was not much left with 
regard to tariff liberalisation in EU-Georgia trade. In terms of 
regulatory frameworks, both Georgia’s geographical location as 
well as pre-DCFTA reforms account for the more limited demand 
for, and receptivity to, EU rules. Being further away from the EU 
                                                        
7 Ukraine has committed to implementing about 255 EU directives and 
regulations, and Georgia 272 acts. 
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and having weaker prospects for strong trade ties with the EU, 
Georgia has developed a regional commercial hub function. 
This domestic agenda shaped the content of the EU-Georgia 
Association Agreement, but not in a way that is easy to grasp for the 
non-specialist reader – it requires careful reading of hundreds of 
pages in the agreement. At first glance, the EU-Georgia Agreement 
has much in common with the two other agreements. But there are 
important differences, not only due to pre-DCFTA reforms, but also 
the underlying reform strategy pursued by the Georgian 
authorities. With de-regulation so vigorously pursued by Georgia 
for over a decade, any re-regulation is carefully evaluated, and if 
needed, opposed or at least slowed or watered down. For example, 
Georgia’s opening of its services market has gone beyond 
compliance with WTO commitments. While Ukraine has far-
reaching harmonisation requirements in the service sector (see EU-
Ukraine Handbook, 2016: 78-9), Georgia’s undertakings are rather 
vague – indeed, the Agreement does not strictly oblige Georgia to 
approximate the EU legislation and “the potential scope of further 
liberalisation is not specified in the Agreement” (EU-Georgia 
Handbook, 2016: 71).  
Georgia’s interest lies predominantly in reaching 
international – and not necessarily EU – standards per se. This 
explains the more cautious approach throughout the Georgian 
Handbook. For example, with regard to TBT, it is argued that “it is 
advisable to proceed with the approximation of EU technical 
regulations in a gradual and careful manner, taking into account the 
local production and trade structure of Georgia, as quick and 
careless approximation could result in trade-restrictive outcomes” 
(EU-Georgia Handbook, 2016: 57). Similar caution is evident in the 
SPS chapter of the Handbook. While the content of the agreements 
may not be significantly different, it is clear the Georgian DCFTA is 
not a ‘blueprint’ for reforms to the same extent as in Ukraine and 
Moldova, but more a stepping stone towards the West (especially in 
the context of diminished chances of NATO membership). 
In terms of ‘starting points’, it is clear that Georgia is an outlier 
amongst the post-Soviet countries, most of which persist with 
having complex and inconsistent regulatory frameworks. In 
Moldova, for example, “there are contradictions in the current 
Moldovan legislation, which obstruct EU entities from opening 
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representative offices, even if technically it was permissible from the 
first day of Moldova’s accession to the WTO [in 2001]” (EU-
Moldova Handbook 2016: 76). This means that over a decade and 
half, Moldova had been reluctant to revise its legislation in line with 
WTO commitments and it was only the EU’s pre-negotiation 
conditionality that triggered the process of modernisation of its 
regulatory framework in earnest. In many respects, the Moldovan 
economy still faces a real challenge of adjustment to competitive 
conditions, something Georgia already experienced in the 2000s. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen if, for example in the case of the 
service industry in Moldova, the DCFTA will result in greater 
compliance than the accession to the WTO. Overall, for Moldova 
and Ukraine, the agreements offer much more reform guidance and 
hence the demand for ‘reform templates’ is much stronger. The AA-
DCFTA provides both stimulus and obligation, i.e. a renewed 
impetus for domestic change and compliance.  
Challenges of implementation 
In each of their Parts, the Handbooks provide an overview of the 
implementation of the AA. Indeed, the picture is exceedingly 
complicated and requires sector-by-sector analysis. The Handbooks 
provide ample evidence of this being a process whereby the 
implementation of the DCFTA and sectoral commitments is 
strongly conditioned by the priorities, capacities and resources of 
the associated countries. In this way, the Handbooks reveal diverse 
implementation pathways. 
In Moldova and Georgia, the so-called ‘key 
recommendations’ issued by the EU prior to the launch of DCFTA 
negotiations provided a substantial impetus to legal approximation 
in certain areas, such as SPS. Paradoxically, while Ukraine was a 
frontrunner in terms of opening the negotiations first, the EU used 
the opening of negotiations as a ‘carrot’ to trigger pre-negotiation 
compliance in Moldova and Georgia (as well as Armenia). As a 
result, these countries became more advanced in some sectors than 
Ukraine.   
For all three countries, agriculture is a key economic sector. 
Yet the adoption of international standards for food safety has been 
slow and challenging. The Soviet system relied on the GOST-based 
system. Replacing it with EU standards has proven more complex 
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and difficult to achieve than expected in the post-Soviet countries 
(even those that made a commitment to move to a WTO-compliant 
system upon joining the WTO). The implementation of SPS remains 
a major challenge for all its partners. The implementation of the AA 
requires partner countries to bear significant economic and social 
costs, which governments cannot fail to take into account. But there 
is an underlying problem of vested interests and considerable 
inertia amongst state bureaucracies.8 In addition, institutional 
coordination is a particularly significant problem in these countries. 
State institutions in charge of food safety suffer from limited 
resources and administrative capacity, and a lack of modern 
technical equipment. While Moldova took a maximalist approach to 
SPS, the biggest and most urgent challenge to Moldova’s 
development is the adaptation of fragmented and isolated rural 
areas to the requirements of a modern economy.9 
Overall, the implementation is complicated by two 
interrelated factors. 
The first is the suitability of the acquis to serve as an 
appropriate blueprint for reforms in non-member states at a 
different stage of development. This suitability was already 
questioned during enlargement. As Grabbe (2003) pointed out, the 
EU’s rules were never designed as a development agenda for poorer 
countries; instead they are the results of negotiations, agreements 
and compromises between the member states on common rules for 
themselves developed in an incremental way over decades of 
European integration.  
This generates a pivotal (yet rarely confronted) question as to 
how the acquis, developed in the process of economic integration of 
EU member states, can be transferred selectively to non-member 
states to facilitate their participation in the internal market. Indeed, 
some Commission officials argued that in the neighbourhood 
context transferring the acquis wholesale would be unwise, 
unrealistic and – in some aspects – unaffordable (Dodini and 
Fantini, 2006; Herdina, 2007).  
                                                        
8 On the role of the oligarchs see, for example, Kononczuk et al., 2017. 
9 Interestingly, Moldova has made even more extensive commitments with 
regard to TBT. This is all the more surprising given the size of the country and 
its economic profile. 
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However, there is no theory of selective rules transfers in terms 
of impact both on the internal market and domestic change in non-
member states. This means that for the AA-DCTA countries, EU and 
domestic officials and experts are tasked with devising feasible and 
cost-effective pathways to implementation. The modes of 
implementation, and hence pace of integration with the EU, need to 
be worked out on a country-by-country, sector-by-sector basis. The 
Handbooks chart the emerging differences in the national 
approaches and the differentiated progress. 
The second issue is related to the very high costs of 
implementation in some of the sectors, such as SPS and 
environmental protection. Given the absence of the membership 
perspective, many scholars argue that the rules transfer should be 
preceded by carefully calculated cost-benefit analyses (see 
Kolesnichenko et al., 2008; Adarov and Havlik, 2016). The selective 
rules transfer allows the costs to be offset against the more 
immediate benefits in terms of increased exports. As was the case 
during enlargement, the AA-DCFTAs rely on deferred gratification: 
‘rule transfer now, benefits later’. In other words, they require the 
front-loading of costly and politically sensitive reforms.  
However, the value of aligning with the acquis differs from 
sector to sector, and – within sectors – between different issues. But 
this requires detailed knowledge of the acquis which is an inherently 
dynamic concept with no fixed-in-stone meaning and content 
(Magen, 2007). Yet partner countries have limited knowledge and 
capacity to make an informed assessment of the optimal sequence 
for legal approximation. Therefore, much guidance and assistance 
are needed from the EU during the implementation of an AA-
DCFTA. It is important to avoid the risk of overburdening the 
governments in some of the poorest countries in Europe with multi-
stranded, overambitious reforms. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, there has been very little comprehensive, deep 
regulatory impact assessment across different sectors.10 Therefore, 
                                                        
10 One example of an assessment of the costing of compliance with the 
environmental obligations of the AA-DCFTA is a study done within an 
assistance project to Ukraine (Semėnienė et al., 2014). Based on the experience 
in accession countries, it is estimated that for full environmental clean-up in 
line with the EU norms, the DCFTA countries would require public and private 
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unsurprisingly, as a rule, the Handbooks do not discuss the costs of 
implementation. 
This is especially important in the political and economic 
context of the eastern neighbourhood states. What are nominally 
technocratic issues in the EU can be highly consequential in 
distributive terms in partner countries. This is because of ‘dual’ 
realities: formal institutions that are captured by vested interests. 
Regulation of issues such as food safety standards, public 
procurement, anti-monopoly or state aid goes to the heart of the 
functioning of the political regime, especially where they are based 
on the principles of patronage and rents rather than the 
independence of regulating bodies. In each associated country, the 
implementation of the AA creates winners and losers, and it is the 
latter who tend to mobilise to block the implementation. 
Having said that, the EU can successfully guide reforms in 
non-members in a structured and sequenced way. Moldova’s 
notable achievement of visa liberalisation in 2014 – followed by 
Georgia and Ukraine in 2017 – demonstrates what can be achieved 
with a clear focus, prioritisation and targeted assistance, even with 
relatively limited resources.  
In recognition of these challenges, the EU-Ukraine Handbook 
soberly notes that “the Agreement, with its DCFTA, is no magic 
wand with which to cure Ukraine’s political system and economy 
of all their problems. However, its provisions do engage with a 
substantial part of Ukraine’s political and economic reform agenda” 
(EU-Ukraine Handbook, 2016: 3). This is an apt summary, given 
Ukraine’s long-standing lack of a reform agenda. 
*** 
Overall, the Handbooks offer a one-stop guide to the 
Association Agreements – the authors painstakingly analysed the 
incredibly complex Agreements to deliver a compact and accessible 
overview to all those who need to grasp their contents. The national 
teams also shed light on the salience of the content for domestic 
reforms. Even though the Handbooks are not meant to be read like 
a book, the reader who does so is rewarded with a panoramic 
                                                        
investment in the region of €1000 per capita, of which about 70% would be 
needed from public funding. 
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overview of the sheer scale and ambition of the AA-DCFTA. The 
Handbooks offer a plethora of pivotal insights into the Agreements 
while at the same time they throw up a number of important 
questions.  
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